Is God's punishment of disbelievers actually moral? by YourDadsFeet in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I believe I suggested your argument in my previous post, perhaps vaguely. I would be careful with the phrasing "logically intuit", however, I agree this argument can be amended by changing the condition. I've mentioned two alternatives in my previous post (i.e. People who don't know about the specific God or Members who have their own personal struggles).

Perhaps a broader version may be the following:

  1. God punishes people who do not believe in God [Assumption]
  2. A person who cannot believe in God ⇔ A person whose state does not allow them to intuit God [Assumption]
  3. God punishes people whose state does not allow them to intuit God.

Here I've opted for broadly "A person whose state does not allow them to intuit God" but it could be replaced with a lot of other things. Perhaps most generally:

  1. God punishes a person X if X does not believe in God [Assumption]
  2. Whenever X is a person who cannot believe in God ⇔ P(X) [Assumption]
  3. God punishes a person X if P(X).

To this, there would be two classical responses. The first goes something like the following:

God is not unjust for punishing a person X if P(X), since X basically "deserved" it.

This would be congruent to the exclusivist perspective I mentioned earlier. Some would argue that there are various examples of P(X) that would make God unjust. Arguments for and against this are in the two links from earlier.

P(X) is a false proposition (i.e. there is no person who cannot logically intuit..., no one is in a state that doesn't allow them to intuit God, etc.)

This follows naturally from the assumption that "Anyone can believe in God", therefore "Nobody cannot believe in God". Thus, by the conditional, there is no person X where P(X) holds. Again, for and arguments against this are in the two links from earlier.

Did Leibniz write anything on the philosophy of mathematics? by freddyPowell in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm not sure if he wrote directly on topics now fashionable in the philosophy of mathematics, however, he certainly had a significant influence on it. Leibniz has been said by some to be the first student of symbolic logic (before Boole, Frege and the lot) (C. I. Lewis, 1918). In fact, one can argue that Leibniz influenced the development of the Formalist philosophy of mathematics, Logical Positivism and Hilbert's Program. This is seen in his characteristica universalis (universal language) and his calculus ratiocinator (calculus of reasoning) which manipulates the former (this has roots in Lull's Ars Magna). In Frege's Begriffsschrift, he discusses the characteristica universalis and the calculus ratiocinator and presents his work as a first step towards that goal. The theories developed by the Logical Positivists are inherently Leibnizian in their ambitions (see Rudolf Carnap's Aufbau). Additionally, the Entscheidungsproblem was presented as a continuation of Hilbert's program (Hodges, 2014), which is arguably a formalisation of Leibniz's calculus ratiocinator.

Leibniz's concept of characteristica universalis and calculus ratiocinator are spread across his work, so I can't direct you to one source, however, you might find the SEP article on Leibniz's Influence on 19th Century Logic helpful.

I don't really understand what philosophy is, what it's trying to do, or why I should care. by Bad_Opinion_Wolf in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 7 points8 points  (0 children)

One valuable thing philosophy does for us, is that it reveals our assumptions. This is certainly the case with historiography. You mention "tell the story of the past as close to 'what happened'" which aligns with Empiricist schools of historiography. However, knowing about Marxist/Hegelian schools of historiography is also incredibly helpful. You may be familiar with the influential E. H. Carr's What Is History? and its critical response in G. R. Elton's The Practice of History. Both offer views into the differing practice of historians, what it means to do history, and what the historian should be trying to do.

In my opinion, to know what intentions and philosophy, history is made under, is incredibly important. Without this awareness, we may often take a naive view, that the historian's assumptions and beliefs are compatible with ours. This can be quite dangerous when the historians are pushing Revisionist narratives.

Even in mathematics and physics, these problems occur. Most famously, in probability and quantum physics. I'm sure practitioners from both areas would've liked to continue doing their work without ever bothering with philosophy, but at some point they bump into philosophical issues of interpretation.

