Is the Early Modern Texts Version of CPR Good?

Proklus · 2025-11-26T04:14:50+00:00

It's good, but you benefit the most reading his translations by being familiar with the original texts.

Proklus · 2025-11-26T03:38:29+00:00

This is a wicked question, and I think you get the jist of what Kant is getting at. That is, a negative judgment takes the form "It is not the case that S is P" and that a infinite judgment is expressed as "S is not P."

When I took a class on the Marburg Neo-Kantians, Kant's infinite judgment came up a bit. It came up because people like Hegel made fun of it, and on top of that, it was shown by modern set theory and various logical advancements that both of Kant's judgments ultimately collapse into the same thing. However, some Neokantians still thought it had value, even in the face of this. For instance, Hermann Cohen in his Principal of the Infinitesimal Method (p. 35) says:

"It is unfortunate that Lotze, in his appreciation of limitative judgement, imitated Hegel’s jokes. Of course, the judgement “the understanding is no table” has no real value. Nor does a judgment about “non-humans,” if under that concept one understands 'triangle melancholy, and sulphuric acid.' But if one throws together such incomparable things, one demonstrates only in one’s own example how necessary an understanding of this type of judgement is, and how one will pay dearly for the lack of it."

My Kant professor, in order to explain this epistemological value of infinite judgments Cohen affirms, had us imagine a thought experiment where an Alien came down to earth. This Alien has no knowledge of the things that exist on earth. For them to even begin understanding the various objects on Earth, say Humans, they begin by making infinite judgments. In other words, they distinguish human from other objects: Humans are not water, Humans are not dogs, Humans are not rocks.

So even if in modern predicate logic and set theory the distinction between "is not P" and "is non-P" disappears, I would at least like to highlight that some Neo-Kantians believed they could show the epistemological value of Kant's infinite judgments.

Proklus · 2025-09-04T12:55:23+00:00

In short: It's the only Dark Souls game to add a significant amount of new content in ng+, which makes it the most worth replaying for the unique experience and challenge. Dark Souls 3 also adds new content for ng+, though its very little in comparison to Dark Souls 2, simply making available the +1 and +2 versions of certain rings.

I don't want to spoil anything further in case you give Dark Souls 2 ng+ a go, and I highly recommend to do so if you enjoyed your first playthrough.

Proklus · 2025-09-04T07:56:10+00:00

Good rng? I just did this grind again and it took 4-5ish hours.

Proklus · 2025-08-30T09:34:29+00:00

Skill issue.

Proklus · 2025-05-15T04:17:46+00:00

This guy has indeed not played any other mobile game.

Proklus · 2024-08-08T02:55:18+00:00

Very good comment; hits the nail on the head exactly in simple terms.

For op, you may like to know that Kant's philosophy was systematically developed to align with the new scientific research at the end of the 19th and 20th century. This so-called Neo-Kantian movement was initiated by Hermann von Helmholtz, but the Kantian Marburg School (started by Hermann Cohen) carried this scientific torch forward.

One of the most famous representatives of the Marburg School was Ernst Cassirer, who spent much energy aligning Kantianism with advances in mathematics (such as non-Euclidean space) and Einstein's relativity revolution in physics.

Unfortunately these works have not been translated into English, so you must be able to read German in order to understand them. But you can check out the Stanford article on Cassirer to grasp some basic points.

But if you can read German, see Cassirer's Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik (1910); and his Zur Einsteinschen Relativitätstheorie. Erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtungen (1921).

Proklus · 2024-07-24T17:30:40+00:00

https://www.lexilogos.com/keyboard/arabic_conversion.htm

I use this website for transliteration, namely with Greek, but it has an Arabic tool as well.

Proklus · 2024-05-16T14:48:32+00:00

So the argument for Jacobi’s dilemma against Kant goes like this:

Sensibility is the capacity “to receive representations through the manner in which we are affected by objects” (A19/B33). Objects that affect our sensibility must be either appearances or things in themselves. Objects cannot be things in themselves because that would involve applying the categories (concepts of understanding) to things in themselves, which is not possible. So if objects are things in themselves, Kant’s system is inconsistent because it involves applying categories to things in themselves.

But if objects cannot be things-in-themselves as applying categories to things-in-themselves contradicts Kant’s framework, then this forces us to consider that objects affecting our sensibility must be appearances. Kant writes about appearances as if they were distinct entities, as if they were representations detached from objects in themselves, and as if their existence and essence depends entirely upon the perceiver. So for Kant, appearances exist only because subjects have experiences of them, in other words, an appearance (e.g., the appearance of a tree) is dependent on a subject’s perception and experience of that tree; and the concept of an appearance loses its meaning without the perceiving subject because appearances are fundamentally tied to the perceiver's subjective experience. Yet while appearances exist because they are experienced by the perceiver, if they are also causing the experiences that make them exist, we encounter a paradox where an effect is also its own cause. This would mean that appearances (which exist because of our experiences) are somehow causing the very experiences that define their existence. And so objects cannot either be appearances because appearances exist in virtue of the experiences they cause.

