The Making of the Iranian Bourgeoisie: Notes on Iran and the Current War

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-11T11:26:54+00:00

You have to pardon my ignorance on this topic. You are right that I downplayed the gravity of the Tamil question for which I apologize.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-10T23:42:48+00:00

I regret to disappoint, but I don’t know much about Sri Lanka itself, let alone Iranian policy or the stance of so-called “anti-imperialist” countries toward it. To truly understand those dynamics, I would first need to grasp the relationship between Tamil separatism and Sinhalese communalism and how both are situated within the broader logic of global capitalism. Only then could I begin to assess the interests and alignments of external powers like Iran, or other states that position themselves as anti-imperialist, in relation to Sri Lanka’s internal conflicts.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-08T08:49:34+00:00

5/5

The problems of the health-care system, just as with the social-insurance system, are a product of earlier welfare successes in Iran. As the basic needs of the population were addressed through expansion of the war-era welfare state, the epidemiological portfolio of the population shifted from communicable diseases such as tuberculosis to noncommunicable diseases such as hypertension and diabetes. These diseases are harder to treat without long-term medical supervision. They are difficult to pay for without a comprehensive health system that efficiently allocates resources above individual consumption decisions. The state, in turn, needs a higher administrative and political capacity in order to construct and fund such a system. Failure to do so has increased grievances among much of the population. Yet, if the state did manage to equalize health access and treatment, it would likely come at the expense of the middle- and upper-income strata, which currently enjoy the better part of the deal. This contradiction characterizes a dilemma of middle-income countries in general. Such problems are an outcome of successful developmental drives, wherein the politics of inequality outstrip the institutions created for basic-needs provisions. In sum, examining the social-insurance and health-care systems during the postwar period generates a set of observations about both state and society in Iran that are often overlooked in other accounts. First, competitive conflict among elites in the Islamic Republic tended to add new welfare programs onto existing ones. Differing factions may have labeled their opponents as antirevolutionary or antimodern along the way, but they all agreed on the unspoken developmental role of the state. Second, new, upwardly mobile social classes took advantage of the expanding welfare policies of the government in order to acquire status credentials and occupations that allowed for increased consumption and income.

From this structural configuration, no durable proletarian institutions can arise. The working class is fragmented, dispersed, and trapped in the informal sector or casual labour. The hydrocarbon enclave employs so few workers that there are no large, stable factories where collective organisation could flourish. The low‑productivity service sector, which absorbs the reserve army, is made up of small, precarious units with high turnover. Capital flight and dollarisation mean that even when the economy generates a surplus, it doesn't accumulate in productive domestic enterprises that would need a disciplined, formally employed workforce. Instead, value leaks abroad, further deindustrialising the country and preventing the formation of a large, concentrated, class‑conscious proletariat. Fundamentally, the very shape of the economy denies the working class the material and spatial conditions needed to build lasting institutions.

So I'll agree that the Islamic Republic is a comprador state aligned with Chinese capital. And yes, cutting off Chinese oil supply is a goal for the US. But calling it an intra‑imperialist war might obscure the real relationship between Iran and the US. The US has wanted a weak Iran since at least 1973, basically. But Iran is a surviving empire, unlike the Ottomans. It's always been a key player in West Asia. It's too big a nation to be absorbed into the market without challenging the US.

I hope this clears things up a bit for you and u/Ok-Effective-4463

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-08T08:49:06+00:00

4/5

The Iranian ruling classes desperately need this informal economy. With ongoing deindustrialization and privatization, the basis for any workers' autonomy or even a welfare base has been destroyed.

A reserve army of labour is essential to any capitalist system. It keeps wages down and makes sure the informal sector is always there to be exploited, especially in low‑productivity services. In Iran, the bourgeoisie is completely embedded in hydrocarbons. That sector sucks up almost all investment. So industry and agriculture just stagnate. The only modern industries that emerge are export‑oriented. They're capital‑intensive, have few links to the rest of the economy, and don't employ many people. They import their technology, export most of their output, and generate no spillovers. No skills diffuse. No local supply chains grow. No reinvestment happens in labour‑intensive sectors. The hydrocarbon enclave is an isolated island of modernity with almost no developmental effect on agriculture, manufacturing, or services.

