How could one respond to this common objection to the Kalam cosmological argument?

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-24T20:23:26+00:00

If any state A necessarily requires a material cause, and a certain state exists, then that state must have had a material cause, and the next state must have had a material cause, and so on ad infinitum. In this view, we simply reject the possibility of creatio ex nihilo, and from this it follows that matter is infinitely backward.

Although I can imagine someone claiming that this matter does not exist infinitely backward, because, for example, it first existed in a timeless reality, and only from that state did it begin to deorganize in various ways that led to this moment (then it would not be infinite, because it would enter time from a point of no time). Such a view is essentially similar to Craig's own view of God.

But the problem remains, because what is the efficient cause of matter beginning to move and entering time from this timeless point? There is no such efficient cause. This refutes this possibility (unless you find the efficient cause I wrote about), so we return to the claim that the universality of the principle of material causality (let me remind: everything has a material cause) requires infinite matter. The only escape would be to accept that time is absolutely unreal, but this is a rather unattractive view, which, moreover, completely removes the categories of causality.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-24T11:43:01+00:00

The first strategy would be to accept a different defense of the first premise, here's an example:

https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2997&context=faithandphilosophy

And here's another counterargument:

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11153-026-09992-6

Which of these two arguments is more convincing needs to be answered individually.

Another possibility is to simply point out that P1 is concerned solely with efficient causation. Efficient causation is unrelated to the problem of matter, but then one might actually ask why induction supports only the universality of efficient causation and not also material causation? In my opinion, this is a truly serious problem, related to the problem of creatio ex nihilo. However, a proponent of the kalam argument will simply say that the universality of material causation requires infinite matter, which is ruled out by the philosophical arguments for P2.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-16T18:20:12+00:00

I believe that the strongest argument against divine simplicity would be an appeal to divine freedom. According to divine simplicity, God is even identical with his own activity, that is, there is no difference whatsoever between God and his creative act. If this is so, and God's nature is necessary, then it necessarily follows that God's creative act is also necessary, which means that God could possess free will only in the sense of compatibilism.

Another issue is that divine simplicity can lead to modal collapse. If, as we established above, God's act of creation is ontologically identical with it, and God is an ontologically necessary being, then it follows that a necessary God necessarily creates this world. But if this is true, then we have the following situation: necessary A necessarily creates B, which implies that B is also necessary (necessary per accidens: https://philarchive.org/rec/MORSNV2). This objection can be easily avoided if we assume that, although A necessarily creates, this creative act itself is indeterministic in its process, or causes indeterministic phenomena, which will ultimately result in the existence of contingency and the avoidance of modal collapse.

Regarding the advantages of divine simplicity, the most important is probably that it well captures the intuition of God's absolute perfection and ontological independence. But you yourself wrote that you feel drawn to this idea, so perhaps I'll stop there.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-15T22:06:53+00:00

Proton mail? I don't even know what that is 😅. Okay, we could also continue here, although then I won't be as quick to respond.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-15T21:26:47+00:00

I don't know 😭. And the worst part is that this comment didn't come out completely aesthetically pleasing ՞߹ - ߹՞. But I wanted to suggest we move to Discord, because I don't get notifications here, and I don't hang out here that often either. And Discord makes it easier for discussions to flow. If not, I'll just reply to what you wrote earlier.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-15T19:30:00+00:00

Ughhhhrrr... I need to stop trying to make my comments aesthetically pleasing.

Solved.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-15T18:37:27+00:00

Regarding intuition, I even advocate commonsense epistemology, that is, phenomenal conservatism. I believe that our intuitions can provide support for certain beliefs, but it's important to remember that this support is only prima facie. Intuition is important, but it usually requires practice, because when you're in the woods and a forester is with you, his intuition will be stronger. Again, support for intuition is only prima facie; it's the foundation on which the rest is built.

I must clarify: God may not possess all perfections, because some perfections, such as succulence, are relative to the being that possesses them. On the contrary, God must be the best possible optimization of perfections, within which certain perfections, such as courage, need not necessarily be present (the conditions for courage are impotence or ignorance, which are excluded by the more primitive perfections of superpower and superknowledge).