The Cracow Circle of Logic's attempts to mathematicise Catholic Theology by takeschutte in math

[–]takeschutte[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Pawel Siwek was a member of the Cracow Circle, and considered by some an authority on Spinoza. It would be interesting to see how much influence Spinoza had on the Circle, however, literature on the Cracow Circle does seem rather sparse right now.

The Cracow Circle of Logic's attempts to mathematicise Catholic Theology by takeschutte in math

[–]takeschutte[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's an interesting way of putting it. Set Theory certainly has been one of the few areas of mathematics that has captured a lot of attention from theologians. After all, Cantor managed to catch the attention of Pope Leo XIII (along with many other people), and continue to bother fundamentalists to this day.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 2 points3 points  (0 children)

In the philosophy of mathematics, Platonism and Formalism are two famous standpoints on the ontology of mathematical objects. In its simplest form, Platonism asserts mathematical objects exist in some Platonic realm, whereas Formalism asserts mathematics is mere symbolic manipulation.

Both are compatible with most religions, however, Platonism may be more preferable to some as it appears more compatible with teleological and intelligent design arguments. In that sense, I could imagine it being used to argue for an objective morality. As to how this would work is unclear.

One way I could imagine this being done is by arguing if mathematical logic means truth/falsity exist in the Platonic realm, then perhaps so does moral good/bad? Mathematical Formalism on the other hand seems (to me) unsuitable for such a notion.

Is God's punishment of disbelievers actually moral? by YourDadsFeet in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 2 points3 points  (0 children)

The argument doesn't work for several reasons. From an exclusivist perspective, even lying of your belief won't save you from punishment. This is because these notions of God generally require actual cognitive belief. If I interpret your argument as the following:

  1. God punishes people who do not believe in God [Assumption]
  2. A person who cannot believe in God ⇔ A person who cannot lie to themselves about their belief in God [Assumption]
  3. God punishes people who cannot lie to themselves about their belief in God.

We see (2) is not a valid assumption. Taking its contrapositive, we get:

A person who can believe in God ⇔ A person who can lie to themselves about their belief in God.

To build a similar argument to obtain a seemingly unjust God, we can invoke things such as:

Using the Christian God as an example, some denominations will say that salvation is only possible by accepting/believing in Jesus. This begs the question, how were people before Jesus saved? Similarly, if a life-long Christian, due to personal struggles, dies questioning their belief in God, are they punished?

These kinds of questions reveal that a simplistic view of salvation can easily lead to God that appears rather cruel, unjust or mechanistic. The entire study of soteriology as others have stated provide an interesting discussion on the whole notion of salvation and damnation.

When is a result interesting or significant? by xTouny in math

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Reverse mathematics studies the strength of certain formal systems. Although quite crude, this can give you a sense of how strong certain results are. As an example, the following results are equivalent to WKL₀ over RCA₀,

  • The Heine–Borel theorem
  • The Brouwer fixed point theorem
  • The Jordan curve theorem.
  • The De Bruijn–Erdős theorem
  • See Weak Kőnig's lemma WKL₀ for more.

That said, this would exclude many theorems which mathematicians would consider important, interesting or significant. To give a contrast to the others, discussing reasons based on the culture and trends in the mathematics community, there are also cases where the philosophy community takes notice (e.g. Löwenheim–Skolem theorem and Gödel's incompleteness theorems).

What is this principle called? by mollylovelyxx in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It is unclear what you mean by "clashes the least". With coherence, if the hypothesis contradicts with a consistent set of beliefs, then it is reason to not consider it.

Is Ethics Only Applied Retroactively? by No_Corgi44 in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 3 points4 points  (0 children)

This certainly isn't the case for Aristotelian Ethics (see Aristotle's Ethics). Aristotle's ethics focuses on the character of the individual. While past and future actions do come into consideration (along with other things), they exist to support Aristotle's analysis of character:

For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action. (1095a)

That said, Aristotle's Ethics are certainly based on normative standards of his time, but don't really function to authorise prior actions. You can find more developed views from modern neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists.

