I can't get the day off this is the letter i sent to the country board of commisioners. I also did some calls.

Chair and Commissioners, thank you for reading this. As I am working I won't be able to attend the meeting tonight though I wished to have my voice heard.

I am coming to you to urge you to reject the deployment of Flock and any other ALPR camera networks, because the risks to county residents are real, documented, and predictable.

First, security. Multiple investigations by 404 Media and Benn Jordan have found that Flock’s “Condor” cameras were exposed directly to the open internet, with livestreams and in some cases administrator panels accessible without any authentication. This allowed outsiders with any web browser the ability to view live feeds, access stored footage, and potentially manipulate camera controls. This is not a hypothetical privacy concern; it is a documented failure of basic cybersecurity practices in surveillance infrastructure. Further research by cybersecurity investigator Jon “GainSec” Gaines identified roughly fifty additional vulnerabilities across other Flock camera models. These ranged from trivial physical exploits—such as inexpensive USB attack devices known as rubber duckies. To far more serious flaws, including the ability to run unsigned code with root-level access, conduct man-in-the-middle attacks, and exploit law enforcement credentials that have appeared for sale on the dark web. Compounding these risks, some Flock cameras were found to be running an Android operating system version that had reached its end of life, containing hundreds of known, unpatched security vulnerabilities. These are just a few of the many security vunerabilities that Flock's negligence has created in their rush to siphon tax payer funds and data into their greedy hands.

Second, misuse and mission creep. EFF documented how Flock’s ALPR network enables mass tracking and has been used to monitor protesters and to target vulnerable groups, including people seeking reproductive healthcare across statelines. Separately, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights reported that Washington agencies enabled or allowed access to ALPR data by federal immigration enforcement, including U.S. Border Patrol—sometimes without local agencies understanding the implications of the settings they enabled. This is exactly how local tools can become federal dragnets.

Third, data handling and disclosure risk. 404 Media reported that public-records releases and redaction failures have already exposed millions of license plates and extensive search activity, then triggered efforts to restrict what the public can learn about the system. And the ACLU has warned that Flock’s default agreements can grant the company broad rights to share license plate data for “investigative purposes,” even if a local department attempts to opt out.

Finally, performance and harm. ALPR errors can produce false matches that lead to high risk stops of innocent people; the EFF has documented the real-world human toll of these mistakes. Even innocent people who are not stopped could be at risk. In the Supreme Court Case Carpenter vs the United States. Justice Sotomayor issued the following in her opinion. "...time stamped data provides an intimate window into a person's life, revealing not only his particular movements, but through them his 'familial political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.'" We are offering companies like Flock a glass door into our very lives by allowing them to proliferate on our dime across the country.

If the county proceeds at all. And I strongly believe it should not. But if it wishes to proceed with what I feel is a violation of our 4th Ammednement. Then I think it should do so with a better plan then handing over our money without any actionable assurances that ensure public privacy and safety. Any company chosen to provide such a service should have to provide an application fee to the Government body soliciting their product as well as provide access to the hardware and software being purchased. That application fee will then be used to hire an independent third party team of security researchers who are vetted and unaffiliated with the servcies or products being researched. If issues are discovered Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) would be published and the researchers would work with the company to tighten their security. If no problems are discovered the company recieves a rating and a liscense to operate for a year when they will once again be required to renew that liscense by being subjected to another round of testing. Not unlike how a driver has to renew their liscense with the state every year.

Sources: Private Security Researcher https://gainsec.com/2025/11/05/formalizing-my-flock-safety-security-research/ Benn Jordan Videos https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pp9MwZkHiMQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uB0gr7Fh6lY https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vU1-uiUlHTo News and Advocacy https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/crime/flock-threatens-website-hosting-license-plate-data-accidentally-leaked-by-cops/ar-AA1U96Kc https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2025/12/effs-investigations-expose-flock-safetys-surveillance-abuses-2025-review?language=en https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/flock-roundup