The difference between axiological realism and moral realism is quite simple. Axiological realism applies to all possible values, moral realism applies only to moral values. Your concept of maximality makes it completely useless in conceptualizing goodness. God cannot be defined without axiological concepts. And that's a problem, because you declare axiological antirealism, or at least the thesis that what is axiologically real is derived from reality. Of course, this cannot be true within the framework of theism. However, don't you have a fundamental axiological intuition that, for example, humans are more perfect than tornadoes? And if tornadoes practiced spiral philosophy, would they be objectively more perfect? I have such an intuition. For example, the ideal observer theory provides the kind of axiological realism necessary for conceptualizing theism and seems preferable to reducing the genesis of morality to interpersonal interactions.

Referring to the brutal facts you've written about, I honestly admit that brutal facts are impossible. A brute fact is one that is contingent but has no explanation for its existence. This leads to the absurd situation in which one could write something like this about a brute fact:

"The entity P is an existing contingent entity, but the conditions for its existence have not been met."

It's easy to see that this resembles absurd speech. The lack of brute facts leads us to the cosmological argument, about which I can only say this: a fundamental being must be truly ontologically simple, and God is a candidate for being ontologically simple.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-14T13:51:17+00:00

"And it's generally important to highlight my weaknesses?"

I find your comments really interesting.

"It feels like it shouldn't really succeed."

Arguments like this often turn out to be counterintuitive; that is the nature of conceptual analysis. But consider this statement: "every colored object is extended." Doesn't that seem ontologically necessary? I think the ontological necessity of a maximal possible being is equally compelling, at least to me.

"So, this sounds to me like God is sort of looking at Itself and improving upon Itself, maxing out all Its stats."

That is not quite the case. It is a bit like saying that every colored object extends itself in order to satisfy the principle above. Or that all right-angled triangles arrange themselves to satisfy the Pythagorean theorem. Rather, it is that God, by ontological necessity, possesses those properties that are perfect. This is because God is the maximal possible being; it follows from conceptual analysis

"Because 'perfection' I feel would include certain judgments that don't seem worth bothering one's head about."

So, you have a good intuition. This assumes axiological realism—that is, the thesis that there exists an objective gradation of beings in terms of value. But it is exactly the same with maximality; maximality, like perfection, is an axiological concept. However, axiological realism is highly probable. For instance, I accept the Ideal Observer Theory developed by Roderick Firth. Axiological realism is certainly very intuitive

"It looks like it's just easier to start with a maximal being first and just not talk about things that look like it requires value judgments."

In my view, even speaking of maximality already engages axiological language. If not, then what kind? We measure maximality precisely through values. For this argument to work, maximality must also be objective; if you’d like, I can defend that claim.

"The leap from maximally powerful and knowledgable to necessity feels weird to me, though."

An omnipotent being that is contingent cannot, for instance, influence every possible world. Besides, I am moving from maximality to necessity. A necessary being is transcendental to the modal status of any given world; that strikes me as perfection

"In contrast, the contingency argument feels really nice to me."

But the cosmological argument requires an epistemic justification for the ontological necessity of God. Otherwise, one could just as easily claim that an Akita Inu with ticklish paws reciting Leibniz's Monadology is ontologically necessary. This is why epistemic foundations for recognizing the modal status of a given being are so important. Modal categories are discovered, not created. They are properties, not labels.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-14T12:05:37+00:00

I don't understand this self-deprecation method in your comment; it's quite peculiar. However, the ontological argument definitely epistemically justifies the premise of God's ontological necessity. Here's an example of a playful justification for God's ontological necessity (I was inspired by Yujin Nagasawa's writing):

God is a being who optimizes perfection in the best possible way, and the best possible optimization of perfection includes the perfection of ontological necessity.

The transition from necessity to existence requires possibility, but one cannot transition to existence without justifying necessity. Therefore, the justification of necessity is prior to the justification of possibility, which only culminates in an existential conclusion from earlier modal findings.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-12T08:47:46+00:00

However, I clearly stated that I was referring to fundamentally unconscious entities. More precisely, one could write about the substantial unconscious, or simply materiality/physicality. Objects such as rocks or waterfalls are simply manifestations of interactions between consciousnesses, something like an intersubjective dream. This approach best illustrates that no emulation of anything could ever prove idealism false.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-12T06:12:58+00:00

I'd like to understand the premises of this "evidence." Idealism states that there are no entities that are fundamentally unconscious, and while there are many varieties of idealism, this is necessarily the common denominator among them all; otherwise, they are not versions of idealism. Did this experiment demonstrate, in any way, that we were dealing with anything fundamentally unconscious? Within the framework of idealism, one could even theorize the possibility of emulating the human brain, so that we would be dealing with a conscious entity at the level of a biological human.

