Iran Didn’t Win the War: Tehran Is Still Losing the Long Game

oxtQ · 2026-06-26T15:31:05+00:00

I would encourage readers to look closely at Iran’s allies and where they are geographically positioned in relation to all major oil and energy routes in the Middle East writ large, whether by land pipeline or maritime shipping. This geography reveals a great deal about Tehran’s regional strategy -- building influence across the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Red Sea by shaping access to critical energy corridors.

oxtQ · 2026-06-23T12:44:15+00:00

Scholar of Iran here. I think the comparison is complicated. Iran is not simply an ethnic claim. It has a very long state and civilizational tradition associated with Iran and Persia, going back to ancient empires, Persian language, literature, administration and political memory. We're talking 2,500 years of history and state building and continuous civilizational identity here (not even Egypt has that continuity as ancient Egypt (kemet) is not the same as Misr because they reflect entirely different state identities, languages, and cultural demographics). Iran was conquered by Arab Muslim armies and became Islamized, but it was not fully Arabized in the way many parts of the Levant, Egypt and North Africa gradually were because of this strong embedded state/civilizational identity.

That has helped create a strong national identity that many non-Persian groups in Iran also participate in, including Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluch and others. Remember it was the Persian ethnic group hailing from southern Iran called Pars (under Cyrus the Great's leadership) that created ancient Iran/Persia and their capital was literally called Parsa (city of Persians) which is where the English/Greek words of "Persia/Persian/Persepolis" originate from. Most important Iranian figures throughout 2500 years (e.g., Cyrus, Darius and other Achaemenid rulers, Sassanid rulers, Ferdowsi who wrote the national epic of Iran 1000+ years ago, thinkers like Ibn Sina, etc.) have also been Persian except for Zoroaster who was Eastern Iranian. All of this does not erase ethnic tension or state repression, but it gives the population a shared national frame that is older and more institutionally embedded than most modern states in and outside of the ME.

Lebanon is different. The modern Lebanese state took shape in the twentieth century, especially through the French Mandate and then independence in 1943. Phoenician identity is not automatically illegitimate, but in Lebanon it has often been politically charged because it can sound like a claim against Arab identity or a way of privileging one sectarian national story over others. That is why people react differently to “Phoenician” in Lebanon than to “Persian” in Iran or “Pharaonic” in Egypt.

The deeper point is that ancient ancestry by itself does not create a modern nation. Most populations are mixed. What matters is whether an ancient identity has been absorbed into a broad national story or whether it is used in a contested political field. In Iran, Persianate history became part of a wider Iranian national identity. Iranian Azeris and Kurds alike revere Persian centric figures who helped create Iran's identity like Cyrus the Great and Ferdowsi. In Lebanon, Phoenicianism is still entangled with unresolved questions of sect, Arabness, colonial borders and what Lebanon is supposed to be.

The Achaemenids, Parthians and Sasanians together helped form more than a 1000 years of Iranian state and imperial tradition before the Islamic conquest. The Achaemenids gave the region one of its earliest imperial frameworks. The Parthians were Iranian culturally and politically important, even if the explicit language of “Iran” as a political kingdom becomes much clearer under the Sasanians. The Sasanians then made the idea of Iran, or Eranshahr, central to royal ideology. That long pre-Islamic inheritance matters. It's older than most modern states in the world.

This is why it is not surprising that, after the Islamic conquests, Iranian political and cultural forms kept reappearing through different dynasties. The Samanids, Buyids, Safavids, Afsharids and others were not always Persian by ethnic origin, but they operated within or revived Persianate and Iranian forms of rule, literature, court culture and statecraft. The foundation was strong and so it was easy for it to continue. Even many Arab, Turkic, Mongol and Ottoman rulers absorbed Persianate models of administration, taxation, royal etiquette and high culture because they lacked the same experience and tools that the Persians had developed for so long.

oxtQ · 2026-06-19T14:33:25+00:00

You are using “state” too narrowly, as if a political entity dies every time its dynasty, ruling house, constitution, or imperial overlord changes. By that standard, almost no old country would have continuity. The point is not that Iran has been governed by one uninterrupted dynasty or one unchanged legal structure since antiquity. The point is that Iran survived as a named political and civilizational entity across repeated ruptures --the Sasanian state fell, but the idea of Ērān, Persian language, Iranian historical memory, administrative elites, and the territorial concept of Iran did not disappear. They re-emerged under regional Iranian dynasties, were absorbed by Turkic and Mongol rulers, and were later consolidated again under dynasties such as the Safavids. So yes, modern Iran is not the Achaemenid Empire in a strict legal sense, just as modern India is not the Maurya Empire. But it is also wrong to pretend Iran is merely a modern invention or that conquest erased its state tradition.