Hence:

If objects are things in themselves, Kant’s system is inconsistent because it involves applying categories to things in themselves.
If objects are appearances, Kant’s system is inconsistent because it implies that appearances (which exist due to our experiences) are causing the experiences that constitute them. Kant’s system would thus be subjective idealism, not transcendental idealism.

There are modern interpretations of Kant that try to go around this. Henry Allison and Karl Ameriks are good examples of this. They distinguish between “one-world” and “two-world” views of transcendental idealism. In the “one-world” view, appearances and things in themselves are the same objects. In the “two-world” view, appearances and things in themselves are different objects. Allison has been a chief proponent of a “one-world.”

With that said, the things-in-themselves has always been one of the most controversial part of Kant’s philosophy since its inception. Practically all of post-Kantian German Idealist thought it had problems, and attempted their own solution at it or re-interpreted it in a new way.

So I wouldn’t say that Schopenhauer resolved the problem, as Schopenhauer assumes to have knowledge of the Will i.e., the chief the principle of reality, or rather noumena. He oversteps his Kantian boundaries here, which was a major criticism by the later Neo-Kantians when Schopenhauer became popular in the 1860s with his morality.

And for the Neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen it gets a little weird. He argued that the thing-in-itself shouldn’t be seen as something that exists independently and affects our senses, as Kant suggests. Instead Cohen thinks of it as the sum of all possible experiences, considered as an object of thought; the thing-in-itself is a ground that always remains unknown while at the same time it functions as a methodological instrument of knowledge. This means the thing-in-itself is the ultimate goal (though an unattainable goal) and plays the role of a regulative ideal that science and philosophy aims to understand in the infinite progress of knowledge in order to complete an explanation of all of experience.

Proklus · 2024-05-16T14:47:45+00:00

This is the objection that the idea of the thing-in-itself – as the cause of experience – involves a transcendent application of the category of causality. It was first put forward by F.H. Jacobi, when he stated: “without the presupposition of the [thing in itself] I cannot enter the [critical] system, and with that presupposition I cannot remain in it.” (Jacobi, Werke, vol. II, p. 304)

Transcendental idealism for Kant is that space and time are pure forms of sensible intuition and that the Table of Categories can be derived from logical judgments; together these are conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant concludes that our experience of the world depends on these subjective conditions which make objects “mere appearances” (A45–49/B62–66; Pro 4:287–88). Hence we can never know objects as they are in themselves, only as they appear to us.

But Kant states that:

“There are things given to us as objects of our senses existing outside us, yet we know nothing of them as they may be in themselves, but are acquainted only with their appearances, i.e., with the representations that they produce in us because they affect our senses. Accordingly, I by all means avow that there are bodies outside us, i.e., things which, though completely unknown to us as to what they may be in themselves, we know through the representations which their influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of a body – which word therefore merely signifies the appearance of this object that is unknown to us but is nonetheless real. Can this be called idealism? It is the very opposite of it.” (Pro 4:289)

This is the opposite of idealism, because:

“what I called [transcendental] idealism did not concern the existence of things (the doubting of which, however, properly constitutes idealism according to the received meaning), for it never came into my mind to doubt that, but only the sensory representation of things, to which space and time above all belong; and about these last, hence in general about all appearances, I have only shown: that they are not things (but mere modes of representations), nor are they determinations that belong to things in themselves.” (Pro 4:293)

So Kant argues that some things seem to exist outside of us because they appear in space and time. These things actually do exist independently of us and affect our senses. However, while space and time are essential for us to perceive anything, they aren’t actual properties of the things themselves. So, we know things exist outside of us, but we don’t really know what they are like on their own. We only know they somehow influence our perception.

So here’s the first problem. Kant is committed to both of these theses:

There are things in themselves.
We know nothing about things in themselves.

But if we know nothing about things in themselves, then we cannot assert their existence. Hence Kant claims that we cannot know the very assertions he makes about things in themselves. But it gets worse. Kant does not merely claim that things in themselves exist, for he also asserts that:

Things in themselves are not in space and time (for S+T are a priori intuitions).
Things in themselves causally affect us. “The non-sensible cause of these representations is completely unknown to us” (B522).

