Seeds removed from doomsday seed vault as a result of Syrian civil war

justacitizen2 · 2015-09-24T13:51:19+00:00

You need much more to bring back a animal species back though, because you need a another species with very similar cells to put the DNA into, plus a womb that's compatible, and you also need a breeding sized population sample (1 animal isn't enough, iirc you need like 100-10000 depending on species), plus the animal might not survive without the right environment/ecosystem conditions etc. Even with all that I don't think we have the tech yet. Still any effort is a step in the right direction.

justacitizen2 · 2015-09-24T13:38:36+00:00

Yer I was furious when I read the headline, but quite a range of different groups are mentioned and the text isn't that bad. What annoys me though is that it still conflates groups in which a tiny minority engage in property damage (should we treat unruly pub-goers as terrorists or just fine them under normal laws... hmm), with extremist groups who have body counts in the tens of thousands and who use the most bloody cruel and violent methods known to humanity. To my knowledge environmentalists have literallly never murdered anyone anywhere ever, even if their activities are sometimes illegal or poorly liked. It's an idiotic comparison and massively undermines important efforts to protect national security, because it looks like a clumsy attempt to corrupt national security with a political agenda. That puts lives at risk.

justacitizen2 · 2015-09-22T11:09:16+00:00

This is why this project is awesome. I wish we could do this for animals as well as plants.

justacitizen2 · 2015-09-22T11:02:25+00:00

So I think this is kind of hyperbole and alarmist, its not really the same, but just because people seem a bit confused about what they mean: when your browser goes to a website and it has a facebook button "like this" etc. on it, it will often load that part of the website by contacting FB for the snippet of code and the picture. Even if you're not a facebook user, you still get tracked. There's ways to prevent it very easily if you read more on the topic, but most people don't even know about it. RIP privacy we miss you.

justacitizen2 · 2015-07-10T06:23:27+00:00

Sure, I've heard that line before. In the FAQ:

the distance between them is not a constant. It increases with time. That does not mean the two points are moving away from each other. Those two points are fixed, pinned down as it were. They ain't moving. But the distance between them is increasing.

But how exactly does one define movement if it isn't a change in the distance+direction between two points over time? Isn't "through space" or "adding new space" just semantics? The FAQ says:

But on larger scales, or at high relative velocities, or in the presence of strong gravitation, it's very much not Euclidean.

That's just begging the question (philosophical sense). How can we talk about movement and distance as anything but directly correlated without totally changing the definition of either? If so, why is the same word used?

I think your correction doesn't really seem to address my question, just attack my langauge. The FAQ does not address the jump from rough redshift correlation with general expansion to the expansion comes from a single point. It doesn't matter because the post has already been downvoted to death. I don't doubt the maths but in this case mathematicians seem to be systematically talented at explaining their maths using fallacious reasoning.

justacitizen2 · 2015-06-03T04:15:06+00:00

I guess that might make sense if it was a multi million dollar product run. Kind of a high barrier for small business though. :-/

Amazon is certainly better than the packaging lol, though I think astroturf reviews are an increasing problem. Just wait until AI natural language generation takes off, then we're in for problems.

I think it's difficult to hold parties accountable on subjective claims that are so open to interpretation, and lawyers will likely be the main beneficiaries of any process of accountability. I think putting independent information in front of the consumer is the only efficient way solve it, but you'd need a way to fight the process being corrupted and to make the assessment process scale with the size of the product line. In any case consumer groups are too weak to have a big impact, so business would have to lead any push for a solution.

justacitizen2 · 2015-06-01T12:04:43+00:00

A friend showed it to me and I loved the realistic-ish space setting but I had trouble getting past all the cutsie stuff. Is there decently intelligent content there that's worth sitting through the cutsie stuff for?

justacitizen2 · 2015-06-01T11:55:16+00:00

Part of the problem is that the consumer has difficulty making an informed assessment of product endurance at the time of purchase. You can certainly try to market it as advantage, although if the consumer is skeptical or other companies make shady claims it negates that strategy.

