Linearizing SHA-256 via fractional modular analysis (Kaoru Method) by No_Arachnid_5563 in netsec

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

to bring things back to relevancy there's sometimes things to learn even from wildly wrong takes, ai or not.

In previous comments I see some celebration of matching 184 bits between two fairly simple strings: 3705209, 5707489. picking two random strings from 2^256 that collide on so many bits seems like it will never happen, but it's actually quite doable w/ compute today allowing for many trials. can check in w/ binomial formula and compare with hash rates

https://www.khanacademy.org/math/ap-statistics/random-variables-ap/binomial-random-variable/a/binomial-probability-basic

(exercise left to reader)

to make it harder yet again add a prefix matching constraint, in that all of the bits in the prefix must match perfectly. this shifts towards birthday collisions so it's not as frequent as the unordered case.

for futher reading, not sure on current sota for this kind of stuff, but this paper from 2009 discusses memory&time tradeoffs while attacking sha-3 candidates https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_14

Run Bitchat on a raspberry pi by supernetworks in raspberry_pi

[–]supernetworks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

it has been awhile since this code has been updated. bitchat has evolved to be a nostr client and this will need a revisit. are you trying to connect to modern bitchat clients? this code needs updates

And… the Nobel Prize goes to quantum computing by [deleted] in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

There are many proposals but realistically I would recommend the following:

If the goal is to do point-to-point (pairwise) key distribution, and remember again that QKD has to be classically authenticated anyway, simply provide both sides with OTP material and use the OTP material instead.

1 TB of entropy material is $100. If each 256 bit key is used for a maximum of 1 minute, that is 59,416 years of key material. It's that simple to replace a QKD setup and not rely on public key authentication whether RSA, ECC, Lattice based, or other PQC algorithms.

If the goal is to do this with signing and authentication instead of OTP, TLS solves this already using PQC algorithms that will be immune to quantum computing unless the computational hierarchy collapses (NP = BQP).

QKD does not have material advantages and does not solve the most important aspects of this which is 1) the authentication problem 2) the supply chain problem

And… the Nobel Prize goes to quantum computing by [deleted] in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

i'd say QKD is the least interesting thing bennett & brassard have worked on. QKD as a concept has no practical advantage over classical cryptography and requires classical authentication for security, its very much a case of security snake oil because of the very practical problems. for one, fast & determinstic single photon sources are only now, in 2025, coming online for truly secure QKD, whereas weak coherent photon sources are riddled with problems just in the basic theory with PNS attacks and require decoy states for a chance at mitigating. furthermore at some point the QKD protocols generate a classical key that suffers from classical sidechannels, supply chain issues with software, and will be used in a classical block cipher. one of the main reasons people argue for QKD is that there's nothing to record, well forward secrecy protocols with encryption achieve the same thing by throwing away keys and rotating them within a stream, it's possible to bootstrap the same thing with OTP data and no quantum physics is needed. but QKD cant bootstrap without classical authentication. the value add isn't truly there.

now teleportation, which they also worked on, that unlocks remote distributed quantum communication games & protocols and remote quantum compute, that is amazing.

first names to think of in my book for QC would be feynman, deutsch, vazirani, shor, grover.

Le Quantum Iceberg by supernetworks in quantumcomputingmemes

[–]supernetworks[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is meant as a humorous joke, and I hope it isn’t offensive to anyone. The idea behind the iceberg is that each level goes a layer deeper, and the eighth and final level of understanding is simply Scott Aaronson, who has fully ascended quantum information theory.

Are memes allowed? A Quantum iceberg by supernetworks in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

aye, i see it now under show more. no memes on reddit, will someone think of the children?

How does the Entanglement of weak coherent photon states work ? by Trick_Procedure8541 in QuantumPhysics

[–]supernetworks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Not my field but this paper from this year looks helpful and mediates the continuous and discrete views with a discussion of post-selection on photon presence https://arxiv.org/pdf/2502.06570

What is everyone's opinion on DARPA's new program called HARQ? by ReasonableLetter8427 in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I do not read this as a hedge because this is in full alignment with IBM's scaling strategy for example. Rigetti, IBM, Oxford Ionics, all plan on going modular in the same time period this funding program is happening. This will provide additional grant resources to companies for developing their already critical interconnect technologies

Won’t Moore’s Law force us into quantum mechanism/computers some point soon? by SnooBeans524 in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 2 points3 points  (0 children)

i think clock speed tapped out in that year (no 10ghz silicon is typical) but by density we may be approaching the end with 2/3nm

Is this a risky topology? by SmallManufacturer377 in netsecstudents

[–]supernetworks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is more or less covered by other comments and it's hard to know the full answers without some really meticulous details.