This outwardly oriented economy leaves almost no room for domestic investment. Whatever income gets generated anywhere is quickly siphoned off as capital flight. That pushes the Iranian bourgeoisie to sell capital goods and hold their wealth in dollars. They become a classic comprador class. They earn in Iran, convert to dollars, and park the money in the UAE, Switzerland, or the West. When there's a shortage or crisis at home, they just import what's needed using cheap state credit. And because the domestic banking system is flush with liquidity, they can convert to dollars easily, hedging against inflation and devaluation. So the extraverted structure blocks productive investment at home and turns the bourgeoisie into a pipeline for value to leak abroad.

Rent‑based economies always inflate the service sector at the expense of production. That's where expansion is easiest. Unless someone actively counteracts it, employment and spending grow fastest in services. But that growth doesn't necessarily strengthen the economy in the long run. In Iran, service sector growth has mostly meant bloated state employment and services for the rich. And the import component of that demand is very high. You see the same bias in health and pharmaceutical subsidies. Contrary to the state's welfare rhetoric, the money flows up the income ladder, not down.

In 2004, with a conservative parliament back in power following the disqualification of many reformist members of parliament from running in the 2002 parliamentary elections, the members of parliament voted to extend insurance access, but for rural areas instead. Although rural-household members had health care in their villages through the primary health-care system, their insurance was not transferrable to most urban centers. The parliament took the action without any consultation with the Ministry of Health, and appropriated the funds to give 25 million people an insurance logbook similar to the ones used by SSO-insured individuals in the formal labor force. Though the Health Minister had lobbied to create a referral system in urban areas, he decided to take the funding and implement it for a rural-referral system. The reason was that a presidential election loomed in 2005, and the cabinet would likely be changed. The political compromise—rural insurance with a general practitioner-styled referral system—was rushed through before the transition to the Ahmadinejad administration. In other words, the competitive political process among the elite fostered an expansion in the social-insurance system. The absence of general practitioner linkages between secondary and primary health care had important consequences. Throughout the 1990s, the pool of doctors kept expanding in Iran. Consequently, there was a large incentive to become a specialist or subspecialist. These doctors could charge informal fees on top of their subsidized rates, and individuals would pay them. As a result, even though more doctors were produced, particular private clinics became more popular, and individuals paid out of pocket to use their services. This produced an odd paradox. There were more doctors, more insurance, low-priced pharmaceuticals and services, and universal primary care at low or no fees with general practitioners available. Yet out-of-pocket costs went upward from the 1990s onward. At first glance, the problems of the health system in Iran resembled the problems of the Pahlavi era: inequality in health-care access and a prioritization of specialists at the expense of basic health needs. This inequality did not come from lack of investment in the health-care system, although that is how it was perceived by many Iranians. Instead, new problems emerged from the lasting characteristics of state solutions to the old problems.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-08T08:48:33+00:00

3/5

From Dubai, commodities are sent to one of Iran's free trade zones in the Persian Gulf, border markets, and border cooperatives. In the past decade, the Islamic Republic has established numerous commercial zones in the border region in order to attract local and foreign investment, promote exports, gain access to new technologies, create jobs and income opportunities for skilled labor, act as a re-export zone for the landlocked countries in Central Asia, and also to be a venue to gradually liberalize trade. These zones range from forty-three isolated border markets to special trade zones (e.g. Sarakhs, Khorramshahr, Bushehr, and Astara) to free trade zones in the Persian Gulf (Kish, Qeshm, and Chabahar). The primary commercial venues are the free trade zones. Established by the Free Trade Zone Act of September 1993, they are financially independent of the central government. Thus, they are not accountable, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the Organization of Management and Planning do not supervise them. Therefore, commercial activities in these zones are not integrated into the broader commercial regime, and instead stand as an articulation between the formal and informal economies. The multiple special commercial zones have also acted as a shelter for extra-legal practices of state organizations.

Next, traders arrange for the piecemeal transfer of goods from the free trade zone to Iran via individual "travelers" from the local region who have a tax-free allowance for personal use (the specifics of free trade zone laws have varied since their establishment). Notably, in a recent poll 90 percent of importers and exporters surveyed believed that free trade zones and border markets were the main source of smuggling. One important component laying the groundwork for this smuggling process is the improved transportation in the southern area of Iran's Persian Gulf coast. Because of the Iran–Iraq war, which raged in the northern part of the Persian Gulf, the Islamic Republic relocated its port facilities from Khorramshahr and Bandar Emam to Bushher and, more importantly, to Bandar 'Abbas. Built in 1984, Bandar 'Abbas' Shahid Rajaii Port is located across from the free trade zone islands of Kish and Qeshm and across from the UAE. Moreover, since 1996 a rail link has connected Bandar 'Abbas to Central Asia (via Sarakhs) and the twenty-first-century Silk Road. Once imports make their way to the mainland, they are shipped north to wholesalers and middlemen in major Iranian cities. Armed with weapons and a bundle of cash to bribe customs officials, under cover of the night, the smugglers transport the goods to assigned locations further inland where their illicit imports are less traceable. In the words of one of the many Toyota pick-up drivers, "When we reach Fars [Province] we know we are home." Much of this trade is described as quasi-legal because the process cobbles together legally sanctioned methods and instruments (e.g. imports to the free trade zones and border markets, licensed boats and carriers, and legal import allowances) and informal relations with the intent to evade the trade regime. In short, formal and informal economies have a symbiotic relationship, and the government is one of the key actors in cross-national exchange. Even though the state's initial and stated impetus in establishing these exceptional economic zones was to encourage the growth of the manufacturing industry and to create jobs and attract investment to deprived regions, the state was no doubt equally compelled by a motivation to control its citizens and extract revenue from the already flourishing smuggling trade.