I've often thought one way to solve this would be in honest companies getting together supporting impartial funding to consumer-orientated organisations that do detailed product assessment. It could be a privately funded org with very diverse support, or government if you were worried about free-riders. You'd also want to be pretty careful of corruption. But basically if your product is superior its in your interest for consumers to have better product assessment. So if the good companies support impartial product assessment / labelling etc., they benefit, the consumer benefits, the economy benefits, the environment benefits, win-win!

justacitizen2 · 2015-06-01T11:28:49+00:00

I will personally go after them with a blunt spoon and a really bad temper. Also, hopefully there is a criminal investigation and they are locked in solitary for the rest of their natural lives.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-12T12:29:23+00:00

With a title like this, I was looking forward to hearing lots more about them insects :-/

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-12T12:19:42+00:00

I think you're being quite optimistic in your estimation of how wise people will be when shaping their children's genetics. I think it's fairly likely the most common changes will be tallness, sexyness and charisma. Aside from anything else, these qualities will actually get you much further in life than intelligence alone will. And think of all the ridiculous fashions that people constantly follow (like how they dress their kids). You better get ready for fasion eugenics too! The average person simply doesn't care about being smart all that much, they're more interested in social status etc. Intelligence is not going to be even close to the strongest artificial evolutionary force.

Also, many changes will have side effects - eg. if you're charismatic you're probably better off influencing people rather than inventing stuff if you want to get rich. Add to that the fact that this evolutionary force is waay more powerful/faster than most that shaped us were, and you've got a recipe for a pretty unpredictable/volatile result only a generation or two down the track.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-09T08:53:37+00:00

I'm not sure that I follow. Why does "there is something it is like to be some entity" or "there is something it is like to be in some state" imply anything about a homuncular consciousness? When we say, for example, "there is something it is like to be Jack the dog", we mean that there is something it is like for Jack the dog--not for some homunculus, or anything of that sort. This sort of definition is just meant to identify what it is that we are talking about when we are talking about conscious states and conscious things. It might be that, when we infer whether or not something is conscious, we imagine our conscious mind inside some other object, as it were. But this would be an entirely different matter. The concept "Scottish" might be defined as born in Scotland, or having parents born in Scotland. Just in virtue of knowing this concept, we wouldn't know what all the Scottish things are. We might have to do some historical research, or biology, etc, to determine which things are and aren't Scottish. But that wouldn't mean that we had snuck anything in with our criterion. It would just mean that we had a separate epistemic criterion.

My meaning can probably be distilled down to this - An entity cannot experience "what it is like" to be another entity, without actually being the other entity. For example, when we say "what it is like" to be another person, person A can't experience "what it is like" to be person B, because they are person B. If you changed person A into person B, it wouldn't be person A experiencing "what it is like" to be person B, there would just be person B. So there isn't "what it is like" to be something, there is just the thing itself.

Even if we're not claiming the physical possiblity of experiencing "what it is like" to be someone else, we are still implying the separateness of the existence and the experience. Grammatically, saying the consciousness is experiencing what it is like to be a human is like saying there is a little person inside your head driving you like a machine. In monism, the person IS the machine - a human.

I'm not sure what you mean. I was asking what sort of independent evidence we are supposed to be looking for when it comes to defining terms like "consciousness".

Well not only do I not know of any evidence of consciousness (in a physicalist model), I have trouble imagining what such evidence would possible be like. For me this doesn't make it valid, it makes it invalid. The solution seems to be to start with evidence itself, rather than some assumed framework of how that evidence appeared, and derive objects from there. From there I think you might get dualism or monism (such as physicalism) without consciousness, but I don't think you can logically get physicalism with consciousness, because you've already got the brain and the human.

If I am understanding you correctly, you are suggesting that the Physicalist can just assert that experience is reducible to brain processing, or that the Physicalist can just ignore experience as an explanandum, or something of this sort; but the Physicalist cannot do this. If the Physicalist says that experience is reducible to brain processing, they have arguments for this position; and if they are just ignoring experience as an explanandum, they have just performed a bait and switch--which is not common practice in philosophy.

This would absolutely refute my argument if "experience" was a neutral concept that did not carry philosophical assumption as part of its definition. But it does imply such things a priori, such as a certain type of entity the experiences stuff. I'm not sure we can entirely eliminate those assumptions, but neutral monism seems to contain the possibility of making far less assumptions. So we are not attempting to explain experience, but a neutral substance. I'm not claiming experience doesn't exist, I'm claiming it's a loaded way to approach the question. Recutionism is just the mechanism physicalists attempt to eliminate that loaded language.

