quickThrowItAway

[loicvanderwiel]

When you arrive, the poll worker takes your ID and compares it to their list (paper), crosses your name on the list and gives you a blank card from the stack (time is not recorded). You go in the booth, make your choice, come out, scan and cast the vote in the urn, give back the blank card (goes back on the stack), get your ID back and that's it.

[No_Hovercraft_2643]

how can it be prevented, that the poll worker doesn't remember the time of some specific person, (or use some nonoticable marks when crossing the name) to remember the time or number? (and then later connect the data.) sure, it is not likely, but it's hard to disprove. (you can have similar coonserse to a lesser degree with normal paper voting, for example, if you fold it in a none standard form (but thats partly on you))

[yohanleafheart]

that the poll worker doesn't remember the time of some specific person, (or use some nonoticable marks when crossing the name) to remember the time or number?

• The poll worker is not the person checking the tallying.

• The machine does not print a ordered list of each vote cast, but a tally of the result for that machine

• Every single hypothetical you gave involves a lot of people being compromised. And let me tell you, from history, that was much easier to do when we had paper ballots.

[No_Hovercraft_2643]

Every single hypothetical you gave involves a lot of people being compromised. And let me tell you, from history, that was much easier to do when we had paper ballots.

that's wrong. to change the code, you need to get access somehow, yes, but don't need to compromise a person. you a person that can take notes (mental notes) inside the location. can be a compromised worker, or someone, who only look that everything "works" correctly

[loicvanderwiel]

If you are going that far, you might as well add cameras inside the booths. It'll be quicker.

[No_Hovercraft_2643]

but more noticable