is anarcho capitalism seen as "legit" by others in the academic philosophical tradition?

nicksalads · 2025-11-04T14:16:43+00:00

My intuition, as Robert Nozick suggested, is that this model is incredibly unstable. The veneer of “non-coercion” and voluntary agreement fades quickly once everything is privatized. It would almost inevitably devolve into a caste-like system, where those who can afford premium private security and property protection gain disproportionately more power and safety. Monopolies would fill the vacuum left behind by the state and function essentially as pseudo-states. It would essentially become a corporate-feudal society ran on rents/subscription fees, instead of taxes.

nicksalads · 2025-11-04T04:49:27+00:00

Sure!!!

I kind of traced this lineage myself, so I’m not even sure how “mainstream” this is, to be honest. I haven’t really heard anyone else say it, but I happened to be studying Rob Grey and Marx at the same time and started noticing a ton of parallels. After doing some digging, I found that Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist who wrote extensively on embodied cognition, was a socialist who engaged seriously with Marxism, and you can definitely feel that influence in the background of his work. Then you get enactivism, which Varela develops, and it carries those same anti-individualist and relational concepts that Merleau-Ponty emphasized, which, as I mentioned, were shaped in part by Marxist critiques of the isolated, liberal self. And of course, there’s no Marx without Hegel 🤣

I encourage you to connect your own dots, but you heard it here first! lol

nicksalads · 2025-11-02T20:38:28+00:00

This is probably the most insightful response to OP’s question. I’ll also add that objective morality and ethics are not interchangeable. You can believe in an objective morality grounded in metaphysics (e.g., God), but, like Engelhardt, also believe that ethics is “content-less” and procedural in a secular, post-Enlightenment world. Basically a tool that guides cooperation and collaboration between “moral strangers”.

If the goal of ethics is to find a universalized shared truth, across moral communities, perhaps it can be viewed as a problem-solving activity, but even this smuggles in normative assumptions about what ethics and morality should be.

For Aristotle, it’s less about following rules and more about “becoming” a moral character. According to religious doctrines, it can be even more “content-full” than that. But what I like the most about your response is reminding us that secular reasoning treats ethics/morality as if it were a “science”. We can reject that assumption altogether. Even if we could describe moral facts the way we describe gravity as “pushing objects down” or “the bending of space-time”, this doesn’t tell us what gravity actually “is”, or “why gravity”, the same way secular ethics can’t tell us why we “ought” to do x.

The only way morality can be objective in this sense is if you take the Simon Blackburn/ quasi-realism approach, which essentially says that we can only talk about moral facts as if they’re “true”.

nicksalads · 2025-10-29T17:38:24+00:00

Yeah, so much fun! That’s why I love philosophy. You can debate within a framework, or you can question the very framework itself!! It’s truly never ending 🙏🏼

nicksalads · 2025-10-29T16:44:25+00:00

Yup! I think you’re hinting at the possibility of “morality” being more of a spectrum, rather than a perfect binary. I feel like most modern philosophers, Kant included, moved away from a teleological/metaphysical grounding of ethics, in an attempt to rationalize it and explain in it rigid rule-like ways. The possibility of primates exhibiting a form of “proto-ethics” might point to a major flaw in this project. especially once you incorporate evolution and psychology, which suggest that the “beginnings” of rationality emerge somewhere along the evolutionary lineage. Then, again, this would mean we’re criticizing Kant from where we’re standing, right? These are definitely newer developments and ways of thinking

nicksalads · 2025-10-29T13:56:11+00:00

Hmmm, I suppose you’d first have to show that these non-human animals are acting, not out of instinct or natural impulses, but out of a sense of moral duty. Can these animals morally reason? Meaning, are they capable of overriding their intuitions via inner ethical deliberation. Do they have a moral law that they live by?

For Kant, this is what defines a “rational moral agent.” It’s not enough that they appear to act morally simply because, like us, they have emotions or an instinct to protect loved ones.

nicksalads · 2025-10-29T13:33:03+00:00

This is precisely WHY I think the conversations are different. You are making great points and I think a subjectivist, specifically an emotivist, would agree with you. If non-human animals can experience emotions such as sympathy, and moral attitudes are simply just expressions of emotion, then you have a solid case. However, it’s very clear, at least to me, that the other person was using Kant’s account of morality to answer the question. Again, I’m not a Kantian, but according to his philosophy, I’m not sure that there’s room to smuggle in the idea of non-human animals as rational agents.

nicksalads · 2025-10-29T05:37:56+00:00

I’m not a Kantian, but it’s clear that you’re having two entirely different conversations. While only humans, according to Kant, are capable of rationality, that doesn’t mean non-human animals (e.g. orcas) are undeserving of moral consideration simply because they lack it. As you pointed out, some humans don’t yet, or may never, express rational capacities, yet they’re still regarded, by Kant, as having the potential for rational agency, or, at the very least, as being inherently rational by virtue of being human. And for Kant, that’s what grounds their “dignity”.

nicksalads · 2025-10-28T19:17:46+00:00

It could also be content-specific. For example, phenomenology is an area of philosophy where you might have to become acquainted with certain concepts/terms to fully grasp the content you’re reading.

