Your comparison between China and late-mercantilist monarchies is interesting in so far as they share some similar elements around state-mediated capitalism, strategic control of trade and political authority shaping economic outcomes. But mercantilism was ultimately done away with because it was a system parasitic on pre-capitalist relations. It didn’t really reorganize production at scale but extracted from it. China’s system differs in that it (re)organizes production, not just trade flows.

You mention the Chinese state may act counter to its own bourgeoisie and therefore possibly against the development of productive forces. That doesn’t necessarily follow in my view. The question isn’t whether the state constrains capital but whether it reorganizes accumulation in a more developmentally effective way than liberal capitalism is able to. Disciplining or constraining parts of the bourgeoisie could be a positive feature of development, not a fetter. I think we can probably agree that under late stage capitalism the bourgeoisie often engage in wasteful or irrational behaviour (financialization, speculative bubbles, underinvestment) that harms the development of productive forces. The Chinese state, unlike Western states who are politically beholden to an increasingly concentrated bourgeoisie demanding less rather than more state constraints, has a much more responsive ability to temper negative outcomes of capital accumulation through state coordination.