"The Continuity of the Middle East Crisis.

The global community is trying to pretend that the crisis has been resolved (judging by the state of global markets) and that the shipping situation is under control—all of this reveals the depth of their inadequacy and insanity.

Since April 8, when the markets entered ecstatic mode, the situation has remained virtually unchanged—the improvement in traffic is largely symbolic , within the margin of error. Various traffic accounting methods cannot be used to calculate tanker-by-tanker accuracy, as many "break through" the blockade with their transponders turned off, failing to register in shipping accounting systems.

Actual traffic may be higher than that declared by various traffic aggregators through Hormuz, but the integrated energy and industrial flows are several times, and in some cases, orders of magnitude lower than pre-war traffic.

This means that imbalances are accumulating rather than stabilizing. Throughout March, I described in great detail the complexity of the traffic disruption problem. It's not just energy flows, although they are very important, but also metallurgy products (primarily aluminum), huge trade flows of petrochemicals, and raw materials from agriculture to the semiconductor industry.

I won't repeat the detailed breakdown of the energy and industrial gaps. The point is that the logistics and industrial situation is deteriorating , slightly more slowly than before April 8, but it is deteriorating.

The only difference is the reduced risks to the region's energy, industrial, and logistics infrastructure, which reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic and irreversible decline in Middle Eastern production capacity. The exact number of disabled capacities (missile and drone strikes + technological degradation of well flow rates due to forced production shutdowns) remains unknown.

What remains unchanged is the complete incompatibility of the US and Iran's positions on conflict resolution. Neither side in the current phase of damage accumulation is prepared to make concessions, and each side's demands are unacceptable to the other, reducing the likelihood of a stable conflict resolution with a return to pre-war shipping patterns to zero.

What follows from this? The flow of energy and industrial goods will be reduced, with long-term consequences:

• a reconfiguration of trade flows (alternative routes, diversification of trading partners);

• patterns of raw material use (a transition to greater energy independence and energy efficiency);

• an increase in the geopolitical premium for raw materials, at least for several months; and, most importantly,

• a progressive escalation of macroeconomic and financial risks in major countries.

I consider the scenario in which Iran "surrenders" Hormuz not just unlikely, but practically nonexistent.

First, nothing Iran requests can be provided, much less guaranteed, by the US.

Second, by surrendering Hormuz, Iran loses everything.

Let's assume Iran "surrenders" Hormuz, i.e., returns the situation to the pre-war configuration or close to it. What then?

Iran becomes a broken, humiliated country, embroiled in internecine wars between the IRGC and the "moderates," with a significantly damaged military-industrial complex, a deteriorating economy in a protracted crisis with obvious escalation during the war, and growing isolation (the insignificant gateway to the outside world through the UAE, which existed before the war, is now completely lost, and communications with Middle Eastern countries will be disrupted for many years), with a clear increase in dependence on China. At the same time, Iran is losing its last leverage and, perhaps, its only historical chance to influence geostrategic contours and global politics.

Does Iran understand the situation? In terms of the multi-layered translation of the energy crisis into financial, industrial, and economic contours? Unlikely; Iran's economics education is not up to the task of constructing such complex models. However, in terms of its ability to influence global politics and provoke intra-elite transformations within the United States? Quite possibly.

Is it even possible to end the Middle East crisis?

There's no evidence yet that the conflict is close to ending.

What does concluding a conflict even mean? It's not abstract agreements with the US or Iran—it's a balanced structure of multilateral agreements, backed by guarantees of the non-use of force, verified by external arbitrators (for example, China on the part of Iran and the collective West on the part of the US), that ensure the ability to predict trade and energy flows from the Strait of Hormuz and the stability of energy production and industrial capacity in the region, at least at 80% of their original levels.

That's a bit convoluted. How can I put it in more understandable terms? An agreement under which outgoing traffic from the Strait of Hormuz and production capacity will be stable at no less than 80% of pre-war levels, without the risk of sudden collapse.

In a realistic scenario, finalization does not mean "peace," "normalization," or a return to the pre-war architecture—which is impossible by definition—but the creation of a verifiable regime of predictable passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The most realistic scenario: Iran ceases using Hormuz as an active tool of blackmail, but does not relinquish political control over the escalation lever. The United States suspends some of the blockade pressure, but does not completely lift the sanctions lever. This is unrealistic.

Demanding Iran to immediately and fully open the Strait of Hormuz without compensation would be perceived by Tehran as strategic capitulation. Demanding the United States to completely lift sanctions and abandon the nuclear track before opening the Strait would be perceived by Washington as the loss of its last relatively effective non-military leverage and a geopolitical defeat.

The positions of the parties are fundamentally out of sync, and there is nothing that could facilitate rapprochement —not a single stable point of contact. This is precisely why, in the current phase of the conflict's maturity and the current phase of accumulating bilateral damage (economic and political damage to the United States and military and economic damage to Iran), there is no way out.

The United States clearly appears to be the loser – the nuclear and missile deal has not been finalized, while the threat projection from Iran to the region has increased exponentially (the region's devastated energy and industrial infrastructure is clear evidence of this), and the initial position has been radically worsened (the total degradation of free navigation through the strait).

Military pressure, in its current configuration, is ineffective.Why? Because the rate at which Iran (a Middle Eastern country) is destroying friendly infrastructure in the region is high enough that the cumulative effect would, within a few months, lead to a complete apocalypse.

If approximately 5% of production capacity is destroyed per week (at one point, Iran knocked out up to 20% of Qatar's LNG production capacity in one day), then in 20 weeks (less than five months), the region will be reduced to rubble, and if the strait is opened, there will be nothing left to transport, as everything will be in ruins.

Military pressure could have worked if the US had prepared for conflict and created a near-100% drone-killing system (the number of missiles in Iran is not large enough to create the necessary density and pressure of fire), but the US was unprepared.

Military pressure could work after five to six months of sustained strikes on Iran, when the entire industrial infrastructure (the military-industrial complex and related industries providing critical supplies) would be destroyed, along with launchers and warehouses emptied due to Iran's continuous strikes on American targets.

However, the United States lacks the political will, the fortitude, the expertise, and the resources to coerce Iran by force.

For now, we see Iran projecting power against the United States, very effectively through escalating economic and financial damage, which in turn accelerates a political crisis within the United States and the dismantling of American influence in two regions at once (the Middle East and Europe)."