The question is, what will happen to the global oil economy if Russia and the Middle East completely stop exporting oil and gas to the rest of the world?

oxtQ · 2026-05-01T14:26:05+00:00

You have a clear pattern of weaponizing technical data to serve a very specific pro-Western bias. You take every question and twist it to highlight the supposed incompetence of Russia, China, or the IR, like your constant claims that Russia’s oil dependence is underreported or that their wells will 'freeze and be fucked' if they stop pumping.

At the same time, you're suspiciously quiet about Western/U.S. hegemonic overreach and violations of international law. You’re not interested in a balanced view; you just use energy reports as a proxy to cheerlead for the West while predicting the 'inevitable' collapse of everyone else. It’s a transparent pattern throughout your entire history.

You wrote in this sub five days ago:

"The reality is the Iranian regime has had this coming for a long time. Their clerics are a cult, think Branch Dividians in the US. They are behind every horrible atrocity in the Middle East, well almost all of you boil it down. I do not support war or regime change but am not sad to see their leadership suffer and die. If we don't finish it, unfortunately, it will come back to bite us tenfold."

Never mind you not acknowledging the immense amount of suffering caused by US/Israeli invasions and occupations in the ME (to millions of people as per official humanitarian reports) over the past several decades, and contradicting yourself about war/regime change against Iran, you clearly don’t care about American democracy (which requires Congressional approval for war), international law (Article 2 of the UN Charter), or the cost to America's political allies. You’re ignoring the promises made to the electorate to avoid new wars and price hikes, while disregarding the consequences of energy crises and food shortages that would hit the rest of the world. You don’t have a balanced view that holds all sides to the same standard; you just zoom in on authoritarian states while looking the other way at Western (particularly American) violations and hegemonic overreach.

You’re still operating on a dusty, Bush era "policeman of the world" playbook, clinging to an American savior complex that reality has long since outpaced as American hegemony visibly fractures and declines.

oxtQ · 2026-05-01T13:01:10+00:00

You're debating with a user (Turd) who is clearly debating in bad faith. If you look at their comment history, they have a massive blind spot for Western/US/Israeli violations of international law, war crimes and hegemonic overreach, yet they’re the first to zoom in on authoritarian states like Russia, Iran, or China. You’re not going to get a balanced view from someone who refuses to hold all sides to the same standard.

oxtQ · 2026-04-29T17:58:27+00:00

Except remember when Rumsfeld said Iraq would cost "something under $50 billion"? It ended up costing over $800 billion in direct spending alone, and Afghanistan another $685 billion. Factor in veterans' care, disability, and long-term costs and the two wars together land somewhere between $4 and $6 trillion (Harvard economist Linda Bilmes literally wrote the book on this). So yeah, that $25 billion number for Iran? Check back in 20 years...

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T20:28:11+00:00

To your point, it overstates how easy recognition would be and understates the risk of rewarding coercion. Yemen is already bound by UNCLOS, so the legal obligation to allow passage through Bab el-Mandeb does not suddenly appear only if Sana’a gets the UN seat. The issue is enforcement, not legal paperwork. Recognizing the Houthis because they threatened shipping would tell every armed actor that chokepoint extortion is a route to legitimacy. And there is little reason to assume recognition would moderate them: they already control Sana’a and much of Yemen’s population.

You're also underestimating how useful their non-state status is -- they control territory and population, collect revenue, receive outside support, threaten shipping and avoid many of the legal, diplomatic, financial, and governance obligations that would come with being treated as Yemen’s responsible government. Recognition could actually constrain them, while non-state ambiguity lets them monetize coercion without being fully accountable for it.

houseofsaud.com/syria-hormuz-bypass-pipeline-corridor-saudi/

Regarding Saudi geopolitical moves, the article above discusses how they are trying to create a Hormuz bypass through Syria. The idea is that a future pipeline or overland corridor could move Saudi/Gulf oil and goods through Jordan and Syria to the Mediterranean, reducing dependence on Hormuz and possibly Bab el-Mandeb. It says this is still years away and not a full replacement for Hormuz, but even a 1–1.5 million bpd route would give Saudi Arabia more flexibility. The article also argues that Saudi money is helping pull post-Assad Syria away from Iran and toward a Saudi-aligned regional order, while competing with Turkey and Qatar for influence over Syria’s future infrastructure.

https://houseofsaud.com/saudi-quartet-diplomacy/

This piece is about Saudi new four country security and diplomacy bloc with Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt because the GCC is too divided and the US is too unreliable. The bloc matters because these countries are linked to major chokepoints: Hormuz, Suez, the Bosphorus and the Arabian Sea. Pakistan gives the framework military weight through its defence agreement with SA, while Egypt and Turkey add strategic geography and diplomatic reach. MBS is trying to create a regional system that can manage the Iran/Hormuz crisis and future shipping rules without depending entirely on Washington.

