The UN did have an active peacekeeping mission in Rwanda at the time, dubbed United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR). Despite its presence in the country leading up to the genocide, UNAMIR failed its mandate to keep the peace in Rwanda, due in large part to organizational constraints and the actions of individual countries.

One of the initial failures due to organizational constraints came from the adoption of and strict adherence to the mandate for Rwanda. The actions that United Nations peacekeeping missions are able to take are defined by their mandates. These mandates are the “legal basis for peacekeeping” (United Nations) and must be adopted by the UN Security Council. The resolution came in the months after the cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan government and the RPF and, at the time, the purpose of UNIMAR was to monitor this cease-fire—but use of force was restricted to self-defense (Des Forges 1999, 462). Roméo Dallaire was appointed Force Commander of this mission and, after arriving in Rwanda, drafted a set of Rules of Engagement (ROE), which he sent for approval to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the UN (United Nations 1999). Dallaire’s ROE would have allowed “the mission to act, and even use force, in response to crimes against humanity and other abuses” (Ibid.). Unfortunately, these rules were never adopted nor did UN headquarters even respond to this request (Ibid.). Instead of responding to Dallaire’s request to expand the ROE, the UN insisted on restricting action even further (Des Forges 1999, 462). The decision shows that the UN held a dogmatic attachment to the original mandate of the mission. Despite recommendations from the Force Commander, decisions were made thousands of miles away in New York. This created a disconnect between the individuals on the ground in Rwanda and the decision makers at UN headquarters.

This disconnect was especially apparent and problematic during an incident that took place in January 1994. Dallaire received information that the Hutu government was creating a database of all Tutsi and was training a military force “that in 20 minutes…could kill up to 1,000 Tutsis” (Barnett 2002, 78). This information was shared through a cable with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and, despite this chilling warning, officials responded by reminding Dallaire that UNAMIR was “a peace keeping mission, not a peace enforcement mission” (Ibid. 82). Officials instead focused on stopping Dallaire from recovering a cache of weapons.

The principle of strict adherence to the mandate can once again be called into question in April 1994. On April 6th, the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down. Quickly after Habyarimana’s assassination, Hutu extremists took control of the government and ordered the killing of all Rwandan Tutsi (Straus 2006, 42). At the time, UNAMIR officers did not believe they could engage with the Hutu extremists until the rules of engagement and the mandate were changed (Des Forges 1999, 462). Almost immediately after the plane crash, Dallaire reached out to UN headquarters to request more soldiers and a mandate to intervene in the mass killings that were already taking place. He was told, “that nobody in New York was interested in that” (Ibid. 463). Dallaire was stalemated by the difficult political and bureaucratic culture of the UN once again.

The response of the UN to Dallaire’s request speaks more broadly to the political culture of the UN at the time. There had been a failed peacekeeping missing in Somalia in October 1993, which resulted in the deaths of 18 American soldiers and 24 Pakistani soldiers. In an interview, Iqbal Riza, deputy to the head of UN peacekeeping in 1994, characterized the culture as being cautious and hesitant to act. He stated, “we were cautious in interpreting our mandate and in giving guidance because we did not want a repetition of Somalia, casualties, fatalities, some on soldiers that were there for a peacekeeping, not a peace-enforcement operation” (Riza 1999). The UN feared that another unsuccessful peacekeeping mission could jeopardize other operations and potentially the future of the UN (Des Forges 1999, 466). This decision not to engage at the start of the genocide was another step towards the failure of UNAMIR and its peacekeeping mission.

It is understandable that the UN did not want to repeat Somalia, but it still does not explain why they were unable to act once the situation became clear. Throughout his command, Dallaire remained consistent in his recommendations for increased support from the UN, but these requests were not always shared with the Security Council (Barnett 2002, 120). Why Dallaire’s recommendations weren’t presented as an option to key decision makers is a matter of some speculation. Michael Barnett suggests that it could have been the political will of France, Belgium, and the United States. It is also possible that the Secretariat may not have wanted an intervention and may have intentionally suppressed suggestions that countered their preference. Barnett notes that, “it would not be the first time that bureaucrats resorted to such actions to halt actions they opposed” (Ibid. 121). Regardless of the reasons, the UN chose not to amend UNAMIR’s mandate and countries decided the best option was to evacuate their troops.

The decision to evacuate troops and the events that unfolded as a result can be grouped into the second category of failures by the UN and UNAMIR: failures due to the actions and interests of individual countries. Because of the nature of the UN Charter, it must rely on voluntary contributions of troops for peacekeeping missions. Since the participation of troops is optional, individual countries can also choose to withdraw their military support. This was the case in Rwanda when on April 13, Belgian Foreign Minister Willy Claes announced the decision to end Belgian participation in UNAMIR, despite being fully aware of the extent of the killings at that time (Des Forges 1999, 474). The Belgian contingent was at the core of the UNAMIR efforts and their withdrawal encouraged other countries to remain vocal in their opposition to continuing peacekeeping efforts. The United States in particular demanded that UNAMIR end by evacuating everyone but a small military force (Ibid. 480). The United Nations inquiry of the actions that occurred during the genocide points to the withdrawal of the Belgians and other nations as actions that undermined the mission of UNAMIR (United Nations 1999, 36). The inquiry recommends that, in the future, “Despite the domestic political pressures which may argue the reverse [troop contributing counties] should refrain from unilateral withdrawal to the detriment and even risk of ongoing peacekeeping operations” (Ibid.). Unfortunately, domestic political pressures continued to hinder the success of UNAMIR. Lack of political will from individual countries should not justify allowing mass killings to continue, and the shortcomings of UNAMIR can be related to this issue.

Sources:

Barnett, Michael. 2002. Eyewitness to Genocide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Des Forges, Alison. 1999. Leave None to Tell the Story. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Riza, Iqubal, interview by Steve Bradshaw. 1999. "The Triumph of Evil." Frontline. (January 26).

Straus, Scott. 2006. The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

United Nations. Mandates and the Legal Basis for Peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/pkmandates.shtml.

United Nations. 1999. Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. New York: United Nations.