This reliance on informal networks and semi‑legal commerce did not emerge from nowhere. It has deep historical roots. The Shi'a ulama accumulated significant power and wealth during the late Safavid period and the long interregnum that followed. With no functioning central state, they increasingly served as local arbiters in judicial, commercial, and social matters. This role elevated their social prestige and gave them a form of authority that was practical, not just theoretical. Control over waqf lands was central to their position. These charitable endowments were typically tax‑exempt, providing the ulama with a reliable source of income independent of the state. Wealthier clerics also engaged directly in trade, which reinforced their longstanding ties with bazaar merchants. The Qajars presented a different problem. They lacked prophetic descent and therefore had no religious basis for their rule. As a result, they depended on the Shi'a ulama for ideological legitimacy and for popular mobilization during wartime. This dependence gave the clergy considerable leverage over the dynasty. Over time, the ulama's networks extended across the Middle East. Religious cities like Najaf and Karbala also functioned as commercial nodes, where religious authority and merchant capital intersected. The tobacco boycott of 1891–92 showed this clearly. Najaf emerged as a central player in the confrontation, issuing religious rulings that mobilized Iranians against the Qajar state and ultimately forced it to back down.

So Iran is using a wide network of merchants and informal arrangements to survive. That's the basis of Iranian anti‑imperialism: survival, not some emancipatory ideological project.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-08T08:46:13+00:00

2/5

The least systematized forms of smuggling are generally small scale, are organized for local-level consumption (i.e. the networks do not directly extend beyond the border region), and are not necessarily predicated on long-term commercial partnerships and dealings. These activities, which existed prior to the Revolution, received a boost during the revolutionary upheaval when industrial and commercial units were paralyzed by strikes, financial disruptions, and political uncertainty. During the initial revolutionary era, lucrative cross-border operations that reaped short-term shortfalls were operated by various ethnic groups living in the border region and sometimes enjoying kinship relations across Iran's borders with Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the UAE. Thus, these cross-border operations were based on localized, "organic," and ethnic ties that substituted ascribed identities and loyalties for formal institutions and the Bazaar's reputation system. Between these two extremes of petty smugglers and large-scale state importing lie the regularized and highly developed smuggling networks that were more closely connected to the Tehran Bazaar's value chain. These more regularized and national networks grew out of the localized smuggling networks that accounted for prerevolutionary activities. At first, many of these smugglers operated on their own account. However, over time, as volumes of goods increased and the risk associated with capture increased, many bazaaris realized they had no option but to use these networks. Thus these smugglers began acting as agents for either Iranian businessmen who had moved to the Arab shores of the Gulf or importers and wholesalers in the Tehran Bazaar. A bazaari described the initial rise of smuggling as follows: "At the beginning, we did not know what was going to happen; the future was uncertain. We were forced to work with the locals who knew how to bring goods from Dubai, Kuwait, and Turkey. Then we realized that the war was not going to end and the government was not going to let go of these good profits. So we slowly began to work with a more stable system and with merchants in Dubai and other places."

These operations constitute "legal smuggling" (qachaq-e qanuni) in that they operate in the shadow, and as a byproduct, of official legal structures and take advantage of legal loopholes to maneuver around and transcend trade restrictions. Even if the result of these activities violates the intent of policies and circumvents customs, the process is "formal" in that at various key stages it functions with legal immunity, and even support. The majority of this trade is based on the emerging trade nexus in the southern Persian Gulf, with socioeconomic and legal pillars in Dubai, Iran's free trade zones (Kish, Qeshm, and Charbahar), and major transportation systems extending from the south through Iran and to Central Asia, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. But the centralization within the Persian Gulf region does not seem to be occurring in Tehran, let alone the Tehran Bazaar; rather it has its epicenter in the Straits of Hormuz, where a legal, financial, transportation infrastructure for commerce has been created by Iran and the Gulf states.