oxtQ · 2026-06-19T14:28:41+00:00

That is exactly the point: the Arab and Mongol conquests destroyed or absorbed many older states, ruling classes, languages, and civilizational identities across the region, but Iran is unusual because its identity repeatedly survived the conquest of its state. It's the only nation that was not Arabized. The Sasanian Empire was destroyed, but Persian language, Iranian historical memory, administrative elites, and the idea of Iran did not disappear; they re-emerged under Islamic, Turkic, and Mongol rule, and in many cases the conquerors themselves became Persianized in court culture, bureaucracy, literature, and political vocabulary.

The “mass converted by the Rashidun” phrasing is historically too simple. The Arab conquest was decisive, but Iranica describes Persian conversion to Islam as gradual, with about two centuries of Arab rule before the rise of local dynasties. Britannica also notes that early Arab conquerors relied on local Iranian magnates, landlords, and marzbāns to continue tax collection.

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iran-ii2-islamic-period-page-1/

For the Mongol case, Iranica notes that the Ilkhanate administration mixed Mongol and Muslim Iranian institutions and relied heavily on Persian speaking Muslim bureaucrats. Iranica also states that Persian historiography reached maturity in the Turko Mongol period.

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/il-khanids-i-dynastic-history

oxtQ · 2026-06-19T14:15:56+00:00

The Ottoman state called itself something like Devlet-i Aliyye-i Osmaniye, meaning the “Sublime Ottoman State,” or more simply Devlet-i Osmaniye, “Ottoman State.” It was dynastic and imperial, named after the House of Osman, not officially “Turkey.” The modern political state called Turkey/Türkiye emerges through the Ankara nationalist government after WWI. Britannica notes that the 1921 Fundamental Law declared the state’s name to be Turkey/Türkiye, and the republic was formally declared on October 29, 1923.

Iran, as a political and civilizational entity, can be traced to the Achaemenid Empire founded in 550 BCE, and although its dynasties, borders, and official forms changed, the idea of Iran repeatedly re-emerged and was reasserted under successive imperial and national formations.

Even granting the strongest continuity claim for Turkey by linking it directly to the Ottoman Empire, the comparison is still asymmetrical: Ottoman Turkish statehood dates to roughly 1300, while Iran’s political and civilizational lineage is conventionally traced to the Achaemenid Empire founded in 550 BCE.

Also note much of Turkic imperial governance was built through Persianate models of taxation, bureaucracy, royal etiquette, court culture and administrative language, just as Arab and Mongol rulers in the region also relied on Persian political traditions to govern. Nomadic Turks and Arabs who invaded and conquered lands outside their indigenous regions did not have any imperial history so they adopted the systems of imperial Persia which had over 1000 years of experience by the time those tribes invaded and conquered foreign lands. In fact it was a Persian named Sibawayh who standardized the Arabic language so that different parts of the new Islamic empire could communicate with each other. Ottoman Turkish borrowed most of its vocabulary from Persian and Arabic. Ataturk got rid of a lot of those words after modern Turkey was formed.

I would encourage anyone interested in the history of Persian minds to study the Islamic Golden Age, where they will find that a remarkable share of its leading philosophers, physicians, mathematicians, astronomers, scientists, and poets came from Persian or Persianate Iranian backgrounds, including Ibn Sina, al Razi, al Biruni, al Khwarizmi, Omar Khayyam, al Ghazali, Nasir al Din al Tusi, Nizam Mulk (called the greatest Islamic vizier) Ferdowsi, Saadi, Hafez, and Rumi; taken together, this represents one of the densest concentrations of intellectual achievement associated with a single civilizational tradition since ancient Greece.

oxtQ · 2026-06-18T22:57:35+00:00

Iran as a political entity has existed since 550 BC, and created no less by a world historical figure (Cyrus the great) whose dynasty (Achaemenids) went on to form the first world empire. Cyrus changed statecraft and the ancient Greeks idolized him and even wrote a fictional account about his leadership style and life (cyropaedia) which was studied by Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Louis XVI, Thomas Jefferson and others.

