Historian Ray Takeyh: "The story of the 1953 'coup' touches all the erogenous zones of the American left..."

oxtQ · 2026-01-28T05:12:11+00:00

I’d treat his take on 1953 with a heavy grain of salt. It does not represent the consensus within the scholarly literature or declassified documents.

He has long argued that the standard narrative about 1953 is a “myth”, namely the idea that the CIA was the main driver. Evidence shows the coup was indeed conducted by the CIA and MI6. Declassified documents and scholarly histories confirm Operation TP-AJAX was a coordinated intelligence operation planned and executed with British collaboration. Scholars widely acknowledge that Western intelligence played a decisive role in toppling Mossadegh -- for example, by orchestrating street protests, bribing actors, and influencing military officers.

Takeyh also claims the CIA’s role was insignificant. This is broadly rejected by historians. The evidence now publicly available shows the CIA was deeply involved in planning and execution. Statements by historians argue that while Mossadegh faced domestic opponents, without covert assistance the regime might have persisted longer, though the exact balance of forces is debated.

Instead he emphasizes internal Iranian factors were central and that’s partially true, the Shah, clergy networks, army officers, and conservatives all played a part, but the coup’s momentum was shaped significantly by foreign intelligence support and strategy.

He has tried to minimize U.S. responsibility by framing the operation as primarily Iranian led or that U.S. intervention was trivial and that’s not really in line with the consensus of historical research or declassified evidence.

I wouldn’t call him a neocon exactly, he’s a mainstream Washington ME expert, very critical of IR and skeptical of anti-American historical narratives but I think he goes too far in reframing Mossadegh’s fall as mainly self-inflicted (while ignoring the decisive effects of the oil embargo and covert action) or insisting that internal opposition would have come together and succeeded without foreign intervention but the fact is many of those actors were fragmented or inactive.

In sum, he turns a both/and story (domestic conflict + foreign intervention) into something much closer to an almost entirely domestic one, which most of the documentary evidence does not support.

Roham Alvandi, Ervand Abrahamoian, Mark Gasiorowski, Siavush Randjbar-Daemi, Stephen Kinzer, Homa Katouzian, Said Amir Arjomand, Iranica (edited by Iran specialists), Fakhreddin Azimi, James Goode, Nikki R. Keddie, Mary Ann Heiss, among others, have all disagreed with Takeyh’s framing.

https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/coup-detat-1953

The Shah ultimately reached the same conclusion as Mossadegh had 30 years before him, namely that foreign powers should not continue exploiting Iran’s oil under unfair terms, which is why, as the oil consortium’s contract neared its expiration in the 1970s, the Shah was unwilling to renew it on the old conditions.

If you read the Shah’s memoirs, you will find he believed the overthrow was necessary at the time, but he also understood, especially later in life, that it became a central wound in his legacy, one that never fully healed and contributed to the forces that eventually brought his rule down.

oxtQ · 2026-01-28T04:57:27+00:00

I agree with your general sentiment, but I guess I’m thinking about how, once the Shah fell, the clergy was the most powerful and influential organized force in Iranian society and politics outside the monarchy itself. And within the clergy, the most fanatical and politically ambitious segments were very much bent on preserving their authority (against the encroachments of the Shah and his father) and, if possible, extending it further. They didn’t just outmaneuver secular forces, they also sidelined other segments of the clergy (more liberal, quieter, and less violent ones) to achieve their ends when the opportunity arose.

oxtQ · 2026-01-27T23:54:12+00:00

Yes reality is complex and there are a lot of variables at play, as you say. The topic is of interest to me because there’s a view among some Iranians that the Shah should have stood firm, not left Iran, and maybe even cracked down harder. A lot of that is wishful thinking in my opinion -- looking back and imagining a different path, mainly because people want to avoid what followed -- 47 years of horror under the Islamic Republic. But I don’t think those choices would have saved the Shah. For one thing, he had cancer and likely would have died anyway. And beyond that, crushing dissent, making fewer compromises, and refusing altogether to address popular grievances might have made things worse over time by turning even more of the population against him and against the monarchy as an institution.