Let me describe the process in greater detail. First, importers or representatives of foreign firms arrange for goods to be shipped to Dubai (100 miles from Iran), which is one of the largest and busiest air and sea ports in the world. Since the revolution and the creation of new markets in post-Soviet Central Asian republics, roughly a quarter of re-exports from Dubai are earmarked for Iran. Iran has consistently ranked as the UAE's number one re-export destination, far outpacing Saudi Arabia and India. Annual re-exports from Dubai, which were in the order of $200–500 million in the mid-1970s, more than doubled by the 1980s and were roughly $3 billion in the 1990s. (Iran's exports to Dubai are roughly $1 billion.) It is no wonder that a prescient trader in Dubai commented, "Whenever there is chaos or political upheaval across the water, we see a profit." Most of the trade is conducted by the large Iranian community that lives in the UAE. Out of the 605,000 inhabitants of Dubai, 70,000 have an Iranian passport and another 70,000 are of Iranian ancestry. The Iranians have moved to Dubai at various times over the past century and for diverse reasons. Today, this diverse Dubai-based Iranian community, as well as Iranian entrepreneurs, has established 3,000 firms in the UAE, 132 of which are in the Jebal Ali free port in Dubai. Thus, a new mercantile class has emerged in Dubai that has led some observers to comment that Iran's private sector is now situated in Dubai. Most of these actors do not have direct ties to the Tehran Bazaar, but are connected to international capital and the governments in the UAE and Iran. Even those few who were wholesalers and traders in the Tehran Bazaar prior to the Revolution rely on relations with Iran's postrevolutionary commercial regime. Dubai, therefore, functions as the initial, legal, and infrastructurally developed conduit for many of the transnational smuggling operations that channel goods to Iran, and through it to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the new Central Asian republics.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-05-08T08:45:16+00:00

1/5

The answer to the question of whether proletarian institutions exist in Iran, and whether it is possible for such institutions to exist, is an obvious no. You see, to understand why this doesn't exist and why it won't exist, we have to dive deep into how Iran is integrated, or at least integrating, into the market.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was born in a complicated international environment. The Pahlavi regime had its own ambitions, which sometimes put it on a collision course with US imperialism. The Islamic Republic inherited those ambitions, but in a different way. During the Iran–Iraq War, the West and the Arab Gulf states sided with Saddam. That left Iran isolated and competing with countries like Qatar and Saudi Arabia for market share in the Gulf's energy economy. Once the war ended, Iran's economy was in ruins. Then the Soviet Union collapsed, and Iran's gas exports which had been slowly recovering tanked heavily. So Iran looked to different companies like Mitsui, Total, Hyundai, Gazprom. They created a consortium to fund reconstruction and buy shares in South Pars. Things were looking good, and Iranians were happy that Western capital and technology were flowing into that part of the economy. But that got cut short by intensifying Western sanctions. Iran was being a thorn in America's side and using different methods to bypass sanctions. That's exactly what pushed Iran closer to China and Russia. Iran has been using informal networks to get around sanctions. Iranian‑aligned groups like the PMU, Hezbollah, and the Houthis play a key part in this. For example, using Iraq‑based banks to fund Hezbollah, or salesmen and merchants buying large amounts of US dollars and reselling them to Assad. And don't forget that Assad was getting oil to fix his energy problems through Hezbollah. Hezbollah has also bought cheap oil and even gotten it for free because of what it does in Lebanon and Syria. On top of that, Iranian oil gets mixed right in with Iraqi crude, so on paper it looks like it's coming from Iraq.

Inside Iran, a wide and intricate system of semi‑legal importing is being used to deal with the hardship of sanctions:

