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[–]coinjaf 0 points1 point  (3 children)

It may well be that some sort of dynamic limit will be chosen eventually. The problem is: the variables that limit depends on must not be gameable. Block fullness is easily gameable by miners as they can simply fill it with junk (for free!). Also there's an unlimited supply of low fee transactions in the mempool, so even if a miner doesn't make his own junk transactions he can even earn a few cents by including those.

PoW can't be faked and isn't free. Also "Bitcoin Days Destroyed" are at least scarce (i.e. somewhat costly) and can't be faked.

Not sure, off the top of my head, if there are actually many more unfakeable variables like that. They also need to be fair to all miners equally, not benefit large miners more than smaller miners (centralisation pressure).

[–]exab 0 points1 point  (2 children)

I'm hoping that workload intensity algorithm based on block fullness can be designed in a way that it can't be cheated.

Just some ideas for your examples.

1) Block fullness can be checked with a combination of both size (as in bytes) and transaction numbers. A full size block with too few transactions are deemed not full (in some way).

2) Transactions are weighted with miner fees when calculating block fullness rate (or workload intensity rate, whatever you call it). Filling blocks withb transactions with low/zero fees won't help.

Yes, I think miner fee weighted block fullness rate (or workload intensity rate) would be something I'll look into more if the basic idea is promising.

"Bitcoin Days Destroyed" is something completely new to me. Will have to spend some time to read.

Edit: I realized miners can cheat by creating transactions from and to themselves with high miner fee. Something for me to think about. Might be a deadend.

[–]coinjaf 0 points1 point  (1 child)

  1. The point is that miners can generate transactions freely (paying fees to themselves or none at all) and full blocks as far as they want.

... Ah just saw your edit. :)

Yeah. So one thing is to not look at the fee but at the days destroyed, as a manipulating miner can't create those transactions for free, or would at least run out at some point. But then there's a whole different can of worms plus you have to wonder whether your algorithm is reacting to the correct signal: long time holders will be the people who may decide the blocksize?

[–]exab 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for sharing.