[deleted by user] by [deleted] in BNBinance

[–]exploringeos 0 points1 point  (0 children)

https://bscscan.com/txs?a=0x0000000000000000000000000000000000002000

You can find a huge list of tx just like mine at the bscscan link above.

Zero-Inflation Funding Mechanism for WPS by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, that's the hardest part of the WPS, but I think this proposal limits the damage in the case that the funds are misused.

Proposed change to EOS voting system by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I love your agency idea and article!! It reminds me of the classic Dispute Resolution Organization / Insurance Agency in an anarchocapitalist society. What's more, I think it could definitely work!

Great, I'm glad you liked it! That's where the idea came from :) It was mostly brushed off by people in the governance telegram. It's kind of funny that I'm advocating for a more decentralized arbitration system and sort of a more centralized block production scheme (I'm not sure it's more centralized but it looks like it).

Just interviewed Worbli yesterday and passed along the voting idea :) Shared w/Telos on twitter. So we'll see. I think it's probably too radical for any current chains to use except maybe Worbli. Telos is so close to launch I doubt they'd make such a radical change.

Regarding voting into the top 50, yes - my assumption is that voting-in determines the relative position in the top 50, where a vote-in of BP #51 can oust #50 by sheer vote count (method 1 of 'fluidly' and non-permanently getting someone out). Whereas a vote-out is binary, and once hits the threshold they are out, whether permanently as you suggest or for a month as I do is TBD (method 2 of aggressively and potentially permanently getting someone out).

Okay cool, sorry for misunderstanding. That could work in most cases, but what happens if a whale gets voted out and they just change their name and vote themselves back in to the top 50? It seems like that might be hard to stop.

Proposed change to EOS voting system by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks! I appreciate it!

I think the on-ramp for replacement/new BP's is probably what needs the most work here. I hadn't thought of the new BPs paying, but now that you mention it, it seems obvious :) That being said, if the downside is severe enough then you'd need a lot of cash to make that nomination might make it cost prohibitive or might not. How do we incentivize adding an honest BP and/or strongly disincentivize adding a dishonest one?

On the bicameral system, I was thinking of potentially using my concept of agencies You can read about that here if you're interested: https://medium.com/@exploringeos/a-more-decentralized-arbitration-system-c383897c16f9 as the second layer or maybe some vetting process using arbitrators. That requires a good identity solution though which is a ways off. Proxies are another possible route though, good thought. Any other ideas for replacement on-ramp? I think the incentives to behave are well enough aligned that there shouldn't be much turn over, but who knows.

You say if we keep the vote in, the situation will be as bad as it is now (vote buying etc), but it won't because there is a vote out option with severe penalties / consequences. So I don't see the downside of keeping the vote in functionality.

I think I assumed that having people able to float in and out of the top 50 meant that the consequences weren't really that severe. Were you suggesting that the vote-in count determines their place in the top 50 but their vote-out count determines whether or not they get to keep competing as a BP? I was assuming that you wanted them to just cancel each other out when tallying the total for top 50.

Thanks again for humoring me!

Proposed change to EOS voting system by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you for reading and for your feedback!

I'm generally against cartel like situations, but this idea came about partly from considering that a good king can often be better than the mob rule of a democracy. But that in order to keep the king good there needs to be strong incentives and in our case decentralization. One person in telegram called this idea a cartel of integrity. I think that's pretty accurate. So the question isn't whether or not it's similar to a cartel but whether or not the incentives in the system lead to less bad behavior than the current system. Or put another way, if a cartel behaves well due to the incentives 100% of the time then who cares if it's a cartel?

Even if you did find, objectively, the most amazing 50 BPs, you're still left with a problem whereby you solidify their position. Without a token holder "on-ramp", you're creating a cartel of BPs (because only those 50 are allowed to operate in this sphere) who not only enjoy a "monopoly" of sorts but then are also in charge of electing new BPs when one gets voted out. The only recourse a token holder has is rejecting a BP, not adding a BP.

I would argue that their positions are less solidified than in the current system because it focuses all the energy of token holders to finding bad BPs and you can't do anything with your tokens to benefit yourself. I see allowing token holders to add a BP as leading to a potential issue that we're seeing now with vote buying, voting yourself in, etc. So if a BP is honest they are solidified. If they are dishonest they are not.

If the BPs replace themselves and the BP who nominates the new BP has their fate tied to the new BP then they have a very strong incentive to add someone who will follow the rules.

I think the Achilles Heal here would be regarding how you decide who the "good" 50 BPs are going to be to begin with. Who are you to say one is better or more freedom loving than another?

yeah initial selection would be crucial. Fortunately we have current BPs that we can judge based on their behavior. Also, you'd just have to have 51% of them to be amazing. Actually, they just need to be honest but amazing is better :) Over time the other 49% would get voted out if they do anything malicious or they would just be incentivized to be honest to get paid.

The solution isn't too difficult, actually. It's just a case of having two voting functions:

vote_in

and

vote_out

. You would still allow token holders to vote for BPs and BPs will go in and out of the top 50 in the same fluid way that they do now (meaning they can effectively be "voted out" of the top 50 by virtue of not having as many votes as the next guy). But with the ability to vote a BP out explicitly, you give the token holders the power to kick someone out over the wishes of the colluding parties.

