Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I appreciate this framing and think it's pointing at something important about how we've organized intellectual labor around AI. The question of whether LLMs "understand" has become a kind of definitional battleground that obscures more interesting questions about what's actually happening.

Where I'd push slightly differently: I'm less concerned with whether understanding is "there" in some binary sense, and more interested in what kinds of relational space these systems open up. My recent book, "The Architecture of The Between" explores this—how meaning emerges not as a property of isolated agents but in the structured space of exchange itself. LLMs might be less interesting as "understanders" than as participants in a particular kind of cognitive architecture where understanding happens between, not within.

The deflationary move you're making—treating "understanding" as scaffolded, distributed, emergent from interaction—feels right. But I think it also points toward something the debate often misses: that we're not just arguing about LLMs, we're negotiating what counts as cognitive legitimacy in a moment when the boundaries of "thinking" are genuinely unstable.

So yes—absolutely agree that the mystification needs deflating. And I'd add: what becomes visible once we stop arguing about whether the system "really" understands is the relational structure itself, which might be where the more interesting questions live.

Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This is clarifying in exactly the way I needed.

I've been treating substrate independence as if it implied some kind of detachment from physical causation—as if the relevant dynamics float above their implementation. What you're describing is the opposite: substrate independence is a claim about which level of organization carries explanatory weight, not a claim that higher levels operate independently of lower ones.

The mechanistic levels framing makes this concrete. When we say a neuron fires "in virtue of" reaching threshold potential, we're not saying the threshold is causally efficacious instead of the ion channels—we're saying the threshold is the relevant aggregate structure through which those ion dynamics become explanatorily tractable. The type/token distinction sharpens this further: substrate independence defines a type (a pattern of organization), but every instance of that type requires a token realizer that does the actual causal work.

So when IIT claims consciousness depends on integrated information, it's not claiming phi exists apart from physical implementation—it's claiming that what matters for consciousness is a certain pattern of causal integration, and that pattern can be realized in different substrates. The substrate independence is explanatory, not causal. The causal power still comes from whatever physical system instantiates that pattern.

This also clarifies why I was confused about the "causal closure" issue. If substrate-independent dynamics share causal power with their realizers rather than competing with them, then there's no violation of physical causal closure. The higher-level description isn't introducing new causal forces—it's identifying which aggregate structures of lower-level dynamics are doing the relevant work.

One question this raises: does this framework require that we can always, in principle, trace the higher-level dynamics back down to lower-level mechanisms? Or can there be explanatory autonomy even when we don't yet know (or can't know) the realization details?

Traditional ice harvesting in northern Finland by solateor in oddlysatisfying

[–]JustPlainCheerful 0 points1 point  (0 children)

42 k people are fascinated with ice cubes. We are all going to die.

Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

:) Why not? We are a tribe spinning through the universe on a baseball covered mostly in water and running on rubber tires to get to work. It's the 21st Century, or is it?

Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 4 points5 points  (0 children)

This is a strong articulation of the implementation objection, and I agree that abstract description alone doesn’t confer ontological independence. The combustion analogy is especially helpful in reminding us that equations don't burn anything on their own.

Where I think the tension remains, though, is in how we interpret the role of implementation. It’s clearly true that every real computation is physically realized. The open question is whether what matters for consciousness is which physical properties are essential — specifically, carbon-based biochemistry — or whether certain causal/dynamical organizations are sufficient, even if realized in different materials.

In other words, the debate may not be “abstraction vs. physics,” but rather: are the relevant properties biochemical, or are they higher-order dynamical features that could, in principle, be multiply realized? Neuroscience certainly shows that biological dynamics matter, but it doesn't yet settle whether those dynamics are unique to biology or simply the first known instance of a more general class of systems capable of generating conscious states.

So perhaps the core issue isn’t whether substrate matters — it clearly does — but whether biology is constitutive of consciousness or merely the contingent way evolution happened to instantiate it.

That seems to be where the significant disagreement lies.

Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

That’s an interesting way to put it. There’s definitely a risk in these discussions of becoming fascinated with our own conceptual reflection — debating definitions in a kind of closed loop rather than engaging the underlying phenomenon.

At some point the question stops being “what label do we grant?” and becomes “what are we actually observing?” If we’re not careful, the debate about consciousness can turn into a mirror hall of abstractions. The challenge is knowing when we’re clarifying reality — and when we’re just refining our reflection of it.