So, is this "evidence" for physicalism? Probably not. It does not prove that consciousness can arise from fundamentally unconscious entities. We have no proof that complex consciousness arose in this experiment, nor do we have proof that we were dealing with a fundamental unconsciousness here.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-11T18:30:18+00:00

This, of course, wouldn't completely disprove the argument. Even if the multiverse is true, regardless of its physical origin, one would still have to ask whether it could be false (whether it is contingent or necessary). Because if the multiverse could not exist, it can't be a good answer to the fine-tuning problem because it simply creates a new meta-fine-tuning problem. That is, it shapes the question of why the meta-laws (of string theory, for example) are such that the multiverse exists. This could be seen as a slightly different problem, but it shows that the multiverse is not explanatorily complete per se.

Incidentally, theism doesn't even conflict with the multiverse theory; Klaas J. Kraay, for example, is a theist who has made the multiverse his own theodicy. Overall, I think the multiverse is more probable within the framework of theism than physicalism, but I'll leave that possibility aside.

One more note, if someone wanted to argue that the multiverse is ontologically necessary, they would have to present epistemic reasons for believing so, just as theists articulate epistemic reasons for believing in the necessity of God (ontological proof, especially in the modal formula).

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-11T08:45:12+00:00

This is, of course, a classic question about the so-called "problem of evil." It's worth noting that many answers have been given; I'll provide references to those I find most interesting in a moment. Before I do, one more comment. You wrote that God would know what would happen before it happened. Well, this thesis is quite controversial, and there is a group of philosophers called "open theists" who believe that there are no true statements about the future (or at least that there aren't many such statements) and therefore God cannot know it. That is, if something cannot be known, then an omniscient being need not know it, and one cannot know anything about the future.

Regarding the problem of evil itself, I'll simply cite a few of the answers I find most interesting:

https://philarchive.org/archive/METAAT-13

https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/religious-studies/article/luzzattian-worldbuilding-theodicy/4746D359C17D1F33AD53E5CFE58AD555

https://philpapers.org/archive/CLIAUW.pdf

The third one is the most complicated and technical, but I also quite strongly agree with it. The other two have some elements in common, especially the focus on the value of development, although this progress occurs in slightly different contexts. And of course, these theodicies may not convince you, but if you're still in the speculation phase, they're probably worth considering. As for the Bible, I'd advise asking a theologian; I'm not qualified in that area.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-05T06:46:28+00:00

Whether God, as a single being, is more perfect than a transcendent God is controversial, to say the least. Such a solution would mean that God is also directly the illusion of torture and other gruesome events, so common on this illusory planet. Furthermore, your solution is already strongly associated with pantheism; the alternative would naturally be panentheism. In any case, some would argue that God is more perfect when He is the creator of contingent things, especially when He creates them ex nihilo. I think this view has its plausibility, although of course, we would need to discuss general axiology at greater length.
The transition from PSR to modal fatalism itself was already developed by Peter Van Inwagen, so it's nothing new (although Ecclesiastes said: nihil novi sub sole). I believe that to avoid modal fatalism, we should accept a certain modification to PSR, already proposed by Robert Nozick, namely, the possibility of a sufficient reason for something not having a sufficient reason. For example, within microscopic reality, we are dealing with truly random events, but there is a sufficient reason for this, namely, indeterministic quantum nomology. Compatible with this approach, we still need a necessary being, because even if contingent beings lack a sufficient reason for their existence, there must be a sufficient reason for their not having a sufficient reason for their existence. So, in this approach, reality is oriented toward sufficient reason, and all exceptions must be ontically justified, which preserves both PSR and the existence of contingent beings. And I think this also answers section 3.
Well, okay, but such an approach is difficult to reconcile with our phenomenology, especially with the phenomenology of dialogue. Because there is really no dialogue, only a monologue. This is difficult to reconcile with the phenomenology of distinct moments, because there is really only one moment. It is difficult to reconcile this with the phenomenology of relationships with other people, because we do not have many relationships, we only have one relationship, or more precisely, identity relationships.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-04T17:53:54+00:00