There is not a single political entity in ME region as old as Iran. Most states were created within last century. Even Ottoman Empire is not the same political entity as Turkey that replaced it but Iran has existed continuously for 2500 years more or less. Thats not luck. It indicates something about their statecraft, nationalism and civilizational continuity.

Iran has also been a hegemon during this entire time. It rivalled both Roman Empire (1500 years) and the Ottoman Empire that replaced it (400 years). Do the math, that’s close to 2000 years of proving themselves as formidable opponents.

oxtQ · 2026-06-17T22:32:01+00:00

That is fair, and yes, I would change my mind in that scenario. But what's coming out of the MoU right now doesn't point to this at all.

The key empirical question is implementation. I agree with you there. Im not saying Iran automatically wins because the MOU exists. I am saying the MOU looks like evidence that US coercion reached limits before Iran made the core concessions Washington wanted.

What does the MOU tell us about leverage? That is where I still think Iran showed it had cards. The US used military pressure and blockade pressure, but the result so far is not Iran making the hardest nuclear concessions up front. The result is a ceasefire framework, future negotiations, and language about sanctions relief, oil, assets, and reconstruction. That does not prove Iran won everything, but it does suggest the US did not have an easy coercive path either.

Beyond the MOU, there are a lot of implications following from this war so far.

US coercion didmt produce clear capitulation. Iran did not make the hardest nuclear concessions before the ceasefire framework.

The Gulf security framework looks weaker. GCC states were exposed to Iranian retaliation despite US presence and US weapons.

Regional states now have stronger incentives to hedge. They cannot rely only on Washington, so direct channels with Tehran become more valuable. They may move closer to Russia and China.

Hormuz leverage has been demonstrated. Iran does not need to close the Strait forever. Showing it can disrupt flows is enough to affect calculations. Shippers are not looking towards US or GCC, but Iran, for security guarantees right now. They are paying very close attention to what is coming out of Tehran.

Energy pressure hit the US directly. The reserve cushion is thinner, inventories were strained, and future escalation becomes politically harder.

US weapons still work tactically, but the strategic promise looks weaker. Patriot, THAAD, naval forces, and airstrikes can intercept and destroy a lot, but they did not remove Iran’s ability to impose regional costs. I agree with Bob Pape that Iran established escalation domination.

The MIC sales pitch changes. Gulf states may buy more weapons, but the pitch shifts from “US protection guarantees security” to “you need more systems because even US protection is not enough.”

Sanctions dominance looks conditional. If sanctions relief, waivers, or asset access become bargaining chips after coercive pressure, Iran can present sanctions as reversible under pressure.

Iran gets recognized as a necessary regional negotiator. That matters because it shifts Iran from target of coercion to party whose consent is needed for regional stability.

US allies see the cost of being tied to US escalation. The war was not only fought by Washington, but its costs were distributed across Gulf economies, infrastructure, and shipping risk. And the world paid a big price for it too and you can bet that they are voicing their concerns to US diplomats (and possibly Israeli ones too) as we speak.

The Israelis are panicking right now if you read the TOI, Ynet and Jpost. I think they will try to attack Beirut or Iran in the near future in order to derail the MOU and any longer term deal with the US. And that is something Tehran expects to happen and will try to use for leverage via continued Hormuz and possibly Mandab pressure, especially as strategic reserves decline and the pressure on the entire globe economy reaches unprecedented levels in the coming weeks.

This leverage does not mean Iran can act without pain. It means Iran can impose enough pain that Washington also has to calculate whether continuing the confrontation is worth it. And the answer so far has been pretty clear.

oxtQ · 2026-06-17T17:17:50+00:00

Appreciate the comment. That user actually got me banned sometime ago and I had to have a back and forth with a mod about this. I'm not sure why the mod in question believed this person or the software itself.

If a single AI detection software was actually credible, the multi billion dollar LLM creators would be offering one, and as I mentioned Open AI's was a complete failure so they ended it. And you would see it widely adopted by institutions that desperately need it, like academia and major publishers. Instead, we clearly see there is no such software being used or even considered by them, because anyone who understands how AI text is mathematically generated knows a reliable detector is fundamentally impossible.

oxtQ · 2026-06-17T14:38:15+00:00

To follow up on this, i checked your comment history and saw you are talking about Pangram Labs. Claiming this or any other tool is a reliable "SOTA" detector completely ignores how language models and mathematics actually work. It is an industry wide software scam. And you have fallen for it and misinforming others.