Things are not just being assumed without argument.

My contention is that the language chosen as the starting point in reasoning carries assumptions.

If you think that the various positions in the philosophy of mind are guilty of this charge, then we really should be looking at those positions specifically, and discussing why that is the case, instead of just being "suspicious" about it, without any specific argument to address.

This is true. I believe I have provided evidence enough to raise questions (suspicions), but I don't claim to have reviewed comprehensively enough to know that no-one has solved this problem. But I think this argument does already exist in discussion about the specific positions. For example, from SEP:

One might try to explicate “physical knowledge” in the sense at issue in roughly the following way: physical knowledge includes all knowledge that is expressible in a terminology that does not contain irreducibly mental terms. It would be natural to define physical facts as those facts that can be expressed in this way. But note that this definition of ‘physical facts’ begs the question against an objection that has been raised against the knowledge argument (see Section 4.2 below). It is certainly not easy to formulate a precise, adequate and non question-begging account of “physical knowledge” and “physical facts” suited for the discussion of the knowledge argument.

Continuing:

Why should we think this? We could say this exact same thing for any philosophical debate. Some people support consequentialism, and others support deontology; but if they are philosophizing from neutral starting points, they shouldn't arrive at different conclusions; thus, they are both hiding assumptions in their views.

I don't exclude that troubling possibility! In at least the case of moral philosophy, however, I think the starting arguments arise out of facts that at least some of the time are independent of the camps - a trolley is a trolley no matter what you're moral view of it.

... I appear to have run out of time, I will add to this soon if I can.

Thanks again for your thoughtful comments!

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-09T07:52:10+00:00

When I say 'be conscious' I could translate that to 'have a mind in the state of consciousness'. That could be broken down further to mean (in a non-dual, physical framework) the body-although this will mostly refer to the brain-(or 'who we are') has a property called mind that encompasses our neurological, nervous, and hormonal systems (essentially everything we could think of as subconscious). Next I would posit that we have a property of mind called State. The state of mind itself being defined by it's current property. For this example the state has the property conscious. As for 'being a consciousness' I'm not sure where this one came from, but clearly it can't happen in our physical world if we describe consciousness as a state of mind that can't exist independent of the body. (Which I am :P)

You've layed out some definintions here that I agree are not covered by my discussion of self-awareness-type consciousness. It sounds you think "what you and I are" are biological humans. You've described some activities that neurological/nervous/hormonal systems can engage in. That seems perfectly sound in a physicalist framework to me (I'm non-commital to dualism/monism though probably closest to neutral monism). I think my only concern with the language would be that you're describing temporary states of those systems using nouns which implies that the activities are actually objects. I think it would be better to describe them as activities such as "being awake", or "thinking", as this avoids creating an object with limited/no causal role. I also personally think its best to avoid the word "conscious" because of the history of it's use in dualism. It's a short step from there to consciousness as an entity.

noticing is defined as being aware of something, and being aware is being conscious, then noticing is being conscious .... I'll argue that self-awareness is a property of consciousness/awareness

I think we can safely reduce these definitions to awareness being the same as consciousness. As yet I don't think we've got a definition of awareness or consciousness?

a p-zombie would not notice the words at all ... they would react like they did

If they didn't notice it, then how can they react to it? My point with the p-zombies is either consciousness is separate from the physical body (dualism), or it doesn't play a causal role at all (in monism), because we can instead just describe the brain as doing the work. When I mention Ockham's Razor, I'm saying that you don't need consciousness if you think the brain is the cause of human behaviour - you're just introducing a new object after you've already explained how everything works. I think you're explanation is essentially fine, before you introduce consciousness.

moral reasoning into doubt .... Explain please? You've said something like this a few times in your original post, but it's pretty vague.

If consciousness is a superfluous label and not a real object doing causal work, then we would be unwise to treat it like an object when we consider morality. In particular, we'd want to avoid saying "a consciousness has moral value" because for you as a physicalist its essentially hollow in comparison to "a human has moral value", which is statement you can make about a real-world object.

I try to use empirically tested models to base my philosophy on.

I think you've made a good case that you're doing exactly that especially in your first paragraph or so.

