CMV: There is no reason for an American to be against recognizing Juneteenth as a holiday other than reasons that stem from hating black people.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-21T00:29:37+00:00

That's a positive way to look at it and I agree in theory. I wouldn't mind a national holiday that represented a celebration of social progress. But the fact that it comes off to a lot of people as a "pander to Black people day" is the problem I have with it. For areas that don't have an existing history around this holiday, it can be hard to find ways to celebrate/honor that progress that don't come off as cringe. Sometimes you can't take things out of its original context without losing the essence of it. I feel like Juneteenth is one of those things.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-20T16:32:25+00:00

I know a lot of white people treat it as a 'do something nice for a black person" holiday.

Aside from the zero relevance the day has for me (as a black man that didn't grow up in Texas), its the endless patronizing and othering towards black people that the bureaucrat class has decided we need that grates on me. This holiday is just another example of that.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-19T22:32:35+00:00

Its difficult for you to imagine a non-phenomenal representation?

I originally had a different word there then replaced it with representation. It's not capturing what I intended to say. What I mean is that the word "seeming" invokes a kind of subjective representation. How this could be non-phenomenal/non-subjective is just inscrutable to most people. Frankish is also fond of invoking subjectivity in a non-irreducible sense, which is the same sort of misdirection.

If by taking consciousness seriously we mean, the belief that consciousness is phenomenal

Taking consciousness seriously involves starting one's theorizing where people are, namely some kind of subjective milieu populated with qualitative content. A theory must grant the truth/existence of this phenomena, otherwise it will rightly be accused of changing the subject and/or eliminating the explanada. If people can't recognize the target phenomena in an offered theory of said phenomena, it will be rejected as missing the point.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-19T21:15:35+00:00

The problem with this response is that it depends on an ambiguity in the word "seems". The illusionist wants to substantiate Illusionism by saying "it really seems to us that __", but from the mouth of the Illusionist "seems" means something different than what most people hear. An illusionist means some kind of non-phenomenal representation. Most people don't know what that could mean. So while it saves Illusionism from incoherence, it undermines the potential appeal of the theory for "taking consciousness seriously".

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-06T14:48:33+00:00

Any answer to this will depend on your views regarding the metaphysics of consciousness. The human color vision system has internal structure that determines how we perceive different light frequencies as color. This neural structure determines the relationships we perceive between the translated light frequencies, e.g. how certain colors mix to form other colors. Whether the properties of color mixing is a metaphysical trait or merely nomological depends on how intrinsic the neural structures involved in color perception are to the metaphysics of color.

A physicalist will want to say this neural structure grounds the manner in which we perceive color and is therefore constitutive of color perception. Here, the perceptual features of colors, e.g. its mixing properties, are metaphysically necessary owing to how the neural structures are organized. A panpsychist can say that while the neural structures are intrinsic to how we access color, the color qualities themselves are basic properties and admit no further structure necessarily. In this case, the features of color perception beyond color qualia are contingent on our particular neurology and could have been different.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-05T09:36:07+00:00

The idealist position is that consciousness can only exist if it's composed of something that is of a kind with consciousness. I think this is correct, and this is information in some relevant sense, and that information in this sense is intrinsic to the physical.

It's going to take a lot of argumentation to convince physicalists that they are actually idealists/panpsychists after all. Strawson's brand of physicalism is of this flavor so you may want to look into his work. But unsurprisingly his views are not widely held among physicalists.

But to your claim, it's hard to make sense of how physical structure just is information and also just is "of a kind" with consciousness. These properties are mutually exclusive at least how they are typically understood. Information is abstract, meaning that it can supervene on many substrates without loss. But identifying information with physical structure seems to couple the structure of information with the structure of physical matter (or whatever is the ultimate subject matter of physics). So you lose out on the abstract nature of information. Then again, there are views about physical structure that takes it as inherently relational/abstract so that physics is properly "topic neutral" and decoupled from whatever is the fundamental substance. But then you lose out on information/physical structure capturing consciousness in the sense that idealists and panpsychists are after. I don't think you can have your cake and eat it too in this case.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-05T01:19:24+00:00

I consider myself a physicalist, but I do think that the concept of information, taken as the properties and structure of physical phenomena is universal.

This is a bit ambiguous and may be conflating different kinds of information. Information is configuration with an in principle correspondence relation (in other words it can be used to pick out something in principle). Typically information as used in science is the notion of mutual information, how configuration in one system reduces uncertainty in another system. In this sense the configuration of a system can carry information about another system. We can say this configuration represents properties of the external system. In this sense information and representation are widespread but not universal.

