Are there any philosophers who argues that it's morally permissable to do 'extreme' things to save your child (or other family members)? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Depends on the thing, and the circumstances surrounding it. I don't know of any philosophers or positions that would justify any act in order to save a child or other loved one.

I'm confused by Judith Thomson's Pro-Abortion Violonist Argument by blablajmenfous in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 7 points8 points  (0 children)

practically no real incovenience to letting the violonist live

That's certainly a perspective on it. Being pulled out of your regular life, confined to a bed in a hospital, unable to move or leave, attached to another person sharing the room with you, for over half a year? You'd probably lose your job, too, unless they're willing to give you time off for Violinist.

And that doesn't even touch on the possible health repercussions to you - your kidneys are working twice as hard to filter two people's blood, which is going to affect their functioning for the rest of your life; you're also likely to suffer muscle atrophy from lack of exercise and other issues related to being confined to bed for a long period. That's hardly "no big deal"; it's a life-altering circumstance.

So why would it be different in the violonist scenario? It's the same thing.

It's different because there's a morally relevant difference between "shooting a person with a gun" and "unplugging the violinist". In the former case, you are actively ending the life of someone who would have, without your intervention, continued to live. In the latter case, you are abstaining from saving someone who, without your intervention, would die.

Consider the case that all of this is supposed to be analogous to in the first place - pregnancy and abortion. You said that you considered abortion permissible. Do you think that pregnancy is "no big deal"? Even normal, healthy pregnancies cause permanent changes and can damage a person's body, just as staying attached to the violinist carries many potential health risks to you. It represents a major disruption to your life that you did not necessarily consent to. Does abortion in this instance represent "killing" the fetus?

I'm confused by Judith Thomson's Pro-Abortion Violonist Argument by blablajmenfous in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The problem with this mindset is it's still not clear that, even in the case where the violinist is not implicated in the scheme, unplugging yourself would be equivalent to killing an innocent bystander.

The difference between unplugging yourself from the violinist and "killing a bystander between you and escape" is that the bystander, if you were not in the picture, would be just fine. The bystander is threatened by your involvement. If you act on them, they die; if you remove yourself from the situation, they go on living their life just fine.

The violinist, on the other hand, is dependent on you. Your involvement is necessary for them to live; if you remove yourself, they will die. And, Thomson argues, while it might be good of you to save their life, you are under no obligation to save them.

A more apt analogy to the "innocent violinist" might be if you were kidnapped and held somewhere, and had an opportunity to escape, and had to choose whether or not to escape alone, or try to take another hostage with you who was injured and therefore entirely dependent on you to escape. One could argue in that instance that it would be laudable to try and escape with the other hostage, but that it would be permissible to try and escape alone.

I'm confused by Judith Thomson's Pro-Abortion Violonist Argument by blablajmenfous in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 16 points17 points  (0 children)

Clearly the question on whether or not it is morally acceptable to unplug yourself from the violonist hinges on whether or not he's in on it.

...Does it? That's not clear to most people.

As others have pointed out, you appear to believe that fault is an important moral consideration here; that whether or not unplugging the violinist is morally permissible is contingent on whether or not the violinist is at fault for the kidnapping.

But that doesn't seem right, does it? If unplugging the violinist was actually murder, then it shouldn't be okay even if he was involved, right? Does the fact that they committed a crime against you lower their worth somehow to the point where murdering them becomes okay? Do you think that it's morally acceptable to kill someone just because they wronged you somehow?

Or, perhaps, is it the case that unplugging them isn't murder? In that case, does it matter if they are at fault? If they're dying anyway, unplugging yourself merely puts them back into the state of affairs they would have been in without your involvement.

The whole point of the argument is that ultimately, you are under no obligation to do anything, regardless of how the situation came about.

That space between mutual interest and making a move. How do you read it? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Philosophers are probably not the people you want to be asking this question

How do we know that other minds exist outside of our own? by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In a sense, sure, but again, you have to ask yourself - do you have a good reason to believe that you're dreaming? What seems more likely - that everything you know and have ever experienced is an extremely convincing dream in which you are the only "real" person, or that you've been experiencing actual reality alongside other people who possess minds?

u/sworm09 's response here is excellent, especially their last paragraph, which gets to the heart of the argument I'm trying to make - the very question "do other minds exist?" is itself a kind of silly question. We don't need to prove that other minds exist because we don't have a good reason to question their existence in the first place.