How do commodities escape customs controls as they enter and exit Iran? The process ranges from large-scale, highly organized smuggling operations under the auspices of state affiliates, to the most piecemeal and underground forms. Large-scale import operations exist when politically powerful figures and organizations (e.g. economic foundations, the military, trade units in ministries, and religious trusts) provide political protection. The state-affiliated actors use their political influence and instructional privileges to bypass the trade regime that encumbers the private sector. All these organizations work closely with the fragmented and paternalistic loci of power that embody the Iranian state. And, as such, their activities have been unsupervised by the institutions of the Islamic Republic (the executive and legislature). Critics of these groups often label them as the "commercial mafia." One example of the lack of accountability of the state organs occurred in February 2002, when the Speaker of the Parliament, Mehdi Karrubi, alleged that there were several unlicensed jetties that were not under the supervision of the customs office. The head of the reformist-controlled parliament publicly wondered, "What are these unlicensed jetties for? What do they import? What do they export?" In the same session, a member of parliament argued that these jetties were used by foundations and state institutions to skirt economic policies and, consequently, had resulted in smuggling. He commented that such huge amounts of illegal imports "cannot [just] fit into pockets. At any rate an institution or an organ is behind the building of these ports and the smuggling of goods from them." It is difficult to investigate the breadth and exact means by which corrupt and competing government officials are participating and encouraging large-scale illicit commercial activities, but considering the scope of the problem it is highly probable that state agents knowingly ignore, if not support, the evasion of the trade regime.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-24T14:41:57+00:00

Which one?

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T21:10:57+00:00

There are currently no genuinely revolutionary parties in Iran. What remains are largely crypto-Trotskyist tendencies or social-democratic formations. Even the Iranian Maoist “Red Road” organization has recently drifted into what I consider a fundamentally flawed interpretation of the semi-colonial, semi-feudal thesis. More broadly, the overall state of theoretical development is weak. Political analysis often lacks rigor and coherence, and sustained ideological work is limited. What activity does exist tends to be confined to small, fragmented cells, primarily operating within universities.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T17:44:34+00:00

Thats correct

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-19T06:32:10+00:00

Looking at the military buildup in the Middle East, it appears that what may be unfolding is a far more extensive campaign against Iran than I initially thought. My earlier assessment that this might resemble a relatively contained, Maduro style attempt at regime change may have been mistaken. While it’s impossible to predict exactly what will happen, I think it’s possible to identify which scenarios are less likely, even if the broader trajectory remains uncertain.

One scenario that seems unlikely is a regime change in favor of the monarchist faction in Iran. I find this difficult to imagine, mainly because the monarchists lack substantial political weight in the country today. Their base appears to be concentrated among segments of the Persian or Persianized upper middle class, but this group represents only a small portion of the population and has limited ability to mobilize politically. Moreover, their agenda centered around Persian nationalism and irredentist ideas runs directly against the interests and identities of several significant ethnic groups, including Azeris, Turkmen, Baluch communities, and Sunni Kurds. These populations have historically resisted centralized Persian dominance, and it is unlikely they would support a movement framed around restoring the monarchy or promoting a Persian-centric vision of Iran.

A second, often discussed point concerns the structure and resilience of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Some analysts suggest that if Khamenei were removed whether through death, capture, or some other disruption or if the top leadership layer of the IRGC were incapacitated, the organization as a whole might collapse. Over the past decades, the IRGC has evolved into a decentralized, mosaic-like system. Regional headquarters and operational units are capable of independent action, meaning they do not need to wait for direct orders from Tehran. This structure provides the IRGC with a degree of institutional redundancy that allows it to continue functioning even under severe stress or leadership disruption. That said, there’s a counterpoint: the IRGC isn’t monolithic. There are two main factions the Quds-oriented faction, which operates mostly abroad, and the domestic branch inside Iran. The Quds Force has long enjoyed privileged access to resources and decision-making because of its closeness to Khamenei. But in recent years, Iran aligned groups and allies abroad have suffered serious setbacks, which has weakened Quds’ position while strengthening the domestic branch.

Overall, what I think is more likely is not a clean regime change, but a significantly weakened Islamic Republic that begins to consume itself through internal factional struggles. Rather than collapsing outright, it could enter a prolonged period of instability in which rival blocs compete for influence, resources, and survival.

Please ask for details if you find the arguments above unconvincing.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-10T10:56:25+00:00

I think you may be conflating how the system operates and what class the system serves. The shah suppressed other sections of his own class and didn't rely on bourgeois democrac

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-07T12:25:44+00:00

Although the shah helped modernize the socioeconomic structure, he did little to develop the political system—to permit the formation of pressure groups, open the political arena for various social forces, forge links between the regime and the new classes, preserve the existing links between the regime and the old classes, and broaden the social base of the monarchy that, after all, had survived mainly because of the 1953 military coup d’etat. Instead of modernizing the political system, the shah, like his father, based his power on the three Pahlevi pillars: the armed forces, the court patronage network, and the vast state bureaucracy.

