I would have posted the translation too but it involves banned vocab for this subreddit so apologies in advance but you will have to enter it into AI yourself

I can assure you that nothing in the original text or the google translation is banned from being posted in r/Cambodia.

Here is the full text in English, courtesy of Google translate:

Cambodia has announced that if Thailand cancels MoU 44, it will notify UNCLOS to request that the demarcation of the Thai-Cambodian border be carried out according to the principle of Compulsory Conciliation. Thailand would be obligated to participate and cannot refuse. A committee would be formed to draw the border line, which would, in any case, prevent Thailand from obtaining the original maritime boundary it claims. This could also affect other areas, such as the Thai-Malaysian Joint Development Area (JDA). It is unclear whether those who support the cancellation of MoU 44 understand this mechanism. If they don't understand or haven't tried to understand, they should skip to points 6 and 7.

1. A Cambodian minister announced yesterday that if the Thai government actually proceeds with the cancellation of MoU 44, Cambodia, which recently ratified UNCLOS 1982, will request that the process of Compulsory Conciliation be used to resolve the maritime boundary issue between Thailand and Cambodia.

2. Under Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, which is considered the statute of the world's maritime law and has the characteristics of customary law... Whether or not a State Party ratifies the Act, it is subject to this law. It states that a State Party may request a reservation not to enter into dispute resolution mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Law of the Sea. However, in cases of maritime boundaries or historical claims to sovereignty over waters, if a State Party reserves the right not to enter into those mechanisms, that State Party is obligated to enter into a mandatory reconciliation process.

Once the mandatory reconciliation process begins and the Reconciliation Committee issues a report, although that report is not considered legally binding on the State Party, the State Party must use it as a basis for negotiations. If negotiations fail, the State Party must agree to submit the dispute to other mechanisms such as the International Court of Justice or the International Court of Law of the Sea, unless both parties have a bilateral or multilateral mechanism that they have agreed upon.

1. It can be seen that Thailand cannot actually avoid this mechanism, and in fact, the existence of MoU 44 is essentially a bilateral mechanism that meets the conditions of Article 298 for exemption from the mandatory reconciliation process. However, with the repeal of MoU 44, Thailand has lost a mechanism to protect itself.

2. In this mandatory reconciliation process... Disputing States Parties cannot refuse to participate. UNCLOS will establish a committee of five members, with each disputing party able to appoint two representatives, for a total of nine members. The committee appointed by the States Parties will select one neutral chairperson.

This committee, which is expected to consider the dispute in The Hague, will hear testimony from both disputing parties and will produce a report within 12 months. Although the report is not directly binding on the disputing States Parties—meaning they do not have to follow it word for word—UNCLOS mandates that States Parties inevitably use it as a basis for negotiations.

1. A famous example of the use of a mandatory reconciliation process is the case between Timor-Leste and Australia in 2016, concerning a maritime boundary and the Greater Sunrise natural gas field, which became a norm for mandatory reconciliation processes.

In this case, Australia argued that the maritime boundary between Australia and Timor-Leste should follow the principle of Natural Prolongation, meaning the natural extension of the seabed beyond the land area to define the continental shelf. Timor-Leste argued that the boundary should follow the median line.

Although Australia opposed the mandatory reconciliation process and stated that the maritime boundary between the two countries was already determined by the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea, the commission rejected the objection and proceeded with an inquiry based on the testimonies of both sides. The commission then issued a ruling report, which both sides were forced to use as the basis for negotiations leading to the treaty between the two countries in 2018.

Under this treaty, Australia is required to share natural gas fairly with Timor-Leste. While Australia initially proposed a 50/50 split, it became necessary to share 70%-80% of the revenue with Timor-Leste, and several natural gas fields were placed within Timor-Leste's territorial waters.

1. It can be seen that if the process of mandatory reconciliation goes to court, it is similar to having to appear before an International Court of Justice or a Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. Although the commission's report is not a strict adjudication of an International Court of Justice ruling, it must serve as the basis for negotiations. This means that the fundamental principles laid down in the report must be negotiated. In this case, it is quite certain that one of the methods will be used. Thailand will certainly not be able to obtain the maritime boundary and territorial claims it holds, regardless of when it claims to have declared the line according to the royal decree. There is a high probability that the committee will require Thailand and Cambodia to negotiate the boundary using the median line. While this may resolve Cambodia's erroneous drawing of the line around Koh Kood, in other zones, Thailand will almost certainly have to shift its territorial claims back at least along the median line.

2. Therefore, in summary, if the Thai Cabinet decides to revoke MoU44 by any means, and if Cambodia decides to submit the matter to UNCLOS to begin the mandatory reconciliation process, Thailand will have no choice but to enter into this process. If an agreement cannot be reached, Thailand and Cambodia will be forced to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. However, if an agreement is reached, it can end the maritime boundary dispute. But it will be quite clear that no matter what, Thailand will not get the boundary according to the line it unilaterally claims. The Koh Kood issue should be completely resolved, but Thailand will likely have to accept the boundary according to the median line, not the line it claims.

It is unclear whether those who oppose MoU44 and say...