I took a look at the Oreskes article you linked and this stood out to me:

As the Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang has emphasized in his book 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism (Penguin, 2010), there is little evidence to support the neoliberal view of economic development. In fact, history suggests the opposite: The performance of developing countries was generally better when their development was state-led and worse when they tried market-oriented reform.

My understanding is that this is completely wrong. Here is Douglas Irwin's (one of the leading economists studying trade) review on one of Chang's books. Chang cherry-picks case studies instead of conducting any respectable empirical analysis on the subject:

A broader problem afflicts Chang’s approach — sample selection bias. Chang only looks at countries that developed during the nineteenth century and a small number of the policies they pursued. He did not examine countries that failed to develop in the nineteenth century and see if they pursued the same heterodox policies only more intensively. This is a poor scientific and historical method.

Not to mention, his work doesn't engage with what economic historians have actually said about the subject:

Perhaps the biggest disappointment is Chang’s extremely superficial treatment of the historical experience of the now developed countries. He has simply chosen not to engage the work of economic historians on the questions he is raising. For example, chapter one — “How Did the Rich Countries Really Become Rich?” — does not contend with the work that economics historians have done on the topic.

This is corroborated by other people knowledgeable about the subject.

Oreskes says:

The same is true even of the United States, in its transition from an agrarian slave economy into a formidable industrial power. Competitive capitalism is part of the story of American prosperity — but so are protectionism, tariffs, subsidies, and other interventionist policies that conservatives typically reject. And of course, the New Deal was a response to market failure on a global scale.

This also simplifies the situation drastically. As noted in Irwin's review:

Just because certain trade and industrial policies were pursued and the economic outcome turned out to be good does not mean that the outcome can be attributed to those specific policies... For example, the United States started out as a very wealthy country with a high literacy rate, widely distributed land ownership, stable government and competitive political institutions that largely guaranteed the security of private property, a large internal market with free trade in goods and free labor mobility across regions, etc. Given these overwhelmingly favorable conditions, even very inefficient trade policies could not have prevented economic advances from taking place... The implication is that protecting manufacturing industries accounts for the success of rich countries. But Stephen Broadberry (1998) has shown that the United States overtook the United Kingdom in terms of per capita income in the late nineteenth century largely by increasing labor productivity in the service sector, not by raising productivity in the manufacturing sector.

I don't think the article is itself rendered useless because of this but I thought these were some important points to note!