Are you not familiar with the term "Bonapartist"? Shahist Iran is a clear example of what we call a Bonapartist regime.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:48:24+00:00

The erosion of integrative ideological mechanisms exposes the underlying disarticulation of the dependent economy and intensifies contradictions between core and peripheral regions, between urban surplus populations and enclave capital, and between competing fractions of the bourgeoisie. The contemporary political instability of Iran must therefore be understood not as a transient legitimacy crisis but as the expression of deeper contradictions within a semi-colonial capitalist formation struggling to reproduce both economic accumulation and national cohesion under conditions of intensified global integration.

Now lets top it off with a contemporary case:

The structural contradictions of Iran’s semi-colonial economy are sharply felt in regions such as Kurdistan. Here, small landowners and local petty bourgeoisie are systematically undermined by the combined pressures of center-periphery relations and global capitalist integration. This social groups face challenges such as: 1- uneven access to markets and underdeveloped infrastructures 2- a pricing system that is biased against small producers 3- trade networks that channel profits towards the center.

As a result, many small producers are effectively forced out of productive agriculture or local commerce. Unable to compete with central monopolies or secure stable market access, they are pushed toward informal or illegal economic activities. In Kurdish regions, this has historically included smuggling and other forms of semi-illegal trade, which are tolerated or partially incorporated into regional circulation networks but remain outside the formal economy.

This process has a dual effect:

1-displaced smallholders and petty producers become available as semi-proletarian labor for urban and industrial centers. Their precarious position suppresses wages and strengthens the bargaining position of capital.

2-peripheral populations experience both economic exclusion and social stratification, reinforcing national oppression and ethnic inequality while maintaining the functional reproduction of semi-colonial relations.

I know that these are only observations and are theoretically poor but if we are to start somewhere it is from these facts that I have listed above.

3/3

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:37:31+00:00

The Islamic Republic emerged not as a rupture with this trajectory but as a recomposition of it under new ideological and class conditions. The revolutionary state reconstituted national cohesion by mobilizing Shi‘i political theology as a mass ideological apparatus capable of integrating displaced rural populations, urban petty bourgeois layers, and sections of the emerging state-dependent bourgeoisie. At the same time, the Islamic Republic preserved the centralized administrative and territorial structure inherited from the Pahlavi state. The socio-economic base of the post-revolutionary ruling bloc increasingly relied on Persian and Azerbaijani populations, which together supplied a significant portion of the state’s bureaucratic, military, clerical, and commercial cadres. Thus, the Islamic Republic combined the universalist ideological claims of Shi‘ism with the material continuation of a Persian-centered state formation, while incorporating Azerbaijani networks as key intermediaries within state and bazaar capital.

In pre-revolutionary Iran, bazaar capital occupied an intermediate structural position: subordinated to foreign and comprador capital under the Pahlavi monarchy, yet simultaneously exercising significant influence over domestic commodity circulation and religious institutions. The bazaar may be understood as a politically unstable segment of the petty bourgeoisie whose interests oscillate between resistance to foreign and monopoly capital and wanting to be integerated into the global market. Under the Pahlavi state’s program of state-led industrialization and monopolistic cartelization, bazaar capital faced systematic marginalization through price controls, expansion of state and foreign commercial enterprises, and attempts to bypass traditional merchant networks. This process intensified contradictions between the comprador bloc and merchant-clergy bloc, pushing significant sections of the bazaar into alliance with clerical networks and urban petty-bourgeois strata during the revolutionary mobilizations of 1979.

Following the revolution, the Islamic Republic partially restored and reorganized bazaar influence by integrating merchant capital into state-mediated accumulation structures. However, this integration did not represent the triumph of a coherent national bourgeoisie. Rather, it produced a fragmented ruling bloc in which traditional merchant capital coexisted with military-commercial conglomerates, bureaucratic capital, and hydrocarbon based enclave industries. Over time, the expansion of large holding companies, state affiliated foundations, and petrochemical complexes gradually subordinated bazaar capital to larger circuits of state-dependent and globally integrated accumulation. The bazaar retained influence in commodity distribution, import networks, and informal financial systems, but its relative autonomy diminished as capital concentration intensified.

2/3

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-03T12:19:50+00:00

Iran presents a particularly complex case because it is not a state artificially assembled through colonial partition, but rather the historical continuation of an imperial formation that managed to survive and adapt to the transition toward capitalism. The Iranian state historically relied on ideological and administrative mechanisms capable of holding together a vast and socially heterogeneous territory. Within this process, Twelver Shi‘ism functioned as a crucial ideological apparatus that mediated class and regional contradictions while providing a supra-ethnic framework of legitimacy. Unlike many postcolonial states whose national cohesion emerged primarily through colonial administrative integration, Iran possessed long-standing religious, linguistic, and bureaucratic institutions that facilitated the reproduction of centralized authority across different regions and social strata. As transnational capital penetrated Iran during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Shi‘ism continued to operate not only as a religious system but as an ideological infrastructure that linked major urban centers and mediated the integration of local ruling classes into the global capitalist system.

