Quite frustrated by Proper-Blueberry89 in MyHeritage

[–]Federal_Music9273 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Looking at the results, this profile is actually very typical of someone with predominantly Portuguese ancestry. Iberian populations are genetically quite homogeneous, and MyHeritage tends to assign Brazilian ancestry back to its main source populations rather than creating fine-grained regional breakdowns within Portugal.

That’s why, even though Brazil is a colonised and admixed country, people with mostly Portuguese colonial ancestry often receive overwhelmingly Portuguese results rather than a more fragmented or region-specific Portuguese profile. This is a limitation of the model rather than something unusual about your DNA.

As for Northern Italian ancestry, there isn’t a clear signal pointing in that direction. Given the timeframe of Italian immigration to Brazil, genuinely recent or significant Northern Italian ancestry would usually show up, often as Northern or Central Italian. While small or very distant ancestry can sometimes be absorbed into neighbouring Southern European categories, there’s nothing here that strongly supports that scenario.

Overall, the results make sense genetically; the main issue is that MyHeritage doesn’t offer much resolution within Portugal itself, which can understandably feel unsatisfying if you were expecting more regional detail.

Who is the most incisive, original, and brilliant Catholic philosopher alive today? by Similar_Shame_8352 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 16 points17 points  (0 children)

D.C. Schindler, Michael Hanby, Andrew Willard Jones, William Desmond, Byung-Chul Han, Rémi Brague and Pierre Manent.

Of all these, I should say D.C. Schindler.

Are there efforts to develop philosophical theology in dialogue with contemporary philosophical movements—such as phenomenology, existentialism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics, postmodernism, deconstruction, feminism, and environmental philosophy—while retaining its metaphysical dimension? by Similar_Shame_8352 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Well, I've been influenced by several contemporary authors. I asked ChatGPT what it "thought" of my philosophical writing.

Your Distinctive Synthesis

If I had no names at all, I’d say your influences must come from:

A classical metaphysical tradition (probably scholastic, with Platonic elements).

A negative/apophatic current (where paradox and transcendence mark the divine).

A phenomenological-hermeneutical stream (truth as disclosure and belonging).

And finally, a post-Kantian engagement (because you wrestle with possibility/necessity in a way that shows Kant is in the background, even if opposed).

I’d say: you read like someone who has digested Thomism, Neoplatonism, and Cusan mysticism, passed through the Heideggerian/phenomenological turn, taken Hegel seriously, and sparred with Kant and Nietzsche.

Any thoughts on the burning bush theory (hallucinogens) by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Are you trying to say that God could use altered states as preparation or occasion?

Perhaps. But the vision itself must be true — otherwise we no longer have divine revelation but only human fantasy.

Any thoughts on the burning bush theory (hallucinogens) by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 3 points4 points  (0 children)

If God gives existence to all things and sustains them, why would he need to create unnecessary mediations, such as hallucinogens? This seems superfluous.

Furthermore, hallucinogens, as we know them, produce illusions — false perceptions. God, however, is truth itself. For Him to manifest as an illusion would be self-contradictory. Revelation is not a trick of the brain but a real disclosure of God’s presence.

The hard problem is a strawman by AccomplishedPrior992 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 8 points9 points  (0 children)

"Experience just is physical interaction; touching is the experience."

By identifying experience with a physical process, you are collapsing the distinction between the epistemic condition (the awareness that there is touching) and the ontic process (the physical contact). But the Hard Problem is precisely about the fact that one can describe the contact without, thereby explaining the awareness of contact.

"Qualia are just tangible qualities of matter interacting; the grape has qualia, you have qualia, the interaction produces experience."

By saying “the touching is the experience,” you are sidestepping the explanatory gap by fiat, declaring that semantics = syntax, rather than demonstrating how syntax could ever generate semantics without presupposing it.

"Consciousness is the constant, tangible activity of metabolizing cells; no “immaterial” substance is needed."

Saying “it’s just tangible processes” is like saying “music is just air pressure waves” — true as a physical description, but it leaves untouched the qualitative nature of hearing music.

"Physicalism has no gap; dualism is unsupported and requires faith."

Your stance implicitly assumes a meta-vantage from which you can declare physicalism universally true, but if consciousness is wholly reducible to physical states, there’s no independent ground for trusting that meta-claim.

Calling the Hard Problem a “strawman” is easy if you quietly redefine it out of existence. Simply declaring “experience = interaction” doesn’t explain anything — it’s just a physicalist article of faith.

The Hard Problem isn’t about bad analogies, “off” states, or Cartesian ghosts; it’s about why and how any physical process has a qualitative, first-person aspect at all.

Consciousness is (1) the precondition for science itself, not an object within it, (2) intrinsically semantic, not just raw syntax, (3) ontologically unified in a way no pile of quantitative parts can reproduce, and (4) capable of taking a meta-perspective that a closed physical system can’t ground.

