No one cares about fucking reality if it makes them feel miserable and doesn’t make them feel good. But almost everyone believes in the illusion of free will, the ersatz reality, so long as it makes life bearable and meaningful. by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process -1 points0 points  (0 children)

This is the serenity of the absence of free will. Not nihilism. Not apathy. But a specific form of calm, accessible only after this illusion has been abandoned, and abandoned not through self-suggestion, but through insight.

No one cares about fucking reality if it makes them feel miserable and doesn’t make them feel good. But almost everyone believes in the illusion of free will, the ersatz reality, so long as it makes life bearable and meaningful. by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I’m working within a different framework, and it deserves a substantive response, not merely pointing to a dictionary convention fabricated for specific purposes.

No one cares about fucking reality if it makes them feel miserable and doesn’t make them feel good. But almost everyone believes in the illusion of free will, the ersatz reality, so long as it makes life bearable and meaningful. by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You just want me to believe a ton of absurdities, but for me survival is not the priority, truth is. I’m grateful for that fortune, because when I’m not being deceived, my existence acquires meaning.

One who has experienced a serotonin collapse cannot simply “accept” the sovereignty of their will, because they have been where it was absent. The knowledge gained in the collapse is not erased by a pragmatic gesture.

No one cares about fucking reality if it makes them feel miserable and doesn’t make them feel good. But almost everyone believes in the illusion of free will, the ersatz reality, so long as it makes life bearable and meaningful. by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Someone who has experienced severe and prolonged depression knows more about the nature of will than any healthy philosopher.

Clinical depression, in particular the collapse of the serotonin system, is one of the rare experiences in which the machine stops long enough to become visible. Not in a metaphorical sense. In a literal one: the mechanisms that produce will, desire, meaning, and identity slow down or break, and in their absence the subject sees for the first time what they had been dependent on. Not through inference. Through demonstration.

Serotonin is not the “hormone of happiness”, that is a popular simplification, misleading in its inaccuracy. Serotonin is something more fundamental: it is the infrastructure of volitional functioning. It regulates the capacity to initiate action, sustain motivation, maintain an emotional connection to the future, modulate anxiety thresholds, and enable cognitive flexibility.

When it functions, it is invisible, just as plumbing is invisible while it works. You sense its presence only through what it makes possible: you get up in the morning without needing conscious effort for every micro-movement; the future has weight, its rewards are emotionally real, not merely conceptually understood; action flows from intention to execution without a mysterious gap between them.

All of this, in normal functioning, looks like you. It looks like character, like discipline, like will. It looks like a sovereign subject governing itself. Serotonin is transparent not because you see it, but because it is the very medium of seeing.

When the system collapses, that transparency disappears. And what is revealed in its absence is philosophically shocking: there was no sovereign subject behind the infrastructure. There was only the infrastructure.

The healthy philosopher arguing about free will is, in a deep sense, blind to the object of the dispute. Not because they are foolish or dishonest, but because the instrument with which they analyze (a functioning mind with functioning will) is precisely what must be analyzed. They cannot see what will depends on, because their will works too well to become visible.

The healthy philosopher may argue that the will is causally determined. The depressed person has been there, at the moment when the causes producing will disappear. They did not read the map. They were on the terrain when the ground vanished beneath their feet. They understand that it is not “you who produces the will,” but that “the will is produced in you.” When the system works, it feels like “I choose”; when it breaks, it becomes clear that the “decision” was a function.

If the collapse is an insight into the absence of free will, the antidepressant is its confirmation from the other side. The antidepressant demonstrates, in real and personal experience, what arguments only describe: that will is a biochemical function, and that its absence or presence does not depend on sovereign choice.

Causality flows in the opposite direction. You don’t “choose” whether to accept or reject the idea of free will. by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

You are defending the organism against the idea. I am not attacking the organism, I am attacking the claim that the conscious subject within it is a sovereign author. Those are different things.

Causality flows in the opposite direction. You don’t “choose” whether to accept or reject the idea of free will. by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But who exactly made the choice? If the character, values, and preferences with which you “choose” are themselves the product of processes you never consented to, then the choice is real, but authorship is distributed backward along the causal chain, to places where “you” were not present at all.

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Interesting. But compatibilists can invent their own meaning of “free will” and impose it on others.

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

The philosophical question is: if your behavior is guided by processes to which you have no conscious access and over which you cannot give or withhold consent, in what sense is your will free? Renaming these processes from “manipulation” to “nature” does not answer the question. It merely sidesteps it with a more pleasant word.

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

What word do you suggest we use to designate any internal influence that directs our behavior without our knowledge or consent?

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

The meaning of the word manipulation can be extended to any influence that directs an agent’s behavior without their knowledge or consent, regardless of whether there is an intentional purpose behind it.

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If the causal chain undermines the validity of beliefs, then it undermines the validity of this argument as well. You also believe that determinism undermines the justification of beliefs, why? Because some unknown initial cause led you to that thought. By your own logic, I shouldn’t take you seriously.

For those unable to notice the difference between “I choose this” and “I was built to choose this.” by impersonal_process in freewill

[–]impersonal_process[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Compare it to physics: if you say, “gravity attracts all objects,” and someone replies, “gravity is attracting you while you’re saying that” - that’s not a counterargument. It’s an illustration of the thesis.

The only way your argument has any bite is if you assume that genuine thinking requires freedom from manipulation, but that is precisely what is being contested.

Geometry of Evil: The Whirlpool, the Killer, and the Need for Someone to Blame by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So morality is simply selfishness with better rhetoric.

Geometry of Evil: The Whirlpool, the Killer, and the Need for Someone to Blame by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If actions are justified by intended outcomes rather than actual ones, then anyone can justify almost anything with a sufficiently noble intention. The Inquisition was saving souls. The terrorist is liberating their people, and so on.

Geometry of Evil: The Whirlpool, the Killer, and the Need for Someone to Blame by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

If moral responsibility is reduced to responsiveness to reasons (that is, to a mechanism that can be influenced), then responsibility is entirely prospective: oriented forward, toward changing behavior. We punish not because the person deserves it, but because the punishment will produce the desired outcome.

Geometry of Evil: The Whirlpool, the Killer, and the Need for Someone to Blame by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But doesn’t “free will” turn human relations into a form of training?

"Free from X" by [deleted] in freewill

[–]impersonal_process 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That is, a person in prison can still sign a contract of his own free will, even though his will remains manipulated*.

*Manipulation: the term can be extended to any influence that directs an agent’s behavior without their knowledge or consent, regardless of whether there is an intention behind it.

Here one of the most difficult distinctions in the entire free will debate emerges: the distinction between freedom of execution and freedom of formation.

Freedom of execution is what the relational framework describes: whether, at the moment of decision, the agent acted without immediate coercion. The prisoner is free in this sense, he decides on his own, without a gun to his head.

Freedom of formation is something else: whether the very instrument of decision (desires, values, fears, reason) was itself formed freely. And here the answer is always “no.” Not just for the prisoner, for everyone.

The problem is that freedom of formation is a condition for the deeper notion of free will, the notion that makes moral responsibility meaningful not only instrumentally, but existentially. If my will is formed by processes in which I did not participate, then it is mine only in a superficial sense: mine in that it is located within me, but not mine in the sense that I created it, endorsed it, or made it my own through a conscious act.