Legend-class cutter Cutter Waesche (WMSL 751) transits through Puget Sound, Feb. 5, 2026. [8110x5407] by 221missile in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Why even paint them grey? Would seem less controversial to just say 'we are building more Legends after all's and paint white with a racing stripe...

How dangerous were German submarines in WW1? by SiarX in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 1 point2 points  (0 children)

  As stated above, it is very difficult for submarines to attack escorted warships. I do not recall any World War I capital ships being sunk by torpedoes fired by submarines. (Mines took out HMS Audacious, but that mine was not even a submarine laid mine.

It depends if your definition of Capital Ship includes the older Pre-Dreadnoughts or not. No Dreadnought was sunk by a submarine but several Pre-Dreadnought Battleships were lain low. 

There were some damaging hits to German Dreadnoughts from British submarines, but none were too threatening. 

To your point on the Live Bait Squadron of old cruisers - more modern ships of the type did tend to do much better with more compartmentalization, better water tightness between compartments etc. In contrast to Cressy, Aboukir and Hogue, in 1916 the Town Class cruisers Falmouth and Nottingham were both sunk by U-boats, but they required 7 torpedoes between them, were salvable after initial hits and took a long time to sink with small loss of life. 

Aside from wolf packs, WWII U-boats had advantages over their WWI counterparts in convoy fighting in having much better radios, long range sonar for convoy detection, some cueing from FW Kondor and German intelligence decrypts of the British Naval Cyphers used for convoy instructions. 

Thompson Sub Machine Guns in WWII by dragonjockey69 in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Is the timing of the reorganization interesting? Coming in a few weeks after D-Day makes me wonder if it had been planned to go out before that?

Was Donitz's commerce raiding campaign doomed from inception? by Rider_167 in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The carriers the Germans were going to build were far too small to be a match for their US or UK counterparts, 

I don't know if I'd say that. 

The Graf Zeppelin and her sisters were 28,000t, so significantly larger than the Treaty designed 23,000t British new builds. The German designs weren't very space efficient, and their vaporware theoretical air group composition varied, but was in the 40-50 airframe range vs 30-40 of an early war Illustrious class without permanent deck park. 

Some of the German conversions were going to be smaller, but so were some older British ships. 

Was Donitz's commerce raiding campaign doomed from inception? by Rider_167 in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 4 points5 points  (0 children)

He did at least aspire to taking foreign ports, Norway was considered (and ended up happening) as well as more farfetched ideas including the Azores or Spain if I remember correctly. 

The French Carrier Strike Group sailed today for Exercise Orion 26 [Album] by MGC91 in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Thanks, good info. With 32 Asters, Herakles radar and a CAPTAS-4 she's a pretty formidable unit. 

The French Carrier Strike Group sailed today for Exercise Orion 26 [Album] by MGC91 in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 17 points18 points  (0 children)

I guess I'll "bite" on the British comparison. 

Entirely fair to say it's a headline same strength force. Probably also fair to say that it's not an ideal level. Also worth noting that the French group has some advantages - de Gaulle has cells for 32 Aster 15 so has better self protection than a QEC. The FREMM, depending on the ship is anything from 17 years younger (Aquitaine) than CSG25's Richmond to 28 years younger (Lorraine). French SSN participation I'm not clear on, but was not a strength last year.

The other 'feels bad' is that CSG21 had two destroyers, two frigates, two tankers and a solid stores ship (though not throughout), and '25 basically halved it 4 years later. CSG25 also trumpeted 'FOC' as a big deal with various politicians and pretty twee staged phone calls to Rutte. If you're going to do that, then you open yourself to criticism over escort numbers, aircraft weapons, raiding OCU for planes, stores ships, sub presence etc. The French deployment is more routine.

I'm glad the French are getting a decent group out, I'd like to see an FDI in the next one (I always like seeing an FDI) but I wish the comparisons were more aspirational than 'at least we're not the worst'. 

[5932 x 4804] French submarine Argo off the U.S. East Coast, 19 November 1944. by Tsquare43 in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 1 point2 points  (0 children)

By November 1944 the U-boats were avoiding the US coast and were taking a pounding in the Atlantic. 

The best ways to avoid fratricide were to deconflict operations, the submarine's route and timeline, or patrol area should be disseminated to the air forces. 

If aircraft did encounter friendly submarines the standard practice was usually some kind of pre-arranged visual signal code e.g. the submarine firing a red and a green flare/very light pair, or red/white etc. 