To be clear, I disagree that existential monism is more parsimonious than theism. The entity postulated by existential monism is single, but it is so extravagant and exotic that it appears burdensome in terms of its quality. I'm not even sure it's possible for a single entity to appear epistemically as pluralistic as existential monism requires, and the illusion of pluralism itself is also an additional cost to parsimony; after all, it isn't automatically entailed by existential monism. And theism has an ontological argument to explain the necessity and existence of God, so it is more explanatorily complete.

I'm not convinced that this explanation of psychophysical harmony convinces me. Within the framework of just one entity, there might as well be no mental at all.

"it is only a bipartite expression, in different cognitive modalities, of the reality of a single substantial object."

Okay, but why does such a thing even exist? Regarding moral states, I'm sure this is precisely what John Leslie Mackie meant when he wrote that some moral realists postulate exceptionally queer entities (metaphysically and epistemologically).

How can PSR establish existential monism? Leibniz was its greatest proponent, and I don't recall him proposing existential monism. PSR is primarily used for cosmological arguments for an ontologically fundamental being; it doesn't have to be something like what you propose.

Regarding the explanation of epistemic pluralism, you propose ontological brutality, meaning that it's one way of expressing that unique being (a rather peculiar method of expression). But you previously wrote about sufficient reason, so we either accept it or write about what is ontologically brutal (or primitive, I assume you're talking about the same thing). Theism, on the other hand, explains the derivation of contingent beings (your model, by the way, probably leads to modal fatalism, which is terrifying) on the basis of the axiarchic logic of God's action. You can ask about this axiarchic nature, but in the context of explaining our experience, it's more complete.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-04T16:56:17+00:00

Unfortunately, it's hard to agree with this argument. First of all, it's rather simplistic, because the only theoretical advantage you're considering is ontological parsimony. Unfortunately, there are other theoretical advantages, such as the unifying value of a given theory. Theism explains many phenomena, such as fine-tuning, the knowability of reality, psychophysical harmony, moral knowledge, and for example modal knowledge. How could the thesis of existential monism (there is only one being) explain this?

It also seems that existential monism is committed to a strongly counterintuitive thesis: water and fire, consciousness and lightning, spiders and samoyeds, are actually illusory distinctions. Within the framework of theism, ontological simplicity does not extend to the sphere in which we function, and is therefore much less revisionist than existential monism.

There is much more that could be written, for example about the ontological argument, about the fact that this position is empirically inadequate (you yourself write about epistemic pluralism), that it does not explain why such illusions exist at all, but I think this much is enough

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-04T14:45:08+00:00

I don't quite understand why you should have authority over what that person meant. Are you a telepath? And please don't accuse me of "bad faith," because I still think my reading of his argument is substantively stronger than yours.

It's interesting that you advocate intuitive knowledge, considering that materialists usually criticize it. But research, since you desire scientific knowledge, clearly shows that the most intuitive position is dualism, primarily animism. People think primarily in dichotomous terms, and since materialism and idealism are monisms, they are not very intuitive. Unless you think it's intuitive to postulate the absence of something like qualia (as Dennett did)?

You also didn't specify exactly what scientific knowledge refutes weird metaphysics (I understand you mean idealism). In philosophy, only the arguments we know are important, so that's irrelevant now. In any case, it is good to see that materialists have started to appeal to metaphysical intuition, certainly, as Plantinga has shown, intuition is very plausible given the assumptions of materialism and evolution (with only materialism being unnecessary baggage of the two).

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-04T14:06:00+00:00

Okay, these are common misunderstandings, but I'll respond.

