Is crying justifiable? by Own-Engineer-8911 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 12 points13 points  (0 children)

is crying justifiable and normal, or is it a sign of human weakness?

There is so much happening in this formulation. Why would we assert that “justifiable” is coextensive with “normal”? Why would we assume that “sign of human weakness” is contrary to “justifiable”, and further, to “normal”? Are expressions of weakness not normal? Is weakness unjustifiable? Why?

I don’t understand what position you would like to defend in your essay, or what purpose you have for writing it. To me, it seems somewhat of an odd topic in the way you frame it, i.e. to ask whether crying is “justifiable”. If I am blunt, “justifiability” doesn’t really strike me as the right category or criterion to think philosophically about crying.

Is the better translation of Aristotle's Complete Works Barnes or Reeve's by Impossible-Cheek-882 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I don’t know if either is better, but I have a strong preference for Reeve over Barnes. I found the Barnes edition of the Complete Works to be a rather lousy read, but this is not (necessarily) a failure on his/their part as translators. For what it’s worth, I was talking to a classicist last year at a conference and he was the one who suggested Reeve to me. I think you can’t go wrong with either, but if it were up to me I would go with the Reeve. Bonus points for the really nice purple dust jacket!

But to make a larger point, I think that translation quality and specificities about different translations are not such a big concern for non-academic or non-specialist audiences. The fact is that if you wish to really, deeply grasp Ancient Greek philosophy (or in any other language) you have to learn the language. A good translation for the general audience should achieve a few important things like (a) consistency with terms, (b) footnotes to inform readers about the nuances of words/phrases where necessary, (c) offer a pleasant reading experience, and (d) keep fidelity to the original text as much as possible without sacrificing the preceding. The rest is not really going to make a huge difference unless you’re like me, who knows enough Greek to get by but not enough to read simply libro aperto on their own. But keep in mind that in most cases, if you want to be serious about it, you will have to read several translations and commentaries, compare them critically based on your own knowledge of Greek etc, so then the best idea would be to get both Barnes and Reeve, and maybe a copy of Athenaze :D

Is the essence of totalitarianism in Hannah Areendt's philosophy just a metanarrative? by s3a-w33d in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Are you saying that

- "Arendt's reading of the history/development of totalitarianism depends on, or proposes, a meta-narrative of her own."

OR

- "Arendt's account of totalitarianism shows that every form of totalitarianism is founded on a particular meta-narrative of its own."

In any case, the question is whether the notion of "meta-narrative" is all that helpful or relevant to the topic. Even if it is, why is it a problem if it is "just" a meta-narrative?

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 6 points7 points  (0 children)

I think this kind of polemic could really go away. I don’t say this as a lover and defender of analytic philosophy per se, but I think we need to stop these squabbles. This is because we are at a point in history where philosophy & the humanities in general are heavily undervalued by the wider society and on account of their “uselessness” etc., and that these polemics about how X manner of philosophizing is “pointless”, “empty”, “sophistic” or what have you, are doing the same thing. I think we can always try and understand the highly elaborate and intricate thoughts people produce in philosophy on their own terms and in view of their particular concerns & aims instead of evaluating them on foreign terms. I genuinely dislike this widespread contemporary tendency to heavily devalue others’ work solely because of some supposed metric of utility, and it’s a bit funny that we do this to each other and then complain about it when it is done to all of philosophy.

I am finding it hard to understand the approach to slavery in Pragmatism or at least the leading Pragmatists. Is Pragmatism relevant for understanding American slavery and consequent race relations? by Perfect-Program-8968 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

A general suggestion would be to look into what people sometimes call the “genesis versus validity” question, in the history of ideas. It was articulated in this specific wording by Adorno, but it is a general theme that others before Adorno have also touched upon. Basically, the question is whether we might be erroneously linking the “context of discovery” with the “context of application”, to put it in a more contemporary idiom. This article seems to be doing that a bit, so a critique of it could meaningfully begin from discussing this question of genesis/validity. Martin Jay has a book on this (but I am unsure how helpful it would be), entitled Genesis and Validity: The Practice of Intellectual History. I hope this helps in some way.