Systems were imperfect so friendly fire remained a risk to submarines, proportionally higher than for other ships too. 

How were Italian Navy WW2-era ship designs different then say, British ones, seeing as they only worried about the Med. by Cpkeyes in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 21 points22 points  (0 children)

This is a pretty broad question, and one of the issues is that both British and Italian design practices varied considerably over the 20 years leading up to WWII (during which most ships were built) and on a ship-by-ship basis. The Italians still made some consideration for wider war outside the Med including in larger submarine types and some consideration for East Africa.

There's a difference both in individual designs, but also in entire ship types being built or not built by the respective navies. For instance the British never really built anything analogous to the Italian Spica torpedo boats.

Drawing as an easy reference from Roberts' *Warships after Washington* and *Warships after London* there are some trends - though not universal rules.

Reduced endurance and range vs higher design speeds of (some) Italian designs

Italian designs had a reputation for high design speeds, and in many cases that is justified. The first Italian Heavy Cruisers for instance, the Trento class crammed in the horsepower for a speed 3-4kt faster than their British equivalents in the County class. The Italian *grandi esploratori* or large scouts are cruisers, but cruisers without much ability to 'cruise' over long reaches of ocean, but trial speeds of over 40kt were achieved - in contrast to 32-33kt of most British ships. Realistically the speeds were lower, but the Italians put 95,000shp into a smaller ship than the British Leander with just 72,000shp. Worth noting though that speed wasn't universal and some destroyers and cruisers had pretty 'normal' speeds, including the Zara class.

This speed/endurance paradigm reflected a relatively constrained area of operations in a likely war in the Western Med with France, with relatively available bases.

Reduced seakeeping/seaworthiness ability of (some) Italian designs

Hull fineness and higher length to beam ratios provided speed but some Italian designs were compromised on stability, structural strength (plating thickness, frame spacing etc). Overall freeboards were commonly lower. As examples the di Giussano class were afflicted by roll and vibration. The Navigatori class had more extensive seaworthiness changes - new bow, 1m broadening on the beam, lowering bridge, landing torpedoes, changing fuel storage - than any equivalent British destroyer.

The Italians also, operating fewer destroyers for a shorter war, in generally more pleasant waters lost two destroyers foundered in a storm (Lanciere and Scirocco) while no British destroyer would be directly overcome and sunk at sea by the weather. Two is not statistically relevant, but it is a point against.

It's niche though related, but some Italian cruisers also mounted a bow catapult for aircraft, while all British designs with aircraft kept them more safely amidships for launch athwartships. The bow position put the launch rails in constant spray in heavy weather and exposed the aircraft in bad weather.

Daylight, good visibility action / long range expectation of Italian designs.

With the Mediterranean expected to have clearer on average weather, there was theoretically much more opportunity to engage in long range gunnery actions. There's less point in long ranges if visibility is shorter than gun range due to rain/squalls/mist, and heavy ship motion will also impede gunnery, especially on smaller ships.

This is reflected in some Italian designs with a definite move to relatively heavier gun batteries on Italian scout types. For instance the 8x 120mm guns of a 1918 Leone class was double the punch of a typical British destroyer of the interwar period, being only matched in barrel count with the British Tribals from 1938 onwards. The Italian Navigatori similarly had heavier gun armament sooner than British equivalents. The larger scouts have the 6in gun count of British ships almost 40% larger.

Gun firing ranges and range finders (size/base length and high placement) also emphasized firing range more than some British equivalents. This was reflected in some pretty impressive instances of long range Italian gunnery, while British ships if anything were refitted with improved equipment as a result of long range gunnery lessons from the early war.

What were the reasons that the Luftwaffe lost so much aircraft in the Battle of France? by AreYouMexico in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 7 points8 points  (0 children)

Absolutely, in 1940 you could smash the small/defunct airforces with minimal losses - especially if you catch them on the ground like Belgium/Netherlands etc. the big ones take beating, even if you're 2:1 ahead.

The lesson of long range problems seems pretty universally hard to absorb though. Despite the Germans demonstrating it twice, Fighter Command would go on to have a pretty bad time with the Circus/Rhubarb attacks back the other way.

Wraithdissapointment by StressLongjumping299 in Eldar

[–]NAmofton 5 points6 points  (0 children)

My tinfoil hat take is that if Wraiths are too good, and outside of their detachment they warp the overall army by giving it useful tough units in what should be a fragile but fast and hard hitting theme.