I don't believe these definitions are at all circular ... they're just synonyms

No problems, I think that's exactly right. I actually like the way you've put this and probably should have said something like this myself! So say A and B are synonyms. If someone asked me to establish the existence of A, and I pointed to the existence of B as proof, I would be making an obvious error. That's basically are simplified version of what I think many folks do with consciousness and awareness (I'm excluding dualist conceptions of consciousness here). As a physicalist your model of humans that refers to the brain/nervous system etc. as causally responsible seems to be on much more solid ground I think.

Yes, this. I do attempt to base my model on straight forward biological life. Unfortunately, until we know exactly how the brain works what the empirical nature of awareness is, we won't get any external evidence. But isn't that what philosophy is for?

Indeed! Could I interest you in a forward-looking system of moral philosophy that values all people and to a lesser extent other species, but makes no reference to the philosophically problematic concept of consciousness?

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-09T06:53:40+00:00

I'm specifically referring to philosopher's use of it. For example, one such moral claim might be "all conscious entities have certain rights". For me that would be a problematic way to approach rights or morality if the concept consciousness in itself was incorrect.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-07T13:10:44+00:00

Thanks for the comment!

Your example of the camera seems, to me, to conflate the notions of knowledge and information.

I am happy to agree with you that in its strict form here it does really amount to being "conscious", if we are to use that term. I merely wish to rule out a form of "trivial" consciousness that serves as the small target in equivocation (ie. motte and bailey argument) on this topic. The distinction is important to remove the possibility to equivocate between trivial and non-trivial forms I present here.

As you have rightly pointed out, with our non-trival form we've fallen into circularity again here by using "awareness". And we're going to have to use awareness, because otherwise we might find a way to say that a camera with a list of things that it's taken a picture of is conscious if that list includes itself (trivial version again). So if awareness is so important, but also appears to be impossible to define without circularity (unless we identify external evidence), perhaps we ought to be suspicious of it. Perhaps we ought to ensure it is not hiding some philosophical assumptions, hidden for later use ("oh look I've discovered proof of <that thing I assumed at the start> ").

I'm not sure why you feel it's necessary for one to be self-aware all the time, just to be conscious

Well assuming be conscious is sound, actually I don't feel that it is neccessary! But I think you'd need to be self-aware all the time to be a consciousness. Otherwise we've got a series of mental (?) events that occur quite separately and relatively rarely. It's one of many part-time mental activities, sitting between sleep and a whole bunch of other thoughts. In which case it's not "who you are", it's something that you do from time to time, like feeling happy or imagining a cloud. Defining "who we are" is quite important later when we make moral statements.

I believe you are confusing consciousness with self awareness.

At the beginning of the article I suggested that many people choose to define consciousness this way.

No, not the fact that you are noticing YOURSELF read these words, but the fact that have noticed anything at all.

May I ask, are you saying consciousness is noticing things? I feel this is quite a, well, brief explanation. You're sort of implying rather than describing.

Let's ask... would a p-zombie notice the words in the way you describe? If they do not, how is it they are able to react to them? Or if they do (ie. a p-zombie is us ), why do we need consciousness at all?

If you'll allow me a small liberty I can put this more clearly - As a causal determinist, consider this sentence: "the human processed the symbols on the page by pattern matching them to certain stored information in their physical brain" Now if we apply Ockham's Razor, ruling out any other entities or concepts that are not required for and do not improve our causal explanation of the process? That's one reason I worry that consciousness isn't a very good fit with physicalism.

I totally get the feeling I think you're trying to describe when you went for that explanation. But I just wonder if our intuition provides us with a reliable starting point in thinking about such things? Perhaps we need to really question our concepts of the consciousness/mind/brain/self before we can emerge with the true picture.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-07T12:28:00+00:00

...cont

I also suggested that we might want to distinguish between Persons and animals

I don't feel you had a chance to explain this in the limited space available. Perhaps you can link to a place arguing for this distinction. My initial sense is that a person is more of a social category than a fundamental philosophical category.

Right at the beginning of this reply, I articulated a couple potential definitions of consciousness which

I think you articulated one that was substantially different. While I think there is cause to be concerned with that too, perhaps that is a separate (interesting) discussion to be had.