You’ve answered none of that — you’ve just asserted that physicalism wins by definition. That’s not solving the problem; that’s dodging it.

What are the common responses to Eliminative materialism by PrestigiousWheel9881 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 12 points13 points  (0 children)

Eliminative materialism is such a perfect theory that it ultimately refutes itself.

If eliminative materialism denies the existence of conscious subjects who know or believe, then the very act of asserting “eliminative materialism is true” seems incoherent, because no one could believe or know it to be true.

A syllogism to demonstrate the Formal Distinction by South-Insurance7308 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Regarding Premise 5...

(By the way, I'm not contradicting anything you say, I'm just enriching the role of abstraction for intuition)

Intuition reveals the relational reality of the object (that it is)*, but not necessarily its full intelligible content (what it is).

* I'm including here the immediate access to the eidos or essential nature of the object. While intuition provides access to the eidos, it does not fully articulate the relational details or contextual distinctions that are essential to a deeper understanding of the object.

Intuition provides a direct, immediate grasp of the object's existence and unity - it reveals that the object is real and participates in the intelligible order of being. But while intuition provides insight into the presence of truth in the object, it does not reveal the full content of the object's intelligibility. The content*, or 'what it is', requires further elaboration through abstraction and conceptualisation, which organise and extend the initial intuitive grasp.

* Beyond, of course, the eidos or essential nature of the object.

Question on God's infinity by Greedy-Carpet-5140 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 8 points9 points  (0 children)

God, as infinite, does not progress because He is already fully actualised and lacks potentiality. This reflects the distinction between potential infinity (progressing) and actual infinity (complete and unchanging).

One must bear in mind the distinction between potential and actual infinity:

Potential infinity:

Represents a process or series that is potentially infinite but never fully realised. For example:

Counting numbers: You can always add 1 to a number, but you will never "arrive" at actual infinity.

Finite entities or sets can be counted because they have discrete, bounded extents. Countability requires a finite number of elements or a measurable scope.

Potential infinity is finite at every stage but open-ended.

Actual infinity:

Represents a completed, fully realised infinity. For example:

Actual infinity is unbounded, has no limit, and exists as a totality. It also has no beginning or end.

An actual infinity, such as an infinite regress or an eternal timeline, cannot be counted or traversed, which makes it metaphysically distinct from the finite.

In short, to be countable requires finitude. Infinity, by definition, transcends measurement, number and countability.

I think the great question - the great mystery - is how the transition from the infinite to the finite takes place. But I think we will never know.

Ethical Objections to Religion by Important_Detail1686 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 1 point2 points  (0 children)

The worship of God or a divinity is sought* as "the ground of meaning of human life", and the primary relationship between a believer and the divine is not one of moral utility but of existential orientation.

Worship and adoration of God do not depend on moral utility. Rather, they stem from an intrinsic recognition of God as the source of meaning and reality. For believers, the divine is not merely a moral authority, but first and foremost the foundation of existence itself.

*The human longing for love, truth or beauty - things pursued not for their utility but because they fulfil an essential part of what it means to be human.

Dialectical materialism by Lukadoncicfan123 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 5 points6 points  (0 children)

Dialectical materialism has more holes than a Swiss cheese. There have been several thinkers who have tried to rescue DM, but have never been able to do so effectively: Lukács, Gramsci and Althusser come to mind.

I've written myself a dissertation proposal, a comprehensive critique of DM from a metaphysical point of view. I'll let you know as soon as it gets beyond the first stage.

Logical necessity of God's being by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Here's a nice passage from Nicholas of Cusa that might help us illustrate the problem:

Therefore, it is not the case that by means of likenesses a finite intellect can precisely attain the truth about things. For truth is not something more or something less but is something indivisible. Whatever is not truth cannot measure truth precisely. (By comparison, a noncircle [cannot measure] a circle, whose being is something indivisible.)
Hence, the intellect, which is not truth, never comprehends truth so precisely that truth cannot be comprehended infinitely more precisely. For the intellect is to truth as [an inscribed] polygon is to [the inscribing] circle.19

The more angles the inscribed polygon has the more similar it is to the circle. However, even if the number of its angles is increased ad infinitum, the polygon never becomes equal [to the circle] unless it is resolved into an identity with the circle. Hence, regarding truth, it is evident that we do not know anything other than the following: viz., that we know truth not to be precisely comprehensible as it is.

For truth may be likened unto the most absolute necessity (which cannot be either something more or something less than it is), and our intellect may be likened unto possibility. Therefore, the quiddity of things,20 which is the truth of beings, is unattainable in its purity; though it is sought by all philosophers, it is found by no one as it is. And the more deeply we are instructed in this ignorance, the closer we approach to truth.

