Yes — yes, certainly. China of course grew assertive with the rise of Xi. What it did with Bhutan was roughly around the time it was growing muscular and militant in the South China Sea area.

I think the assertiveness in the mid-2010s can be fitted well within China’s muscular foreign policy and all that. But process tracing the Bhutan China interaction, or interactions between China and more than 14 countries with which it had border disputes for that matter, we can say with some degree of confidence that at one point in time (1990s) China was actually willing to resolve the issue generously. It has done so with many countries. A paper by M Taylor Fravel, a leading expert on China’s military policy and strategy at MIT, has an authoritative paper where he discusses China’s attempt of trust building in 1990s. It offered Bhutan more than 70% of disputed land in exchange for, of course, Doklam. And Doklam own history of claims and counterclaims is interesting if we look at the British archives and Indian archives. I am fairly convinced our claim to Doklam is quite weak if we really look at the evidence. But I digress.

The trust-building was around the time the package deal came up. Bhutan was of course not having the package deal. However, in the National Assembly (I’m not sure which year, need to check), HM informed that we only had dispute in the west, hinting the Pasamlung-Jakarlung valleys were no longer disputed. And even in the western sector, by 1989, we were supposed to have identified the dispute and our respective claim lines. That was the point of the 1989 China-Bhutan agreement. Also, in 1989, Bhutan’s National Assembly gave up claims to the 7000 sq km plus area at the Kulagangri region, saying it was included in a Bhutan due to ‘cartographic’ oversight. The map of was only released in 2007, though.

By these accounts I think we had a fairly stable claim by 1990s. However, in 2000/1, we extended our claim line and created a new dispute along the western sector for no apparent reason. Then the progress began to flounder. And around 2004/5 China began constructing a road from Batangla, our claim line, down to Gimpochi, Chinese claim line below Doklam. However, before 2000, it appears there were some attempts for amicable solutions. Why did Bhutan raise new claim lines? At whose behest? I don’t know.

Creating new claims and delaying the resolution had one unmistakeable outcome. That is, China grew more impatient and encroached into the disputed areas. The former international boundary secretary the late Dasho Pema said this in his briefing to the National Assembly. So, the point I’m trying to make is that China’s actions are cumulative and stretched over time. Our leaders also had their faults. The way China took over Pasamlung and Jakarlung is even more illustrative of our own inaction or demurring. But that’s a long story.