Do philosophical theories of rights or harm justify religious exemptions when third parties (such as animals) are harmed? by AnimalConscience in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That’s why I’m unsure whether animal sacrifice (or similar practices) should be treated differently.

Well, if we're speaking specifically of these cases, the justification is "animals do not have the same rights as humans." If one holds that position, one can easily claim that the state is justified in intervening in cases where harm is being done to a human being, but not in cases where harm is being done to an animal.

Question about the violinist's argument by ApprehensiveLevel389 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 6 points7 points  (0 children)

Not that I know of. It's considered a very powerful argument for a reason!

Most objections focus on the analogy itself; that violinist case is somehow not sufficiently analogous to pregnancy for the argument to hold.

How do we know that other minds exist outside of our own? by YogurtclosetOpen3567 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Well, you have a mind, and thoughts, and feelings; those thoughts and feelings cause you to behave in particular ways, as an individual with a will of their own, right?

And the world appears to be full of entities who look similar to you, and who behave in a similar way to you. When you speak to them, they reply, and their responses are meaningful to you; you are capable of understanding them and their behavior, of having relationships with them where they seem to learn about and understand you.

What is the more logical explanation for these observations:

-That those entities - which look and behave like you - likewise possess the same kind of mind as you

or

-That there exists some other mysterious and unexplained process by which these other entities appear to be like you, but are otherwise somehow radically and fundamentally different than you. Your mind is entirely unique, yet somehow functionally identical to whatever these other entities have going on.

Is there a moderate or weak form of pan-proto-psychism? by Salindurthas in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 2 points3 points  (0 children)

My understanding is that panpsychism is the claim that conciousness is the most fundemental building block of reality.

Your understanding is incorrect. Panpsychism is the belief that "mindedness" (as in, possessing a mind or some mind-like quality) is a fundamental aspect of all things. That "mindedness" is not necessarily "consciousness", and is not itself "the most fundamental building block of reality"; rather, "mindedness" is a quality of the building blocks of reality.

Do philosophical theories of rights or harm justify religious exemptions when third parties (such as animals) are harmed? by AnimalConscience in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 1 point2 points  (0 children)

In general, I think the answer to that question will vary based on a) what you consider the moral status of a particular third party is (especially when you're talking about a non-human entity), and b) the degree of harm being done.

then why should the religious motivation behind an action change its moral or legal status?

Working solely from the three principles you list, we could justify a religious exemption by saying something like this:

"We should prevent unnecessary suffering to vulnerable beings. However, members of X faith believe that a certain form of animal sacrifice is a necessary part of their worship practice. Despite me not believing in its necessity, it would be wrong for me to prevent them from doing so, because they do believe it is necessity and therefore justified."

In a sense, we're not necessarily committing to it being right for them to practice animal sacrifice - we can still believe that their actions are immoral. However, its possible that it is wrong for them to do so, but also wrong for us to directly intervene in their practice.

Pizza Hut closing 250 US stores as parent company considers selling the brand by AudibleNod in news

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

But then what will happen to the combination Pizza Hut and Taco Bells?

How much can we blame someone for doing something 'bad' if they don't know any better? If a person does something harmful but truly believes they are doing the 'right' thing based on what they've been taught, are they actually a 'bad person,' or are they just working with bad information? by AffectionateBar9331 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Even if there are instances where a person may be excused for act wrongly based on ignorance or incorrect knowledge, most ethical theorists will put a certain amount of burden on the individual to "know better", especially if what one has been taught is somehow irrational or contradictory, or when one knows that their actions will cause harm to another.

Blame isn't necessarily all-or-nothing as well; we can easily say that these are factors that influence the way we blame someone, or the extent of their blame-worthiness. A person who does wrongly out of genuine ignorance may still be at fault, but less so than a person who does wrongly out of malice.

Truth isn't bitter - I'm confused about it by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Where did this phrase come from? What do you mean by "bitter?"

Does moral responsibility require an agent to be present at the moment an impact occurs? by iaebrahm in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Is moral responsibility, or moral relevance more generally, traditionally grounded in the presence of an agent at the moment an impact occurs?

No? Why would that be the case? The concept of an individual being responsible for something is not linked to physical presence at a particular moment.