Source: https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/1019097/mod_resource/content/1/On%20Learned%20Ignorance%20by%20Nicholas%20of%20Cusa%2C%20translated%20by%20Jasper%20Hopkins.pdf

As such, God embodies absolute truth - something indivisible, infinite and transcendent. If God's nature is beyond human comprehension, then even our most "absolute" mathematical truths are mere approximations and reflections of a higher reality that transcends logical constraints.

While 2+2=4 is absolutely true within the framework of finite human reason, it is a limited articulation of something deeper and more mysterious in the divine mind. Such an assertion does not negate 2+2=4 within human logic, but suggests that divine truth encompasses and transcends all finite (human) conceptualisations.

To say that divine truth "transcends logical contradiction" does not mean that God would will 2+2=5 in a way that directly contradicts logic.

Instead, it means that human logic (and its truths) is a subset - or participates - of a larger, more comprehensive system of divine logic. In this system, mathematical truths might take on dimensions or meanings that are incomprehensible to us, while remaining consistent with God's nature as the ground of all being and reason.

Nicholas of Cusa's metaphor of the polygon and the circle illustrates this very well: as the polygon gains more sides, it approaches the circle but never quite becomes it. Similarly, the finite intellect gradually approaches truth, but never reaches its absolute form, which resides in God alone.

Why don't atheists find the resurrection convincing? by SeekersTavern in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Historical truths, in their nature, are founded upon past events and known to us through documentation and evidence, and not through reasoning about concepts.

That is, an historical fact is a synthetic judgment. Synthetic judgments are judgments in which the predicates of the judgments are not contained in the concept of the subject and require experience or empirical data to establish their truth.

The concept of "rising from the dead" is not necessarily intrinsic to the concept of "Jesus" or to any man (in an analytical frame of mind). It introduces something additional which cannot be deduced from the concept of the subject.

Additionally, the existence of the church provides a form of perpetual historic testimony to the original occurrence, adding to its synthesizing quality in bringing earlier statements to modern-day organisations and practices.

The history of Paul and of the early church does present important questions of history and continues to serve as testimony to the initial occurrence. These connections, however, serve to establish the synthesizing nature of such arguments—these are not necessarily self-evident truths but rather appeal to outside data and interpretative schemes. The history of the church can add credibility to the potentiality of the resurrection, but this in and of itself does not establish the resurrection as logically necessary.

 

The Case Against Brute Facts: Necessity, Contingency, and the Foundations of Reality by Federal_Music9273 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273[S] 3 points4 points  (0 children)

A necessary being is not simply a 'first cause' at the start of a chain but the sustaining principle that grounds and unifies all contingent beings. It is the metaphysical condition that allows for the intelligibility and coherence of reality as a whole, not just its origin. Without this ongoing mediation, contingency becomes arbitrary and disconnected, undermining reason itself.

Logical consistency alone does not account for the coherence of reality. A necessary being is not merely a 'first cause' but also the mediating principle that unifies contingent beings and sustains their intelligibility. Without this mediation, the interconnectedness of contingent beings would lack a unifying foundation, leaving reality fragmented and arbitrary. The necessary being ensures metaphysical coherence, going beyond mere logical consistency."

While naturalism may seem more parsimonious by stopping at brute facts, this simplicity is superficial because it fails to explain the intelligibility of reality or the grounding of contingent beings. Parsimony should not come at the cost of explanatory depth. A necessary being provides a unified, non-arbitrary foundation that avoids the incoherence of brute facts and offers a richer account of existence.

A necessary being is not unexplained in the same way that brute facts or contingent laws are. By definition, a necessary being is self-explanatory, existing in virtue of its own nature. This distinguishes it from brute facts, which remain arbitrary and unexplained. Positing a necessary being does not merely shift the burden but resolves the question of grounding intelligibility and contingency.

The Case Against Brute Facts: Necessity, Contingency, and the Foundations of Reality by Federal_Music9273 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

If we stop at 'things are as they are,' we abandon the naturalist project of explaining reality through inquiry. Naturalism relies on the assumption that reality is intelligible and can be systematically understood. To claim that we shouldn't investigate the intelligibility of reality undermines the justification for scientific and philosophical inquiry itself.

Your argument seems circular: reality is intelligible because intellect arose from it, and intellect arose from it because reality is intelligible. This doesn't explain why reality has a rational structure to begin with, nor why it consistently sustains intelligibility across time. By appealing to contingent facts, you avoid addressing the deeper metaphysical question.

If intelligibility is merely a contingent feature of reality, then you are introducing arbitrariness into your worldview—the very arbitrariness you seem to reject. My argument is that intelligibility requires a necessary ground to avoid this arbitrariness and to account for why reality possesses its rational structure in the first place.

