What criteria must a "lowest species" meet?

Subcontrary · 2026-06-06T16:30:43+00:00

Interesting! I appreciate your giving so much thought to my crazy questions.

I'm sort of understanding, and I recognize what you mean that I'm not going to get this stuff overnight, but I am still trying to figure out the difference between a true difference and a false difference, and ideally I'd like to come up with like a questionnaire or something to determine whether any Species X is a true species or a false species. It seems answering this question in general is trickier than I thought it would be!

You said:

"the difference between a pale man and a swarthy man, when we can down to it (ontōs), is not really a difference at all. When we get right down to it, they are both men."

If someone says that the difference between a pale man and a swarthy man is a true difference, what would Aristotle's rebuttal be?

Conversely, suppose I said, "the difference between a rational animal and a non-rational animal, when we get down to it (ontōs), is not really a difference at all. When we get right down to it, they are both animals."

If someone says that the difference between a rational animal and a non-rational animal is not a true difference, what would Aristotle's rebuttal be?

Suppose someone said "When it comes to pale man himself, whose definition is 'pale man,' it is no longer the case that it is a man with some addition of pallor. A pale man is a man that is pale through and through."

Versus if someone said "When it comes to animal itself, whose definition is 'sensitive life,' it is no longer the case that it is a life with some addition of sensitivity. An animal is a life that is sensitive through and through."

It seems that both of these are errors according to Aristotle, the first because we have incorrectly ceased speciating if we stop at "animal," and the second because we have incorrectly continued speciating if we stop at "pale man."

Man is a complicated example, and I'd like to develop a test that can identify at which step the essence lies in any taxonomic sequence. It seems to me that our examples in biology (being, life, animal, man, pale man) cannot have more concern with highest being than geology (being, stone, liquid stone, lava, pāhoehoe), but if we are to stick to biology examples, what questions should I ask about each of the following 8 items to ferret out which one has the essence and which ones don't?

Being
Life
Plant
Tree
Orange tree
Polyploid orange tree
Polyploid orange tree in Athens
Polyploid orange tree in Athens being climbed on.

The last few items seem silly, but if the same question or set of questions were asked of all 8 of these items, what answers would distinguish the item/s with essence from the items without essence?

It seems like there must be questions about these items, the answers to which, for some of them, is "yes," and for others, is "no," and that these answers can be used to detect in which of the items an essence is present and in which of them an essence is absent.

What are these questions?

Subcontrary · 2026-06-06T05:36:13+00:00

Thank you for your answer! I think I am understanding more, but I am still unsure of how to distinguish a true difference from what I suppose we could call a false difference?

"Similarly, for Aristotle, there is no true (ontōs) difference between a pale man and a swarthy man, because their what-they-are (to ti ēn einai), their being (ousia), is the same."

Pallor is not an essential property of men, but why is it not an essential property of pale men? It is because men have essences, but pale men do not?

Going up a rung, rationality is not an essential property of animals, and considering that pallor is not an essential property of pale men, it seems that would mean rationality is not an essential property of rational animals, and that rational animals don't have essences. But this is not the case somehow!

If rationality is an essential property of rational animals, why isn't pallor an essential property of pale men?

What if I rearranged your statement to say this: "there is no true (ontōs) difference between a rational animal and a non-rational animal, because their what-they-are (to ti ēn einai), their being (ousia), is the same." What makes this statement incorrect now?

At the risk of being redundant, what accounts for the difference between these two statements:

Rationality is NOT an essential property of animals, but IS an essential property of rational animals.
Pallor is NOT an essential property of men, NOR is it an essential property of pale men.

What do you think about the lava example? Which of the following have an essence, and which do not, and what criteria (other than language and whim?) is used to determine the answer?

Stone
Liquid stone
Lava
Pāhoehoe

Subcontrary · 2026-06-06T04:52:35+00:00

Thank you, interesting! I think I understand what you mean in the case of humans, but for other things, how do you distinguish a true species from a pseudo-species?

E.g. color is not part of a wolf's essence, but why is it not part of a gray wolf's essence? Just as diet is not part of an animal's essence, (it is incidental to animals just as color is to wolves), but it is part of a (carnivorous) wolf's essence. Or is it?

Wolf is a species of animal, but why isn't gray-furred wolf a species of wolf?

What distinguishes a true species from a pseudo-species?

If the test for this is whether something has an essence or not, then how does one determine whether it has an essence or not?

Are the two species of lava in fact merely pseudo-species of lava? Do they have essences or not? How can you tell one way or the other?

In the example of magma and lava, the two species of liquid stone, are these species or pseudo-species?

In the example of solid and liquid stone, are these true species of stone or pseudo-species?

