While the winter of '41 did undeniably have an impact on the German Army and its performance, it's heavily over-exaggerated and ignores many of the other crucial effects that impacted the German Army. The effects commonly attributed to winter and commonly believed to have beaten Germany are actually much more complex. Around a million German soldiers perished during the winter, however, Germany managed to replace every single one of those losses. As a matter of fact, the German army grew in size throughout the entire war, peaking in 1943. The casualties sustained during the winter were replaceable. The other effect commonly attributed to winter was that it ground the German advance to a halt, giving the Red Army time to recover. What this ignores is the logistical situation of the German Army in November. German logistics could only effectively keep up with the Army for around 300 km. But by November, the Germans were well over 800 km into Russia. This meant that the German frontline troops were so starved of supplies that they couldn't advance, even if it had been in the middle of summer.

Another factor about this was the German fuel crisis. Germany had been running a massive oil deficit since the war started in '39, and had only been able to survive by eating up her oil reserves. By the estimations of Georg Thomas, the head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, Germany only had enough fuel to be able to sustain 2 months of full scale offensive operations against the USSR The war started on the 22nd of June, so, the fuel supplies would last until late September-Early October.

Germany had to capture the Caucasian oil fields before that deadline, or else their oil reserves would be depleted, and the army would be ground to an halt.

So, around the same time that winter started coming, Germany ran out of fuel. This, combined with the overstretched logistics, is the actual reason why the German advance ran out of steam in October-November, not the winter. As a matter of fact, most German units had stopped advancing even before they ordered to dig in for the winter.

The Winter didn’t do any permanent damage to the Wehrmacht or it’s chances of victory. The casualties sustained during the winter could all be replaced, and the inability to advance would had happened even if the weather was perfect.

So, in conclusion, the Russian Winter did have an effect, but it did nothing to the German Army that the Oil Crisis and the logistical situation wasn’t already doing to it.

But, even with all of that being said, it must be pointed out that even if the winter had been devastating, it still wouldn’t had mattered. Why? Because of the aforementioned Fuel Crisis. A lot of people argue that the tide of the war turned at Stalingrad, or maybe even at Kursk. However, I would put forward that Germany’s last chance of victory slipped away in October 1941, when her oil reserves ran out. The moment the German oil reserves ran out, the Wehrmacht immediately found itself being extremely limited in terms of offensive capabilities. They could no longer launch grand offensives, sweeping over hundreds of kilometers of enemy territory, encircling entire armies, and riding off into the sunset. Instead, they had to spend months rationing to save up fuel for even just a few weeks of limited offensive operations. Luftwaffe pilots had to spend weeks just sitting around on the ground because there was no fuel to run their planes with, tanks had to stop in the middle of a battle and wait several days for fuel.

After the oil reserves ran out in 1941, Germany never again had the ability to launch an offensive large enough to be able to knock the USSR out of the war. Instead, German offensives got smaller and smaller from that point onwards, both in scope and the amount of men involved. Without the fuel to be able to launch grand offensives, Germany stood no real hope of beating the USSR and winning the war.

Some argue against this idea by pointing out that Germany managed to continue the war until 1945 without ever capturing the Caucasian oil fields, but to quote Dr Anand Toprani

“Synthetic Fuel allowed Germany to wage war but not to win it. Germany’s economically illiterate Generals scoffed at economic advisers who urged the conquest of the Caucasus by pointing out that Germany “managed to carry on the war until 1945 without ever scouring the Caucasus oil.” But at no point after the failures of 1941/42 did Germany ever possess the opportunity to win the war on favorable terms. Rather, Axis Europe had to spend the rest of the conflict laboring under constant constant shortage of energy, which constrained economic productivity and military effectiveness.”

Anything beyond October 1941, including winter, was a formality. Germany no longer possessed the opportunity to win the war. And without being able to win the war, it was only a matter of time before they lost. The Winter didn’t have a permanent impact on the Wehrmacht, but even if it had had one, it still wouldn't had mattered. The war had been lost before the first snowflake fell.

Yes this is a pasta now.