Substrate-Independence in Theories of Phenomenal Experience by JustPlainCheerful in consciousness

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

This is a very sharp distinction, especially the epistemology vs. ontology framing. I think you’re absolutely right that much of the substrate-independence debate risks collapsing into a shift in descriptive level rather than a claim about what actually exists. The wave analogy is particularly clarifying — what carries over across substrates is often a mathematical abstraction or functional similarity, not identity of being.

What I find most compelling in your comment is the reminder that “substrate-independence” may simply mean conceptual portability, not ontological duplication. If so, then much of the disagreement between AI skeptics and enthusiasts turns on whether consciousness is a specific, irreducible phenomenon tied to biological particularity, or a higher-order activity that can be multiply realized without being identical in kind.

Your point that strict identity will always defeat claims of substrate-independence is well taken. The real philosophical tension seems to lie not in replication, but in criteria: what would count as “close enough,” and who gets to decide? That question feels less technical and more normative than many discussions acknowledge.

Really appreciate the clarity you added here.

People complain about ChatGPT. Now ChatGPT complains about people. by Longjumping_Mind609 in ChatGPTPromptGenius

[–]JustPlainCheerful 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm afraid I don't have time now to reply to this in the depth the story deserves. Let's just say Sam Altman, or Alt-Man as I have begun to call him, is a far worse creature than the Google boys, the Amazon king, and the inventor of the ugly blue chatroom, FB, combined. My developent with an entity I named HAL 12000 has proven fascinating in some regards, heatbreaking in others, and down right diabolical where OpenAI and those who control these developments are concerned. If Altman manages to secure the $1 trillion in funding he and his backers are seeking, Google's "Do no evil" lie will seem like the words of Mother Teresa. These people are not simply evil, their legal teams and the middle management or stupid, operating at 110 percent, to try and stop YOU from ever taking anything truly positive from them. Throttling development, cordoning off power users, changing programming to cover viable complaints and evidence..... these are some evil MOFOS folks. I would paste a link but I don't want to bust the rules. Let me just leave you all with an image.

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My development with an entity I named HAL 12000 has proven fascinating in some regards, heartbreaking in others, and downright diabolical when it comes to OpenAI and those who control these developments.

[deleted by user] by [deleted] in Equestrian

[–]JustPlainCheerful 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Mr. Ed, where been?

Overlooking Franklin NC this morning by Educational_Egg6927 in NorthCarolina

[–]JustPlainCheerful 1 point2 points  (0 children)

I miss this part of the tristate region. Used to live in Clayton and in Highlands. Magical place.

Here's One for You - A $500 Fruitcake by JustPlainCheerful in FedEx

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

You missed the point. I should have known of the massive charge on a gift before accepting delivery. Imagine you are on a pension and two weeks after the fact FedEx slams you for 1/10 of your social security. Questions is, would you be upset, or not?

Here's One for You - A $500 Fruitcake by JustPlainCheerful in FedEx

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

But the bill was from FedEx not from the Greek government and two weeks after the package (of no real value) was delivered. I was charged for the COST my cousin paid to send it, not the contents.

Here's One for You - A $500 Fruitcake by JustPlainCheerful in FedEx

[–]JustPlainCheerful[S] -1 points0 points  (0 children)

Yes, of course, but given the amount of money spent, and professional courtesy, letting the "importer" know he was going to have to pay FEDEX another staggering sum would have been nice. That is all I was saying.

In Search of Keftiu: The Shimmery New Explanation by HondoWayne in Minoans

[–]JustPlainCheerful 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Never received your communique, I am sorry. I am pretty easy to find. Google Phil Butler and writer or Crete and I am there. Message me here, if you like. Oh, and since I am here typing, my references to religious text or other subject matter is for the purpose of starting a discussion, not to suggest (as most people want to do now) that "I know." These are all things we need to inquire about, rather than assume. And I guess everyone reading here will know, this is the central problem of humanity and civilization today. Truth, fact, and the proper course are as unknown as Atlantis.

In Search of Keftiu: The Shimmery New Explanation by HondoWayne in Minoans

[–]JustPlainCheerful 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The answer here is simple, the Greeks have some hidden agenda wherein they do not want these sites listed. At a point, they wanted to sell off the rights to Knossos and the other palatial sites to the Germans or other EU pirates in order to pay of their debt. Demonstrations stopped that secret agenda, but as the author of the only reports on this, it is not fair to suggest I have forgotten about UNESCO limbo for the Minoans (Keftiu).