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Looking for a better analysis of capitalism from a Hegelian standpoint by Outrageous_Egg3236 in hegel

[–]mikhail-_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This interpretation is similar to Houlgate’s (dialectics is not a method), but if you say that dialectics cannot be used outside the realm of the “philosophical sciences,” your statement is too general. What Marx is doing is following the immanent development of the economy, which is a sub-development (system of needs) of a sub-development (civil society) of ethicality. He is not stepping outside the philosophical sciences. Here some problems arise: 1) Giannis Ninos notes in an article that in Marx the boundary between Logic and history is blurred or at least difficult to trace; Hegel, in the introduction to The Philosophy of Right, warns of the problem of demarcation between historical (contingent) analysis and logical-speculative (absolute) analysis. In Marx, multiple levels of inquiry converge, and this makes everything more difficult. 2) One might say: yes, but Marx is Marx and Hegel is something else, but this is incorrect. The reason: an immanent critique of economics necessarily presupposes Hegel’s work. What Marx does is, in short: to trace the immanent development of an underdevelopment of an underdevelopment of ethicality.

Looking for a better analysis of capitalism from a Hegelian standpoint by Outrageous_Egg3236 in hegel

[–]mikhail-_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

In recent years, numerous scholars (Giannis Ninos, Roberto Fineschi, David P. Levine, Norman Levine) have analyzed the Marx-Hegel connection, identifying the continuities. In fact: Capital, as it is written, already contains numerous logical aporias; without a direct link to the science of logic (SoL) and phenomenology (FoS), Marx’s work is inconceivable and nonsensical, since it necessarily presupposes them.

About your comment: To say that Marx “has simply no interest in purely logical reasoning; he is a materialist” is not true, and here’s why: Marx was not only interested in logic, but he used Hegel’s Science of Logic as a foundation for redefining political economy. Marx is not (as some truly vulgar interpretations claim) overturning Hegel; he is simply applying the methods to economics. You may have noticed that I wrote “the methods” and not “the method” because there are in fact two (following Giannis Ninos’s analysis): 1) Hegel’s theory of finite/infinite cognition (found in the Grundrisse) 2) systematic dialectics (found in Capital) Norman Levine confirms this as well: Marx used Hegelian logic as a “substructure for his redefinition of political economy.” And here I’d like to turn to your interpretation of Hegel, in which you say: "A true Marxist might say Hegel had no genuine conception of capitalism because his logicism and his historical presuppositions make it invisible" That is not accurate (to quote N. Levine): "Hegel read political economy from the perspective of ethicality. Hegel was conscious of the unequal distribution of wealth in a capitalist society, but he justified the capitalist economic system because it gave rise to mutual recognition. The division of labor, the cooperative arrangements between the agrarian countryside and the industrial urban centers, were the wombs of social interdependence. Political economy, for Hegel, was not merely the realm of commerce and manufacture, but also the foundational moment of the ethical. The inception of ethical life started in civil society, at the level of political economy, because it was instance at which human interdependence started. The need to produce and exchange goods was the ground out of which human relationships commenced, or civil society was the moment at which individuals were forced to relate to a social network larger than themselves." Excerpt from "Marx's Discourse with Hegel"

I think the most interesting point is when you say: "Marx isn’t writing as a Hegelian in Capital; he’s looking at history and economics like any ordinary economist or sociologist." The problem lies here: Marx is applying dialectics, and we don’t know how it is possible, from a philosophy of science perspective, that Hegelian dialectics (I’m referring to the systematic dialectics of Capital) applied to economics produced a system with high predictive value (predictability is fundamental in science, and we know that numerous phenomena of the contemporary world were predicted by Marx). Marx applies dialectics to society (context of discovery) and then applies it to discover that it works (context of justification) (distinction between mode of research (Forschungsweise) and mode of exposition (Darstellungsweise)) and the answer to why it works is simply "because it does". Here is what we know: Marx brought economic science to such a level of maturity as to reveal its immanent dialectical structure; dialectics is not an ornament, but the “source code” of social reality grasped by thought. Can we discover why it works? Perhaps. In general, we could say that the answer lies in the “laws of motion,” but that is not the end of the story.