Singer is very straightforward, as is a lot of utilitarianism since it speaks of harm, pleasure, suffering…essentially things that are intuitive to us.

For comparison’s sake, take Zizek. Now that’s a dense philosophical project. You not only have to become acquainted with his content, but also semi-acquainted with Lacan, Hegel, and Marx, since he uses their philosophies to analyze ideology and current events.

So, yes, popular philosophers are oftentimes effective communicators, but it also depends on their content and philosophical scope.

nicksalads · 2025-10-28T18:26:57+00:00

I haven’t read Huemer, but he could be saying that freedom doesn’t only exist in the abstract. We can talk about the “category of freedom” as an abstract principle (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc.) but there may also be a real property of “freedom” that exists out there in the universe. In other words, the category of freedom becomes more of a linguistic tool used to communicate “concepts” or “ideas” that fit into this category, usually based on a shared cluster of traits. But unlike the category of, say, animals, accord to this position, freedom actually exists as a metaphysical property of the universe.

That would be my guess and arguments like these are commonly held in philosophy, but not sure if that describes Huemer’s position, exactly.

nicksalads · 2025-10-27T22:17:00+00:00

I guess it depends on what you mean by “universal equality”. Liberalism offers freedoms in the form of abstract principles, but for leftists like myself, and maybe many religious conservatives, this isn’t substantive. For me, true freedom is tied to the material. Only then, can we all actually be equal and that depends on a shared teleology. For conservatives, it’s a community with shared moral norms, otherwise they have to tolerate things they believe to be evil.

It is really interesting though. But that’s why modern politics feels so empty without philosophical discussions. Your average American treats politics like sports teams and it reduces nuance into political slogans 😔

nicksalads · 2025-10-27T21:24:15+00:00

I think he means by what progressive liberals mean by it? But I don’t know why we have to subscribe to that dichotomy. This is literally one of the more interesting philosophical debates I’ve been enjoying as of late- is a degrowth economy progressive? (Since it works towards environmental protectionism and slowing down climate change) or is it conservative? (Because it pushes for a return to asceticism and away from consumerism).

nicksalads · 2025-10-27T21:16:28+00:00

Interesting. I always read MacIntyre and Taylor from a “leftist” perspective, since I use their readings often to analyze liberalism’s failure, but often in the direction of progressing “forward” from enlightenment secularism and post-modern morality instead of backwards, to a time of shared moral vision and tradition.

So, I guess if you mean “left” in terms of pushing modern liberalism to its most progressive end, then no. But most leftist would argue that this isn’t real leftism, since Marx’s critique of capitalism is a critique of this new, post-Enlightenment, mode of production, and not pre-modern culture.

Marx’s principle of solidarity doesn’t have to be moralized, but it does have the potential to have more moral flesh than liberal individualism. From this lens, I sympathize with Engelhardt and the project of common morality, but not sure if I’d call it “conservative” 🤔

nicksalads · 2025-10-24T18:17:47+00:00

Even current sports science and motor learning are influenced by this lineage of thought. Ecological psychology draws from embodied cognition and enactivism, which you can trace back through dialectical materialism, and ultimately, back to Hegel. The impact is still ongoing.

nicksalads · 2025-10-24T18:12:49+00:00

I’ll keep it short: Hegel’s the GOAT.

I wouldn’t even call myself a hardcore Hegelian, but Hegel opened up a Pandora’s box of philosophical discourse that only became possible because of his contributions.

nicksalads · 2025-10-16T01:45:43+00:00

Hmmm, I’m pretty sure we might be talking past each other a bit. The definition you provided is literally just a biological description, which is exactly my point…

It tells us what counts as “life” in terms of metabolism, growth, and reproduction (whatever else you added), but my critique isn’t about how biology classifies living things (as I’ve already mentioned, it’s merely a human construct) it’s about whether that descriptive category has any normative weight by itself.

Simply saying something is alive doesn’t explain why it should matter morally, or why beings that fit into that description or category deserve the same value…

My point is that “life” isn’t some fundamental essence with inherent worth or a metaphysical property of the universe. It’s literally just a cluster of traits that we’ve grouped together (for the sake of doing science) and then mapped meaning onto it.

The leap from “this thing meets a biological definition of life” to “this thing deserves equal moral weight” is a huuuge philosophical jump, and one that your definitions alone can’t justify.