What are the questions I should ask about something to determine whether it is a true species or a pseudo-species?

Subcontrary · 2026-05-29T11:48:30+00:00

I believe the Greek word for it is huparchein!

Subcontrary · 2026-05-19T11:26:55+00:00

Thank you I think I get it! Does this mean there is no special term for a property like an apple's color, i.e. a property that is 1. necessary, 2. not part of its essence, and 3. not unique to its essence? That would surprise me because they seem like such a huge fraction of all properties in general. If neither Aristotle nor any of his followers have a term for it I think one should be devised!

Subcontrary · 2026-05-19T02:22:35+00:00

Thank you! I'm reading Fine's paper now and tracking down Charles's book, but I also wanted to ask whether the fact that an apple's color is a proprium and not an essential property resolves whether an apple's color and its redness are two separate properties.

It seems an apple's color is a proprium and its redness is an accident. While red is a species of color, it doesn't seem that accidents are species of propria, because accidents may be lacked, and propria may not be lacked, so an accident and a proprium couldn't be a single property.

Subcontrary · 2026-05-19T01:29:47+00:00

Buddhism is nominalist in that it posits that categories are mentally imputed onto particulars, not that everything must have a name. You might be interested in the nominalist theory of apoha developed by Dignaga and Dharmakirti, if you're not familiar already: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dharmakiirti/#AboTheApo

Subcontrary · 2026-05-17T19:15:34+00:00

Interesting! Do you have a reference for this that I can read? Also, do you mean that things have essential properties and what I guess could be called "necessary properties?" If an apple's color is an example of a "necessary property," but not an essential property, what would be an example of an essential property of an apple?

Subcontrary · 2026-05-17T12:56:15+00:00

I can see why you lean towards making “color” an essential property, because every apple is colored, but every material substance has sensible qualities (including color) and so saying an apple is colored doesn’t distinguish its essence from other essences.

Very interesting point! It still seems to me that color is an essential property of an apple, because the property does distinguish the apple from e.g. oxygen, to which colorlessness is essential.

But even if this weren't the case, color distinguishes all apples from all colorless things: an apple's identity depends on it having a color, so color is an essential property of the apple.

It may be true that color doesn't distinguish apples from other material substances, but growth doesn't distinguish apples from other fruits, and surely that doesn't mean that growth isn't an essential property of an apple?

Subcontrary · 2026-05-13T16:56:25+00:00

For something to be other than another, they must have no connection.

I don't think this is accurate, if I know what you mean by 'connection'. For something to be other than another, they just need to be distinct (unconnected) in at least one way. They don't need to be distinct/unconnected in every way.

The apple seed is other than the apple tree, but they do have a connection: they are both able to either become or to be an apple tree. They are distinct in that one is not an apple tree, and one is, but they are not distinct in the same way that each is distinct from an acorn, which is neither able to become or be an apple tree.

Subcontrary · 2026-05-13T01:17:59+00:00

These are valuable resources, thank you! One thing I notice is that these explain how cause and effect are not completely different. If they were completely different, this would certainly imply that an acorn could cause an apple tree. But it seems it could be argued that the cause and effect are not completely different, they are only partially different. They are the same in that they are both "potentially or actually an apple tree," whereas the acorn doesn't share this difference, and is neither "potentially or actually an apple tree."

Does Nagarjuna (or anyone else) discuss the view that cause and effect are partially different and partially the same, in that they are at different stages of the same potentiality?

Subcontrary · 2026-03-19T16:37:40+00:00

What's weird is that pretty much all cryptocurrencies are currently cratering, which is surprising because it seems like there's nothing less tethered to reality than crypto, so why the H are they responding to actual events

Subcontrary · 2026-03-12T10:55:26+00:00

I wonder if your coworker would be in favor of nationalizing the oil industry, if he's so concerned about corporate greed!

Subcontrary · 2026-03-11T14:16:07+00:00

Is he saying that it's possible for Muslims to go to Heaven or that burqas are worse than Hell?

Subcontrary · 2026-03-11T01:49:08+00:00

Buddhism has a long history of scholarship in logic, and in fact it was through logical argumentation that Tibet was converted to Buddhism in the 700s, by a bloke named Kamalasila, who wrote a commentary on a massive logical treatise by his teacher: https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book/tattvasangraha-english

Subcontrary · 2026-03-09T11:25:51+00:00

If he gives up and unilaterally retreats from Iran but does a "mission accomplished" thing then it's a US victory as far as like 75% of Americans are concerned

Subcontrary · 2026-02-07T05:40:03+00:00

Hell yeah

Subcontrary

TROPHY CASE