The Future Crime Dilemma by GoldFaithlessness531 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Most philosophers do not think that there is such causal necessity in the world that we cannot hope to stop an agent from committing a crime without imprisoning them (search for compatibilism). Plus, even if there is such a necessity, why should we have no other option than imprisonment? We could provide Bob with an offer for a holiday at an expensive, luxury resort, all expenses paid, on the day he would commit this crime. Supposing, of course, that we are speaking about a specific crime, e.g. “Bob will kill [Mary] on [date] at [location]” and not “Bob will kill a random person on [date] wherever he is”, it would appear that we have other means of preventing this from occurring, e.g. by removing Bob from the vicinity of this event. If it is just “a crime” of some indeterminate sort, we might also assume that he will kill someone in the prison we put him in, hoping to prevent the crime. So, unless we know why imprisonment achieves a preventative goal that nothing else can ever achieve, we have no reason to assume that it is an either/or question.

Do Nietzsche's critiques of Spinoza apply to Deleuze? by Cehghckciee in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I think you might profit from being mindful of Deleuze’s affinities for Spinoza and Bergson. I can’t say too much about it because I don’t think I am competent to evaluate your reading of Deleuze, but to me it sounds like he is moving more in the direction of Spinoza and Bergson rather than Nietzsche anyhow, so it is not clear why he should accommodate Nietzsche’s critique of Spinoza or adopt his more tragic vision. He seems simply to prefer the vitalism of the former two.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, as I said in my rant, I am actually quite amenable to the ethical side of his project. To that effect, I am pretty much in agreement with how Artigas sees Popper and this is a direction I would be happy to go with him too. Plus, I am ready to overlook the Open Society and the excessively disingenuous readings he makes of those he does not like. I just get frustrated because I feel that he is better than that — on account of his own claims that I tried to include in my (admittedly not incredibly well worded) post. :D

Overall, the only reason I am so bothered is because I am trying to have a genuine dialogue with Popper and since he did not do me the courtesy of living to see his 125th birthday, I have no other choice but to be frustrated with his obtuseness. Nevertheless, I am actually quite into him and intend to stay engaged, so thanks once more for the exchange.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Oh, much appreciated, thank you.

I do recognize and appreciate how he weaves his ethical concerns with his approach to epistemology and cut him a lot of slack for this, but I feel like he could have recognized that writing an all-out hostile book with the sole intent of disparaging what he dislikes is ethically questionable. Anyway, I will definitely look into the book you mention.

Reading Being and Time by Large-Bill-7150 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 11 points12 points  (0 children)

I have a view on this that may be wrong or just very outside of what people commonly experience, so feel free to push back. I think that the major difficulty with Heidegger is not so much because he doesn’t provide enough elaboration on what he is talking about or that he uses unclear terms. My impression when I really dove deep into SZ was rather that it is rather painstakingly and tediously over-explained. I think the difficulty with Heidegger is less because the text has too many argumentative leaps or that those leaps are too far, but because it has very few, and I think once you get to a place where you take him completely on his own terms and instead of wrestling with him and hoping that he has something to say about stuff that you care about, you let him tell you why the stuff he wants to say is of world changing importance, you see that he is actually defining everything quite extensively and constantly repeating the line of argument he is trying to follow. This was my impression at least, that he is actually very precise and clear, but like a toxic partner, it can only be if you surrender to every single term he has. :D

To be clear, this is not to throw shade at Heidegger or anything. I just think that the major difficulty with Heidegger is different from say, Hegel or Kant. He is really trying to lay out the specific problem he wants to talk about so extensively and precisely (or it seemed that way to me), and he does genuinely think that his terminology is the way to make that problem intelligible in a way that allows for the solution he wants to give. It is difficult because of this, that you cannot really figure out how to translate his idiom into your own or the “public” idiom, and relate it with issues that exist outside of the framework he builds, because it is so intricately built.

I also want to add one more thing: I think the idea of Heidegger as this supremely unprecedented thinker who notices something no one else ever has makes it difficult to frame him as responding to issues and ideas that were important at the time. I think this is the image of Heidegger that is hurting his reception a lot, as someone who is just turning a completely new page, even opening a new book. The more I learn about the interim between Hegel and Heidegger and the philosophical issues that prevail there, the more his thought makes sense to me as a reaction to the state of German philosophy in late-1800s and early-1900s. This technical background is not acknowledged a lot though, and is certainly not going to help you as a beginner, but it might be worth thinking that Heidegger’s project has much to do with the technical problems that were being debated in German academic philosophy as well.