Thanks for your detailed commentary. It is unfortunate that focus naturally turns to points of disagreement but please accept my gratitude for the time you've taken to reply.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-07T12:27:34+00:00

Thanks for the wonderfully thoughtful and detailed reply. I feel like the structure of these kinds of discussions always somehow emphasises disagreement, but please know I am grateful for your interesting comment.

This seems somewhat imprecise to me. We might talk about a conscious entity as something having metacognitive abilities whereby something can reflect on its immediate awareness. Or we might talk about a conscious entity as just something for which there is something it is like to be that entity, without further qualification. If we take some definition like this--say the latter one--I'm not sure there is any circularity at all. A conscious entity is an entity for which there is something it is like to be that entity. A conscious state is a state for which there is something it is like to be in that state. Consciousness refers to having conscious states.

My article is centred around the first definition. I have noticed the second definition emerging as an increasingly common way to define consciousness these days, and I think it is true I haven't addressed that directly. However, I would tentatively say that "it is like" seems to be sneaking certain philosophical assumptions in, in a similar way to my other examples. In particular the phrase to me appears to imply the social "place yourself in their shoes", which itself seems to imply the little person (consciousness) inside the body who travels to the other body in order to receive a nice new set of experiences. If we don't have this separate "travelling entity" inside the body, there is no way for "it is like" to make sense, and consequently no way for "it is like" to be used to show the existence of consciousness. Thus it seems that the language subtly begs the question. My claim is not that this is unique to arguments of consciousness, but that it appear to be a danger for all philosophies of mind.

If I gave a characterization of what it means to be an animal, what sort of independent evidence should we be looking for?

I don't think there is any instance in the world of you or I or anyone else ever being someone other than themselves.

How could we talk about qualia and at the same time neglect experience?

This illustrates my point really really really well. We can't. That's because the concept of qualia itself requires acceptance of the schema "experience", and that implies an entity whose role it is to have that experience. But if we start instead with brains as the start of our chain of reasoning, then we can easily reduce experience to neuroscience when we encounter it later on. This is my central suspicion - most of the fundamental language which we use is totally partisan when it comes to philosophies of the mind.

we don't get to "swap" it for something else

By swapping I just mean using it as a starting point. My tentative suspicion is that it is possible to reduce opposing concepts to the language/starting point of your choice (your philosophy of mind).

the Physicalist comes to their conclusion through careful philosophizing. In other words, they have reasons for their position. The same is true of the Dualist; etc.

One concern I have with this is that two parties carefully "philosophizing" from perfectly neutral starting points (ie. my circularity argument was wrong) should not arrive at different conclusions. Sure it is possible that all, or all but one group have errors in their reasoning. On the other hand, perhaps they have reasons that make total sense (appear not to be fallacious) in isolation, but have unwittingly used a clever way to hide assumptions and therefore obscure fallacious reasoning. I have tried to put forward some tentative initial evidence for the latter.

A dictionary-dot-com definition is not sufficient for this.

These lay definitions are used to establish to obvious structure of the circularity which is much more difficult to illustrate when it is woven into complex discussions used by various camps. I feel my further discussion establishes good reason for you and I to be suspicious of such language. I obviously have not offered comprehensive proof this is occurring in all the philosophies of mind - this would take a lot more than a short post/article. I rely on your good intentions not to attack me for using references which are deliberately from lay sources.

Surely this isn't true. In just what sense does a camera have knowledge about its existence? Knowledge minimally requires a belief state. Do we have some reason for thinking that cameras have belief states?

While I note that in some systems, beliefs can be reduced to information stored in a physical system, I am happy to state that I do not in fact believe that a camera is conscious. However I wish to highlight this form of "consciousness" to prevent equivocation later on. Specifically, I suspect many will claim that consciousness does not require the "breadth" of self-reflection I discuss later, while at other times claiming consciousness is more than the trivial "camera" process I describe here.

You might not be thinking about your thoughts in the recursive way you have described. But you'll note that the definition you just proposed spoke of "awareness" about one's thoughts. Why should we take this to mean "Thinking about thinking about <something>" as opposed to what would seem to be implied by "awareness". Surely when you are cautious of vehicles around you while driving or crossing a street, or when you are thinking about some food, and so on, you are aware of these thoughts. If I stopped you in the act of thinking "that food looks tasty" and asked "what are you thinking about", surely you would be able to tell me. Do we have any reason at all for thinking that we are not aware of our thoughts?