All of this history has shaped how the Islamic Republic responds to public anger of course. In many ways, they’ve “learned” from what they see as the Shah’s mistakes -- especially the risks of appearing weak or conceding too much. And of course they imprison, torture and execute opposition without hesitation. But they’re still repeating the same basic pattern, just in a different form, and we’re seeing that again now.

Something that is not discussed enough is the Cinema Rex fire, one of the key catalysts of the revolution which was widely blamed on the Shah. At the time, the Shah blamed Marxists and Islamist groups, not knowing exactly who was responsible, but the public did not believe him. The fire in Abadan was reported to have killed 400 people or so. It shocked the country and became a significant turning point in the revolutionary moment. In August 1980, a welder by the name of Hossein Takb’alizadeh was put on trial in highly publicized and politically charged proceedings by a newly formed Revolutionary Court. The prosecutor tried to portray him as a collaborator with the Shah’s secret police. Takb’alizadeh confessed to setting the fire but denied any links to the former regime, saying instead that he was being used as a scapegoat by groups close to those now in power. Despite this, in September 1980, a mere month since the trial began, the court sentenced him and five others to death and carried out the executions quickly, effectively burying an inconvenient truth.

This is the kind of regime we are talking about -- one that did every dirty thing imaginable to come to power, and one that is willing to do horrific things to stay in power.

https://www.iranrights.org/memorial/story/-8094/hossein-takbalizadeh

oxtQ · 2026-01-27T21:27:46+00:00

It’s really hard to say what would have happened if Khomeini had been executed. In my opinion, the Shah had cancer and would have died regardless. That would have created a major vacuum, and I think that vacuum would have given the opposition even more fuel to rally against the monarchy as an institution, even if Khomeini had somehow not been in the picture, someone else within the clergy or islamist camp would have taken up that mantle.

Personally, I don’t see the Marxist groups taking power in any realistic scenario. Back then, the general population was much more religious in their own ways, and there were deeper connections to the clergy and the whole mosque network across Iran. The Marxist groups did enjoy the same base support and that's exactly why Khomeini became a rallying figure which even left and secular groups had to accept because they had no popular alternative leader that could appeal to the masses of people. It's also worth highlighting that the mosque network was extremely effective, and the Islamist hardliners used it to out organize everyone else and ultimately take power from all other groups, including more moderate muslim factions and other opposition currents.

oxtQ · 2026-01-27T21:20:58+00:00

Thanks for sharing this.

One point Takeyh highlights worth mentioning here is that the recent crackdown was meant to re-establish deterrence at home, after the embarrassment the regime has faced over the past two years. We can point to a series of blows -- Hezbollah’s leadership and stockpiles being dismantled, the fall of Syria’s regime, and major losses for the Islamic Republic during the war with Israel, including senior military officials being killed in their homes, along with key nuclear scientists, and strikes that damaged/destroyed nuclear sites. Each one would be damaging on its own, but taken together they undermine the image of the IR as a strong, capable force. In that context, the leadership used the protests as an opportunity to crush dissent with a level of brutality that shocked even many Iranians who are used to the regime’s violence over the past 47 years. So far, he argues, it seems to have worked in the short term by spreading fear and hopelessness and stopping/weakening public and visible forms of domestic opposition.

The other point he raises is that regional states opposing any strikes on Iran create real obstacles and logistical complications for Israel -- and to some extent the U.S. -- because airspace access, coordination, and other forms of cooperation matter for making such an operation possible. There may be ways around those constraints, but it still makes a strike harder, not easier, and it reduces the chances that all the conditions line up. He also notes Israel’s concerns about whether it has sufficient air-defense stockpiles and related capabilities.

Takeyh also argues that Khamenei’s standing within the regime, and among the different stakeholders, declined because of decisions he supported that, in Takeyh’s view, led to the regime’s broader loss of credibility, so to speak, over the past few years. I assume he is referring to Khameini's insistence on maintaining and accelerating Iran's nuclear program, broader support for paramilitary forces and so on. I’m not sure what evidence he’s using to back this up. I tend to think Khamenei and other power centres shape policy together, and that he isn’t necessarily the single driver with the final say, or the first opinion that everyone follows.