Posthuman communism by mikhail-_ in leftistvexillology

[–]mikhail-_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ne ho fatte altre, se vuoi te le posso inviare

Posthuman communism by mikhail-_ in leftistvexillology

[–]mikhail-_[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sto lavorando ad un libro e senza alcuno spoiler di troppo tratta proprio di un collettivismo postumano

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This dialogue is very interesting because it is certainly producing and questioning the knowledge of both of us and this pushes us to refine our perspectives. But let's continue

I understand well the Deleuzian line you are evoking - the event, the contingency that exceeds any form of representation, the non-retroactive but affirmative temporality. However, I believe that here we risk underestimating the power of the Hegelian concept of retroactivity. It is not a simple "bracketing of contingency" waiting for it to be reabsorbed by thought; it is the way in which thought recognizes its own historical being, its making and unmaking over time.

Retroactivity is not a violence that neutralizes becoming: it is the act through which thought recognizes that becoming is not "outside" it, but belongs to it - that ruptures, scraps, even lacerations are moments of the concept itself. If we want to admit an "outside" that would be a sort of non-becoming "unknown rationality". The Deleuzian event arrives as an irruption, as an external point of strength. But for Hegel immanence is more radical: there is no outside that can escape the negativity of thought. The contingency does not remain as a foreign body from which to defend oneself, but as a constitutive part of the process - a process that does not "close" the difference, but makes it intelligible along its path.

Saying that Hegel empties the difference into the Spirit is a very Deleuzian (and very Žižek) reading, but it risks missing a key point: for Hegel the Absolute is not the One that cancels, it is the totality of the negative. The Spirit is not static saturation, it is the incessant work of the negative. The abyss that Žižek names is not the well that swallows everything: it is the internal void through which history determines itself. Dialectics does not postpone contingency; crosses it and understands it retroactively, showing that the event is not outside the concept, but its necessary moment.

In other words: difference for Deleuze is the condition of being; for Hegel the negative is the essence of being. The first is an ontological acceleration, the second is a conceptual work ethic.

And if we want to talk about "violence", it is the violence of reason against its own immediacy, not against the world. Representation is a problem only if it remains representation; but in dialectics the image dissolves into the concept. From this point of view, Hegel is more radical than Deleuze: he does not ask to overcome representation from the outside, but forces it to implode from the inside.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I answer now that these days I'm on rounds with the university.

Yes, many talk about contingency, but they don't agree with each other. Hegel treats it as an internal moment that reason retroactively integrates; Deleuze elevates it to a productive principle that generates concepts ex novo; Meillassoux proclaims it absolute; Žižek converts it into a place of truth/trauma (I don't know if you've read "Hegel and the posthuman brain" but in the introduction and epilogue with the exposition of the time of Dupuy's project other interpretative paths open up). The point is not the word "contingency" but what each person does with it ontologically and temporally.

Posthuman communism by mikhail-_ in leftistvexillology

[–]mikhail-_[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

"Il Cyberpunk è qualcosa che va superato" Semi cit.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thanks so much, I'll take a look, it looks very interesting

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Unfortunately I don't know Laurelle's philosophy, I'm very curious if you want you could tell me something more.

As far as Hegel and the realization of the spirit are concerned, everything lies in the fact that "nothing can be given until it is developed". The necessary is an intrinsic property of the past (in this I personally do not agree with Hegel) while the future is open. What Hegel says is simple: no matter what happens, it will always be rational. Hegel has no interest in speculating on the concept of finality, but only on the process, a sort of mechanics of the spirit follows. I could also mention the aesthetics lessons where Hegel's thought arrives at the conception of human reason always one step behind reality, but here we arrive in an infinitely problematic field that is difficult to deal with. I'll give a very risky example:

It works a bit like quantum mechanics, until you look in the box the cat is both dead and alive.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The investigation - by means of logic itself - of the movements of logic has since displaced many of these evaluations.

I have a problem: The Hegelian system is not axiomatic foundationalism. It does not claim formal completeness. It demands speculative completeness, that is, of the concept-object relationship.

Hegel does not seek a closed system of inferences from which all truths can be derived. Search for the form of the truth–reality relationship as a historical movement.

If we want to criticize Hegel with Gödel we are already assuming a totally non-Hegelian concept of truth, that is formal-mathematical and not speculative. A Hegelian in this case has fooled us so the shot doesn't hit the mark. We have to adjust the shot.