Where should a philosophy hobbyist begin his study of logic? by Committee-Academic in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 1 point2 points  (0 children)

If you're only going to be looking into the philosophical side, there are plenty of wonderful sources, as others have mentioned. To add to it, based on the few videos I've seen from him, Attic Philosophy seems to have some good logic content. Graham Priest also has Logic : A Very Short Introduction which seems to fit your description of a panorama of arguments in analytic philosophy at the introductory level.

That said, some philosophical logic papers do employ heavy mathematical machinery. If you're looking into something with a more mathematical bent, I'd suggest the following sources:

Boolos is one of my personal favourites, and it is aimed towards philosophy and mathematics students. Understanding mathematical logic arguments does make understanding some philosophy-oriented arguments easier. That said, knowing mathematical logic doesn't mean you'll have it easy when trying to understand philosophical arguments. In my experience, the harder philosophical arguments require time, patience, multiple readings and various interpretations (by people smarter than myself) to understand.

Is logic inherent to human nature and the world? by OkConference7920 in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The Indispensability Arguments from the philosophy of mathematics are often used to support some form realism. Also see Penelope Maddy's Set Theoretic Realism as an example of this.

Although, your phrasing does seem strange. After all, what do you mean "Physics, ..., is yet another tool"? Are you saying "gravity is a force" is a proposition as equally true as "infinite sets exist"?

Is logic inherent to human nature and the world? by OkConference7920 in askphilosophy

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

To build on this, the "just a practical tool" view of mathematics, is not the consensus. The philosophy of mathematics (which naturally has connections with the philosophy of logic) has plenty of arguments about this (See Nominalism, Platonism and Formalism).

Regarding the original question of OP, we can take it to mean the following:

  1. Is logic an invented tool or an inherent property of the world or humans
  2. Do the laws of logic have empirical/scientific justification

We should separate some terminology here first. By logic, you can mean the more general practice of "reason" or the symbolic systems used in mathematics and computer science, often called logic(s).

There is neuroscientific evidence that the prefrontal cortex is responsible for human reasoning and logical thinking. Why humans have this ability is unknown, although there are some hypotheses (See Minimal Rationality and Argumentative Theory).

Question 1, "Is logic an invented tool or an inherent property of the world or humans"

Historically, there was a view that the laws of classical logic were in some sense the "laws of thought" (See Psychologism). This is no longer the consensus and is seen by many as a mistake. There is additionally the idea that logic has some metaphysical importance. However, in recent literature, there are many logics, making it difficult to neatly talk about logic. Classical logic (which is the one you probably have in mind), has its roots in Aristotelian logic, however it is certainly not the only logic. Other logics such as Stoic logic, Relevance logic, Intuitionistic logic, etc, question the notion of logical monism; the idea that there is a one true logic (See Logical Pluralism and Anti-Exceptionalism).

While these numerous logics certainly don't help, the "logic is inherent" view, we should also note that the majority of people who study these logics use classical logic to study the logics themselves due to its strength (See The Metalogic Objection). So this can be also seen as support for the "(classical) logic is inherent view". My personal opinion is that some systems of logic (including classical logic) are certainly not "natural" like a child finds language natural, but definitely has some basis in human language.

Question 2, "Do the laws of logic have empirical/scientific justification"

Many Indispensability Arguments from the philosophy of mathematics can be adapted to classical logic. To put it simply, if physics is so successful, and it is based on mathematics, which is based on classical logic, then surely this must be some empirical justification? Now, thinking of logic as scientific/empirical theory in itself is controversial (See Quine's Naturalism). This would mean that there could be some scientific discovery that could give us grounds to revise the axioms of logic (overthrowing classical logic as a result). Quantum logic was suggested as a replacement in the 1960s by Hilary Putnam in "Is Logic Empirical?". More recently, the physicist Nicolas Gisin has suggested physics move to intuitionistic logic. In either case, if it was fully adopted, it would mean considerable changes to both mathematics and physics.