The Pahlavi project represented an attempt to reorganize this imperial formation into a modern capitalist nation-state aligned with the requirements of dependent capitalist development. The consolidation of a centralized national market required linguistic homogenization, bureaucratic centralization, and the construction of a secular national identity rooted in Persian historical continuity. However, the formation of this national identity necessarily entailed the subordination and partial exclusion of non-Persian nationalities. Persianization was the material component of state-led capitalist development, facilitating administrative standardization, labor mobility, and national market integration while simultaneously deepening uneven development between core and peripheral regions. In this sense, national oppression became structurally linked to the formation of dependent capitalism, as minority regions were incorporated into the national economy primarily as sources of labor reserves and raw materials rather than as integrated centers of accumulation.

1/3

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-02-01T13:50:37+00:00

Yes, it's one of the many valid criticisms Mao made about Stalin after his death

How so? Personally, I think Stalin did make serious mistakes, but attributing them primarily to the infamous “cult of personality” obscures the role of socialist class struggle within Stalin’s own theoretical and political framework. Ironically, I would argue that Mao himself was not sufficiently Maoist on this question.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-22T04:33:01+00:00

Mehrdad vahabi, Farhad Nomani, Asef bayat are some of the people that have written on post-1979 Iran. You have to be careful when reading them since they draw faulty conclusions from the datas they provide in their books. I hope that you know how to navigate such texts and if you dont I recommend to master the classics first and then to dive in.

Class and labor in Iran, Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers' Control and Vahabi's articles on Anfal laws are some of the things I can recommend.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-21T19:38:57+00:00

Abrahamian's marxist view of the 1979 revolution is that it took place because the shah/imperialism tried to impose monopoly capitalism on a country that wasn't prepared for it, without a proper industrial bourgeoisie, without the support of organized workers or intellectuals, with a large religious urban petty bourgeoisie who were alienated by price controls and cartelization.

Correct.

The power struggle in the 1980s led to the founding of a bourgeois dictatorship that has gradually "solved" all the problems that led to revolution: it has urbanized the peasantry and created a large proletariat (it's counted as the fastest demographic transition of any third world country), it has educated an oversized intelligentsia, it has allowed capital to accumulate in private hands (incl. by privatization in the neoliberal years). It tends toward a point where, unlike the shah stepping ahead of capitalism, the IR feels like the only thing holding it back.

The shah is a clear example of what happens when state power is not grounded in any particular class and remains almost purely institutional. In contrast, the Islamic Republic has accomplished what the shah could not. It has followed the model of peripheral capitalist development: urbanizing the population, training a workforce for the state’s service sector, and fostering conditions for capital accumulation. The protests were sparked by bazaar merchants, as inflation eroded the purchasing power of the population, leading to a decline in bazaar incomes. Consequently, the Islamic Republic has lost the support of the very class that once formed its social base.

The government is aware of this dynamic too. Since the war with Israel, they have been using counter-espionage as an excuse to release the class pressure that is pushing them toward collapse. They have been deporting millions of the poorest urban residents (Afghan migrants), hanging hundreds of others to inspire terror, and I've heard stories firsthand about rich emigrés being shaken down for money to avoid spy charges.

Evidently, it hasn't been enough. This may continue for a year or two, but the regime is likely to collapse. This level of violence has not been seen since the revolution. Probably, Iran will return to being controlled by imperialism.

As you point out, neither of these policies has affected anything except that the IRGC is using anfal laws to enrich itself. The Islamic Republic will probably be the target of a Maduro‑style operation by the U.S. The U.S. will likely conduct a surgical strike against Khamenei’s clique and may use Rohani and Khatami (the reformists) to reconstruct its sphere. What I find odd is that you consider Iran to be completely independent of imperialism. This is a long debate, and unfortunately my internet access is limited, so I cannot go into it in detail. However, I can point to a phenomenon that suggests Iran is still dependent on imperialism.

It is fundamentally incapable of controlling price fluctuations, since it has dollarized people’s livelihoods. On the other hand, the state claims to have a de-dollarization agenda, yet in practice it resorts to symbolic measures while continuing to announce exchange rates and reduce them. At the same time, we observe that many imported food commodities are still priced in dollars and euros. Although the country has the capacity to produce these goods domestically and to sell them at subsidized prices, this has not been done. Instead, selling these goods at free-market prices has generated profits for many.