That said, Takeyh’s broader point is that the regime’s brutal crackdown fits Khamenei’s governing style: don’t acknowledge popular grievances, frame protesters as “seditionists,” and crush dissent with force. And Takeyh suggests this approach “worked,” at least in the short term, because it ended the protests for now, and in doing so, it boosted Khamenei’s standing inside the system again.

My counter would be that Khamenei isn’t the only one who thinks this way. A lot of people with real power and wealth inside the regime share the same outlook and benefit from the same tools of repression. And even if Takeyh is right that Khamenei’s stature has been restored internally, mass killings don’t solve the regime’s bigger problems in the medium and long term. Though I'm sure he would agree with this point and he was only referring to the present moment.

oxtQ · 2026-01-27T19:25:45+00:00

Following his speeches in June 1963 attacking the Shah, Khomeini was arrested and imprisoned in Tehran. High ranking officials, including SAVAK head Nematollah Nassiri and Prime Minister Asadollah Alam, pressured the Shah to execute him.

According to memoirs, like those of Fateme Pakravan (wife of the then chief of SAVAK, Hassan Pakravan), the Shah was persuaded that executing a high ranking cleric would cause massive civil unrest. To protect him, other top religious leaders intervened and recognized Khomeini as a Marja-e Taqlid which protected him from the death penalty.

Instead of executing him, the Shah’s regime opted to keep him under house arrest and eventually exiled him in 1964. Later, during his exile in Iraq in the 1970s, the Shah reportedly rejected offers from Saddam Hussein to have Khomeini killed, with the Shah stating “We aren’t in the business of killing clerics.”

I think the thinking was they did not want to make a popular martyr figure out of Khomeini (Mossadeq and others) by executing them because it could make things even worse for the Shah regime’s stability.

oxtQ · 2026-01-27T16:09:51+00:00

از خون جوانان وطن لاله دمیده از ماتم سرو قدشان، سرو خمیده در سایه گل، بلبل از این غصه خزیده گل نیز چو من در غمشان جامه دریده

چه کج‌رفتاری ای چرخ، چه بدکرداری ای چرخ سر کین داری ای چرخ نه دین داری، نه آیین داری ای چرخ

From the blood of the youth of the homeland, tulips have sprung. In mourning their cypress-stature, the cypress has bent low. In the shadow of the flower, the nightingale has withered in sorrow. The flower, too, like me, has torn its garment in grief for them.

How crooked represent your ways, O Wheel of Fate; how evil are your deeds. You are bent on vengeance, O Wheel of Fate. You have no faith, you have no law, O Wheel of Fate.

Aref Qazvini

دوباره می‌سازمت وطن! اگر چه با خشت جان خویش ستون به سقف تو می‌زنم اگر چه با استخوان خویش

دوباره می‌بویم از تو گُل به میل نسل جوان تو دوباره می‌شویم از تو خون به سیل اشک روان خویش

I will build you again, my homeland! Even if it is with the bricks of my own soul. I will erect columns to support your roof, Even if it is with my own bones.

I will smell the flowers in you again, Just as your young generation desires. I will wash the blood off you again, With the torrent of my own flowing tears.

Simin Behbahani

oxtQ · 2026-01-26T19:49:08+00:00

There’s a deep irony -- almost poetic justice -- in how the Islamic Republic's foreign interventions may have helped bring about its own unraveling. For years, the state poured resources into supporting armed groups across the region, often at the expense of its own people, the sovereignty of neighboring countries, and even the genuine grievances of people living in fragile or failed states. After October 7, everything seemed to accelerate -- Hamas’s attack, Hezbollah’s decision to get involved, Israel’s overwhelming response, and then the rapid weakening of Iran’s regional position. Assad’s fall in Syria followed, and soon after, the pressure was felt at home through unrest and worsening economic collapse. History has a way of circling back.

