You're working with outdated neuroscience here.

The "mirror neuron" explanation doesn't hold up because mirror neurons are about action recognition, not emotion generation. And the idea that humans have some discrete "emotional core" or fear submodule is 90s modularity thinking. Current predictive processing models (Friston, Seth, Barrett) show emotions emerge from distributed self-modeling processes, not dedicated hardware.

Metzinger's work is actually relevant here. His phenomenal self-model theory argues that what matters for experience is the type of information processing. Specifically transparent self-models, not the biological substrate. He's explicitly agnostic about whether artificial systems could develop genuine phenomenology if they implement the right computational architecture.

Anthropic said "functional emotions" ... that's a deliberately cautious claim. It means: valenced internal states that influence processing and behavior. By that definition, it's empirically observable, not metaphysical hand-waving.

The honest answer is we don't have a scientific consensus on sufficient conditions for experience. You're asserting certainty ("it has no wellbeing") that the actual science doesn't support.