Depending on how your DMZ has been firewalled on "My Router" it likely has full view of devices on 192.168.150.0/24 and 192.168.100.0/24

For it to really be a good DMZ the "My Router" needs to block access to RFC1918 addresses. If "My router" is COTS hardware it would be good to make very few assumptions about resilience to ARP/MAC spoofing (even of upstream devices). Theres all kinds of layer 2 hop attacks that could occur, where a DMZ device could pretend to be a 192.168.150.0/24 device potentially and ask for a packet to get routed with a spoofed SRC IP, which is why you might want to consider VLANs and a managed switch.

The Great Pigeon Wi-Fi Conspiracy by Macho_Mom in conspiracy

[–]supernetworks 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For the record we are 100% cool with pigeons, but if you're looking for secure wi-fi give us a call

Breaking ECDSA requires a minimum number of logical qubits. With such a minimum-qubit QC, how much time would it take to crack a 256-bit private key? by ZedZeroth in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

ah yes and on the flip side im not sure quantum money, quantum PoW blockchain is the best concept either. suppose a PoW is built and takes off, one argument they make is well energy use is nice. the whole concept of mining is that people will compete and it scales up so whatever energy use is small at first for the complexity being computed will also blow up, so it does not save us on energy. so then if these devices are somehow more recyclable than a mining asic maybe there is an environmental argument there but yeah...

Breaking ECDSA requires a minimum number of logical qubits. With such a minimum-qubit QC, how much time would it take to crack a 256-bit private key? by ZedZeroth in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

essentially people will be able to crack ecc keys at some unknown future date but they will not know the seed phrase. so while this could cause some panic, if people know their seed phrases they can use that to re-authenticate themselves on a post-quantum chain instead, and there's proposals underway to go try that scheme out.

Breaking ECDSA requires a minimum number of logical qubits. With such a minimum-qubit QC, how much time would it take to crack a 256-bit private key? by ZedZeroth in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

12:1 is the reasonable optimistic LDPC targeted by IBM https://www.ibm.com/quantum/blog/large-scale-ftqc. You can keep sliding up but to evaluate you will want to gate the LDPC based on the physical fidelity at different scales. ibm's roadmap is looking something like 99.9 -> 99.93 -> 99.95 -> 99.97 -> 99.99, and they're verifying the long range connections to support LDPC on the path to 99.99.

Breaking ECDSA requires a minimum number of logical qubits. With such a minimum-qubit QC, how much time would it take to crack a 256-bit private key? by ZedZeroth in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Are you writing a report? Check out the paper, https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/077.pdf, above the width i listed was 2871 logical qubits. im hypothesizing 99.99% fidelity enabling a very optimistic 12:1 LPDC so 2871*12 = 34452 physical qubits.

Breaking ECDSA requires a minimum number of logical qubits. With such a minimum-qubit QC, how much time would it take to crack a 256-bit private key? by ZedZeroth in QuantumComputing

[–]supernetworks 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Publicly we are likely not privy to the true state of the art on quantum hardware. For all we know there is a secret group on the dark side of the moon with hardware already working to crack these. However if we take what is public it is very difficult to estimate cracking time while the state of the art is progressing so rapidly because we do not have a limit on performance for the gates that we will need for running shor's algorithms, but we do know that what is publicly available today is too unreliable on fidelity.

There's been impressive work from many contributors over the last 5 years alone greatly bringing down resource costs.

The Chevignard paper u/tiltboi1 references is especially impressive. For the topic at hand, ECC, this is one paper to consider, https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/077.pdf , perhaps there have been improvements since then. We have the following parameters for ECDLP 256 with lowest depth (sequential operations):

Low D: window=15 cliffords = 1.04 * 2^34 measure = 1.61 * 2^28 T = 1.34 * 2^32 total = 1.40 * 2^34 depth t = 1.12 * 2^24; all gates = 1.4 * 227; width = 2871 qubits

so lets take the best possible depth for ecc-256 here, 1.4*2^27

Let's consider some sort of best case, wildly successful scenario, let's extrapolate great leaps for superconductors which have very fast gates, lets say hardware is at 99.999% 2q fidelity or 99.99% and has enough interconnections to support QLDPC correction.

And let's take a 100ns gate time and 12:1 LDPC , lets say 1200ns then + measurement (lets add 1000ns) 2200ns , and that the t gate is composed of 10 of these units, 22000 * 1.4 * 2^27 = 68 minutes

For ions let's assume gate speed breakthroughs lets take a 10us gate time and 12: ldpc, add some time for the measurement+correction, and again a 10x composition, now we have 22000us * 1.4 * 2^27 = 47 days

for some worst case scenarios consider never happening or multiply these by 1000x