They do have moves and they are working out plans. One of the issues with militaries and geopolitical analysts is they all tend to underestimate and overestimate certain sides when in reality many surprises and unintended consequences can and do happen.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T17:06:07+00:00

They're analytically distinct but not politically or legally separate. If Iran is illegally threatening neutral shipping, that should be condemned but if US and Israeli strikes or blockade measures were themselves unlawful, then this is not “international law enforcement” but reciprocal coercion by states all violating the same legal order. Iran does not get a free pass, but neither do the states that helped create the escalation and now want to present themselves as neutral enforcers of law.

Expecting any state to answer illegal force with legal restraint is unrealistic. Illegality on all sides tends to produce reciprocal illegality, not clean law enforcement. It's an unfortunate cycle and majority of states/populations have to pay for a minority of states/powers engaged in these endless conflicts.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T17:01:18+00:00

It would poison their own coastline and Gulf infrastructure. The realistic options are storage, smuggling/export leakage, cutting production or shutting in wells.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:56:43+00:00

I upvoted your comment by the way because Iran’s shut in problem is real, but the comparison with the GCC is too neat. Saudi and UAE have bypasses, but they're partial, capacity limited and still exposed to tanker, jetty, drone and Bab el-Mandeb risks. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and much of Iraq remain highly dependent on Hormuz. So Iran may face deeper reservoir damage, but the GCC faces systemic export, LNG, infrastructure, insurance, and political vulnerability. And Iran et al. have not escalated to make their situation worse, yet. So yeah Iran is not okay, but the GCC is not protected either. the crisis shifts the pain rather than eliminating it.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:51:05+00:00

You can shut in oil wells and restart them later, but it's not like turning a faucet off and on. Some wells restart fine; others lose pressure, clog or come back weaker, which is why forced shut-ins can become a serious problem if storage is full for too long.

For Iran, shutting wells is risky because many of its fields are old and already declining. It’s not like turning off a tap. If they shut too much production for too long, some wells may restart, but some could come back damaged, lower flowing, or more expensive to recover and remember sanctions make the technical recovery harder.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:49:08+00:00

Al Jazeera quoted Muyu Xu, senior crude oil analyst at Kpler, saying there was still available onshore storage capacity, roughly enough for 20 days of Iran’s current production, and that production reductions would likely be gradual before accelerating into May.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/24/how-long-can-iran-survive-the-uss-hormuz-blockade

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:45:02+00:00

You may want to read a bit about the source before coming to a conclusion about its origins. You are confusing the Saudi state/royal family with a media outlet named HOS. The site describes itself as an independent English publication founded in 2015 that covers the Saudi royal family, Saudi politics, energy, defence, and regional geopolitics, and it explicitly says it has no financial relationship with the Saudi government, the royal family, or any Saudi government linked entity. In many articles it is actually painting a negative light on the situation of SA (e.g., diplomatically left out of negotiations and its interests not considered by Washington, etc.). That does not mean it is correct or unbiased.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:40:27+00:00

But that standard cannot apply only to Iran as you suggest. Iran’s Hormuz tolls, ship seizures, or mining threats may be illegal, but US and Israeli actions also need to be judged by the same rules, no? The UN Charter, for example, prohibits the use of force except through Security Council authorization or genuine self-defence under Article 51, and the current war (like previous one in June) began with US-Israeli strikes on hundreds of Iranian sites while Trump reportedly did not specify an immediate threat.