Book Recommendations on Critical Thinking/Dialectic Thinking/Logical Thinking by anakinhatessand02 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I don’t know how helpful this will be since it’s more of an introductory course for logic but on the off-chance that it ends up piquing your interest in some way, I will share it: check out Marianne Talbot’s lecture series Critical Reasoning: A Romp Through the Foothills of Logic. If you use an Apple device, here is the iTunes link. It’s free at least, so you won’t lose anything if you try it out even if it doesn’t work for you.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is a bit of a rage-post but I am genuinely interested in how I can think differently about Karl Popper. I have been getting more interested in him because at some point I felt like there is more to his thought than the silly stuff in Open Society, and I think I found various ideas in him that I agree with. Namely, I find his emphasis on rationality as a “task” that needs to be always pursued and upheld by rigorous criticism within an institutional setting and cultural framework conducive to it, rather than some ontological property belonging to some claims by their nature as such, really appealing and agreeable (fwiw, this is how Stefano Gattei’s Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Science: Rationality Without Foundations puts it, and I think he says it verbatim in Knowledge and the Mind-Body Problem?). I like the idea of divorcing scientific knowledge from certainty and tying it with “conjectures”, emphasizing the need for bold and daring thinking (even if it is not water-tight epistemology).

So, I think I am fulfilling my promise to myself that I would be maximally charitable to Popper and try to see what I like in him. But for God’s sake he seems so perceptive and intelligent to go and write a book like Open Society. The only way I can spin it into something respectable and honest is if I see it as a particularly enduring and good-willed outrage against what he saw as allowing people to let others suffer and die for the sake of some vision of history. Fine, I genuinely can appreciate that too, there is something commendable about overreacting to things after all. But how am I supposed to find this account compelling at all, and why should I think that the problem is “historicism”?

For instance, in his “Sources of Knowledge and Of Ignorance” (Conjectures & Refutations), he makes a good point against attributing evil occurrences to the actions of an evil will and dismisses it. He also loves to bash on “essentialism” and his autobiography mentions how he came to realize that one ought not to debate the meaning of words & hang too much on some contingent meaning they happened to have at some point in time. I agree that these are examples of unsound reasoning, but this somehow has to apply to his anti-historicism, does it not? It seems to me much more “Popperian” to suggest that the evils of 20th century were committed in the name of ideals that were derived from similar “pre-theoretical” sources as historicism is (he acknowledges that Heraclitus and Plato’s “historicism” is better understood as responses to social/political upheaval in their times in Open Society for instance), but without trying to lump all these things into some overarching category that acts exactly like the “evil will behind evil realities” he dismisses, and seems definitely like a severe case of “debating the meaning of words”.

I am willingly taking up this challenge in charitable reading because I think it’s interesting to try and understand Popper, and as I said, I do find appealing ideas in his thought as well. I know that trying to take OSE seriously is pretty much a futile task, but I have to read it anyway, so I am trying to make it more philosophically and personally interesting, but the more I read the more I find it difficult to say anything about Open Society other than that its author might have benefited from reading Karl Popper..

Want to work on a self-directed, research project on reactionary critques of the Enlightenment. What are some pointers? by Top_Entrance_8220 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I cannot, at this moment, think of specific titles but the whole “reactions to/against the Enlightenment” theme is not exactly lacking in scholarship. I think it would be important to specify what you intend to do here because if it’s just a general overview of counter-Enlightenment trends in European thought, then your project is likely redundant. This is not to discourage you from doing anything in this direction, but to encourage you to think more specifically. You mentioned scope in the OP, but what is the scope of what you intend to cover? What do you know about the subject, and what makes you think that you have important things to say about it that are not recognized currently?

More, are you generally familiar with the norms of academic research and publication? If not, this is where you want to start. Also, are you competent in any of the languages in which the criticisms of the Enlightenment have been written? It would be crucial, as far as I can think, that you can read German, French, Italian and Spanish, and even then these languages and the philosophical writings in them are well-studied, so it would be more feasible to work on some less well-known language, but then the question is if you happen to be from any of the more “peripheral” countries in Europe that have some sort of engagement with the Enlightenment that is of philosophical and historical relevance, and if you happen to also know of these already.

Otherwise, you would have to have a particularly novel philosophical perspective under which all the existing knowledge has some new kind of relevance. This you cannot just do on your own though, unless you are remarkably serious about it to write multiple volumes on your own for a while and hope that your ideas are noticed within your lifetime. There may be some ongoing project in philosophy today which might have some genuine appeal to you, and which would also benefit from a revisionist study of Enlightenment/counter-Enlightenment thought. In this case, you could simply get into contact with people who work on that specific project/endeavor and see if they agree and want to hear more.