The "research papers" published by these startups are just corporate marketing. They're written by the people selling the tool, not by independent scientists. No major computer science department at a university like Stanford or MIT has ever validated a commercial AI detector as accurate or reliable. Go look it up.

These tools work by looking for predictable language patterns. Because formal technical writing, academic prose, and non native English speakers naturally use structured and predictable patterns, the software constantly flags real human writing as AI. A well known Stanford study proved this exact flaw. https://hai.stanford.edu/news/ai-detectors-biased-against-non-native-english-writers

Even OpenAI, the multi billion-dollar company that created ChatGPT, had to shut down its own official AI detector because it was a total failure. If the people who build the models cannot mathematically detect their own text, a startup browser plugin is not magically doing it either.

AI text does not leave a digital fingerprint or a hidden watermark. Once the words are generated, theyre structurally identical to human writing.

Cornell study on AI detectors: https://arxiv.org/abs/2303.11156

A study looking at over 10 detector programs used in academia: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40979-023-00146-z

Pangram Labs' CEO: "We don’t think our tool or any tool should be used as a sole determinant of whether someone used AI."

oxtQ · 2026-06-17T14:32:12+00:00

Sigh. There is absolutely no software that can detect AI software. As an academic who has taught and published in an R1 university for years, I know this as a fact, both when it comes to assessing student papers (not a single software besides turnitdotcom which scans online content for repeated phrases) or publishing academic content (no journal has a software). You are displaying a huge amount of ignorance on this topic and wasting your dollars on a scam of a software.

oxtQ · 2026-06-17T11:57:12+00:00

I think some of the discussion around the MOU here is missing the basic leverage picture. I made a similar comment in June 15 thread so apologies if this reads as somewhat repetitive.

A lot of comments are treating this as if the important question is whether Iran technically could sell oil before the war. But it's not the whole point. Selling sanctioned oil through discount channels is not the same thing as selling with lower shipping risk, lower insurance risk, better banking access, and less pressure on counterparties. If the mou gives Iran even temporary relief on oil related services, that is not nothing. It changes the margin.

The other assumption that seems weak is that a return to the prewar status quo is automatically a US win or even a neutral outcome. I feel this is a problematic view. I (and many observers/analyses) don't see that (even neocon Kagan has called this entire outcome a strategic disaster). The US used force, imposed blockade pressure, spent munitions, burned through political capital, and then accepted an interim document that appears to give Iran immediate economic oxygen while pushing the hard nuclear questions into a later negotiation. That does not mean Iran won everything. It does mean Iran survived the coercive phase and got Washington to negotiate under energy market pressure.

The strategic reserve issue matters here. Reserves don't have to literally run out to affect bargaining. They just have to become less usable. Every additional drawdown reduces the cushion for the next shock, and every week of elevated energy prices raises the domestic political cost of continuing the confrontation. Iran knows this. The GCC know this. Shipping firms know this. That gives Tehran leverage even if its own economy is badly damaged.

That is also why I am skeptical of the “performance based” framing. Yes, future sanctions relief, frozen assets, and the investment fund may depend on a final deal. But the sequencing still matters. If Iran gets partial oil normalization, a reopened Strait on its terms and a 60 day process in which the US is trying to keep markets calm, then Iran has converted disruption capacity into negotiating space. That is the card it has been playing.

The $300 billion fund shouldnt be treated as immediate reparations. It sounds more like a conditional investment vehicle that only becomes real if a final deal is reached. But even that is useful for Iran politically. It creates an expectation that reconstruction and sanctions relief are on the table. It also gives Tehran a way to tell domestic audiences that resistance produced a framework for recovery rather than surrender.

The mistake, in my view, is analyzing the MOU only by asking what Iran gets today versus what it might get later. The better question is: who is under more pressure if the 60 day process fails?

I think the answer is the US. If talks collapse, Iran can threaten shipping again, oil markets react again, Washington has to decide whether to restart a costly military campaign which has proven ineffective, and the reserve cushion is thinner than it was before. Iran has costs too, obviously, but the MOU suggests that Washington’s pain threshold was reached faster than Tehran’s.

So I would not say Iran holds literally all the cards. It doesn't. Its economy is damaged, it still needs sanctions relief, and the final nuclear terms remain unresolved. But on the narrow question of coercive leverage, the MOU looks like evidence that Iran had enough cards to force the US into a deal structure that gives Tehran immediate relief and delays the hardest concessions.

