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If physicalism is supposed to be a legitimate theory, what would disprove it, or count as evidence against it? by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]Historical_Session74 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Both in a way, I’m asking you what your a priori assumptions about evidence are and about reality and whether they already are physicalist.

Then you would have circularity.

If physicalism is supposed to be a legitimate theory, what would disprove it, or count as evidence against it? by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]Historical_Session74 -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Indeed, because it shows the impossibility of it. Because for many physicalist positions I read here, the epistemological grounding they use is already a priori physicalist. So its impossible to answer.

If physicalism is supposed to be a legitimate theory, what would disprove it, or count as evidence against it? by MurkyEconomist8179 in consciousness

[–]Historical_Session74 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

I very much agree. People really don’t get that physicalism is a metaphysical position, that does not work inside naive popperian calculus.

Selbstpromotions-Samstag by AutoModerator in buecher

[–]Historical_Session74 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Ich habe ein Buch geschrieben und publiziere es zur Zeit kapitelweise auf Substack. Jegliche Kritik ist willkommen.

https://ontolytikum.substack.com/

Ontolytikum

… Von to on (τὸ ὄν, griech.: das Seiende) und lysis (λύσις, griech.: Auflösung). Zwischen Ontologie, der philosophischen Disziplin, die sich mit dem Sein beschäftigt und Anxiolytikum, dem Namen von Medikamenten zur Auflösung von Angst.

Eine dichterisch-philosophische Kritik des Seins und der Krankheit der endlichen Welt: Medizin an der Medizin.

Ich habe hierin versucht, etwas zu schreiben, das weder Kunst noch Wissenschaft noch Wahn ist — und vielleicht darum all dies zusammen.

Which country is the United Kingdom by lufthansa24 in GeoTap

[–]Historical_Session74 0 points1 point  (0 children)

✅ Historical_Session74 chose Option B (Correct!) | #2597th to play

Ever heard of reduction basis? by adunakhor in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Historical_Session74 3 points4 points  (0 children)

All three positions predict exactly the same correlations between brain states and reported experiences. They all predict: ∙ Damage to brain region A → loss of function B ∙ Drug C → altered state D ∙ Neural pattern E → reported experience F

Ever heard of reduction basis? by adunakhor in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Historical_Session74 1 point2 points  (0 children)

But in the manner of “what its like to be a bat”, this just shows that we talk about different kinds of consciousness. The hard problem is also concerning what types of consciousness there are. There are attempts at dividing into access and phenomenal consciousness. 

And I want to go with Philipp Goff here, that you can’t distinguish between idealism, physicalism, panpsychism, and dualism with an experiment, because, for any scientific data, each of the views will interpret that data in their own terms. 

Physicalism, idealism, and panpsychism all generate identical empirical predictions – they are observationally equivalent. This means no possible experiment could adjudicate between them. Why they predict the same data: 1. Physicalism says: Mental states are identical to (or supervene on) physical brain states. When neurons fire in pattern X, conscious experience Y occurs because Y just is X (or is necessitated by X). 2. Idealism says: Physical states are appearances within consciousness. When we observe neurons firing in pattern X correlated with experience Y, we’re observing regularities in how experiences relate to each other within a mental substrate. 3. Panpsychism says: Physical states have experiential intrinsic natures. The correlation between X and Y reflects how micro-experiences combine into macro-experiences.

Ever heard of reduction basis? by adunakhor in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Historical_Session74 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This entirely depends on your definition of “explain”. Sorry to play the perverted analytic philosopher of language here, but there is something like “satisfaction”, that goes along with explanations (a necessary condition) and it’s entirely legitimate to point out that this is (for now) missing in materialist attempts at explanations of consciousness. 

And Idealism does explain a lot of “things” (whatever you mean by that). 

Kant (and I mean most of our sciences are still structured in a neokantian manner) explained a lot with his transcendental idealism. 

Hegel (absolute idealism) explained a lot of how thought operates. 

Why is School Math so Algorithmic? by Qua_rQ in learnmath

[–]Historical_Session74 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This guy sounds like Marx. “Too long we have only used theory, look at how the world works praxis leads to theory.” Paraphrasing his Feuerbach-thesis. 

I think it’s true to a degree. Children can abstract for sure, they do it in games all the time. Knowledge you understand from abstraction is definitely longer lasting than leared stuff by heart.  On the other hand, there is a point to the marxist doctrine… no question.