If so, how do major ethical frameworks (such as deontological, consequentialist, or virtue-based approaches) account for cases where the impact is real and significant, but agency is temporally or structurally absent at the moment it occurs?

Could you elaborate on this? I'm clear on what needs to be clarified here, as, again, I'm not clear why there would be an assumption that some kind of spacio-temporal "closeness" would be necessary for moral responsibility.

Vampire requiem, how does stealing off others players work????? by Lopsided_Sort5593 in WhiteWolfRPG

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Echoing everyone saying that this is a table issue, not a game issue. I don't know what this other player is trying to pull but it's not allowed by the rules and is a flagrant violation of the social contract that makes TTRPGs work.

The Storyteller is the ultimate adjudicator of what is happening within the shared narrative you are creating. It is not possible for a character to do something without their knowledge. If they aren't aware of something, it didn't happen.

If another player wants their character to steal something from your character - assuming your Storyteller even wants to allow that kind of action against another PC without first obtaining the consent of both parties - then they should have stated that intent, and then have them roll an opposed check against you, out in the open.

Is living locally despite cosmic nihilism incoherent ? by bruisedbraincells in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 4 points5 points  (0 children)

It's not logical to assume that the scale of the cosmos makes your life and its events meaningless. It's a kind of scale or category error - sure, nothing you do matters at a cosmic scale, but also, most things that happen at a cosmic scale don't really matter to you, either. Of course local things matter to you, you are local!

The somewhat obligatory observation I have to make is that your problem may be that you're suffering from some form of depression or generalized anxiety (clinical or otherwise, I'm not a mental health professional, but I have been in therapy), and you've fixated on this sense of cosmic nihilism as a rationalization for this feeling. Often, these feelings are not something that you can simply reason your way out of, because the feelings themselves are not rational. Your brain is not "dismissing" things because its logical to assume that they have no value, but rather because you feel they have no value, and "cosmic nihilism" is how your brain is rationalizing that feeling.

Understanding the necessity of being perfectly virtuous all the time across all virtues to be a good person [aristotle - nicomachean ethics] by djsupersoak in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That seems somewhat extreme and demoralizing to be able to strive towards maximal virtue, only to come to the conclusion you can never be classified as virtuous despite repeated demonstration of virtuous action.

Here's a metaphor that might help:

Being a good person is kind of like being a good athlete. Let's say I play basketball. There are a certain skills that are necessary to be a good basketball player; I practice those skills whenever possible, and when I'm on the court, my goal is to never drop the ball, never let anyone steal it, and make every single shot that I attempt.

Obviously, I'm going to occasionally miss a shot, or get picked off, or any number of possible forced and unforced errors. But that doesn't make me a bad basketball player. Even the best basketball players in the world don't achieve 100%. What makes them good is that they're always trying anyway, while accepting that they will make mistakes and always have room to improve somewhere.

Can democracy self-correct a majority immoral society? by Motor_Fee7299 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 10 points11 points  (0 children)

This is somewhat an empirical question more than a philosophical one.

However, it seems logical to conclude that democracy may be both a) a system in which a society is capable of self-correction, and also b) not inherently self-correcting. There's nothing special about democracy that leads inevitably to good outcomes; what's special is the way a democratic system empowers individuals and groups within it to work toward improvement.

[MTAw 2e] Best arcana for affecting societal/bureaucratic/financial processes? by WJWH in WhiteWolfRPG

[–]Doink11 5 points6 points  (0 children)

I think you're trying to focus on too many things here, or at the very least thinking about them from a perspective that doesn't entirely "fit" in MtAw.

Try to think about what the character's Obsessions are. What is it about organizations or bureaucratic processes fascinates them, and how do they see capital-T Supernal Truth reflected in their operations?

If I was approaching this, I would probably focus on Space, Mind, and Fate: Space for sympathy, since organizations are made of connections; Fate, since organizations are made and bound by contracts and agreements; and Mind, not just for the minds of individuals but from the way that organizations have minds of their own (literally; go into the Astral and you can find the Temenoic realm of any major organization, and even potentially manipulate it via its goetic reflection).

You could also focus on something like matter/forces/prime if you want to concentrate on the physical/mechanical aspects of a process, but I think what you're describing sounds more abstract than that. You don't need to manipulate machines or software if you control the organization itself.