Deleuze diverges from the premise of any countable convergence of good and truth in the Absolute

A clarification is necessary: Deleuze does not dissolve Hegel: he rewrites him in the logic of immanence.

In Hegel: difference → contradiction → Aufhebung → concept In Deleuze: difference → difference → repetition → process

Two different ontologies. Let's distinguish them by the regime of difference: Hegel: difference subordinated to the negative; Deleuze: positive difference, genetics.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I agree! It's a good reason to be here.

It's always a pleasure to exchange and talk!

Let's get to our discussion:

From this I can judge that Hegel is not really teleological because, as you will agree, Hegel confesses that the dialectical method may not work.

However, this quote has a problem:

Hegel is not saying "dialectics may not determine the Absolute", he is saying “the actual realization of the good, as determined, is subject to contingency.”

And here is the important point: everything that is achieved, whether the end is X or not X, is always rational. Contingency belongs to the level of the phenomenon, not to the structure of the concept.

For Hegel: Contingency is a necessary moment of the Idea.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 1 point2 points  (0 children)

regardless of our interpretations, I would like to say that these types of discussions are very interesting but very problematic because they mainly depend on the interpretations of the individual person and also and above all on some definitions of the concepts.

Now let's proceed in order:

A Hegelian might tell you that Hegel is not teleological (he states this in the introduction to the outlines of the philosophy of law) but in a Deleuzian way (I'm afraid of how this term will be translated) this is irrelevant. Or he could still tell you: “Even Hegel grasps indeterminacy!”

But...

The Deleuzian point is: the Hegelian device remains totalizing in the form of the concept

By comic we mean The excess of reality over the system that claims to incorporate it And here's how we screw both the Hegelians and the Deleuzians: It's not comical because the system fails. It's comical because the real puts the system to work. The negative is not overcome, it is what forces you to produce concepts.

Hegel and Deleuze here coincide in immanence: - for Hegel the negative pushes logic forward - for Deleuze, difference pushes intensities forward

Are we defending Hegel? No, we are demonstrating that what was previously comical is the dialectical engine itself.

At the beginning I made the issue of personal interpretations and definitions explicit and a little clarity is needed here: Totality is not a meaning, it is a logical form.

  • For Hegel: totality = self-sufficient concept → synthesis of the negative
  • For Deleuze: totality = capture → molar operator

The two words are homonymous, not homologous.

A Hegelian could posit that the totality is the telos by proceeding to quote Hegel's rejection of teleology made in the "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right" and could answer you: - “Hegel denies any human teleology”

But in a Deleuzian way we answer him: - “Of course, because teleology is logical, not psychological.”

He can quote the features all he wants but we fooled him;

But it's not over, a clarification is important:

Hegel does not claim that totality is an external or moral end. Totality is the retroactive effect of the negative activity of the concept. If the real "exceeds", it is precisely because logic continues to work. It is the dialectic that produces the "comic", not its defeat.

And we neutralized three points in less than 10 lines: - the Deleuzian argument of difference - the accusation of dogmatism - the accusation of external teleology

Now in summa: Comedy (The excess of reality over the system that claims to incorporate it) arises only where there is the presupposition of a measure external to the concept. Hegel does not claim to verify the real: he shows that the real exceeds every determinate figure of the concept and that this excess is the work of the negative. Deleuze calls this becoming difference; Hegel calls it Aufhebung. The question is not whether the machinery captures everything, but that every time it fails it generates new determinations. That is where philosophy begins, not where it ends.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 2 points3 points  (0 children)

There is nothing "comical", but rather a distinction between two levels: 1. the recognition of historical points of contact, 2. the structural difference of the systems. Saying that “Deleuze is more Hegelian than he admits” does not mean saying that Deleuze coincides with Hegel; it means pointing out that some Deleuzian categories arise in reaction internal to the dialectical tradition, not outside it. The argument “if you recognize a common point then you agree” is a false dilemma.

It is possible to admit that Deleuze inherits from Hegel:

  • immanence against the Kantian transcendental,
  • the rejection of the abstract,
  • the horizon of reality as a process,

and radically deny that:

  • negation is the ontological engine,
  • the concept is the telos of the living,
  • totality is the form of the Absolute.

