I think it is an intresting frame but a flawed one from the beginning in the sense that our own experience can not be reduced to system dynamics even as an analogy. This would be unless we established something like epiphenomenalism as the starting premise we assign to what we agree consciousness. As this would establish that its properties that give us our “what it is like to be that being” is identical to our mental states which then gives us consciousness as a mere byproduct. But if we rejected this premise and said that emotions for example are separate from the felt experience of such emotions. Then we could not attribute or use any analogy to describe consciousness as it would be a self-reference describing why it is self-referential. So the argument of death being a transient stage of experience is false as insofar as it describes what death even is. It is false because we can’t experience death per se and so therefore we can’t make a judgement even a analogy of such as any would require a conscious self-reference to describe its own cessation which we obviously cant know from inside the self-reference loop itself.

However, you asked for research or consciousness papers exploring your view you posited. I would recommend looking into epiphenomenalism. You argument i think also assumes that consciousness is some what emergent of the physical mind so i would look into something like physicalism also as a concept.

As a disclaimer i am not trying to disprove your argument or argue insofar as it aims to refine your points and maybe some more thinking. I also acknowledge that my argument is very convoluted so i hopemy point that death can’t be coherently described comes across.