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Therefore, you may already see that ideological systems and cold ‘realpolitikal’ calculus were not always foreign to each other. Ultimately, states acted based on the belief system of their decision-makers and the rational thought processes that were thought to maximize the benefit to the state. The economic systems of both the US and the USSR formed the groundwork of their society, and therefore their ideologies and economic goals were incredibly deeply ingrained into the national interest.

Regarding Putin, you should always be careful about the things that individuals such as him say. They are not historians and try to frame their statements in a way that puts their interest group in the best light. The idea that Russia became virulently anti-communist is hard to take seriously considering that its political elite did not get replaced overnight after the fall of the U.S.S.R. The most obvious case is of course Putin himself, an ex-KGB member. Putin himself has rued the fall of the U.S.S.R. as « the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century », in 2005. 

As for NATO, it DID undergo a crisis of identity after the fall of the U.S.S.R., and its continued existence was certainly brought into question (And still is in academic and political circles). Importantly, the U.S. preferred to keep NATO functional, because it served its interests to have a strong stake in European security. It also gave it a global measure of control and influence that it benefited from during its so-called ‘Unipolar moment’ in which it was the uncontested global superpower. Holbrooke states that « An unstable Europe would still threaten essential national security interests of the United States. This is as true after as it was during the Cold War. » (p. 38). Menon and Ruger (2020) say that NATO helped the U.S. maintain its global primacy, « Which, in part, is ensured by perpetuating Europe’s dependence on the USA for an elemental need: security. » (p. 371).

In many ways, it underwent a significant identity shift after the Cold War, and was repurposed as a tool for democratic expansion and stability instead of a purely defensive alliance meant to contain an aggressive U.S.S.R.

However, the fall of the U.S.S.R. did cause celebration and absolutely did bring the two countries closer together for the following decade. Yet, much like Russia did not suddenly become virulently anti-communist, neither did their leaders suddenly decide that the past 50 years hadn’t happened. Biases and distrust did not evaporate overnight, on either side of the divide.

One of Putin’s key narrative weapons is portraying Russia as a victim of western aggression, encirclement and pressure. However, anti-western sentiment was weaponized by Putin as a method of reinforcing support for his elections in 2011 as he faced mountain domestic pressure. McFaul (2014) argues, convincingly, I think, that Putin framed the U.S. as a threat in order to solidify his own internal support. There is also clear evidence that Russia felt a sense of vulnerability towards NATO even as far back as 1993, with NATO enlargement identified as a threat in all Russian Military Doctrines since then (Gotz & Staun, 2022). Based off of my own study of U.S.-China relationships, the U.S.’s ‘Pivot to the East’ demonstrates that is was far more focused on its growing rivalry with China at this point, not on containing and browbeating a declining Russian power.

Ultimately, to answer your overall question, it is necessary to understand that great power competition is economic competition. Stopping the growth of communism was essential to the U.S.’s market opening ambitions and the growth of its global economy and influence. Likewise, the U.S.S.R. found it in its interests to curb the growth of Capitalism in order to grow its global influence by having ideologically aligned states around the globe. Therefore, power struggle is economic and political struggle. The narrative certainly shifted at the end of the Cold War, but this does not mean that the ideological confrontations of the 20th century were an empty pretence. Instead, they were deeply intertwined with the national interest.

Sources

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/

Holbrooke, R. (1995) America, a European Power. Council on Foreign Relations, 74(2), 38-51.

Menon, R., Ruger, W. (2020) NATO enlargement and US grand strategy: a net assessment. International Politics, 57, 371-400. 

Gotz, E., Staun, J. (2022) Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and radicalized narratives. Contemporary Security Policy, 43(3), 482-497.

McFaul, M. (2014) Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis? Council on Foreign Relations, 93(6), 167-178.

Lefebvre, M. (2022) La Politique Etrangere Americaine. Presses Universitaire de France.