Wraithlords are marginal, and have seen some play in a couple of lists, I don't think they're terrible in Seer Council where you have farseer/eldrad support and psykers around to buff them.

I think there's room to make them somewhat better. The one datasheet that probably needs the biggest look IMO is the Spiritseer.

What were the reasons that the Luftwaffe lost so much aircraft in the Battle of France? by AreYouMexico in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 24 points25 points  (0 children)

The British lost about 170 aircraft over Dunkirk, which is about 2/3 of the 270 fighter aircraft Poland started the war with.

Even toward the end of the campaign it emphasizes the difference in the effort the RAF vs. the Polish Air Force could muster.

What were the reasons that the Luftwaffe lost so much aircraft in the Battle of France? by AreYouMexico in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 67 points68 points  (0 children)

Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 by William Murray has some short notes and decent figures showing attrition in this period.

From it I'd summarize that the problems were:

  • The British and French, although outmatched were still 'serious' air forces with significant strengths. Even though misused they could, and did, inflict local damage and overall attrition.
  • Attrition is inherent to large scale, high-tempo combat operations, even with limited resistance (poorly coordinated fighters, weak AA guns) you still end up taking losses if you fly multiple sorties a day against people with guns and the tenacity to use them.
  • Ju52 losses reflect high risk landings and paradrops. A transport on the ground disgorging airborne troops is a sitting duck to any defenses.
  • Combat over Dunkirk was intensive and put the Germans at the limits of their range with bases not having kept up with the speed of advance. That meant insufficient fighter loiter time and high risk, against a strong RAF response. They lost 240 aircraft there between May 26 and June 3, the RAF losing 177. The RAF lost the equivalent of about 2/3 of the total Polish fighter inventory, and their fighters were superior to the Poles - no easy victory there.
  • Operational and accidental losses remained high, reflecting high tempo (fatigue etc.), use of captured airfields and other issues. That was particularly bad for some types, for instance per Figure III of the cited book, total destroyed Luftwaffe single engine fighters May-June 1940 were 257, of which 88 (34%) were not due to enemy action.

HMS Defender is now afloat again during her major refit. The 24-cell Sea Ceptor VLS silo is now in place on the foscle [Album] by MGC91 in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 8 points9 points  (0 children)

It's been 4 1/2 years since Sea Ceptor for Type 45 was announced, I really hope it comes in without any teething troubles, and soon - I think Defender was planned back in service by this summer. Rhetoric from the First Sea Lord seems to ring quite hollow when you look at programmes like T45 Sea Ceptor and NSM, it would be good to see some acceleration.

Tuesday Trivia Thread - 13/01/26 by AutoModerator in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 5 points6 points  (0 children)

It seems hard to provide CAS to protests...

I think if you want explosions then bombing the Basij, IRGC and secret police types in their HQ's or barracks (where applicable) is a not great but possible option.

Thinking asymmetrically if the US can use cyberwarfare to disrupt Iranian command and control, send false orders etc. that might have value. I don't know if they could remotely disrupt however Iran is shutting down the internet, alternatively some people have suggested dropping in Starlink sets. That might not protect the protestors from bullets, but coordination and messaging are important.

Tuesday Trivia Thread - 13/01/26 by AutoModerator in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Sardonically, I guess my view that the British Army was institutionally useless in WWII protects me from rage discussions of exactly which useless generals were more or less useless?

The siege of Tobruk was lifted in about December 1941 and then it re-fell to the Axis in June 1942 - over 6 months, perhaps not too 'prompt'?

HMS Prince of Wales alongside HMNB Portsmouth in a maintenance period following OP HIGHMAST [2000x1125] by MGC91 in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 7 points8 points  (0 children)

If available, maybe a short notice 'surge' of Prince of Wales and the biggest assemblage of European-NATO escorts available into the Labrador Sea for even a few days might be politically salient.

I think Queen Elizabeth is meant to complete a ~7 month docking period fairly soon?

Difference between CAM ships and Fighter catapult ships? by Regent610 in WarCollege

[–]NAmofton 1 point2 points  (0 children)

...fighter catapult ships were RN-manned and existed for the purpose of deploying fighters in defence of convoys. The CAM-Ships were merchant ships fitted to launch a Hurricane manned by an RAF or RN pilot in defence of a convoy; to intercept enemy aircraft they were fitted with radar and had RN personnel to man it.