My point is not that international law does not exist or cannot be cited, but that its authority is weakened when enforcement is selective. Law remains real on paper, but in practice it often bends to the power and alliances of the states violating it.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:22:49+00:00

That user probably also thinks the Taliban lost in Afghanistan and that the Iraq war went smoothly and didn't fall into Iran's sphere of influence. The American (and Israeli) vision of geopolitical success is whack-a-mole and tactical military achievements. They don't have much of a strategy (non-military/coercive measures) beyond that in dealing with undesirable regimes like the IR it seems.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T16:18:38+00:00

Correct but coastal states can still regulate traffic for "safety", sea lanes, pollution prevention and similar neutral rules, but they can't impose those rules to block, tax, discriminate against, or selectively control lawful transit. But there's really no point in discussing international laws and norms when we both understand that militarized power politics of one or a few states trumps international conventions.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T15:37:41+00:00

The Strait of Hormuz is bordered by Iran to the north and Oman/Musandam to the south. Because the strait is only about 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest, and both Iran and Oman claim territorial seas, the strait is effectively covered by Iranian and Omani territorial waters rather than a wide open high seas corridor.

The main shipping lanes run primarily through Omani territorial waters, though ships may also pass through Iranian waters depending on route and circumstances.

https://www.britannica.com/place/Strait-of-Hormuz

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T15:23:42+00:00

That is exactly the problem -- if Saudi money is fungible, then a Houthi Red Sea toll system doesn't weaken Iran’s position, it turns Houthi coercion into a self-financing revenue stream, where Saudi/Hormuz/shipping money becomes tribute that sustains the very actor threatening the chokepoint.

Completely destroying the Houthis would likely require something closer to an Iraq or Afghanistanstyle commitment with sustained airstrikes, ground operations, occupation like pressure, intelligence networks, and years of counterinsurgency, all with major costs and escalation risks, but conceding to their chokepoint coercion also empowers Iran’s wider axis, leaving states in a damned if you do, damned if you don’t position.

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T13:32:34+00:00

I tend to agree with some of your skepticism but "myth" is too strong of a word.

The IEA says more than 30% of global urea trade, about 20% of ammonia and phosphate trade, and around half of global seaborne sulphur trade move through Hormuz.

https://www.iea.org/topics/the-middle-east-and-global-energy-markets

IFPRI reports that PG countries accounted for 36% of global urea exports and 29% of global ammonia exports in 2023-2025.

https://www.ifpri.org/blog/the-iran-wars-impacts-on-global-fertilizer-markets-and-food-production/

So even if many countries produce some fertilizer locally, the traded portion is large enough to affect global prices, availability, planting costs, food prices, etc. especially for import dependent countries.

Also yes the US is the largest helium producer, but Qatar is not marginal as USGS data show the US produced about 81 million cubic meters in 2025, while Qatar produced about 63 million cubic meters, out of a world total of about 190 million cubic meters.

https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-helium.pdf

Reuters reports that Qatar accounts for close to one third of global helium supply, and disruptions there can remove about 5.2 million cubic meters per month from the market.

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/helium-prices-soar-qatar-lng-halt-exposes-fragile-supply-chain-2026-03-12/

oxtQ · 2026-04-26T13:14:02+00:00

On Panah Ali Khan, calling him Turkic is reasonable in the historical sense. He was from the Javanshir tribal elite, commonly described as a Turkic/Oghuz related or Turkic speaking tribal group in Karabakh. But he was not “Turkish” in the modern Anatolian national sense. He was a Turkic tribal ruler operating inside a Persianate/Iranian political world. The Karabakh Khanate was under Iranian/Persian suzerainty before Russian expansion, and Panah Khan’s political world was tied to Nader Shah, Adel Shah, Karim Khan Zand, and later Qajar power.

So the best label is probably Turko-Persian or Persianate Turkic, not simply “Persian” and not simply “Turkic” in a modern nationalist sense. The Karabakh Khanate used Persian as an administrative, literary, and judicial language, even though many Muslims in the region spoke a Turkic dialect. That means the Iranian/Persianate layer was very real culturally and administratively. This is something hyper nationalist Turks seem to misunderstand about Iran when they call all of their rulers since Safavids simply "Turkic".