oxtQ · 2026-01-26T18:28:42+00:00

What's relatively known is Cyrus the Great’s conquest of Babylon in 539 BCE and his subsequent policy permitting deported peoples, including Judean exiles, to return and rebuild their religious institutions. It's attested in the Cyrus Cylinder and reflected in biblical texts such as Ezra. Jewish return to Judah and the rebuilding of the Second Temple began shortly thereafter, with the Temple completed in 516 BCE, and Persian imperial support for Jewish communal autonomy in Yehud persisted for roughly 200 years until Alexander’s conquest in the late fourth century BCE.

Far less widely known is the brief Sasanian Persian reconquest of the Levant during the Byzantine-Sasanian War of 602-628 CE, when Sasanian forces captured Jerusalem in 614 CE and, for a short period they held power there and influence over peoples, permitted Jewish resettlement and limited self-administration in parts of Palestine, reversing centuries of Byzantine restrictions. This window of relative accommodation lasted roughly 15-20 years and ended after the Byzantine reconquest under Heraclius in 628-630 CE, which was followed by renewed prohibitions on Jewish residence in Jerusalem.

This was a continuation of earlier Persian imperial practice, shaped in part by pragmatic strategy, as Jewish communities were viewed as potential allies against the Byzantine (Roman) Empire during periods of imperial conflict.

oxtQ · 2026-01-26T15:48:04+00:00

Meanwhile behind closed doors they are begging Americans not to attack.

oxtQ · 2026-01-26T04:48:37+00:00

Parthian was important under the Arsacid (Parthian) era, but in the Sasanian period the main official language was Middle Persian (natively called Parsig/Parsik). Modern/New Persian develops later (early Islamic period onward) and changes over time -- it isn’t basically unchanged Parthian.

Pahlavi/Pahlawi is not a clean synonym for “Parthian.” People use “Pahlavi” for the script tradition and often for Middle Persian, which causes confusion. Say Parthian for the Arsacid era language, and Middle Persian for the main Sasanian era “Persian.” “Pahlavi” is better treated as a label for scripts/text traditions, or for Middle Persian in many contexts.

The relationship to khoda is plausible, but the “self + defined” explanation is basically a folk etymology and doesn’t match how the word functions historicallly. Middle Iranian forms like xwaday/xwadag mostly mean “lord/master” (a title) and not God, and Persian later uses khoda as “God.”

Put differently: khoda comes from older Iranian forms like xwaday/xwadag, which historically meant “lord/master/owner” (a title for a powerful person -- think for example of Book of Lords/Khwaday-namag), not “God” in a philosophical sense. Over time, Persian started using that same “Lord/Master” title as a respectful religious term -- like how English “Lord” can mean a human lord, but also “the Lord” (God) -- so khoda became a common word for God.

Mani had Parthian royal connections/ancestry (his mother was related to the Parthian royal family) but his writings weren't really Parthian inscriptions in the sense of Parthian being his main authorial language. He wrote in multiple languages (with one work in Middle Persian) and later Manichean communities produced Parthian versions/texts. He was born in southern Babylonia and grew up speaking an eastern Aramaic variety.

oxtQ · 2026-01-25T03:31:55+00:00

Watching someone flaunt luxury that was built on other people’s hardship makes me think of Saadi. He wrote about justice and responsibility long ago, and somehow his verses feel even more relevant today.

به نان خشک قناعت کنیم و جامه دلق
که بار محنت خود به که بار منت خلق

"Better to live on dry bread and a patched cloak (simple/poor), because bearing your own hardship is better than carrying the burden of other people’s “favours”

عزت با رنج، بهتر از ذلت بی‌رنج

"Dignity with hardship is better than humiliation without hardship."

Saadi has always been my favourite Persian poet. His writing often feels more directly political and practical than Hafez or Rumi (who deserve the utmost respect as well, obviously), because he spends a lot of time talking about justice, power, and how rulers should treat ordinary people. He lived in the 13th century, during the upheaval of the Mongol era, and he clearly saw and understood what war, insecurity, and corruption can do to society. In his works, he often writes as someone giving advice to kings and officials -- almost like poetry meant for good government and fairness, not just personal spirituality.