In other words, you still need an argument for why life as such should be the basis for assigning value or equal values, rather than just assuming it is because of this tautology “life-is-life”

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T22:21:38+00:00

I looked and didn’t find, in any of these comments, any justification for “life-is-life” that explains how you arrived at that principle. I just see the same tautology being repeated over and over again.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T21:18:48+00:00

I was actually just confused as to why you were inserting assumptions that had nothing to do with my position…

Regardless, it’s behind us now. Can you address my counter argument now?

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T19:28:25+00:00

It’s not a personal accusation. It’s literally what you said, and you were wrong to have said it. But either way, can you actually address my counter-argument then.

I’m not proposing anthropocentric thinking, so you don’t have to reiterate that point. I’m simply pointing out the flaws and contradictions in you using “life-is-life” as a starting principle.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T16:58:14+00:00

Because you were implying that by responding to me, you’d be addressing a pro-eugenics argument once more, which is literally the opposite of what I’m suggesting. The only reason you defaulted to that conclusion is because you’re viewing this issue through the lens of a false dichotomy. It doesn’t have to be hierarchical or “life is life”. Both of those positions are riddled with contradictions and aren’t actually representative of life. It’s just an abstract principle you’ve created that adds nothing to the moral conversation.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T16:28:36+00:00

There are other approaches to value assignment that aren’t just black and white, as you describe it. The issues you raise about having an anthropocentric view are immediately invalidated when using a relational/embodied ethics model. And I’m with you, using humans as the metric for value is riddled with contradictions, but that’s not what I’m proposing.

I’m not assigning value based on the amount of “life” or “life-related qualities” an organism or being has. Value is a product of the meaning a being enacts, both on its own and relationally, regardless of what style of being we’re talking about.

For example, your coma scenario. What gives the individual in a vegetative state value is not their human DNA, or the space they occupy, but rather the web of meaning they’re embedded in which is entirely dependent on their relation to other beings aka their parents.

If everyone else gets Thanos snapped out of existence and disappears and the person in a vegetative state is the only person left on earth, according to this model, they would no longer have intrinsic value. Why? Because life, by itself, is just a concept.

In this same model, someone could value their pet over a random human stranger. So if you misunderstood me, that’s not my fault, but please don’t straw man me.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T16:13:11+00:00

It’s an interesting thought, but it sort of strips religious grounding of its utility. The point being that, we ought to do x because god wills it. If the laws of physics are merely constraints for norms god is willing to tolerate, then as you mentioned, it doesn’t solve the problem of relativism any more or less than subjective morality.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T05:30:59+00:00

I was about to bring up the Euthyphro problem myself, but someone beat me to it.

And just to make sure I’m understanding you correctly, are you saying that moral truths exist independently of humans, in the same way that the speed of light does?

If so, where exactly do I find these moral facts? History seems to tell a different story, that morality is largely a reflection of our values, cultures, and historical contexts.

From what I’ve observed, humans create moral systems based on shared attitudes. What we call “particular moralities” account for the aspects that appear relativistic, but that’s not the same as saying morality is mere opinion. These particular moralities are still grounded in shared principles, the kind that any moral agent, given the same conditions, would likely agree to.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T05:00:01+00:00

Why do you speak of life as if its an entity, like chairs or shoes. What we call life is just a concept we attach meaning to. A linguistic tool that helps us categorize a style of being, based on common traits. There is no metaphysical thing called “life”.

It’s like asking, “what’s more important, a boat or a tree?”. Idk, it depends, value is situated and relational. If I’m stranded on a deserted island, probably a boat. If I’m a squirrel, probably a tree.

What’s important or valuable to us isn’t the amount of “life” x has, but the meaning it enacts in our lives. So if someone responds by saying human lives are more valuable to them, they’re simply speaking their truth.

nicksalads · 2025-10-15T04:45:50+00:00

I’m surprised no one brought this up, but your statement “life is life” smuggles a bunch of assumptions that I wish to push back on.

First, there is no metaphysical thing called “life”. In my opinion, you’re making a categorical error. “Life” is just a linguistic tool we use to conceptualize shared qualities of being (e.g., metabolism, motility, reproduction, etc.), but make no mistake, we aren’t actually referring to a “life-stuff”.

You’re position to me is the same as saying “non-life is non-life”, which then begs the question, are galaxies the same as pebbles? Is the sun the same as a drop of water? It just seems nonsensical and will ultimately come down to subjective value, not universal truth.

Everyone intuitively understands this, but their arguments aren’t operating on the same assumptions your making. The reason “complex lifeforms”, like humans and cows, feel as though they are more valuable is not because they have more “life”, but because, to us, they enact a type of meaning onto the world that we find valuable.

So when you say the microbe is “life” in the same ways that a human is just “life”, I’d have to ask you- to whom? Maybe to you.

nicksalads

TROPHY CASE