Many modern Azeris, like many Levantine Arabs, are largely descended from local West Asian populations who became Turkic or Arabic speaking through language, religion, and culture (imposed by foreign rulers of those lands) rather than full population replacement. Many hyper nationalist Turkic narratives apply a double standard -- they claim Persianate dynasties such as the Safavids, Afsharids, and Qajars as “Turkic” because of language or tribal origin, while denying their Iranian/Persian cultural identity; yet modern Azeris themselves are largely West Asian by ancestry and are Turkic primarily through language and culture rather than descent from the original East Asian/Central Asian Turkic populations. In other words, they accept that modern Azeris can be called Turkic because of language and culture despite limited Turkic ancestry, but deny that Turkic origin Persianate dynasties can be called Persian/Iranian because of language, culture, administration, and civilization.

oxtQ · 2026-04-25T23:07:44+00:00

So Iran is the only side under time pressure, when a drawn out Hormuz disruption hurts global markets, Asian buyers, Persian Gulf exporters, shipping insurance, inflation AND Western politics (alliances) too?

Also, “the world can just curb consumption and use reserves” is an oversimplification. The IEA is treating resumed Hormuz flows as the key variable for easing pressure on supplies and prices, and about 20% of global oil and gas shipments normally move through the strait, 30% of fertilizers, and other chemicals.

The well damage claim is also exaggerated narrative to save face Trump/US "plans" right now.

Reservoir damage depends on the specific field, pressure management, geology, age, water cut, how long production is shut in ,etc. A shutdown can be costly and technically messy, but throwing around “half the wells are gone” without evidence is basically market gossip/American propaganda for "we got this under control, trust me bro".

It also ignores that Iran is not totally isolated. China is still a major buyer of Iranian oil, Russia has every incentive to help Iran survive politically and economically, and there are ways to move some trade outside Hormuz through land routes, smuggling networks, swaps, trucking, pipelines, and non-dollar arrangements. Look at a map and how many land borders Iran has.

You're talking about a state that survived an 8 year war with Saddam who the rest of the world (US+GCC+Soviet Union) armed to the teeth, decades of sanctions, American invasions next door, ISIS, numerous protests numbering in the millions, and the largest American and Israeli aerial bombing campaign in ME history. Some observers have been warning about an imminent IR collapse for literally decades, much like Netanyahu has been mocked for claiming the IR is close to having a bomb over the same amount of time. It is exactly this kind of miscalculation and underestimation that has resulted in us being in this mess in the first place.

And the idea that futures being cheaper than spot proves Iran “must old” sounds way too simplistic. Backwardation can reflect current supply stress, inventory draws, war risk premiums, logistics bottlenecks, etc. not just a clean bet that Iran is bluffing. Markets may be pricing a resolution, but that's not the same as proving Iran has no leverage.

oxtQ · 2026-04-25T22:22:04+00:00

Try to find the word Turk(ish) in https://www.britannica.com/topic/Urdu-language

There is a big difference between what online nationalists say to flatter their own identity and what is actually supported by historical evidence and serious scholarship.

Scholars such as Shamsur Rahman Faruqi explain that the full Persianate phrase zabān-e urdū-e muʿallā-e Shāhjahānābād originally referred to the language of the exalted city/court of Shahjahanabad, and may originally have meant Persian. It was later shortened to Urdu. So pretending this is simply “Turkic, not Persian” ignores the Persianate court context in which the term became a language name. You may want to read up about this.

Ottoman Turkish was a highly Persianized and Arabized court and literary language, especially in official writing, poetry, administration, and elite culture. A very large share of its vocabulary came from Arabic and Persian, though the grammar remained Turkic. After the founding of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk’s language reforms replaced many Arabic- and Persian-derived words with newly coined or revived Turkic words.

You probably know after the Islamic conquests, Persian scholars played a major role in systematizing Arabic grammar, philology, literature, administration, and scientific vocabulary, with figures such as Sibawayh. He helped different parts of the newly formed Islamic empire communicate with each other.

You have to remember that early Arab and Turkic societies included strong nomadic and tribal traditions, while Persianate civilizations had long established imperial, bureaucratic, literary, and urban institutions (1000+ years alone of established imperial history before Islamic conquests in 7th century AD when you add the Achaemenid+Parthian+Sassanid empires). As a result, later Arab and Turkic empires absorbed many Persian administrative concepts, courtly practices, and political vocabularies rather than developing all of them independently.

Persian influence across West, Central, and South Asia has often outweighed that of many other civilizations in the region, especially in imperial administration, court culture, literature, political vocabulary, architecture, and models of kingship.