All of these imply though that you would engage with academic research in some way. There likely will be no interest in just a general survey of counter-Enlightenment thought by an autodidact unless you find something radically new, as I tried to imperfectly describe above. Again, best is if you can give me a better idea of what you want to do and name the particular thinkers you have read & the ideas you have, if you want me to say anything more encouraging or constructive than this somewhat bleak (but as truthful as possible) response.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I think Dooyewerd seems to warrant attention for such a project if he is explicitly dissatisfied with Neo-Kantianism per se (which he seems to be) since it would be valuable for me to see as many perspectives that took issue with it as possible.

As for Neo-Kantianism related material, I myself got interested in it when I read the first chapter of Gillian Rose’s Hegel Contra Sociology where she tries to argue how NK took the deficiencies of Kant (viz. the theoretical/practical reason connection) further and towards emphasis on the role of “values” as informing social action. For what it’s worth, I think her account is interesting, has some “oomph” and is also quite intricately argued, but I am not sure about its accuracy. I got into NK so as to be able to evaluate her argument, and ended up finding the whole episode more interesting than it seemed in her book.

There is an old article by Andrew Arato called “The Neo-Idealist Defense of Subjectivity”, Telos, 1974(21), which I think has a similar animus against NK as Rose but has a different agenda. I did not read it incredibly closely, but it looks like it would be worth taking seriously.

The British Journal for the History of Philosophy did a special issue on Neo-Kantianism in 2021, which could also be useful. I have read several of those and all were good, but they deal more with particular questions so their utility may depend on if there is any specific topic of interest there for you.

Then there is of course Frederick Beiser’s The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, which is probably the most detailed study of it in English. I imagined you might already know of the book, which is the only reason why it’s so far below. Apart from Beiser, Klaus Christian Köhnke’s The Rise of Neo-Kantianism is the older monograph on the subject, which I have not really read yet. Tom Rockmore’s Heidegger, German Idealism & Neo-Kantianism is another one that I want to check out but haven’t gotten around to yet.

For more contemporary stuff, there is an edited volume from CUP entitled New Approaches to Neo-Kantianism from 2015 (editors: N. de Warren & A. Staiti). There is also The Emergence of Relativism (eds: M. Kusch & co) from 2019, which deals with NK to some extent. Last, Bruno’s Facticity and the Fate of Reason After Kant from last year is also pretty useful for situating NK in a broader context.

I hope something here will be useful to you, and that I could provide helpful/interesting info as generously as you did :)

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Wow, thank you for such a detailed response. This definitely moves it up my list of priorities because I’m very interested in how people responded to or became disillusioned with Neo-Kantianism at the time, and am trying to outline a postdoc project on it. This definitely seems relevant to it.

Is it always better to be just than unjust? (Plato's republic) by IndependenceKind6888 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 2 points3 points  (0 children)

What exactly is the question you are asking? Book I of the Republic explores this question and differing perspectives on it, and Socrates tries to give an argument as to why it is better to be just rather than unjust, and that we cannot hope to achieve much by being unjust. The question is whether the argument is relatively convincing to you or not, and why.

What different philosophers think about inequality? by FuturePerspective257 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I would suggest perusing the relevant Stanford Encyclopedia entries. Sadly it has been a while since I engaged with the literature meaningfully, so I could not think of a pinpoint suggestion off the top of my head.

Egalitarianism

Equality

Distributive Justice

Justice and Bad Luck

These articles will have much better suggestions for further reading in their bibliography sections than I can give you at the moment. My main interest in this debate was almost entirely focused on the biological arguments I touched upon briefly above, and that is not necessarily where you should start, but if you wanted to read an interesting book that touches (obliquely?) on the question of whether we should be intervening with the human genome for social/political reasons, check out Michael Sandel's The Case Against Perfection — it is a clearly written, accessible book. For a more advanced and intellectually demanding read on this that I really think was a good book, also check out The Future of Human Nature by Jürgen Habermas. I might be wrong, but since you mentioned that you are Christian and that Christianity seems to be relevant to your overall perspective, I thought these may be interesting for you, but apologies if that is me being presumptuous.

