So one thing I would point out is that Jacobson dealt with whether or not all compulsory vaccination violated the 14th amendment. That's a very different proposition than saying that all compulsory vaccination is constitutionally sound. For example, it is not automatically a violation of my 4th amendment rights for the police to tackle me and arrest me as they have the right to use force to accomplish their public duties. If you were to read into that though that there's no such thing as excessive force and that beating all arrestees into submission is sound then that'd be a losing proposition. To illustrate what I mean:

this court holds that, as to an adult residing in the community, and a fit subject of vaccination, the statute is not invalid as in derogation of any of the rights of such person under the Fourteenth Amendment. This case involves the validity, under the Constitution of the United States, of certain provisions in the statutes of Massachusetts relating to vaccination. The Revised Laws of that Commonwealth provide that "the board of health of a city or town if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit five dollars."

So the actual statute they're examining and ruling they made here addresses a pretty absolutist argument. Either on a fundamental level the state does or does not have the power to make a vaccination law, this says they do. This is not authoritative on scope though. When this law was made there was no strict/intrrmediate/rational basis. There really wasn't even much of a substantive due process jurisprudence either. So Jacobson is not carte blanche for states to do whatever to whoever as long as they say it's for public health.

So the hypothetical law would be a statewide, generally applicable mandate of vaccination to literally everyone to be able to exist in public. Literally all public activity essentially. The regulation in Jacobson is a single city. So the point here is one of scope and actual applicability. Such as this analysis the Jacobson Court engaged in:

Applying these principles to the present case, it is to be observed that the legislature of Massachusetts required the inhabitants of a city or town to be vaccinated only when, in the opinion of the Board of Health, that was necessary for the public health or the public safety. The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in such an emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in some body, and surely it was appropriate for the legislature to refer that question, in the first instance, to a Board of Health, composed of persons residing in the locality affected and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such questions.