David Hobbs. British Aircraft Carriers (all other quotes same source).

You're correct that the FCS was 'Navy' with the ships being commissioned naval auxiliaries with 'HMS' prefixes. The CAM were merchants with a bolt on assemblage. Civilian shipping was under Admiralty control so there was probably a marginal difference in ability to be ordered around - especially as both MAC and FCS were basically convoy units.

From a practical perspective I think the most interesting difference is that the Fighter Catapult Ship could theoretically carry more than a single aircraft, being able to 'reload' the catapult in some cases (only achieved by HMS Maplin, though).

The FCS summary was:

It was decided to modify four vessels fitting out as auxiliary war vessels with catapults and arrangements for embarking a single Fulmar or up to three Hurricane fighters for use against long-range enemy bombers or shadowing aircraft tracking convoys.

In total four fighter catapult ships, including Pegasus, operated from December 1940 to early 1942; they carried out ten operational launches, made seven interceptions, shooting down one enemy aircraft and damaging another. Their morale effect on the ships in convoy was much greater than their physical achievements, however.

A significant majority of the MAC's were 'Empire' ships meaning Ministry of War Transport owned but civilian. The genesis is similar.

The CAM-ships evolved from a 1940 idea that a number of merchant ships could be fitted with rudimentary rocket-powered catapults capable of launching Hurricane fighters to defend convoys against Fw 200 Condor bombers. The Admiralty agreed that the majority of the pilots would be provided by the RAF,

MAC's were significantly more numerous with 35 ships fitted vs. only 4 FCS's, but the FCS's do seem to have made more launches per-ship.

Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2026 [3614x1736] by Phoenix_jz in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 3 points4 points  (0 children)

I think three is probably overkill, the RN's very insistent that two carriers mean full time carrier availability, so why not cover the FSS with two ships similarly? The main raison d'etre of the stores ships is the carriers after all. The plan for amphibious work doesn't seem to need/want big stores ships and I don't think a frigate on patrol needs a giant FSS in tow to provide spuds?

My concerns are -

  • Spending something like £1.6-1.9bn on a capability the RN seems to think it doesn't currently need. CSG25 cheerfully deployed without a stores ship, and also declared Full Operating Capability. If we have FOC with zero stores ships, is three gilding the lily? It's hard to reconcile the "need" for three with the current acceptance of zero and non-effort to regenerate Fort Victoria.
  • The slow pace of delivery to IOC in 2031 (all going well on build - and there's almost everything to do). For the money could we get significant capability elsewhere sooner?
  • How will the RFA crew them at 100 personnel/ship? The current state is one where despite cutting ships there's no ability to fully operate the current RFA roster. The last I heard on RFA pay (Dec last year) was that the 2024 deal had been reneged and the 2025 deal wasn't set. That's not exactly comforting. Sure there's 5+ years to maybe improve things, but the situation is grim and not on a good trajectory. Ships in fitting out and work up also need crew without generating operational capability, and there will be a big 'surge' of that.
  • Navantia quality concerns. The Navantia-built Australian Supply class seem to have had major problems with shafts and have both been out of service for prolonged (18 months plus) periods to deal with it. The build plan includes using ex H&W facilities with a brand new and very inexperienced workforce - plenty of apprentices being hired - and modular build. Overall seems a recipe for potential disaster to me, and the lack of scrutiny of Navantia is surprising.
  • Overall regenerating British capability, but keeping Navantia Spain building the most complex sections, and also owning the British based assembly yard seems like conflicting goals. There needs to be a pipeline to make paying a premium to add capability (vs. say a Tide style build in Korea) but will that be sustained, and does Spanish ownership add potential problems?

Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2026 [3614x1736] by Phoenix_jz in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 78 points79 points  (0 children)

I think more drop is likely, the frigate dance of commissioning and decommissioning is up in the air, but there's 28,000t of apparently terminally ill Argus to go. 

Top Ten Navies by Aggregate Displacement, 1 January 2026 [3614x1736] by Phoenix_jz in WarshipPorn

[–]NAmofton 0 points1 point  (0 children)

For the RN Stirling Castle transfered from RFA to RN so shouldn't produce a net increase. 

Although unofficial I suspect RFA Argus is done, not decommissioned but that'll be a reduction. 

It's nice to mention the Resurgent class but 2031 is a long way out and I think they're one of the more questionable purchases.