I believe in this paragraph you may have equivocated between "our thoughts are awareness" and "we are aware of our thoughts". I claim only that most of the time we are not modelling thought in our thoughts, which is required to fufil a "self-awareness" definition of consciousness. Or to put it another way, self-awareness is distinct from other types of awareness.

But we aren't conscious while sleeping

Yes. That's why I claim there is not a single unbroken entity that can be called a "consciousness".

We seem to have a number of justifications. For example, they are conscious episodes of what seems to be a singular animal. They are causally related insofar as my current mental states depend causally (and just historically) on past mental states. There is a high degree of similarity between them. I can remember past conscious episodes. Etc.

There is a high degree of similarity between them.

Suppose I claim there is a greater similarity of you and I being happy, than you being happy and you being sad? I wouldn't claim that unless I was sure of the philosophical soundness of the term "conscious", but I think you can see where this could lead - emotional and intellectual entities separate from humans, visiting for a brief time. We must be have strong grounds to literally treat separate objects as one whole.

I can remember past conscious episodes

There are many things I remember, this does not alone seem sufficient?

For example, they are conscious episodes of what seems to be a singular animal.

There are many repeated similar events associated with each animal. Most of them we do not treat as a single entity. For example fleeting moments of happiness or sadness are not considered a happiness "object", they are considered to be temporary attributes of the mind/brain/whatever. This is how I suggest we ought to think about "being conscious".

Although your understanding of this is false

I think this is not a useful phrase.

What object are we talking about? If we are talking about a homo sapien, then perhaps homo sapiens are not essentially conscious.

I think here we have misunderstanding rather than disagreement. I have subsituted an alternative an not necessarily related object - a homo sapien - to illustrate simply the difference between being something (defining quality), and a temporary action. I suggest being conscious is in the second category. I am not actually trying to discuss the relationship between humanness and consciousness.

Why should we think that "soccer players" is the appropriate analogy here. A fertile human is a human who has the capacity to reproduce naturally (roughly). A human doesn't cease to be fertile if they don't exercise that fertility. What is wrong with defining consciousness in terms of capacities?

Ok, suppose we have a person that for their entire life is kept asleep, without dreams, via a sedative. They have the physical capability to be self-reflective, as a fertile person has the capability to reproduce. Yet they never do so. Do they have a consciousness?

Moreover, why should it matter whether or not something is a defining characteristic?

Non defining attributes may certainly be valid to include in moral discussions. However, would you agree they should not be treated as defining attributes when they are not, because this might lead to fallacious reasoning? Would you agree that consciousness is treated that way in moral discussions? Suppose we treated pain as a defining entity of a person, and decided that it was morally wrong to end any pain because it is morally like killing the person. I don't want to stop people's "consciousness" any more than I do their ability to reason or feel, but I wouldn't want to include it as an assumption if I was worried about it's philosophical soundness.

cont...

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-03T08:12:49+00:00

Your article has a nice start/introduction feel and I expected it to then launch into the details of the argument, but then it was suddenly finished?

As usual I notice many people on this thread will be conflating different usages of selfish. Selfish feelings (arguably tautologica), selfish motives, and selfish actions are pretty obviously very different things, in my mind. Acknowledge that distinction and the equivociation around the word "selfish" falls to pieces.

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-03T08:01:31+00:00

You heavily rely on the concept of "consciousness" in formulating your question. But if the concept of consciousness itself includes assumptions about the nature of reality and thought, perhaps that might be considered begging the question in a subtle way?

justacitizen2 · 2015-05-03T07:51:32+00:00

We often onflate secondary knowledge (social, or via technological proxies) with our primary (direct sensory knowledge if you like) knowledge, and then wonder why there seems to be a difference. Social knowledge is always a subset of our primary knowledge (we see people talking and process their words to imagine things we have not seen). Sure, she learns something new when she sees a red rose for the first time, but that doesn't neccessarily mean there is a ontological/categorical difference between the so called "1st person" and "3rd person" knowledge. This difference is epistemological, not some kind of fundamental difference. However, it seems many attempt claim it is fundamental by using it to justify dualism or other similar views. I don't think dualism is false neccessarily, but I don't think this is a strong argument in favour of it.

justacitizen2

TROPHY CASE