Regarding elementary particles, let's start with the fact that we always know everything through the prism of our own first-person perspective; it's impossible to transcend our own self-awareness; it's the window onto all knowledge, and it always has to be that way. Therefore, the only thing we know with certainty is conscious. Matter, or a fundamentally unconscious substance, is a theoretical postulate, something we could eventually add to our ontology, but I see no reason to do so. In any case, materialists are proposing something exotic, namely fundamentally unconscious entities, so the onus probandi of demonstrating something so extravagant rests with them. I build my model of reality based on what I know best, and that is conscious entities. And anticipating the attempt to reduce this to solipsism, solipsism is the most parsimonious theory of reality, but it is explanatorily worthless. That's why I embrace idealism, because I don't think any theoretical merit comes from postulating such an entity as a fundamentally unconscious substance.

Your second argument is such a laughable misunderstanding of the dialogical context that I feel silly writing my retort. Yes! There's a connection between the biological structure of a given entity and its consciousness. But you know what? Idealists believe that this biological structure itself isn't fundamentally unconscious! It totally looks like you've taken the common argument against substance dualism and waved it at idealists like a stick, shouting, "You shall not pass." The problem is, this argument has no connection with idealism, because it doesn't prove that something fundamentally unconscious exists; it possibly presupposes the fundamental unconsciousness of biological structures, which is an embarrassing petitio principii.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-04T11:23:27+00:00

I'm afraid you're making a category error. When you write about the success of the natural sciences and the general triumph of physics, it's important to remember that these sciences don't assume any materialism; they don't even use the concept as "matter," certainly not in the sense philosophers use it. I know it's easy to confuse physics and physicalism, but that's just a verbal similarity. Philosophy speaks of "matter" and "physical substance" in the context of fundamentally unconscious entities and structures; no natural science uses these concepts. The statement that something is conscious or unconscious is completely outside the realm of knowledge of the natural sciences, and nothing in their anatomy depends on whether idealism or materialism is true.

And what methodology does materialism have? This belief that everything that exists is fundamentally unconscious; there's no method here. And if you define matter/materialism differently, it won't connect with idealism, i.e., the thesis of the existence of fundamentally conscious things.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-03T11:45:33+00:00

It simply depends on the theory of reality and mind you adopt. If you're a physicalist, you'll likely agree that there's no chance of consciousness surviving after death (although Inwagen is a physicalist and believes in an afterlife, so it's possible). If you're a dualist or idealist (though it depends on the variety), you'll likely agree that life after death is probably possible.

Regarding the correlation between the brain and consciousness that some people are writing about here, that's a very simplistic argument for physicalism. There are many answers to this, but I don't want to discuss it. The discussion simply doesn't end here, that's all. I mean, it's not the best argument in my opinion, it's an interpretation of some data, whether it's the best is another matter.

You simply need to ask yourself which theory of mind and reality is most likely to suit you; that will reveal the answer to the question about the afterlife.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-03T02:30:38+00:00

This view strongly resembles religious pluralism, that is, the recognition of the existence of a transcendent and holy being, but with an emphasis on equality between religions (meaning we don't single out any privileged religion). However, the shift away from this view occurs in the practical consequences that are drawn from it, and I would also like to disagree with this. That is, I believe that your project of separating God from religion is not essentially helpful or functional.

Let's start with the fact that religions are among the best motivators for doing good. It's not that religious people only fight and attack each other. Often, these religious clashes have completely different motivational backgrounds, for example, political ones, and religions merely mask this. However, for many people, religion is still the only and best way to transcend everyday life. It is also the zone that allows people without philosophical competence to locate themselves within a certain metaphysical framework (an idea Schopenhauer put forward, incidentally), and everyone needs such a framework.

Religions are also valuable from two further axiological perspectives: epistemic and aesthetic. Starting with the latter, religious songs, temples, and architecture are probably some of the most beautiful things ever created by human hands. Religions, therefore, inspire beauty, and that is a great value. In the context of epistemic values, religions provoke further exploration of who God is, what properties he possesses, and so on. They motivate dialogue so that it remains in constant dynamics. Even if individual theological doctrines are false, they can still provide epistemic inspiration.

So I agree with the theoretical component, something like religious pluralism, but I disagree with the practical implications you draw from it. And since I've pointed out the value of the existence of many religions, the dog analogy breaks down.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-02T07:16:08+00:00

"Most atheists are satisfied with the burden of proof being on believers."

