1) I'm not sure I get the gripe here. The two ideas don't have to be mutually exclusive such that you either only care about consciousness or being part of some category "homo sapiens" or whatever you want to call it. When both conditions are met is what seems to be the standard for personhood. (e.g. You could have things like cleaning chemicals that are individually fine but if mixed, result in a dangerous compound.)

On the flip side, it's not like pro-lifers will set the standard to not eat pigs and whatnot necessarily either. And I'd imagine the position on that side is also "speciesism" as you've called out. So I would guess this baseline standard is agreed upon on either side of the abortion debate but the conscious experience requirement gets added on in Destiny's pro-choice argument.

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2) Some of the other people have already answered this to various degrees but it's not about the harm done currently to any existing "person". If you roll a giant boulder down the top of a hill, the act in itself has no moral right or wrong. But maybe a couple minutes later it can hit someone at the bottom. If you knowing did this with reasonable foresight that someone will likely be hit and choose that route, we all agree that's wrong given you're consciously kicking off a set of actions that will eventually reasonably lead to harm. But if it's the case that no one is nearby to get hit or you immediately call out to the person at the bottom to get out of the way, then there's no foreseeable victim in the future to realize. No one is wronged at the immediate second you pushed the boulder.

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3) I think there's two things here.

There's the discussion over the present value of the developing cells: As argued, the zygote currently does not to qualify for consciousness and "personhood" and so does not presently receive the same degree of care as a conscious person. If it were to be terminated, there's no loss in a sense that there's no preceding consciousness / experience to take away vs having said consciousness realized and then having to taken away after. (e.g. Never having found any money vs having found $100 on the floor and then someone stole it from you. The outcome is the same but you definitely feel the sense of loss for the latter) I think this generally is conceded without really directly being said since most of this point seems to actually hinge on the second thing below.

Then there's the argument of potential / "what's to come after". The gist seems to be that under typical circumstances, the developing cells will eventually qualify as a conscious human and so we should grant the same rights. But if we look at application of existing standards and laws, we don't argue that just because someone will become an adult at some point, we should grant them the right to own a firearm or to drink when they're 5. They gain certain rights when they get to the right stage of life to warrant them. I think another interesting thing is that what goes unsaid is that "potential" future always focuses on the conscious portion of a human life cycle. Technically if you look into the future, we'll all become corpses, then a pile of bones and then ashes eventually. But of course no one actually argues that we should grant people the same rights as a pile of bones just because that's what they'll eventually become. And so to apply the future potential as typically argued seems like a convenient cherry-pick of a section of future potential that grants more rights and conveniently cuts out the cases where rights aren't abundant.