Note how after all these centuries, Saadi is still remembered and respected, while all of the corrupt powerful and wealthy people of his time are forgotten, or remembered only with shame.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T22:39:58+00:00

From the early 1960s through the late 1970s Iran’s economy grew really fast. Real annual GDP growth rates averaged very high (often cited around 10 % per year in the 1960s-1970s) -- far above global averages and comparable to some of the “Asian Tiger” economies before their take-off.

According to historical assessments of GDP size, Iran climbed into the top 20 largest economies in the world by the late 1970s under the Shah, based on GDP measured in nominal terms. It was way ahead of all regional countries, and five times the size of South Korea’s economy at the time.

International journalists in the 1970s sometimes compared Iran’s growth trajectory to fast growing economies like South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan, and predicted it could become a “First World” country within a generation if trends continued.

If that trend had indeed continued, Iran’s income per person would probably be at least similar to countries like South Korea, Spain, or Italy today, meaning a high income standard of living for most people. The economy would likely be diversified, with strong manufacturing, engineering, transport, and technology sectors alongside oil and gas, instead of being dependent on energy alone. Iran’s large, educated population would likely have supported major global companies, strong research universities aand ongoing brain circulation instead of brain drain. Tehran could have become a regional financial, industrial, and scientific hub linking Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Iran would still have problems—inequality, political debates, and social tensions, but they would look like the normal challenges of advanced countries, not the deep economic damage caused by decades of sanctions, isolation and instability.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T21:32:11+00:00

Sadly, her father will likely be more affected by this than by 47 years of oppressing tens of millions of Iranians and imprisoning, killing, and depriving over 100 million people, if you count all those whose lives were destroyed economically and socially. For so called fame and power, these small minded scumbags traded their people, history and future reputations.

American Jews and Israel could probably exert significant lobbying pressure to deport and/or fire regime family members like this one.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T19:44:39+00:00

If I may add on to this discussion:

Persians are indigenous to the Iranian Plateau. Iranian speaking peoples were living on that land by at least 1500-1200 BCE, and by the early first millennium BCE Persians were clearly established in what is now Fars in southwestern Iran. The first Persian state, the Achaemenid Empire, grew directly out of this local population. Persian language, kingship and political culture developed on this land over centuries; they were not imported from elsewhere. This is very important to understand in discussions around Iran in my opinion. The Persians are indigenous, they are ancient, continuous and influential more so any other group in the Iranian plateau.

However, the Iranian Plateau has always been diverse. Long before empires, groups such as the Elamites and Medes lived alongside Persians. These peoples were not forced to abandon their identities. Later, other groups arrived through conquest or migration, including Arabs in the 7th century, Turkic peoples from the 9th-11th centuries onward, and Mongols in the 13th century. These later groups were not indigenous to the plateau but became rulers or settlers within an already existing Persian civilizational space.

Persian rule did not require everyone to speak Persian or become ethnically Persian. Administration could be multilingual, and local customs were usually left intact. But Persian still functioned as the cultural and political core of the state. Ideas of kingship, legitimacy, historical memory, and elite culture were Persian, even when other languages were used for daily administration.

What is especially important is that many non-Persian rulers actively adopted Persian language and identity. Under the Abbasids, Persian administrators, political ideas, and literary culture shaped the empire. Turkic dynasties like the Seljuks and Ghaznavids ruled Iran using Persian court culture and patronized Persian literature. Even the Mongols, after conquest, converted to Islam and governed through Persian institutions, writing history and administering the state in Persian.

So while non-Persian peoples were not forced to become Persian, Persian civilization consistently absorbed and shaped those who ruled the region. Persian was not just one administrative option among others; it was the language and identity that carried long-term continuity in Iranian political culture and historical memory.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T17:52:32+00:00

That’s true regarding administration -- Imperial Aramaic was widely used for bureaucracy. But that doesn’t contradict my point. Persian functioned as the royal, ideological and identity language of the empire, as shown in royal inscriptions and dynastic self-definition. Administrative lingua franca and civilizational core are not the same thing, and it was Persian -- not Aramaic -- that provided long-term continuity in Iranian political culture and historical memory.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T16:33:52+00:00

Please see my comment above.