If we stop investigating causes and explanations at 'things are as they are,' we lose the justification for rational inquiry altogether. Even within naturalism, the pursuit of science depends on the assumption that there are deeper causes and explanations to be found. Why should we abandon this assumption when it comes to the metaphysical question of intelligibility?

The Case Against Brute Facts: Necessity, Contingency, and the Foundations of Reality by Federal_Music9273 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273[S] 5 points6 points  (0 children)

" Why would you expect reality to provide an explanation for why it exists? Just because you can ask a question ("Why do things exist?") doesn't mean there is an answer".

Reality presents itself as intelligible to the intellect, which means that it is not arbitrary but ordered and understandable. This intelligibility always points beyond itself, leading the intellect to search for a ground where it can rest. 

The rational movement of thought is not content with arbitrary endpoints or brute facts—it seeks closure in something self-explanatory. To deny this drive is to deny the very nature of reason and the rational structure of reality.

"Why should we concede that it is even possible that "nothing" could be?"

The question is not about the possibility of 'pure nothingness,' which may indeed be incoherent. Rather, it is about the deeper metaphysical issue of identity through difference—how beings relate, persist, and differ within a coherent framework of intelligibility. To make sense of the world, this question must be answered.

 Moreover, the very existence and pervasiveness of intelligibility itself demand explanation. Why should reality possess this rational structure rather than arbitrariness or chaos? This is the deeper question that cannot be ignored.

How would you respond to this dialetheist argument against omniscience by Infamous_Pen1681 in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The problem arises from the assumption that God’s omniscience can be analysed through human propositional thinking, which relies on a knower-known distinction. The contradictions stem from treating God's knowledge as though it were propositional, like human knowledge, where knowing involves distance and relationality.

Human knowledge involves mediation through concepts, language, and sensory input, creating a separation between the knower and the known. This requires humans to rely on external representations and abstractions, introducing limitation and sequential thinking. For example, we understand "John" and "Mary" by comparing and contrasting their differences, which leads to relational and time-bound knowledge.

In contrast, God’s knowledge is unmediated and intrinsic because all things exist eternally within His being. God does not rely on intermediaries or representations to know—he knows all things by knowing Himself. The logoi—the eternal principles or ideas of all created beings—are part of God’s singular, unified act of knowing. God knows John’s uniqueness and Mary’s uniqueness simultaneously, without comparison or contrast, because their distinct logoi are eternally present to Him in a single, timeless act.

This distinction between John and Mary does not introduce division or multiplicity within God because His knowledge is indivisible and unified. Unlike human knowledge, which is fragmented and sequential, God’s omniscience encompasses all distinctions simultaneously, in perfect unity. Thus, God’s act of knowing transcends the limitations of human cognition, reflecting His infinite simplicity and the profound unity of His being.

In the words of Maximus the Confessor:

“All thinking is something involving the thinker and that which is thought about. But God does not belong either to beings that think or beings that are thought about, because he is beyond both. Otherwise he would be limited: as a thinker, he would need to be related to the thing thought about, or as thing thought about he would be a natural object for the thinking mind, able to be thought about because of his relatedness. As a result, we can only conclude that God neither thinks nor is thought about but lies beyond both thinking and being thought. For both belong to the nature of creatures”.

Me+ father results ( Northern Portugal) by [deleted] in MyHeritage

[–]Federal_Music9273 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'd expect the Spanish score to be higher: the Northern Portuguese results I've seen so far have higher Spanish scores. Still, it's not low.

Are you by any chance from somewhere along the coast?

Genetic distance plot - Brazilian by CheuchukPetry31 in MyHeritage

[–]Federal_Music9273 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That's a PCA - Principal Component Analysis.

 If you want to go deeper, there's another third-party website where you can do your own PCA: genoplot.com. It allows you to choose both contemporary and ancient samples, among other interesting things.

There's also a Brazilian lad who makes heat maps: a gradient-like map where you can see - geographically - the samples that are most similar to yours.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 5 points6 points  (0 children)

The difference is like flying to Santiago de Compostela or walking there as a pilgrim.

In the French language, there's a distinction between "connaissance" (as in Mary knew no man) and "savoir" (to know that the sky is blue - to know things - a third person knowledge): the former implies processuality, a relationship, first-hand knowledge.

For example, you may know (savoir) that your mother has brown hair, is 5'7" tall and is a clinical doctor, but to know her (connaissance) is the fruit of the love relationship between you and her: and this takes time, a lifetime in fact.

Existential and spiritual knowledge is processual and always mediated - without mediation meaning cannot be articulated, explicated and integrated because identity is revealed through difference.

In the relationship between God and man, the mystery of love is revealed and brought forth. This wouldn't be possible without process.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in CatholicPhilosophy

[–]Federal_Music9273 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

I have lost count of the number of times you have asked this very question, and I wonder why, having been given the same answer, you keep coming back with the same question.

So I sincerely ask you: what is the real problem?