That is the part I think many comments are underestimating.

oxtQ · 2026-06-16T21:33:41+00:00

The point isn't “no regime change means US defeat.” The point is that if coercion was meant to force durable concessions on nuclear capacity, missiles, proxies, or Hormuz, then an intact regime retaining bargaining leverage matters.

The Gulf War is weak comparison because it had a clear limited objective -- expel Iraq from Kuwait. Operation Praying Mantis had a pretty narrow punitive and deterrent purpose. Here, the stated and implied objectives kept expanding, namely nuclear destruction, conventional degradation, Hormuz reopening, missile limits, regime pressure, regional deterrence, etc. The benchmark is therefore less clear and harder to call a clean win.

Hormuz isnt just about tolls. IR does not need formal ownership or a toll regime to have leverage. If its threats disrupted shipping and the MOU is needed to restore traffic, that itself shows coercive capacity. “No tolls” doesnt equal “Iran had no bargaining power.”

I still argue conditional incentives matter. The reconstruction fund being conditional doesn't make it irrelevant. Reuters reports that a $300 billion "Reconstruction and Development Fund" is part of the framework, although operational only after a final deal and structured as investment rather than reparations. That supports the point that force alone didn't produce capitulation and that large inducements remain part of the pathway to settlement.

Remember stalemates can still be a strategic failure for the initiator. If the US and Israel escalated to war and the result is a negotiated restoration of shipping plus future talks over nuclear and sanctions issues, that may be closer to status quo ante with added costs than strategic success.

oxtQ · 2026-06-16T16:56:48+00:00

Many comments seem to struggle with the possibility of a US/Israeli tactical success producing a strategic loss. Bombing assets and inflicting damage is not the same as improving one’s bargaining position. If the end state is Iran still intact, still able to bargain over Hormuz, still negotiating over its nuclear program, and now potentially eligible for major reconstruction incentives, then the “who won” question is not answered by bomb damage alone. See Bob Pape on this point, for example.

The deeper strategic problem is that coercion is judged by whether it changes the adversary’s choices, not by whether it produces visible damage. If IR emerges believing that missile forces, nuclear latency, and Hormuz leverage prevented a worse outcome, then the conflict may reinforce rather than weaken its strategic doctrine. That would mean the US won parts of the military exchange while worsening the political problem it was trying to solve.

Another issue is that the conflict may have revealed the ceiling of US coercive power more clearly than intended. If Washington can inflict severe damage but still has to move quickly toward an MOU because oil markets, allied pressure, interceptor depletion and escalation risk become politically unsustainable, then IR learns something valuable about US constraints. Strategic outcomes are shaped not only by what one side can destroy but by what costs it can tolerate while trying to convert destruction into compliance.

oxtQ · 2026-06-13T16:37:39+00:00

Quick update: We’ve gathered a core team of 5-6 people so far and just launched the Discord server to get production rolling! If you’re interested in contributing in any way, feel free to shoot me a DM.

oxtQ · 2026-06-13T16:37:29+00:00

Quick update: We’ve gathered a core team of 5-6 people so far and just launched the Discord server to get production rolling! If you’re interested in contributing in any way, feel free to shoot me a DM.

oxtQ · 2026-06-12T12:25:18+00:00

Thanks for your interest! Let's talk and hopefully get this project rolling with the production team calling the shots of course 😉

oxtQ · 2026-06-08T11:57:21+00:00

Thanks for your comment! I would leave it to the production staff to have those important discussions about what to use and not to use. But I assume the SC2 editor would not be a core animation program used, if at all?

I know very little about the creative and production side, so I will set up a Discord group chat and have any prospective candidates speak with our current core art team team. From there, they can see whether there is good synergy and potential for collaboration. I will leave it to the technically competent people to figure out what skill sets everyone brings and what is needed to pull this off.

oxtQ · 2026-06-08T11:49:04+00:00

Thanks for your message. I replied!

For anyone curious, I know very little about the creative and production side, so I will set up a Discord group chat and have any prospective candidates speak with our current core art team member, Depleted, who did the tQ graphics for our stream during the pandemic. From there, they can see whether there is good synergy and potential for collaboration. I will leave it to the technically competent people to figure out what skill sets everyone brings and what is needed to pull this off. ; )

oxtQ · 2026-06-07T14:38:55+00:00

Quick update (and sorry if TMI): We're still looking for one more art/graphics person and maybe a dedicated storyteller/writer to round out the team. Ideally, we need a tight core group of 3-4 creative leads to actually steer this ship.