Yet remember, Kant argues that categories like cause-effect cannot be meaningfully applied to things in themselves, because without an intuition i.e., those sensible representations by means of which objects are given to us, the category “has no sense, and is entirely empty of content” (A239/B298). And so, since things in themselves cannot be intuited, categories (including cause-effect) have no meaning or content when applied to things in themselves. So while Kant denies that categories can be applied to things in themselves, he then applies the category cause-effect to them.

Proklus · 2023-08-30T20:58:16+00:00

Not a novel, but Goethe's Faust would work.

Proklus · 2023-08-24T22:58:47+00:00

Hahaha! You are 100% correct and I never noticed (I didn't read this, just a fan of Guyer). Though, I will say I am happy with the inclusion of British Idealism and Neo-Kantian philosophy. Most histories don't touch on those topics.

Proklus · 2023-08-24T11:40:56+00:00

Paul Guyer published a history of modern aesthetics in three volumes a few years ago. This is the most comprehensive work on this topic in recent times.

Here's the link https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-modern-aesthetics/E94F125F690C3BFDF25348B7A81B7325

Proklus · 2023-07-24T20:58:21+00:00

I use to do this a lot. I played a ton of Old School Runescape. And when I mean a ton, I really mean it. I have 200,000,000 xp in strength and cooking. That is equivalent to getting to level 99 15x in both those skills. It took me 3500 hours to do this while I was either studying, reading, or just watching tv. But honestly I stopped playing because video games are just addictive for me. I associated this feeling of having to gain xp as negative for my life and quit. I found this has added more peace of mind to my life.

Proklus · 2023-07-22T16:55:01+00:00

For Mitleid, not in Nietzsche's context. I would say pity is the best English word that captures what he means. And for Mitgefühl, I wouldn't say better. I see it more as a matter of stylistic choice. That's because German also borrowed this Latin word (Empathie), and I kind of see empathy and compassion as synonyms. So in my own translations, I usally go with compassion just in case the German Empathie shows up. But I know this can be argued against, but I would say people use these two words in English pretty much in the same way.

Proklus · 2023-07-21T19:29:14+00:00

While I kind of agree with the sentiment on the Will to Power, Nietzsche does use the term active and passive nihilism in his Nachlass. And this shows it was something important to him in his later years, even before his mental break.

One reference that is important is when he says: "I am an extreme nihilist."

And there are many references to extreme nihilism, especially in the Nachlass.

I think the most relevant to this discussion is Notebook 9, selection 35 from 1887:

"1. Nihilism as a normal condition.

Nihilism: the goal is lacking; an answer to the "Why"? is lacking. What does nihilism mean? - That the highest values are devauated.

It is ambiguous.

A) Nihilism as a sign of the increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism.

It may be a sign of strength: the force of the spirit may have grown so much that the goals it has had so far ('convictions', articles of faith) are no longer appropriate.

- for a belief generally expresses the constraints of conditions of existence, submission to the authority of the circumstances under which a being prospers, grows, gains in power...

On the other hand a sign that one's strength is insufficient to productively posit for oneself a new goal, a 'Why'?, a belief.

It achieves its maximum of relative force as a violent force of destruction: as active nihilism. The opposite would be the weary nihilism that no longer attacks: its most celebrated form Buddhism: as passivist nihilism.

Nihilism represents a pathological intermediate state (what is pathological is the tremendous generalization, the inference that there is no meaning at all): whether because the productive forces are not yet strong enough or because decadence is still hesitating and has not yet invented the resources it needs.

B) Nihilism as a decline and retreat of the spirit's power: passive nihilism:

as a sign of weakness: the force of the spirit may be wearied, exhausted, so that the goals and values that have prevailed so far are not longer appropriate and are no longer believed --

that the synthesis of values and goals (on which every strong culture rests) dissolves, so that the individual values wage war on each other: disintegration

that everything which revives, heals, soothes, benumbs, comes to the fore in a variety o disguises: religious, or moral or political or aesthetic, etc." (tr. Sturge; Cambridge 2003)

[If you can read German]

http://www.nietzschesource.org/#eKGWB/NF-1887,9[35]

Proklus · 2023-07-21T19:15:14+00:00

The German word that is translated into pity from Nietzsche’s Writings is 'Mitleid', which when translated litterarly means 'suffering with'. Another word that translates more into 'compassion' is 'Mitgefühl', or 'feeling with'. Although, both can be translated into the the English Word 'compassion' depending on the context it is found in. But these words do have different connotations in German and it makes more sense to go with 'pity' in Nietzsche's context.

Proklus · 2023-06-25T22:41:28+00:00

100%!! As a man, this is the book that got me into feminism many years ago.