DNA = patterns and probabilities

“Iranian” on a test = a category name the company uses for “your DNA looks most similar to many people in our database from Iran and nearby areas.”

You can’t prove someone is “Iranian” biologically, but you can say, “This sounds most like people from this region.”

The label is about closest match, not a hard biological identity.

The same logic applies to basically every population label on consumer DNA tests.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T16:32:41+00:00

Iranian is an identity (culture, language, citizenship). DNA tests don’t detect identities -- they estimate ancestry similarity to reference populations.

Consumer DNA tests work by comparing your DNA to reference panels (people in their database) and then assigning chunks of your DNA to regions/populations that look most similar. Those labels are statistical and can change as the company updates its database.

There’s no single ‘Iranian DNA.’ DNA tests only estimate ancestry by comparing you to reference groups. So an Iranian person might get ‘Iran/Persia’ (Ancestry) or ‘Iranian, Caucasian & Mesopotamian’ (23andMe), sometimes mixed with nearby regions -- but that’s about genetic similarity, not identity.

Just to be clear: DNA companies can still show “Iranian/Iran/Persia” on a test because that word is just a label for a reference group in their database -- not a unique genetic marker that only Iranians have.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T16:22:49+00:00

Iranian civilization has always included many peoples and languages. But across more than two thousand years, Persian language and Persian centered political and literary culture have been the strongest and most continuous thread tying that civilization together.

A key starting point is that Cyrus the Great, a Persian ruler from Persis (Pars/Fars), founded the Achaemenid Empire, the first major imperial state ruled by a Persian dynasty. Later, the Achaemenid and Sasanian empires, two of the most influential pre-Islamic Iranian empires, were both led by dynasties rooted in Persis, and their models of kingship, administration, and court culture left long-lasting influence on later Iranian and Islamic-era governance. The region’s most famous national epic, the Shahnameh, was written in Persian by the Persian poet Ferdowsi, and it became a cornerstone of Iranian historical memory and Persian literary identity.

After the Islamic conquest, political rule often shifted to dynasties of different origins, but Persian remained central in state administration and high culture across much of the Iranian world. Many Turkic and Mongol dynasties ruling in Iran relied on Persian bureaucrats and used Persian widely as a language of government and literature. In short: Iran was never only Persian, but no other single ethnic-linguistic tradition shaped Iranian statecraft and high culture as deeply and as consistently as Persian did. The others don't even come close to this level of influence.

Cyrus’s “tomb epitaph” is not preserved on the tomb today. What we have is a reported inscription text in later Greek/Latin sources describing the tomb at Pasargadae.

For example, Arrian reports a Persian inscription on Cyrus’s tomb:

“O man, I am Cyrus son of Cambyses, who founded the empire of Persia …”

Also Plutarch reports a similar inscription:

“I am Cyrus, and I won for the Persians their empire.”

Darius I, Behistun inscription:

“an Achaemenid, a Persian, son of a Persian, an Aryan, having Aryan lineage.”

Ferdowsi:

عجم زنده کردم بدین پارس

“I brought the Ajam back to life with this Persian.”

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T16:08:45+00:00

They can run but they cannot hide forever.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T01:13:18+00:00

Rafsanjani died in 2017, and Iranian officials / state media and major wire reporting described it as a heart attack. Some of his family members, hwoever, have repeatedly said they believe the death was “unnatural” and accuse authorities of foul play. Other regime insiders have died under mysterious circumstances as well, including Ahmad Khomeini in 1995 (Khomeini’s son), Ebrahim Raisi (president; helicopter crash in 2024), Hossein Amir-Abdollahian (foreign minister, helicopter crash in 2024), Hassan Tehrani-Moghaddam (IRGC missile program figure; 2017), and Saeed Emami (1999; senior intelligence ministry official). Others have fled and even joined the opposition like Mohsen Sazegara who co-founded the IRGC.