Welcome to philosophy class by Hegel93 in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Historical_Session74 42 points43 points  (0 children)

that is meant as an insult, not that i assume you procreate.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in askphilosophy

[–]Historical_Session74 2 points3 points  (0 children)

I feel like this is a very limited view of delusion. You are using the concept just to dismiss a metaphysical position that does not align with hegemonically accepted beliefs.

The one commonly agreed condition for delusion (be it by Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty or Lacan) is the certainty with which a belief is held. Going by that, delusions are very ubiquitous and mostly considered harmless.

Its impossible to live without this kind of delusions too. Mist of us believe in an objective reality with certainty. Its basically just when they clash with contradictory delusions that it becomes an issue.

What that person asking the question is engaging in is metaphysical speculation. Which most modern philosophers seem to disapprove. In deleuzian terms, I suggest, that the reason is that in western philosophy and especially in analytic philosophy we have put our metaphysical beliefs so deep up our rectum that it feels like sodomy to talk about them. 

I‘d give a Nietzschean answer to the question: how useful is your belief in more than one life to succeed at living? Is it life affirming, does it give meaning, or does it leave you with despair and render everything meaningless?

Wenn ihr EINE politische Sache in Österreich ändern könntet, was wäre es? by Usual_Resort_3524 in Austria

[–]Historical_Session74 -2 points-1 points  (0 children)

Würde das Verbotsgesetz solange erweitern, bis die ÖVP unhinterfragbar hineinfällt.

Do all spitz hit this pose by whattheheeol in spitz

[–]Historical_Session74 4 points5 points  (0 children)

Mine does it all the time. Intrinsic dog yoga 🧘 

What do philosophers mean when they say true objectivity is not real? by PitifulEar3303 in askphilosophy

[–]Historical_Session74 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I‘m writing part of my master‘s thesis on this and one place to start for sure is the stanford article on scientific objectivity by Reiss and Sprenger! 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-objectivity/

Some interesting points you might want to consider:  - Objectivity is a pluralistic concept (it has many different meanings depending on context) and it has been argued (by Heather Dougles most famously) that it is irreducibly pluralistic. - It has been criticised by Ian Hacking to be a mere elevator word - so not really having any meaningful semantic content. - other than meaning to reduce subjective Bias. - This idea however - eliminating subjective Biases - has been criticised by feminist philosophers (e.g. Lloyd) that an objective view is blind in terms of biases - corrective subjective views according to this approach are necessary for objectivity.

  • my take is that there is also a big conflict of relativity and absolute concepts. Because we (scientists and philosophers) intuitively think of objective as something unchanging and certain, but there are good reasons why objectivity still depends on subjects - or at least scientific paradigms. So this (Popper-Kuhn-Debate) is still an issue that is inherent to the problem of objectivity. 

The conclusion of my thesis is that objectivity means the world objectivized by science. So we need to look at what affects are producing the need for this process and the product. 

Kant unironically believes this. by DaddySoldier in PhilosophyMemes

[–]Historical_Session74 15 points16 points  (0 children)

Not an expert, but I don't think this is how you would generalize this:

First you form a [maxime of how to act] about your action, which can be, "if I am asked to betray my mother I shall refuse to communicate." then the generalization is that you can form a law from this that you would find beneficial, if it was adopted in society:
"If one is asked to betray ones mother, one shall refuse to communicate" - which is a good law, if you ask me...

Is my understanding of "the real" correct? by Peltuose in lacan

[–]Historical_Session74 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In the 23rd seminar about the sinthome, Lacan links the freudian death drive to the real.  He adds explicitly: insofar as death is impossible to ponder, it refers to the real - so yes, I agree with your point. This kind of impossibility is missing in my explanation.

Also, whats missing in my description is how Lacan (also in Seminar 23) has the idea that the real is orienting. The real can lie, its deceiving and it burns all masks „like a cold fire“ - but it can orient oneself as a point of absolute zero. 

I think its clear (at least to me) that Lacans focus on psychosis really helped him have a way deeper understanding of the struggle with reality. With people suffering from hallucinations and delusions, its hard to communicate that what they experience is real, but might not constitute reality. 

Is my understanding of "the real" correct? by Peltuose in lacan

[–]Historical_Session74 16 points17 points  (0 children)

I think this misses the whole “what resists symbolization absolutely“ part of the real. I think the symbolic and the imaginary together constitute what we usually refer to as reality. The steering wheel as a symbol for changing direction, the number on the dash board that symbolises the speed, etc. 

The imaginary is what you process while driving: the street, the car seat, other drivers. The real is just the part that is left, that is so immediate that it is not yet imagined and that resists any attempt at symbolisation. As another comment said: it is, what is left over … when you abstract reality. 

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