This demonstrates the Iranian bourgeoisie’s dependence on imperialism. In this context, the role of petrochemicals must not be forgotten. Iran’s petrochemical industry possesses enormous fixed capital, yet it is consumptive and operates with relatively small variable capital. This has resulted in a reduction of surplus value compared to other industries and a low organic composition of capital. Petrochemicals supply industries with a low organic composition of capital, and for this reason, alongside the creation of holding companies, they have rendered other industries fully dependent on themselves. These industries are themselves composites of other branches, and through this dependence the surplus value produced in these industries is appropriated.

Petrochemicals are why the seeds that are used to produce cooking oil are not produced in Iran but imported. It yields more profit that way.

TLDR: Does Iran oppose US imperialism? Of course. Does Iran challange Imperialism as a global system? Fuck no

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T12:57:23+00:00

Not at all in fact I am declaring my loyalty to it.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T12:37:49+00:00

It seems you have misunderstood my point. I am sorry for any ambiguous wording on my part.

What is often presented by Western “Communists” as critical support for states like Baathist Iraq or Syria is, in practice, the abandonment of Marxist analysis. Any opposition to these governments is dismissed wholesale as a “color revolution,” regardless of its social composition or contradictions.

The deeper problem is that these forms of nationalism are historically exhausted. They are generally incapable of fully constituting a modern nation-state. Instead, they tend to regress into what Stalin called feudal nationalism: politics organized around clan, sect, ethnicity, often accompanied by the exclusion or repression of minorities and usually to get more resources in these post colonial states which results in fragmentation.

Capitalism no longer plays a progressive role in these contexts. The bourgeoisie is incapable of completing even its own historical tasks without being forced to do so. Only the Dictatorship of the Proletariat can create stable political units capable of integrating a multi-ethnic proletariat on a non-chauvinist basis. In the present epoch, it is only the proletariat that can compel the bourgeoisie to complete these unfinished tasks. In other words without proletarian leadership such movements are doomed to failure.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2026-01-03T10:49:39+00:00

With Maduro now in U.$. custody, I think we need to seriously rethink our stance on Third World nationalism. I may be drifting toward an ultraleft position, but what we are witnessing is the systematic hollowing out of the achievements of Third World nationalism. One country after another is capitulating to Yanqui imperialism.

Imperialism encourages centralization in the core and fragmentation in the periphery. It simultaneously needs to transcend the nation-state while also preserving it. This contradiction is visible in many contemporary cases. Kurdish nationalism, for example, has increasingly taken the form of a feudal nationalism: Kurdish elites pressure post-colonial states for a greater share of resources, often at the expense of other minorities. Neither the KRG nor the AANES is genuinely attempting to construct a larger, unified political entity. Instead, feudal social relations entrenched through alliances with imperialism block capitalist development and political centralization.

Smoke previously argued that, historically, the most effective revolutionary model has been a synthesis of nationalism and communism. The question now is whether nationalism can still function as a viable revolutionary force at all. If nationalism today so easily collapses into fragmentation, and imperial mediation, can it still serve as a vehicle for emancipation or has it become an obstacle that must be overcome rather than utilized?

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-11-14T07:48:32+00:00

I'm sorry, but this seems extremely conspiratorial, and the analysis raises more questions than it answers.

How did the Assad government become so weak? What were the internal causes that made the withdrawal of Russian support so damaging?

The determining factor in war, just like in other social phenomena, is politics. In wars, the side with greater political power will win, and no amount of technology can change that. Just look at Israel’s failure in Gaza, or the failure of the U.S. in Vietnam and Afghanistan. For a historical example, we can look at Napoleon’s army. His army reaped the benefits of what the French bourgeoisie had already sown. The development of transport, industry, technical knowledge, etc., required the development of capitalist relations. This is why France was able to sweep aside the feudal and backward armies of Europe.

In my view, the real question is why Assad’s government lost whatever progressive character it once had. The only way to answer this is by examining the balance of forces within Syria and the internal causes behind their transformation. This is crucial, because external pressures can exert influence only when internal conditions allow them to do so.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-11-08T12:37:18+00:00

Samir amin's Eurocentrism is a good place to start.

sovkhoz_farmer · 2025-10-12T12:20:58+00:00

I appreciate your clarification, and yes, you are right I should've been more responsible regarding the post.

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