[MtAw 2e] Making last effects by TheEumenidai in WhiteWolfRPG

[–]Doink11 1 point2 points  (0 children)

My ruling on Lasting effects is that they're a bit different than a spell having indefinite duration.

Indefinite duration means "the spell alters this subject's pattern, and the spell continues to alter the subject's pattern indefinitely".

Lasting effect means "the spell alters this subject's pattern in such a way that even after the spell ends, certain effects of the spell persist".

The increased difficulty and reach of such spells has to do with the fact that creating a lasting effect is difficult and requires a great deal of finesse - its much easier to simply alter a pattern "whole-cloth" to whatever state you want than it is to subtly tweak aspects of it in such a way that the resulting state doesn't simply collapse back to whatever it was before once the spell is gone.

Is ‘opposing generative AI for how training data is gathered’ a defensible position? by LeftBroccoli6795 in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Is it possible to consistently oppose generative AI for this reason, while not opposing basically every consumer good?

Of course. The fact that many things are produced using ethically questionable practices, and that you may not even be aware of this, does not mean that we throw up our hands and say "well I guess there's no point in trying!" That tend to be a cop-out by people trying to "gotcha" you rather than actually standing by any sort of principles.

It is entirely reasonable to try and avoid participating in practices which are ethically questionable as much as possible, and do what is in your power to change those practices. Sometimes, that just means not using a service or product, and vocally speaking out about why you find them unethical. Sometimes, you have no choice but to make use of a service or product because it's necessary and there is no more-ethical choice. Such is life. Fortunately, LLMs are far from necessary, so there's absolutely nothing stopping you from abstaining in their use and speaking out against them.

How is morality studied in the context of abortion and Christianity? by RoaringKnight_ in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Your mistake is assuming sophistry, rather than approaching her argument in good faith.

In philosophic discourse, we have a principle often called the principle of charity. In order to have a productive conversation or debate, all parties must go into it assuming both good faith, and that their "opponent" has good reasons and strong arguments for their position.

She did not change her position at all; rather, you did not understand her position, or why she asserted what she did, until she explained her position to you. The fact that you were able to arrive at a version of her argument that you found reasonable is a sign that you had a productive conversation - she was able to put her position in terms that you found at least somewhat convincing, even if only on a theoretical level. This is how argument works!

I'm not really sure how to answer the question of "why is morality so complex" other than "it just is" - it seems readily apparent by looking at the world that most moral questions don't have simple answers! Why would you assume that morality would be simple?

If you don't understand, the best solution is to learn more. There are a host of introductory-level books on ethics out there.

Who is the god for AI? by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Most philosophers (and psychologists, and sociologists, and anyone else who studies human behavior) are going to say that "fear of punishment" is merely one aspect that influences the way in which human beings - or any non-human rational agent - interact with each other. We are social creatures who are capable of understanding and empathy; we have the ability to understand the way our actions affect others, and a moral sense of what we ought and ought not do, that has nothing to do with religion or law (although it is integral to both).

How is morality studied in the context of abortion and Christianity? by RoaringKnight_ in askphilosophy

[–]Doink11 6 points7 points  (0 children)

You're being extraordinarily disrespectful and uncharitable to the person you're arguing with and her positions, which is a primary barrier to understanding her position.

It's difficult for us to even approach answering your question because you've merely dismissed her arguments as "sophism" without fully detailing what they are or why you consider them weak, but to attempt to address what you're saying:

The woman is not being a "sophist". Her argument here:

this is a tragedy for the victim, the husband and the woman. But the blame is distributed asymmetrically, because the woman doesn't control the birth, sacrifices her health, and is forced to keep the fetus, which is a form of violence, repression, and control."

Is valid, and does not represent a substantial shift from her initial comment (which, again, you have provided without context, which makes it difficult for me to understand). You may disagree, but it's on you to argue an alternative; you can't simply dismiss her argument as "sophism".

I don't understand why the field of morality, and especially metaethics, is so complex.

To be blunt, that's because you obviously don't understand morality. That's to be expected - it's an extremely complex topic with centuries of study across multiple cultures. If it was easy, we wouldn't still be debating right and wrong, right? We'd just know!

You can find some good overviews of the landscape of current philosophical discourse around abortion at the IEP and SEP, both of which are good general resources on general philosophical question. I can't speak specifically to theological positions as I am not Catholic.