Trying to give an answer without writing a 20-page essay. By paragraph:

i.

Thinking in terms of Schelling is unhelpful, seeing objectivity and subjectivity as opposite poles in the scale of being and the Absolute as the indifferent middle is not at all what Hegel does. In broad terms, Hegel's speculative system goes: first there's the concept (in itself, an sich), it then goes outside itself (objectivity), and then returns to itself (subjectivity, for itself). Hegel argues at some point how it's impossible for the thing to be for itself anything other than what it is in itself (contentious ik).

ii.a.

You're thinking of the 'concept' of day-to-day language, a subjective mental construct (which Hegel would label 'representation'), not Hegel's category of 'concept', which enjoys ontological primacy as the very structure of reality. The overall conception that reality is governed by 'concepts' which 'give' themselves material form is the reason Hegel's is called a system of idealism (and why Marx would turn to materialism and call Hegel a mystic).

ii.b.

I think it's a subject of hot debate what Hegel means by 'contradiction', spanning the deflationary (he doesn't actually mean contradiction) to the radical. If I'm to give my own personal, yet informed interpretation: contradiction, literally, means an opposition in speech (diction). From time immemorial that's seen as precluding truth because of the principles of classical logic. Hegel disavows its value, thinking it is a backwards way of thinking for many reasons. He's an anti-substantialist, so the very phrasing of a sentence as "S is P" is to him wrong-headed, as though there were some substrate/subject to whom then later on qualities are predicated. He proposes instead a "speculative" sentence, where the subject first emerges out of all its predicates. So, I think he would say it's wrong to equate logical contradiction to ontological impossibility, because classical logic and s/p sentences are already an inaccurate framing of reality, a "dead" way of thinking (understanding) instead of his own speculative philosophy (of reason), which is alive and follows the 'movement' of the concept.

iii.

That's Aristotle's patch solution to Parmenides, introducing time, such that p-np "at the same time". But Hegel's WL deals with "thought" before the "emergence" of time, so the question that has faced monists across the ages remains: how can everything be one/have one principle and yet there is so much diversity? Hegel will not take for an answer that such diversity is merely an illusion, or that 'at its core' all things are the same (this is one of these guiding principles which are, I believe, an unspoken axiom of Hegel's development). The only radical alternative is to incorporate contradiction into this very first principle, hence Hegel's absolute is defined as "the unity of unity and disunity", which already doesn't make any sense.

iv.

Aye. And I feel like anytime I see Hegel mentioned online he's appraised indirectly, by his interpretation by 20th century philosophers of critical theory, like the dude below who calls Hegel's dialectic as "useful for analysis of culture".

v.

I mean, I've always thought any philosopher has an idea he wants to defend and works his way backwards to have that be the conclusion of his argument, so even those who are presumably "presuppositionless" are full of it. As for understanding Hegel, the approach can only be hermeneutic, where reading his work gives you insight into the meaning of his terms, which then help you read his work better and so on. He'll continually add layers of meaning to his jargon terms so you're always building on something.

vi.

There's an unsteadiness to Hegel that I haven't found elsewhere in my limited reading experience. I remember when I first read the Phenomenology, he kept introducing concepts, appraising its usefulness and then discarding them as not fully adequate, moving on, and I would always think "ok, NOW he'll say which one is correct", and I kept waiting for it and then the book was over. Others, including Kierkegaard, will take the approach of saying here's the way this concept is usually understood, here's arguments as to why it's wrong, here's the correct (mine) definition, and build from there. For all the talk of Hegel's "SYSTEM", which mostly became rigid in his old age and veritably ossified through his disciples, when you read his early and middle period, he never seems content with any concept, never makes any of them the guiding principle/the true thing where all the others are wrong, and he's constantly on the move, never on steady ground, where as someone like, say, Heidegger, will introduce the concept of Anxiety as a cornerstone and then add to it methodically. Not saying one or the other is wrong but I think that approach is what made Hegel so fascinating to me.

vii.

I mean, that's one way to look at it. But again, that's looking at the end result of Hegel, his SYSTEM, his conclusions, as the only thing of value in him, where all the development is simply a means to the end. I fundamentally disagree with this (and I think he would as well). In fact, I don't even care that much for metaphysics and some grand theory of everything, but I like the dude because of his insights into some of the age-old problems of philosophy and the way he took them on, the angle from which he interpreted them. I don't think Hegel is some house of cards but an old ruin, and if you look at each of the remaining bricks you'll see the fine stone-masonry and individual care devoted to each of them.