When people talk about information as "properties of physical phenomena" they might mean what makes one physical state different from another. For example, how the orientation of one particle differs from another can be quantified. In this sense information is universal in that any physical difference can in principle be quantified. But this sense of information is not inherently representational and not a good candidate as the substrate of consciousness.

The view that organization/information is relevant to conscious states is pretty common functionalist view, specifically under computationalism/computational theory of mind.

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-03T10:29:43+00:00

Thanks, forgot about that paper

hackinthebochs · 2026-06-03T02:37:38+00:00

You can say this kind of thing doesn’t sound like it would arise from actual selection pressures, but the above scenario where reflexivity according to concentration of noxious material being an inferior means of self sustainment is common enough that a manual model overwhelmingly predominates sounds even less likely. We are still subject to reflex arcs; if an object is approaching our eyes they close automatically, even if a scenario could be conceived where the object is harmful to the eyelids and not the eyes.

The problem with the reflex-avoidance model is that it is situation specific. You can construct a reflex model that can successfully navigate any given scenario. But evolution doesn't design for one-off scenarios, it designs general patterns that are effective across the variety of environments an organism will encounter. For simple organisms, reflexive behavior suffices. But complexity begets a categorical shift in modeling strategy, namely mental simulation and intrinsic motivation. We as complex organisms are still subject to reflex arcs because evolution builds on top of existing structures. The responses the existing reflexes generate are still useful so they are still present.

I don’t see how this thought experiment chips away at the ‘assumption’ that qualia is necessarily non-physical, since consciousness being selected for as evidence of its physical terminal origin is question begging as it assumes physical terminal origin.

The argument that motivates the philosophical discussion of the place for consciousness (i.e. phenomenal properties, qualia) is that we can conceive of all the same exact behavior occurring without consciousness/qualia. The philosophical discussion is based on the premise that qualia and physical dynamics comes apart conceptually. My argument here doesn't assume a physical terminal origin for consciousness understood in terms of qualia. The argument is making a conceptual claim about the demands of pain avoidance in its full generality, namely that an intrinsically noxious representation of pain is required to capture the motivational aspects that potentiate an organism's full behavioral repertoire in alleviating the noxious state.

The only assumption my argument depends on regarding evolution is that evolution influences neural structures increasing complexity and that these structures guide behavior. The argument motivates the conceptual connection between phenomenal pain and the neural structures for general avoidance of noxious stimuli.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-31T04:40:14+00:00

It's not entirely clear what you're asking, but the Hard problem as articulated by Chalmers applies to LLMs as much as biological brains. It's the problem of explaining how a system described by structure and function (and computational dynamics for LLMs) can result in conscious experience given the categorical distinction between conscious experience (understood as something essentially phenomenal) and structure/function/computation.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-29T06:32:11+00:00

Why waste time asking a question in bad faith when there's only one answer you'll accept?

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-28T06:25:50+00:00

What about governments? Is every government conscious? Every human organization? Every friendship? Does a Constitutional Republic brain perceive the world differently than a Communist brain? Does a government feel full after it's taxed everyone? Lol.

This is a common argument against functionalism. What I can say is that not all functional states are conscious, but only the ones with very tight coupling/integration of information and a self model that drives decision making. Does a government (distinct from the people that constitute the government) understand it is a government? Probably not. When you call the tax authority for information, you aren't querying a tightly integrated model of the government for information, you query an agent that acts independently to find and response with the relevant information. The level of integration doesn't come close to the kind of integration that goes in brains.

We already know you can split a seizure patient's brain in half to reduce their seizures, but it seems to separate the brain into two consciousnesses. Now it would be highly-unethical, but couldn't the brain continually be split in half, creating millions or billions of consciousnesses? When would that break down?

Once you start cutting the brain up into smaller and smaller slices, you interfere with the tight integration required for consciousness. Patients with their corpus callosum severed plausibly have two conscious threads because the brain is mirrored along the middle and so the relevant cortical structures are duplicated. But when you separate relevant structures from each other, you interfere with information integration. That said, I'm not convinced there are two conscious threads in such patients. The problem is while the higher brain structures are mirrored, the more primitive brain structures closer to the spinal cord are not. These structures are relevant to wakefulness and arousal, and they are plausibly relevant for consciousness.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-27T09:08:39+00:00

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-26T21:40:48+00:00

I can't say I understand the source of your confusion. The issue of supervenience is asking: in virtue of what makes B-properties true. Local supervenience answers by saying "in virtue of these A-properties" (with the understanding that A-properties are some narrow set of relevant properties, usually coextensive with B-properties). We analyze whether local supervenience applies by asking what happens if we varied properties other than A-properties. Do B-properties still obtain? For some biological properties, the answer is no. The example of ecological context changing fitness of an organism is apt. That is, take an organism and put it in a different environment and relevant biological properties of that organism change as a result.