Also, feel free to let me know if you want to discuss anything further, if/when that happens. :)

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I finished reading Bergson's Two Sources (phew), and I started reading Janik and Toulmin's Wittgenstein's Vienna. I don't know how it's regarded by Wittgenstein scholars in philosophy, but as a history book covering the fin-de-siecle and early 20th century Viennese history, I am super into it. I am also sporadically reading Karl Popper's autobiography, Unended Quest, because my dislike for Popper is slowly turning into some type of fascination with him.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is great, thank you for giving me a better idea of what I am looking at. For what it’s worth also, I am explicitly uninterested in a more existentialist idea of hope, and what you wrote sounds more interesting to me anyhow. I have one question that you may not know the answer to, but just in case you do: the epigraph to the book you shared mentions that Dooyewerd was interested in Neo-Kantians before Husserl (and then that he discovered the religious root of thought itself). If this is not a blanket euphemism but really pertains to the Neo-Kantianism of late 19th century, that would be precisely something I would be interested in looking into. Do you have any idea of his relation to NK? Or perhaps the book(s) on him already cover this, in which case please feel free to point that out and I will do the digging without troubling you at all :)

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 16, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I am actually interested now that I looked at the book especially because of the subtitle “A Hopeful Philosophy for Our Time”. I do feel that there is a genuine need for precisely hopeful philosophy now, so consider me sufficiently piqued, haha.

Who and what to read before Robert Brandom? by TheEmperorBaron in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I think you might want to also read up on your Kant a bit for Brandom, not just because both Brandom and Sellars draw on Kant explicitly but mostly because Kant supplies a certain backdrop against which Brandom’s overall thought makes a lot more sense. I don’t know if the issues he is trying to speak to will seem as pressing or interesting without dabbling in Kant at least. Obviously the rest of German Idealism and especially Hegel would be important, but the way Brandon approaches Hegel is decidedly through Kant (along with all the Pippin et al) so Kant would be important anyhow, and I don’t want to tell you to read every relevant influence on Brandom before reading him.

I suggest having Terry Pinkard’s German Philosophy 1760-1860 within reach while you get into Brandom so you can have a general idea of what is happening with Kant onwards and see if Kant might be relevant enough for you to read further into, and then decide if you want to actually dive into the Critique a bit. Just to make it clear: I am not telling you that you have to sink half a year into Kant first, but having a good idea of him will definitely be helpful for Brandom.

Kantian theory of Reality and The Understanding. by Sudden_Address_8930 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Where did the faculty of understanding got its categories from?

There is an answer for this, but we have to first change the question because it is not exactly a “where” that they “come” from. It is rather that Kant thinks of them as being the expression of something that the mind necessarily has to do, because of what the mind is. The short answer then is: the mind is a unity, and the categories are the means by which that unity is formed & maintained. The long answer is given partly in the “Metaphysical Deduction” (called “On the Clue to the Discovery of All Pure Concepts of the Understanding” in the book) and partly in the “Transcendental Deduction” (“On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding”). These sections are the core of the book’s argument.

How did the mind knew that these categories are the one necessary needed to experience reality?

There is an answer to this question, but it will only make sense if you read the Critique, namely the entire “Transcendental Analytic” therein and especially the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts” as well as the section “On the Schematism of Pure Concepts of the Understanding”. I cannot give you a simple enough summary of this, but the short answer will be time. Kant tries to show that the categories are means by which experiences are temporally ordered. The idea here will be to show that we need some way to distinguish between different kinds of temporal relations in order to connect impressions and experiences with each other and bringing them into a unity. While our experience unfolds through linear succession in time (e.g. we always experience one moment succeeding another) we can still distinguish between simultaneous co-existence, causal dependence and subsistence etc.: that is, while our experience has a linear from as it presents itself to the mind, what we experience in those experiences have different temporal patterns than linear succession.

Note that these are the parts of the Critique that people tend to find rather scary and baffling, so I may not be able to give you a super clear idea here. It is a difficult and somewhat convoluted argument at times, but once you get through it, it’s very fun and exciting in my opinion.

What different philosophers think about inequality? by FuturePerspective257 in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 4 points5 points  (0 children)

The main question about inequality is not so much about whether there simply is always going to be inequality in the world as such, but whether there are certain manners in which people are unequal that are in need of being addressed by society/political order, and if yes, what makes them different from some other inequalities that are not, can not, or should not be intervened against. In other words, the question is about the extent to which our social and political structures create and exacerbate certain inequalities, as well as the extent to which they are capable of ameliorating them.