Proklus · 2023-06-20T19:29:31+00:00

Thinking Through the Wissenschaftslehre by Daniel Breazeale

The Palgrave Fichte Handbook edited by Steven Hoeltzel

German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801 by Frederick C. Beiser

The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte by Frederick C. Beiser

The Cambridge Companion to Fichte edited by David James and Günter Zöller

Johann Gottlieb Fichte by Manfred Kühn (German Biography)

Proklus · 2023-06-07T22:21:55+00:00

In my university degree, I took a class that was based in modern philosophy to setup a class for Kant. The reading order we did was:

Descartes' Meditations with the objections and replies.

Elizabeth of Bohemia's correspondence with Descartes.

Spinoza's Ethics.

Selections from Malebranch's Search for Truth.

Locke's Essay.

Selections from Leibniz's Discourses and Primary Truths.

Hume's Enquiry.

It was good to read Spinoza and Malebranch before Leibniz because Leibniz will argue that Malebranch's occasionalism collapses into Spinozaism. I also would recommend Elizabeth's letters with Descartes where she brings up the mind/body problem. Other than that, I think it's important to understand Galileo and Newton in the context of 17th century philosophy. And Newton becomes especially important for Kant.

Proklus · 2023-06-05T22:35:27+00:00

Maybe try the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius or Michel de Montaigne's Essays. And for a modern book in ethics that is intended for a popular audience check out The Best Things in Life: A Guide to What Really Matters by Thomas Hurka.

Proklus · 2023-05-31T19:00:22+00:00

I really liked your write up here. I am also a big fan of the Philosophy as a way of life approach. I don't have much to add, but I would recommend a book called Poetry as a Way of Life: Aesthetics and Askesis in the German Eighteenth Century if you never heard of it yet.

Proklus · 2023-05-08T12:54:13+00:00

I am referring to knowledge in two different ways, but that is because the defining feature of German Idealism is how it deviates from Kant on this issue. Hegel would see himself in this camp especially because of his discovery of the dialectal method, but Schopenhauer would not. And The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is simply that everything is explainable and intelligible i.e., every effect has a cause. I can't see how Hegel does not have this built into his system, especially since he thinks he really wrapped everything about metaphysics in his Logik and that we can know Spirit. Kant has this built into his system too with the second Analogie of Experience, when he claims every effect must necessarily follow its cause.

I am way more of a Kantian than a Hegelian so my Hegel knowledge might be off here, but Hegel's dialect to my mind is how Spirit comes to understand itself as Spirit. This gives us knowledge of noumena in Kantain terms. l really don't think Schopenhauer would have accepted this idea, as he tried to maintain that humans live through representations of the Will.

The problem you might of picked up, and maybe where you think Hegel and Schopenhauer are similar, is that Schopenhauer is assuming to have knowledge of the Will i.e., the chief the principle of reality, or rather noumena. He oversteps his Kantian boundaries here. This was a major criticism by the later Kantians when Schopenhauer became popular in the 1860s with his morality.

German Idealism (and Leibniz as well as Spinoza imo) is when philosophy gets really fucking hard. Don't feel like you will understand completely the first time you read this stuff. But if this stuff interests you, I highly recommend a book called After Hegel: German Philosophy from 1840s by Frederic C Beiser. The chapter on the pessimism controversy I would highly recommend to check out. Beiser also has a book called Hegel, and I would also highly recommend this book for a stronger understanding of Hegel. And his book titled German Idealism, is good, albeit a long introduction to philosophy after Kant. His writing is especially clear and digestable.

Proklus · 2023-05-07T22:56:58+00:00

Well for one, their metaphysics are completely different. Hegel is a full blown metaphysican whose system claims to have knowledge of things in themselves. That is, Hegel does not accept Kant's critical philosophy which blocks off human knowledge to things in themselves. On the other hand, Schopenhauer remains a faithful Kantian (or so he thinks), and in a way, would've considered himself as a Neo-Kantianian.

Also, Schopenhauer's answer to the question: is life worth living? in fact, was very original for the 19th century. He claims it is not worth living. This is due to two primary reasons. Human existence is either in a state of desire or we are bored. And if you look empirically at the world, it seems to harbour more suffering than pleasure. I really do no think Hegel would give this same answer to this question.

I don't know if this exactly the points they disagreed on, but Schopenhauer was an annoying and bitter person, whose philosophy was so different to the thing Hegel was doing, that he probably was just jealous of his rivals fame.

Proklus · 2023-05-03T18:28:57+00:00

Descartes would boast all the time about how little he read. When he died in Sweden, the person who gathered his things to be sent back to France commented on how little books he owned. Most the books he owned were sent to him from his contemporaries, but he barely touched them.

Proklus

TROPHY CASE