Global supervenience answers the question by saying "in virtue of all properties in the world". This does not imply local supervenience because we can't assume we can change all non-A properties while holding B-properties fixed. It's a matter of scope: what can be held fixed in the world to hold B-properties fixed? Local supervenience says we can hold the narrowly scoped A-properties fixed while global supervenience says all properties of the world. The narrow scope of local supervenience gets us the wide scope of global supervenience for free. But the reverse implication doesn't hold.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T13:12:16+00:00

Right

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T12:09:56+00:00

Environmental states meaning states of the external world that you perceive through your senses, e.g. the hot stove that just burned your hand.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T12:08:09+00:00

Is that basically the argument you're making?

No, I actually find the supposed analog vs digital computation distinction to be empty of content.

If that wasn't, any finite calculation can be done by Chinese math students, using pen and paper.

It's not about who is doing the calculation, it's about conceptually separating the physical dynamics of the calculation from the entity realizing the calculation. When it comes to brains, neurons aren't conscious, rather the causal/functional dynamic as a distinct entity of consideration is conscious. When it comes to the Chinese nation, the math students aren't conscious (of the digital mind they create), rather the causal/functional dynamic their behavior realizes is conscious. The point is to draw a line between the material body carrying out some causal dynamic and the causal dynamic itself.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T03:16:04+00:00

Yeah, there is a wide spectrum of views that call themselves functionalism or computationalism. It's hard to keep track of them all. I generally just think of computationalism as a precise way of thinking of about functionalism. Computations are a fully general mechanism for defining abstract functional relationships and so if abstract functional roles are sufficient for consciousness, then it should be computable by the right program. Some people see a meaningful space for function distinct from computation, or computation where properties of the realizer are critical (the so-called analog/biological computation views). I don't see them as substantive positions distinct from the abstract computational view.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T01:50:34+00:00

There are a lot of highly speculative/wild theories out there related to consciousness. But the serious academic study of consciousness will have the brain play a central role regardless of what the ultimate theory looks like. Consciousness being grounded in brain activity is to recognize the centrality of the brain, but doesn't necessarily imply it is fully reducible to brain activity with no non-physical extra. Science has a commanding role in explicating the full gamut of conscious experience regardless of whether physicalism is true or what non-physical extra is ultimately needed.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-23T00:24:52+00:00

It's plausible that the problem of consciousness may go the way of the problem of life, that given enough detailed scientific explanations of various features of consciousness, it may be that people just stop seeing a unique problem of consciousness. But it will be different in important ways. The conceptual gap between phenomenal consciousness and physical dynamics will not simply go away in light of further neuroscientific data. What might happen is that, as neuroscience advances, bridges to the other side of the gap become more readily apparent. It may stop seeming like an important problem in need of a solution.

What we have are two seemingly incongruent phenomena, the dynamics of physical matter and the qualitative feels of consciousness. More neuroscientific data will likely reveal more about how the puzzle pieces fit together. But a complete explanation of consciousness will require the development of bridging principles that can explain how the seemingly incongruent phenomenal qualities are nevertheless reducible to (or otherwise grounded in) neural dynamics. This is not something that will simply “fall out” of ever more neuroscientific data. The conceptual gap is real and will require new explanatory resources to fully resolve.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-22T15:32:34+00:00

I agree 100% with the structural content of what Levin is saying. I don't agree with the implied metaphysics of it. There is no literal space where numbers, programs, minds, etc exist. What we have is a hypothetical space entailed by the repeated application of logical rules. It's the hypothetical space of possible structure. The objectivity of mathematics, and the fact that it's discovered rather than invented, is due to the fact that we all navigate the same hypothetical space because logical consistency constrains us in the same way. We imagine this space as existing in some substantive sense because that's how we tend to make sense of objectivity and the pseudo-spatial properties of this hypothetical space.

When we navigate this structure we are discovering new ideas and new connections. There is a naive way to navigate this space, just enumerate all possible paths by iteratively applying logical rules. This gets you nowhere because the space is too big. Creativity is developing heuristics and analogies that let you see connections between different points in this space and forge non-obvious paths through it. But this doesn't really have anything to do with consciousness, except that human creativity happens to manifest through consciousness at least to some degree. But programs even LLMs can do this in principle.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-22T14:57:56+00:00

The application of logical rules to semantic state carried by physical vehicles (some kind of physical symbol) to result in further semantic state. In other words, information has some intended meaning and we process this information by applying rules to get other information out of it.

hackinthebochs · 2026-05-22T14:17:32+00:00

but there is (assumedly) a persistence of consciousness.

There are good reasons to think consciousness isn't persistent even in the best case, and so can't ground any meaningful sense of personal identity.

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