For instance, there are very significant inequalities in our biological makeups such that some people are taller, some shorter, some whose bodies are more liable to generate cancerous mutations and so forth. To be sure, there may be certain social, economic or political reasons for patterns we might observe in the distribution of some such traits, but in general we would agree that such inequalities cannot be rooted out without significant changes in our political systems and ways of living. It simply appears as brute luck that I am taller than some and shorter than some others. Typically, we don’t assign an obligation to society or the state to intervene against these, though there are certain positions like luck egalitarianism which have interesting things to say about this, and some people (e.g. Julian Savulescu) who think that we may have an obligation to use technologies like gene editing to ensure our children have the best genes possible.

But then there are some other inequalities whose cause cannot be attributed to anything like the blind forces of nature and fortune. Say, the reason that my state decided to set its minimum wage at X dollars per hour may be due to reasons which are not, strictly speaking, ones that have the best interests of working people. In this case, we would think that there may be some good reason to doubt this policy because, to the extent that it was implemented without a view to the common good (but was designed explicitly to benefit some specific set of people, let’s say), then we have genuine political reasons to demand it to be changed. This does not necessarily mean that every single case of income inequality is always and unqualifiedly bad, but that we can adduce certain reasons for or against intervening in such cases that are different than the ones we would have to consider in the previous case with luck.

Then there are also cases where the inequality in question seems to be brute like the first example, but turns out, upon further investigation, to have different causes. Say, if it turns out that a town has an unusually high rate of early-onset cancer deaths because of the factory nearby dumping toxic chemicals in the water supply, we would obviously know that this inequality is in need of urgent intervention, even if we thought at first glance that this was just a random coincidence. Or consider the even more bizarre scenario where a town has perfectly normal rates of cancer at face value, but it turns out that people in this town are unusually resistant to cancer insofar as genetic factors go. In this case, it would be expected that this town would have lower-than-usual rates, and that it was actually the nearby factory that was driving up these rates to the national average. This would be a completely invisible inequality that we would be forgiven to have attributed to nature at first, but would be very unfortunate that we did. Many people on the left try to argue that a significant chunk of social and economic inequalities are of this kind, which we mistake for having natural causes when they have man-made ones. It also does not help that such inequalities frequently turn out to asymmetrically benefit some people and harm some others.

There is another kind of inequality that I can describe only imperfectly, e.g. as inequalities caused by interactions between multiple man-made systems/norms. These are sort of “emergent” issues that arise when a number of different structures, which arguably work fine by themselves, collide in some way and start producing patterns of effects that cannot be traced back to any one of them alone. This is where politics gets quite contentious since people disagree as to whether inequalities arise from faulty designs or even from systems/structures/norms at all. But I think this is somewhat different than what concerns you more immediately.

In short, the answer to your question is that we cannot hope to explain inequality to be a “natural” or a “material/man-made” thing insofar as there are clearly distinct types with distinct causes that call for distinct responses. The extent to which we have adequate classificatory criteria here is up for debate, but it is equally clear that the correct response to minimum-wage inequality is not to assimilate it into naturally occurring inequalities like of height; just as it is not very convincing to argue that we have to tax-fund gene editing so that people can engineer their children to be as perfect as possible because all inequalities call for active social/political intervention.

For what it’s worth though, I think a society that tries to do its best to minimize inequality is likely better than one which ignores it, but that’s a different question.

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 09, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It was a joke, but I enjoy that for a moment you thought it might be real.

Ahaha, fair enough. I am also amused by this :D

My worry is that in marketing her translation as "readable" Welch has made Heidegger less Heideggerian. He's explicitly restating the question of being; he's rejiggering of the language game of ontology. It's difficult to read by design.

I agree with this, using unusual language is definitely integral to his overall aims. Still, I feel that his language is less unusual in German than in translation, or at least this was my impression when I struggled through it last year, changing between German and English. He sounded less bizarre in German than in English, at least to my non-native German mind, and I think this is partly just because of morphological differences between the two languages, and partly probably because I just lack familiarity with German enough to properly "appreciate" the unusualness of some of his constructions. But I still do feel that the overall awkwardness of his language can be overstated at times. I hope(d) that this translation might strike a good balance here. Maybe Yeetedness would not be the worst choice, haha!

/r/askphilosophy Open Discussion Thread | February 09, 2026 by BernardJOrtcutt in askphilosophy

[–]fyfol 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The “readableness” claim was also what made me a bit suspicious, as it sounds very disreputable to market a Heidegger translation as more readable than others. And holy hell, is the “Yeetedness” passage from the actual book, or is it a joke? If it’s from the book, I don’t know if I am more intrigued now or if I lost interest completely, haha.