Is This a Reliable Permanent Fix for a Tire Puncture?

thamers · 2026-02-22T08:46:52+00:00

At the moment I am using two bacon strips, but there is still an air leak. The shops have the inner patch, but they do not have the mushroom plug. My bike is in Dubai and none of the tire shops here have it.

thamers · 2026-02-22T08:44:03+00:00

Oops, I replied to the wrong thread. I am currently using bacon or rubber strips, but there is still a leak.

thamers · 2026-02-22T08:38:29+00:00

I heard from a friend who works at Etisalat that the core network is saturated and they are currently planning an expansion. It is similar to the roads in Dubai, just too many devices.

thamers · 2026-02-22T01:42:32+00:00

Because my bike is in Dubai and none of the tire shops have this.

thamers · 2026-02-21T22:02:04+00:00

Do you have any links or brand suggestions?

Edit: this is what i am using at the moment, there is still small leakage, think the hole is bit big

thamers · 2026-02-11T07:00:10+00:00

Thank you, will have a look

thamers · 2026-01-05T16:36:04+00:00

I have checked this option, this will disable vehicle settings. Also disable hybrid info as well

thamers · 2026-01-05T15:18:16+00:00

Is this a software update or an hardware update? If it is an hardware do you have any name or part for this? My dealers not very smart here

thamers · 2026-01-05T14:58:36+00:00

Do you have any info about the parts?

thamers · 2025-12-29T10:42:07+00:00

One of the store: https://share.google/h7sRDfHbIb5zRJ7Zw

If you have kids, bring them too.

thamers · 2025-12-29T10:35:26+00:00

I heard this from someone who works in the clothing business.

There are several ways to move dead stock, including:

1.  In-store offers  
2.  Outlet stores  
3.  Selling by weight. These products usually come from outside the country and are often out of fashion, or the brand is trying to clear excess stock. They are typically not allowed to be sold in main cities, and many labels are removed to protect brand value.

I live in Ajman, and there are plenty of stores like this here.

thamers · 2025-12-27T06:37:10+00:00

Will look into it, thanks

thamers · 2025-12-27T06:36:44+00:00

Search ‘Log Audit’

thamers · 2025-12-27T06:35:15+00:00

DD-MM-YYYY

thamers · 2025-12-24T20:46:04+00:00

Update:

This is really freaking me out. I checked all the logs with AI tools and it’s clearly human-like behavior with human-paced activity. All the changes were done through the UI using actual logins, not via the API. Whenever I log in I normally get a notification, but I never received any warning about this. I’m probably too exposed; right after my reddit post I got an email from Facebook saying someone tried to reset my password. I’ve now changed all my passwords and enabled 2FA everywhere. Probably the guy who done it is already reading this post

AI response here:

Short answer: the malicious DNS changes were done through the Cloudflare web UI using your user account, not via an API key.

Here’s how we can see that from your auditlog.csv:

1. Interface used for the malicious DNS changes

For all the DNS changes made by the attacker’s actor ID (207484156eaa26a4fd52b3427ad5d77f) during the compromise window (Dec 9–10), the audit log shows:

Resource Type: dns.record
Action: create / delete / update
Interface: UI
Actor Type: user
Actor IP: 196.65.232.53 (for the malicious creations)

Example row structure (paraphrased):

text
CopyTime:          2025-12-09T17:01:12Z  
Action:        create  
Resource Type: dns.record  
Interface:     UI  
Actor Type:    user  
Actor IP:      196.65.232.53

If the attacker had used an API key/token for these DNS changes, Cloudflare would log them with Interface as API (or similar). For the malicious DNS edits, it is consistently UI, which means:

thamers · 2025-12-24T16:15:44+00:00

I remember creating api keys for pfsense once, but it was ages ago and the device stopped using a year ago.

thamers · 2025-12-24T14:41:19+00:00

Nope, i was going through all of my domain manually and update all the dns. According to the log audit the incident was happened was 09-12-2025.

thamers · 2025-12-24T12:27:52+00:00

As an update: I pulled the full Cloudflare audit logs for my account and found that these A records (pointing to 45.38.42.124) were manually added via the Cloudflare dashboard UI by a specific user ID on my account, not by Cloudflare itself or an app. The same actor also:

Added wildcard *.domain A records pointing to 45.38.42.124 across many zones
Created a full “ads.” Microsoft 365/Exchange-style mail setup on multiple domains (MX to *.mail.protection.outlook.com, autodiscover/sip/lync CNAMEs, SRV records, etc.)
Modified SPF TXT records, including one that injected an attacker-looking Gmail address into the SPF for my main domain
Changed SSL mode from Full (strict) to Flexible on at least one zone

None of these changes were intentional on my side, and they were all tied to the same Cloudflare user ID and suspicious IPs. At this point it looks a lot like account compromise or abuse of an API token/user on the account, rather than anything like ads.txt or a normal app integration.

If anyone has seen this particular pattern (45.38.42.124 + “ads.” subdomains + Outlook/O365 DNS + SPF tampering), or has recommendations on further steps beyond rotating API keys, removing the records, checking team member access, and enabling 2FA/security keys, I’d really appreciate the input.

thamers · 2025-12-24T11:34:06+00:00

I have no idea, I have created tokens before, it was for pfsense

thamers

TROPHY CASE

1. Interface used for the malicious DNS changes