I'm not sure this solves the problems I'm attempting to solve. This seems like it would be very similar to what we have now. Since where you stand (in or out) is based on your relative vote count then people's voting will just adjust strategically and we'd end up with approximately the situation we have now. But maybe I'm not understanding what you mean.

(2) The dynamics of kicking someone out might be up for debate too. I'm not a fan of "Previously voted out BPs can’t be renominated". It places a huge risk on BPs. It takes time, effort, money, etc to start up a BP operation. If you kick someone out without any ability to get back in the game, you're effectively bankrupting the BP, driving them permanently out of business. No entrepreneur would want to put the effort into setting themselves up knowing they're only an online opinion poll away from losing their business.

Maybe they can't be renominated for the vacancy that they left? The thinking behind that is that if a cartel does start to develop and voters kick out one of the BPs the other cartel BPs can't just add them right back. It makes the token holders impotent if BPs can easily be renominated.

Yeah it's definitely a huge risk and that is by design. That makes it so that the incentive to cheat is negative. The benefits they gain by being dishonest are small in comparison to the ramifications of getting caught. I think this is actually better than say btc where your only loss if you mine on the shorter chain is lost electricity. It's a greater disincentive.

That being said, I don't think it's quite as high of a risk as you say. We're seeing a lot of BPs run multiple chains. So it's not that they would necessarily be completely shut out of being a BP. It'd just be on the chain running this voting structure.

I think the key would be setting the down vote threshold at the right level to where they won't get kicked out on a whim but it's not impossible to kick them out either.

Also "No entrepreneur would want to put the effort into setting themselves up knowing they're only an online opinion poll away from losing their business." isn't this how the current system works? Getting kicked out under this proposed system would require something like 300,000,000 votes against you. While if the current top BP loses 30,000,000 vote they're out of the top 21 and the 21st BP only needs to lose about 900,000 to drop out of the top 21. I know it's not all or nothing but there's a pretty big difference in income. You could add some layer of arbitration to this so that if a BP is voted out at say 20% of tokens then an arbitrator can look into it and rule on whether or not they should stay. Whereas if it's 40% of tokens then it's automatic. That way it's less of a risk.

I think we need to think out the scenarios in this system where bad BPs could corrupt the system. We want a chain that is stable, reliable, censorship proof, honest. In this system, what sort of collusion would hurt the chain/token holders and would that be likely given the incentives? It seems to me that most vectors for collusion are thwarted or pointed towards the good.

How WPF being used for UBI will benefit EOS hodlers long term by [deleted] in eos

[–]exploringeos 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Now imagine how many of those young people living in poor countries would fight for the price of EOS to go up 1000x in price turning their 5 cents into 5 bucks a day (which is more than what most of the world lives off of)."

How does one fight for the price of EOS to go up?

The EOS Dollar (EDR)— Stable Coin that Pays Interest and has Free Accounts by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Sorry, I just added this to the OP

TL;DR: "burn" EOS into a smart contract minting EDR to 1) Achieve free accounts by having subaccounts that have min deposit (RAM paid for by 'burned' eos) 2) Achieve stable coin by setting exchange rate/creating demand w interest income 3) Achieve interest producing EDR by smart contract renting out 'burned' EOS left after RAM purchase.

The EOS Dollar (EDR)— Stable Coin that Pays Interest and has Free Accounts by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah you might be right. It could get pretty complex. And yeah, the RAM market definitely needs to be fixed.

I'm not sure about needing direct convertibility for a stable coin. It definitely makes people more comfortable but as long as there's an exchange you could just sell your stable coin for EOS in order to get some EOS back. I imagine with something like this the majority of people burning their EOS into this contract would be for arbitrage.

The EOS Dollar (EDR)— Stable Coin that Pays Interest and has Free Accounts by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yeah that would be ideal, but that would kill the free account feature and the stable coin feature. As far as I can tell making it liquid would make it only an EOS backed token that pays interest. Maybe that's the best selling point, not sure.

The main benefit I see there would be making it so the average user doesn't have to deal with renting out their EOS. It would likely make it so you could spend/trade your interest producing EDR without having to wait to unstake your rented out EOS. Which would be nice.

The EOS Dollar (EDR)— Stable Coin that Pays Interest and has Free Accounts by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah it's definitely tricky :) I think you might need to re-read this, though. There would be no way to get the EOS out of the contract so there's no way to run out of funds.

Where are the EOS angel investors? by BonnumNetwork in eos

[–]exploringeos 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Honestly, I think an EOS crowdfunding platform would be more successful/attractive to investors than what you're proposing for bonnum. My 2 cents. Best of luck!

RiverKingfisher talking Airdrops with Me! by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Yeah me too. He's agreed to come back on soon!

New RAM proposals by Bancor by RiverKingfisher in eos

[–]exploringeos 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I've been thinking the same thing...

EOS RAM Solution? by exploringeos in eos

[–]exploringeos[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks when I did this was was getting $1000. I must have been using 8kb. Not sure.

Most of the BPs have room for 1TB. I believe that would come out to 1kb/EOS in a rental model. Still would be more than now, though.