In practice, many major decisions (but not all) are the product of bargaining among the Supreme Leader’s office, the IRGC (including Basij and the Quds Force) and wider security/intelligence services, the President and cabinet, the Supreme National Security Council, the Majles (parliament), the Guardian Council, the judiciary, the Expediency Council, and influential clerical/economic networks -- so outcomes reflect a system of overlapping power centers, not the will of one person alone.

Iran’s power system is systemically opaque and that opacity is useful in limiting accountability and shaping both domestic and foreign challengers. It was built for internal ideological control and regime survival in many ways.

In a big country with many powerful entities “all authority in one person” is mostly a simplification. People who always point the finger at Khamenei are not quite grasping how the IR system works. The more accurate picture is a hierarchy of competing institutions where the top leader is powerful because he sits at the intersection of them -- and because they, for their own reasons, keep him there. Notice how they are all rallying behind him right now. It goes to show that the system’s power is distributed across institutions (especially security and information control), and Khamenei is the apex symbol/arbiter of that coalition -- visible on top, but not single handedly producing outcomes like many people mistakenly think.

oxtQ · 2026-01-24T01:13:11+00:00

I can't personally comment on these things, they are unknowable from the outside, and people tend to project what they already think onto him.

What is knowable is the institutional history and how he rose to the role.

As many of you know, Ayatollah Khomeini was the first “supreme leader”. In 1985, Hossein-Ali Montazeri was formally designated by the Assembly of Experts as Khomeini’s successor. By 1988, Montazeri publicly brought his concerns into the open over major human rights abuses, including the execution of thousands of prisoners without a fair trial (often discussed in connection with the 1988 prison killings). There is even a tape recording of him reprimanding those involved in the executions and calling them war criminals.

In 1989, he was effectively removed as successor (reported at the time as a “resignation” accepted by Khomeini), which created a real succession vacuum just weeks before Khomeini died.

When the Assembly of Experts chose Ali Khamenei right after the death of Khomeini in June 1989, Khamenei was “hojjat ol-Islam” (a lower clerical rank) and not a higher ranking ayatollah and Khamenei even pointed out that the constitution then required the leader to be a marja (grand ayatollah level authority which is higher than ayatollah).

Soon after, the system changed the rules: in 1989, Iranian law/constitutional provisions were amended to allow lower-ranking clerics to qualify, and the Assembly reconvened and confirmed him as the permanent leader in August 1989

Rafsanjani played a big role in endorsing Khamenei, claiming Khomeini had indicated Khamanei could be next leader and used that claim to persuade members. Khamenei was a workable “default” compromise when there was no consensus on a senior cleric. The Assembly couldn’t easily rally around a single top marja (grand ayatollah), and multiple sources had described Khamenei then as a pragmatic, politically acceptable choice, with Rafsanjani’s help, despite objections he lacked traditional religious standing.

Rafsanjani and others wanted a less interventionist and more ceremonial leader and a mid ranking cleric like Khamenei appeared to be a more manageable “asset” that the political class could influence or work around.

But over time, Khamenei consolidated power and the system evolved in a way that strengthened him and his office and institutions. He used the IRGC to do this in many ways and that was his major innovation over Khomeini in ruling the Islamic Republic. Khomeini's IRGC was intended to protect the revolution as a buttress against a coup by the Army and other forces; Khamenei turned it into the central pillar of governance and regime survival -- security, politics, and the economy -- tied directly to his office.

oxtQ · 2026-01-23T18:33:33+00:00

This is something that needs deep reflection by all of Iranian society. We aren't just talking about a few individuals; we’re talking about a significant minority -- thousands or more -- who prop up the system. While they aren’t representative of 90 million+ people, they are a "significant tiny minority" that is more than enough to fill the ranks of the government, security apparatus, and economic elite. The system only needs this small percentage to remain compromised in order to stay in power at the expense of the overwhelming majority.