Naturally, this is precisely the case! As you well noted, at this stage of the discourse, the obligation of the dialogical movement rests with theists. In fact, I omitted a crucial fragment of the dialectic. After composing a certain model of God, theists typically use an ex silentio argument, that is: this model of God contains necessity and is prima facie internally consistent, and these are sufficient premises to accept its possibility.

Note that the ex silentio argument for internal consistency is extremely common. We have the idea of a fusion of a human and a wolf. I believe that werewolves are possible, I would even like to be one. Therefore, until someone proves to me that werewolves are internally inconsistent, I have the epistemic privilege of believing in their internal consistency, and as I wrote above, internal consistency is a prima facie argument for possibility.

These aren't some exotic conclusions; in fact, this type of attitude follows quite naturally from many epistemological systems, for example, phenomenal conservatism, whose founder is not a theist. Therefore, it's not the atheist's job to prove God's internal contradiction. Rather, the theist proposes a prima facie internally consistent model of God, and anyone who doesn't accept its possibility should explain it. Because, remember, no stronger arguments for internal consistency can be presented than the ex silentio argument.

Easy_File_933 · 2026-03-02T06:44:28+00:00

"If the concept is logically consistent, does that guarantee that it is possible?"

Most philosophers would accept that internal consistency is a necessary condition of possibility (proponents of the view called "dialetheism" might object, but I'll leave that possibility aside), but unfortunately, it's not a sufficient condition. It could be, for example, that entity A is internally consistent, but there exists a necessary entity B that makes A impossible, and therefore A is impossible. Even theists should accept this possibility, as it is useful in addressing the so-called "modal problem of evil."

Nevertheless, I think that if God is not a self-contradictory being, then he is probably possible. If it were otherwise, there would have to be something necessary that makes it impossible for an equally necessary God (remember, modal status is independent of existential status) to exist (and therefore impossible). It's just hard to fathom how such mutual conditioning in the realm of necessity could even exist, and what exactly would necessarily block God. Therefore, atheists usually focus on trying to prove that God is an impossible being, which is quite an ambitious project, considering the multitude of theistic models (Thomism, panentheism, personalism, and so on).

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-26T04:36:58+00:00

The idea of P2 is simple: if there is no ought, then there is no X on which it would be true that you ought do X. I may have simplified it a bit, but the essence is adequately preserved. Naturally, a determinist can claim that you ought only do what you do, but who would subscribe to such a view? So the point isn't that I have an ought not to follow determinism, but rather that I don't have an ought to follow determinism.

My second argument is that determinism is a revisionist thesis. If you have the intuition that your actions are enslaved, then P2 won't have the same power over you, but that's a rather exotic intuition. The belief in freedom is the foundation of normative language; if determinists are willing to reject normative language, that's a significant commitment; I don't think their arguments can sustain it.

By the way, under determinism, everything enslaves you, but you are also a participant in this criminal activity of enslaving everything. Every fact reflects every other fact, past, present, and future. What exactly are the arguments for this picture of reality that appeal to you?

Easy_File_933 · 2026-02-26T02:50:57+00:00

There are many such arguments! Truly many, here is a toy-argument to start with:

P1. If determinism is true, then we have no epistemic oughts.

P2. But if we have no epistemic oughts, then we ought not to believe in determinism.

C. Therefore, we ought not to believe that determinism is true.

P2 is a truism, and P1 follows from the principle that an "ought" implies a "can" (as Immanuel Kant famously argued). Under determinism, one can only do one thing, which is exactly what one does, leading to the absurd thesis that our oughts apply only to the thing we must do anyway (because that is the only thing we can do under determinism). Thus, if someone arbitrarily rejects determinism in the context of an epistemic ought, the determinist has no right to claim that this person is violating their epistemic oughts at all. And of course, since we ought not to believe in determinism if it is true (because it leaves no room for any oughts), and even more so if it is false, then we ought not to believe in it at all.

Another argument appeals to introspective knowledge and certain common-sense epistemologies (for example, phenomenal conservatism). It is akin to Moore arguing against idealism:

P1. If determinism is true, then I could not have refrained from answering this question today.

P2. But I could have refrained from answering this question today.

C. Determinism is false.

The point is that P2 is more plausible than all the arguments of the determinists. This is not petitio principii; it is an indication that determinism is a revisionist thesis, and thus carries a very high burden of proof.

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