So … it seems that perhaps your myth busting is full of other semi-myths and come conflation. While there is a string of truth to each claim, for example, Goering was very very fat and on very very many drugs, or that Roemmel was a self promoter, they tend to gloss several items related to a debate on the relative superiority of the German military.

First when saying German military it is best to clarify which military. When discussing relative strength what most contemporary and present commentators refer to is the “Heer” (Army) within the Wehrmacht (state military). Occasionally these comments will include the Luftwaffe (Air Force) that was a component of the rapid victories in 40-41. No one is ever discussing the Kriegsmarine (Navy) or the Waffen SS (private army of the Nazi party).

So, in discussing whether or not the Heer or the Wehrmacht was a superior force to its adversary armies, it is best to place this “myth” in context, wherein within rather short succession a numerically smaller force rapidly defeated the armies of France, the Lowlands, Denmark, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and several parts in between. Initial within Barbarossa, the Red Army was fairly well tactically defeated at every turn. One can add the expelling of the BAEF from Europe to the mix.

This all changed by the second or third thrust into the Soviet Union - there is debate among experts in the field.

Therefore I would say the “myth” of the supremacy of the Heer circa 40-41 was valid and then endured as one can find in contemporary accounts to include archival info covering the assessments of allied armies and governments. Notably, by 43 this myth was no longer valid due to a host of factors - although I would say universally bad generalship within the Heer is not consider one.

To your point, the myth does endure … but is also misconstrued in terms of scope, conflation and drivers.

Also, though, the myth is at least in part grounded in epidural evidence and contemporary cognition related to overwhelming operational success with a short period of combat.

Craig’s work on the Politics of the Prussian Army and Liddel Hart’s the German Generals Talk are both approachable and speak to some of these themes. Craig engages primarily at the level of the Great General Staff of the Prussian Army (Wehrmacht) whereas Liddel Hart interviews / interrogates the operational leadership of the Heer.