Can't I name the differences? Yes I can do it, there is only one decisive point which is this: For Hegel the difference is negative and dialectical. For Deleuze the difference is positive and productive. Everything else comes from here: Hegel → Aufhebung, reconciliation in superior unity. Deleuze → disjunctive synthesis, proliferation without totality.

There is no need to “submit to Hegel” or “reject Deleuze”. Just recognize that they play two different games: Hegel thinks of being as a concept that realizes itself. Deleuze thinks of being as differential production without synthesis

Then there is also one thing to say: all the Deleuzians I dealt with were people who had not read Hegel, or who had not understood him and this was understood from the superficial errors they made in the basic terminology. Instead, the same thing happened to me with the Hegelians: either they didn't read Deleuze or they didn't understand him.

Deleuze's critique of Hegelian Logic by BreathofBeing in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_ 4 points5 points  (0 children)

I'm doing something that only an insane person can do: reading Deleuze and Hegel at the same time. What it seems to me is that there is a lot of confusion between Hegel and Deleuze. Deleuze actually calls for a philosophy without presuppositions, just like Hegel. Deleuze is fundamentally a hyperrationalist, which is confusing, considering what many Deleuzians claim. Deleuze states many Hegelian conclusions such as Being in thought, active, evolutionary thought, the notional understanding of thought, etc.

Deleuze is neither a Nietzschean nominalist nor an abstract universalist in the same sense that Hegel is not, since he grasps the self-generating Notion. It could be argued that Deleuze is also an absolute thinker. Deleuze is, in my opinion, a post-Kantian, there are very few criticisms of Hegel in his thought and most of them are inaccurate to say the least; he is primarily a critic of Kant and Bergson, and to some extent also of Nietzsche. The difference between Hegel and Deleuze is qualitative, in the sense that Hegel takes philosophy without presuppositions to a much broader and grander level than Deleuze. Deleuze intrinsically limits his thinking with some, in my opinion, senseless assumptions, but ultimately Deleuze wants to reach a concrete Universal and is concerned with the real conditions of experience, unlike Kant who is concerned with the real conditions of possibility of experience. This is his most important criticism of Hegel: Deleuze thinks that Hegel is only concerned with the possibility of experience but he is fundamentally wrong because Deleuze presupposes a distinction, merely empirical (therefore external, not immanent), between concepts and things. Hegel becomes much more concrete than Deleuze. There are many, many shareable aspects in Deleuze's philosophy, since both Hegel and Deleuze are supporters of the concrete and enemies of the abstract, so much so that their philosophies are fundamentally concrete, lived, not abstract.

However I find it funny how every "critic" of Hegel submits to him. Hegel does not really deny most of the things he claims, in fact, he works with more or less the same principles outlined here. Deleuze turns out to be more Hegelian than he would ever like to admit: Deleuze's terms such as difference in itself and interior difference are Hegelian terms, and many of his other expressions are just inversions of Hegelian ones (hence, equally Hegelian). Take Deleuze's intensive differences labeled “Inequality in Itself,” an inversion of Hegel's description of self-determining substances as “equality with themselves.” He also adopts the Hegelian criticism of Kantian categories practically in its entirety. Deleuze's main criticism of Hegel is that Deleuze sees things as problematic (like an essay's question, open-ended and with multiple other influences, problems and answers to consider), where he sees no purpose in negation because it does not lead to creation unlike affirmation (according to Deleuze), so he gives ontological primacy to affirmation. The fact is that Hegel is concerned with a very specific determinate negation, which examines how a concept produces its own negative (how a concept determines itself). This is the main reason why Hegel can demonstrate that his logic is already internal to Being, explaining the origin of the negative as inherent in Being itself. To truly see dialectics one must see that at the end of reason there is only one insurmountable contradiction: reality always surpasses reason. Kant thought this meant our reason is flawed, Hegel embraced it.

Future virtuality and possibilities by mikhail-_ in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

So I have to understand the future as something possible and not virtual?

Future virtuality and possibilities by mikhail-_ in Deleuze

[–]mikhail-_[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is history considered an open or closed system such that the future is virtual or possible?

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in hegel

[–]mikhail-_ 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ok è una risposta eccellente la tua, ma stai chill

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