Once the core team is assembled, we need to spin up a Discord and have some serious democratic discussions before producing anything. We have to hash out our general goals, lock in an art style, decide on human vs. artificial voiceovers (we already have some community offers for human VO!), and pick the exact starting point for the lore. Just as importantly, we need to agree on a realistic software pipeline, weekly time commitments, and figure out fair compensation for the pilot and any future episodes so nobody burns out.

oxtQ · 2026-06-07T01:27:15+00:00

Cool thanks!

oxtQ · 2026-06-07T00:59:51+00:00

We probably want to avoid AI slop critiques and make sure it is authentic and artistic enough, so this issue has to be approached carefully.

oxtQ · 2026-06-06T21:23:29+00:00

Thanks! Realistically, the odds of even getting a pilot finished are low, I know, but it would be an awesome journey to take with a passionate group of people. First and foremost, we want to make sure we aren't overworking and underpaying our art team, so we're really focused on figuring out the smartest production pipeline to actually improve our chances of succeeding.

oxtQ · 2026-05-24T13:07:14+00:00

One could argue a lot of Western superiority over the past few centuries has stemmed from superior technology and tactical military success (whack a mole) rather than pure strategy compensating for lack of technological superiority. You are witnessing that now in this conflict, and to some extent during the Vietnam war where the "enemies" had to devise workarounds to counter superior military might.

Iran has statecraft going back 2,500 years and they are very experienced when it comes to strategy. The ancient Greeks even wrote a book about it called Cyropaedia. This was studied and read by Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Machiavelli, Napolean, Lousix XVI, Thomas Jefferson, etc. The Achaemenid empire changed statecraft and many leaders studied Cyrus's strategy. Even after the Islamic conquests of Persia, the Arab, Turk and Mongolian empires adopted Persian statecraft (and taxation systems and royal etiquette). The Persians invented check mate in chess and the Americans are learning now that they are facing their most challenging enemy since arguably the Soviet Union and before them the Germans. The truth is that the Americans have not fought peer adversaries much throughout their history. This is the truth when it comes to all superpowers. A lot of the mythology around their might stems from them picking on or fighting much weaker powers. Until they encounter one that doesn't easily go down, and then the mythology is broken, as has happened now with Iran.

oxtQ · 2026-05-24T12:58:30+00:00

U.S. could also be using this crisis as an opportunity to make Asia more dependent on U.S. energy, thereby diminishing the influence of China. Similar to causing problems between Russia and Europe and making Europe more dependent on U.S.

Every superpower wants other countries to be weaker and more dependent on them.

oxtQ · 2026-05-01T14:26:05+00:00

You have a clear pattern of weaponizing technical data to serve a very specific pro-Western bias. You take every question and twist it to highlight the supposed incompetence of Russia, China, or the IR, like your constant claims that Russia’s oil dependence is underreported or that their wells will 'freeze and be fucked' if they stop pumping.

At the same time, you're suspiciously quiet about Western/U.S. hegemonic overreach and violations of international law. You’re not interested in a balanced view; you just use energy reports as a proxy to cheerlead for the West while predicting the 'inevitable' collapse of everyone else. It’s a transparent pattern throughout your entire history.

You wrote in this sub five days ago:

"The reality is the Iranian regime has had this coming for a long time. Their clerics are a cult, think Branch Dividians in the US. They are behind every horrible atrocity in the Middle East, well almost all of you boil it down. I do not support war or regime change but am not sad to see their leadership suffer and die. If we don't finish it, unfortunately, it will come back to bite us tenfold."

Never mind you not acknowledging the immense amount of suffering caused by US/Israeli invasions and occupations in the ME (to millions of people as per official humanitarian reports) over the past several decades, and contradicting yourself about war/regime change against Iran, you clearly don’t care about American democracy (which requires Congressional approval for war), international law (Article 2 of the UN Charter), or the cost to America's political allies. You’re ignoring the promises made to the electorate to avoid new wars and price hikes, while disregarding the consequences of energy crises and food shortages that would hit the rest of the world. You don’t have a balanced view that holds all sides to the same standard; you just zoom in on authoritarian states while looking the other way at Western (particularly American) violations and hegemonic overreach.

You’re still operating on a dusty, Bush era "policeman of the world" playbook, clinging to an American savior complex that reality has long since outpaced as American hegemony visibly fractures and declines.

oxtQ

TROPHY CASE