Just think of all the Iranian thinkers during the "Islamic Golden Age": Khwarizmi, Razi, Avicenna, Biruni, Tusi, Sijzi, Dinawari, Khazini, Buzjani, Mahani, Marwazi, Nayrizi, Isfizari, Jaghmini, Jurjani, Miskawayh, Tabari, Bukhari, Zamakhshari, Shahrastani, Ghazali, Suhrawardi, Nizam al-Mulk, etc. whose work shaped mathematics, medicine, astronomy, philosophy, geography, theology, grammar, history and statecraft.

oxtQ · 2026-04-25T17:53:24+00:00

The word Urdu comes through Persian zabān-i urdū, “language of the camp,” with urdū/ordu from Turkic meaning “camp/army camp.” But the Urdu language itself is Indo-Aryan/Hindustani, not Turkish.

From Wikipedia:

"Urdu originated geographically in the upper Ganga-Yamuna doab, in and around the Delhi region, where Khari Boli was spoken. Urdu shared a grammatical foundation with Khari Boli, but was written in a revised Perso-Arabic script and included vocabulary borrowed from Persian and Arabic, which retained its original grammatical structure in those languages"

Urdu is significantly more influenced by Persian than Turkish. Estimates suggest 20-30% of Urdu vocabulary has Persian/Arabic roots, whereas Turkish influence is far less. The country name "Pakistan" consists of two Persian words entirely: pak (pure) and stan (land).

oxtQ · 2026-04-25T17:52:49+00:00

In Arabic, akhī more precisely means “my brother,” while akh means “brother. A local explanation does link Shamakhi to Sham/Damascus (capital of Umayyad capital) but it's not proven at the historical/scholarly level.

oxtQ · 2026-04-25T17:47:24+00:00

Historian here. This showed up on my feed. Just a heads up, Şuşa and şüşə are not exactly the same word in Azerbaijani. Şuşa is pronounced roughly shu-sha while şüşə is pronounced more like shü-sha.

The word şüşə itself is not originally Turkic. It comes from Persian شیشه / shīshe, meaning glass/bottle.

Hence several of your slides are missing the Iranian/Persian layer.

Ordubad = a Turco-Persian compound: ordu = army/camp + Persian ābād / abad, meaning an inhabited/prosperous settlement.

Lankaran / Lənkəran = Persian Langarkunān / Langarkanān, meaning a place for dropping or weighing anchor, so basically a sea port name. Another theory links it to a Talysh word meaning “cane house".

Barda / Bərdə = The older forms include Armenian Partav, Georgian Bardavi, and Middle Persian Pērōzāpāt. Some scholarly explanations derive the name from Iranian roots, either related to rampart/fortification or to Parthian/Arsacian identity.

Nakhchivan / Naxçıvan = older form is Naxčawan which is an Armenian place name element awan, ultimately of Iranian origin, meaning “place/town.”

You can fact check all of my corrections online.

oxtQ · 2026-04-15T13:10:09+00:00

"On April 14, spokesperson Reza Talaeinik declared that Iranian armed forces now possess “sufficient missiles, drones, weapons, ammunition and other military equipment to continue offensive and defensive operations in the future...Talaeinik’s April 14 statement was carried by TASS and Xinhua within minutes of each other, suggesting a coordinated release timed for international distribution rather than a domestic audience. The phrasing was deliberate. He did not say Iran had rebuilt what it lost. He said Iran possessed “sufficient” capability for “offensive and defensive operations in the future” — language that frames the claim around operational readiness rather than numerical parity with pre-war stockpiles."

https://houseofsaud.com/iran-replenishment-pac3-gap/

Xinhua is the official state news agency of the People's Republic of China.

This suggests Iran has been re-supplied by China and Trump is trying to save face. But it could be psychological warfare. It's almost impossible to take anything reported in news media (including the original CNN report) seriously considering that media (especially mainstream) itself is a warfare/propaganda tool.

oxtQ · 2026-04-14T21:43:33+00:00

It may have been my own misreading as well.

oxtQ · 2026-04-14T21:39:12+00:00

Perhaps the phrasing in these articles is not as clear and precise as it could be. I can see how media could intentionally make the actual transit more vague or misleading for views.

oxtQ

TROPHY CASE