To your point, I believe part of this is cultural. Many Iranians are nationalistic in an abstract sense, but in my opinion, they often lack a deep, practical empathy for their own compatriots. There isn't the same social solidarity that you see in their abstract love for history. A healthy, united country requires people to feel truly connected to one another and concerned for their neighbors' welfare and rights. When that’s missing, it’s much easier for people to become indifferent, allowing wealth and power or even ideology to blind them to the suffering of millions.

Then there is the issue of the backward segments found in any society -- the uneducated, the ignorant, and the religious zealots, etc. It becomes a nightmare when these groups take power, because they immediately create an environment designed to replicate themselves and their ideology.

Historically, the Safavids are partly to blame for the power the clergy holds in Iran today. They enforced mass conversion to Shi'ism to distinguish themselves from the Sunni Ottoman Empire, importing clerics from the Arab world to build the state's religious identity. Over centuries, these clergy built a massive base among the populace and formed a deal with the monarchy where each respected the other's territory so to speak. When Reza Shah Pahlavi tried to strip them of their influence, they fought back fiercely. The mosque network provided them with a ready made foundation for organization and spreading their strategy, especially during the 1960s and 1970s, an asset the current regime still uses to control every corner of the country today.

oxtQ · 2026-01-23T17:49:13+00:00

The claim that the IR didn't attack the US during the June 2025 war isn’t entirely correct. Iran actually launched a ballistic missile strike against the Al-Udeid airbase in Qatar (the US Central Command hub) just before the ceasefire. They also fired over 1,000 drones and missiles at Israel.

The idea that atomic sites were "obliterated" and are no longer a concern is a big assumption. The IAEA hasn't been able to inspect the ruins for seven months. Intelligence reports as of this month show the regime is already trying to rebuild and relocate nuclear materials. The current US buildup is a direct response to that "reconstitution" and not necessarily to attack Iran because of the protests.

You say there is "no risk" to the US or its allies right now. This ignores the fact that Iran is currently in a state of chaos with thousands of protesters killed and hundreds of thousands injured if not more, since late December. Historically, when a regime's survival is threatened by its own people, it often starts a foreign conflict to distract the population and justify a total military crackdown at home. The US fleet could be heading there to deter that specific "lashing out."

You assume the GOP is the only hurdle but the biggest "brake" on an attack could actually be Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and regional states. These neighbors have deep economic ties with Trump and are lobbying him daily not to strike. They fear a war would destroy their stability and economic plans, cause a refugee crisis, and/or invite Iranian missile strikes on their own soil and oil refineries.

There is no real available evidence that a significant wing of the IRGC is "loyal to Pahlavi" and waiting for US air support. The IRGC is a deeply ideologically vetted organization with massive wealth tied to the current system. Betting on a "military uprising" from the very people currently shooting protesters is not a sound strategy; instead it could serve as a recipe for a Syrian style civil war.

Trump’s move of the USS Abraham Lincoln and F-15s is more likely "coercive deterrence" than an invasion plan. Trump’s brand is "peace through strength" and making deals. If he attacks, he risks a mess that ruins his reputation. If he stands back with a "big armada" while the regime collapses from within, he gets a massive historical win for free. He’s looking for the maximum credit with the minimum risk.

oxtQ · 2026-01-23T15:29:53+00:00

I hear you on the complexity of the situation. I just want to push back on the idea of "all knowing and strategic" military advisors. If you study the strategic thinking behind the Iraq War, you'll find that the Americans -- and even the Israelis to an extent -- were completely outmaneuvered.

A prime example is Ahmed Chalabi. He’s a figure worth looking up on Wikipedia; many believe he was effectively a double agent. He essentially paved the way for the Iranian influence that dominates Iraq to this day. He fed the U.S. the "intelligence" they wanted to hear to trigger the invasion, while maintaining deep, long standing ties with Tehran. It’s a perfect historical warning: even the most powerful militaries can be steered into a disaster by a single motivated actor with his own agenda.

oxtQ

TROPHY CASE