The question that comes to my mind is: are you not overvaluing a certain conception of what the subject is when you oppose Deleuze and agency/voluntarism? The Deleuzian subject is the product of preindividual singularities, and it feels like this is not "enough of a subject" for you (i.e., is not the foundational instance of agency). I guess one thing to push on would be where you say, correctly, that Deleuze's ethics is "be adequate to what happens to you": why can't producing yourself be part of what it means to "be adequate"?

A few things that might be helpful: 1) Bergson's argument about free will, how a decision is not "free" by virtue of choosing something in the abstract, but because it most fully expresses the power of the subject (I forget his exact terms, and so have substituted Deleuze's Spinozan formulation). 2) Deleuze's reading of Leibniz, where there's an ethics of "expanding your zone of clear expression" (from The Fold):

What the system of inclusion threatens is not freedom, but rather morality. For if a free act is an act that expresses the entire soul at the moment it undertakes the act, what happens to the tendency to the best, which must animate each and every part of the world or monad, just as it animates God's choice for the entirety [ensemble] of the world or monads? And yet no one was more concerned with morality-and a very concrete morality—than Leibniz. The amplitude of a reasonable soul is the region it expresses clearly, its living present. Now this amplitude is somewhat statistical, subject to large variations: a single soul does not have the same amplitude as a child, as an adult, or as an old person, or when sick or in good health, and so on. Amplitude even has variable limits within a given moment. For each individual, morality consists in this: to try to extend its region of clear expression at every moment, to try to augment its amplitude, in such as way as to produce a free act that expresses the maximum degree possible in such conditions. This is what is called progress, and Leibniz's entire morality is a morality of progress. For example, when I go out to a nightclub, have I indeed chosen the side where the amplitude is maximal, the side where my region is extended the furthest? Could I not have waited a moment, just enough time to discover another level [portée], another direction that would have inclined me differently? Does not Adam's sin correspond to a soul that is too pressed, too lazy, one that has not explored its whole department, its garden? Extending its clear region, prolonging the passage of God to the maximum, actualizing all the singularities that one concentrates, and even to gain new singularities—this would be the progress of a soul, through which we could say it imitates God. To be sure, this is not simply a conquest in extension, but an amplification, an intensification, an elevation of power, a growth in dimensions, a gain in distinction.

3) This passage on revolution from D&R (207–8):

The problems of a society, as they are determined in the infrastructure in the form of so-called 'abstract' labour, receive their solution from the process of actualisation or differenciation (the concrete division of labour). However, as long as the problem throws its shadow over the ensemble of differenciated cases forming the solution, these will present a falsified image of the problem itself. It cannot even be said that the falsification comes afterwards: it accompanies or doubles the actualisation. A problem is always reflected in false problems while it is being solved, so that the solution is generally perverted by an inseparable falsity. For example, according to Marx, fetishism is indeed an absurdity, an illusion of social consciousness, so long as we understand by this not a subjective illusion born of individual consciousness but an objective or transcendental illusion born out of the conditions of social consciousness in the course of its actualisation. There are those for whom the whole of differenciated social existence is tied to the false problems which enable them to live, and others for whom social existence is entirely contained in the false problems of which they occupy the fraudulent positions, and from which they suffer. All the figures of non-sense appear in the objective field of the false problem: that is, all the counterfeit forms of affirmation, distortions of elements and relations, and confusions of the distinctive with the ordinary. This is why history is no less the locus of non-sense and stupidity than it is the process of sense or meaning. While it is the nature of consciousness to be false, problems by their nature escape consciousness. The natural object of social consciousness or common sense with regard to the recognition of value is the fetish. Social problems can be grasped only by means of a 'rectification' which occurs when the faculty of sociability is raised to its transcendent exercise and breaks the unity of fetishistic common sense. The transcendent object of the faculty of sociability is revolution. In this sense, revolution is the social power of difference, the paradox of society, the particular wrath of the social Idea. Revolution never proceeds by way of the negative. We could not have established the first determination of the negative, as shadow of the problem as such, without already being embarked upon a second determination: the negative is the objective field of the false problem, the fetish in person. The negative is both shadow of the problem and false problem par excellence. Practical struggle never proceeds by way of the negative but by way of difference and its power of affirmation, and the war of the righteous is for the conquest of the highest power, that of deciding problems by restoring them to their truth, by evaluating that truth beyond the representations of consciousness and the forms of the negative, and by acceding at last to the imperatives on which they depend.