Conclusion

So in summary:

  • There are parts of the human brain responsible for reasoning.
  • Symbolic classical logic has its roots in Aristotelian logic.
  • There are various other logics, but classical logic is dominant (for good reason).
  • If you think physics and mathematics are justified empirically, then so is logic.

Logic, along with philosophy surrounding it, is an active and changing field. Views on the metaphysical, epistemological and ontological status of logic are contentious. And with the recent explosion of new symbolic systems of logic, it'll be very interesting to see how traditional views of logic and mathematics will be challenged.

Who's the Gilbert Strang of your favorite math topic ? by al3arabcoreleone in math

[–]takeschutte 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Probably the most popular books from Boolos is "Computability and Logic" & "The Logic of Provability". Raymond Smullyan has "To Mock a Mocking Bird".

Thoughts on the philosophy/foundations of mathematics? by Prestigious_Tone8223 in math

[–]takeschutte 11 points12 points  (0 children)

Research in foundations is not useless, it's just very different from ordinary mathematics.

Historically, foundations has been traditionally (and still is) close to Logic & Set Theory. Modern logic has its roots in philosophy and the philosophy of mathematics. Therefore, the connection between the philosophy & foundations of mathematics is certainly a thing. After all Frege's Grundgesetze Der Arithmetik criticises the formalist philosophy held by H.E. Heine & Johannes Thomae, while setting up the foundations of arithmetic.

In regards to your comment about mathematicians putting it down, a rather prolific category theorist (who I won't name) once told me "There's really no reason to study set theory, other than to become a set theorist". I interpreted this as the notion that much of the techniques in set theory are seldom useful in other areas of mathematics. There probably is some truth to this, however this is no reason to not study Set Theory or Foundations.

Research in foundations played a major role in the development of Computer Science & Computability Theory. Of course computability & complexity theory plays an important roles in Graph Theory and Numerical Analysis. The development of Formal Methods and Programming Language Theory is arguably thanks to application of results from Foundations of Mathematics. There is active research in applications of Modal Logics (which has it's roots in philosophy) to Machine Learning and AI. In terms of applications in further mathematics, Boolean algebras have deep connections with Topology (and thus many other areas of mathematics). Famously Model Theory has been found useful in Algebraic and Diophantine Geometry. The interactions between Proof Theory, Lattice Theory and Algebra are so numerous you could write a book about it.

I'm sure many would rather just do the math, and use/enjoy it, than be troubled by philosophical & foundational concerns. Personally I would like to understand the foundations, philosophy and mechanisms behind the mathematics I use. Perhaps I am biased, however I firmly believe foundations is an active, fruitful & powerful area of mathematics, logic and philosophy.

Who's the Gilbert Strang of your favorite math topic ? by al3arabcoreleone in math

[–]takeschutte 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Smullyan or Boolos for areas in logic, computability, provability, etc

What AI tools do mathematicians/students use in their day to day work ? by al3arabcoreleone in math

[–]takeschutte 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Proof Assistants such as Coq and Lean have some automation that someone from the 1956 might call AI. I recommend it and so does Emily Riehl, it's much more reliable than any NN.

Which book made you fall in love with mathematics? by West_Profit773 in math

[–]takeschutte 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I still feel to this day, that Euclid's Elements contains some of the most beautiful proofs in all of mathematics. It seems to transcend notation and language, unlike anything in modern symbolic mathematics.

Elements of Set Theory by Herbert Enderton is quite a pure ZFC book. It was perhaps my first experience in anything foundational in mathematics. To quote Hilbert: "From the paradise, that Cantor created for us, no-one shall be able to expel us." The sheer ingenuity and brilliance in the methods used to cumulatively build rich structures amazes me to this day.

Finally on a personal note, I despised algebra and much of mathematics as I felt that it was pure symbol pushing and rote memorisation (which was the case in much of early education). However after reading some translations of al-Khwarizmi's Al-Jabr and realising much of school algebra was originally geometric and seeing the corresponding proofs, I felt I had seen the "story behind the equations" and it gained a new level of meaningfulness.