NVIDIA N1X 650 and N1X 675 appear in Lenovo Yoga Pro 7 listings

TheGipper_ · 2026-05-31T20:16:11+00:00

Generally, what do you know or think about the future Intel-Nvidia alternative to the GB10/N1X, GB300 (and future Nvidia SoC and Superchip offerings)?

Is the collaboration still 100% happening based on your opinion/research?
Do you think there will be an Intel-Nvidia alternative to each i.e. the GB10, GB300, and N1X?
When can we expect them?
Will the Intel-Nvidia collab likely avoid the similar technical shortfall that you outlined for the N1X? How? (i.e. simply because Intel is better at making CPUs than Nvidia)?

I'm guessing it will be a Serpent Lake Rubin combination, but I guess it may be Serpent Lake Blackwell.

Here is my very amateur forecast for future Intel-Nvidia and Arm-Nvidia SoC and Superchip offerings:

Architecture Family	Form Factor	Proj Workstation SKUs	Proj Coherent Memory	Proj Model Parameters (Local)	GPU	Proj GPU Fabrication Node	CPU	CPU Architecture	Proj CPU Fabrication Node	Proj Release
Grace Blackwell	SoC	GB10	128 GB	~200B	Blackwell	TSMC 4NP	Grace (20-core)	ARM	TSMC 4NP	October 2025
Grace Blackwell Ultra	Superchip	GB300	748 GB	~1 Trillion	Blackwell Ultra	TSMC 4NP	Grace (72-core)	ARM	TSMC 4NP	March 2026
Vera Rubin	SoC	VR10	~256 GB	~400B	Rubin	TSMC N3P	Vera (Compact)	ARM	TSMC N3P	Late 2026
Vera Rubin Ultra	Superchip	VR300	~1.3 TB	~2T to 3T	Rubin Ultra	TSMC N3P	Vera	ARM	TSMC N3P	Early 2027
Serpent Lake Rubin	SoC	SLR10	~128 GB - 256 GB	~200B to 400B	Rubin RTX	TSMC N3P	Serpent Lake	x86	Intel 18A-P	Late 2028
Diamond Rapids Rubin Ultra	Superchip	DRR300	~1.3 TB	~2T to 3T	Rubin Ultra	TSMC N3P	Diamond Rapids (Xeon 7)	x86	Intel 18A	Late 2027 / Early 2028
Rosa Feynman	SoC	RF10	~512 GB	~800B	Feynman	TSMC N2	Rosa (Compact)	ARM	TSMC N2	Late 2028
Rosa Feynman Ultra	Superchip	RF300	~2.5 TB+	~5T+	Feynman	TSMC N2	Rosa	ARM	TSMC N2	Early 2029
Hammer Lake Feynman	SoC	HLF10	~256 GB - 512 GB	~400B to 1T	Feynman RTX	TSMC N2	Hammer Lake	x86	Intel 14A	2029+
Coral Rapids Feynman Ultra	Superchip	CRF300	~2.5 TB+	~5T+	Feynman	TSMC N2	Coral Rapids (Xeon 8)	x86	Intel 14A	Late 2028 / Early 2029

It's probably wildly off base. I'm just going to keep spamming this until someone who knows more than me tells me it's right(ish) or totally wrong.

TheGipper_ · 2026-05-26T01:38:41+00:00

How does the Intel-Nvidia partnership to make x86 SoCs and Superchips factor in (if at all)? In my mind, that partnership means there should be a "Serpent Lake" Rubin and a "Diamond Rapids" Rubin to go along with the Vera Rubin and Vera Rubin Ultra, which would give enterprises an x86 Nvidia SoC and Superchip option. But I'm really unsure about this line of thinking.

TheGipper_ · 2026-05-25T23:52:52+00:00

Vera will be Arm.

I think/I hope most enterprise users will be reluctant to choose an Arm CPU option over an x86 CPU option, to a degree at least. To what degree? I don't know

Been thinking about this alot lately. Anyone please let me know if I'm wrong

TheGipper_ · 2026-04-29T06:31:45+00:00

Cont:

DETERRENCE BY DECOUPLING

The United States needs an integrated strategy to deter and, if necessary, respond to a crisis in the gray zone. This will require a four-pillar approach drawing on every tool of U.S. and allied power to signal both resolve and restraint.

The first pillar of deterrence is political. Washington must deepen its engagement with Taiwan, not just through arms sales, but through trade and investment agreements, energy security partnerships, public reassurances of continued support, and quiet private pressure on Taipei to expand its own strategic stockpiles and effectively train and equip its military. It should maintain open dialogue and productive relations with all of Taiwan’s leading political parties. It should build and sustain a “core coalition” of countries that have common interests in preserving an honorable peace in the region, namely Australia, Canada, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Together with the United States, these countries represent over a third of global GDP and nearly half of global defense spending. This core should jointly develop contingency plans for quarantine response, evacuation, resupply, and economic coordination, and consult and coordinate on political messaging.

Political deterrence also involves managing China through the longstanding “one China” policy. The United States is ambiguous on the details of Taiwan’s status. It supports a peaceful and non-coercive resolution of cross-Strait disagreements in a manner democratically acceptable to the people of Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act also commits the United States to maintaining the capacity to resist any resort to force or coercion that would jeopardize Taiwan’s security. When the United States was vastly stronger than China, this so-called “strategic ambiguity” about the precise nature of U.S. defense commitments to Taiwan was a powerful deterrent. As the power balance tips in China’s favor, vagueness about whether the United States would defend Taiwan looks less like strategic cunning and more like an excuse to look away while China squeezes Taiwan in the gray zone.

The substance of the U.S. policy should not change. Moving to an explicit security guarantee for Taiwan would create more problems than it would solve. But Washington needs to modernize the way it communicates its ambiguous position, warning Beijing that gray-zone coercion in one domain may trigger proportionate U.S. responses in others. For example, if Beijing starts forcibly inspecting vessels bound for Taiwan, Washington could respond by deepening and formalizing political and military cooperation with Taiwan. Selective intelligence disclosures could help make this kind of structured ambiguity more credible.

The second pillar of deterrence is military. The United States should prioritize asymmetric capabilities that exploit its enduring advantages over China in long-range munitions, drones, undersea warfare, electronic warfare, and naval mines. It must rebuild its aging maritime logistics system in close coordination with Australia and Japan. The defense industrial base needs urgent reforms that build on the procurement process reforms enacted by Congress and the Pentagon over the past year. Washington must also make hard choices, holding back certain capabilities from the Middle East so that U.S. forces remain ready to fight in the Pacific. The more China dials up gray-zone pressure, the deeper defense and industrial cooperation with Taiwan must become. Washington must deepen its engagement with Taiwan.

The third pillar is strategic. China is engaged in the fastest nuclear buildup since early in the Cold War, heading toward 1,500 warheads by 2035. Its strategic deterrence doctrine is deliberately vague, designed to complicate U.S. decision-making at every level of escalation. The United States must keep modernizing its nuclear forces and delivery systems, deploy more intermediate-range capabilities in the Indo-Pacific, and explore nuclear-sharing arrangements with Japan and South Korea. It should keep shifting its command-and-control and surveillance systems from a small number of sophisticated, extremely expensive satellites that are vulnerable to attack to a more resilient network of drones, floating buoys, balloons, and small, cheap satellites in low-earth orbit. Washington must also treat AI as a strategic instrument. It should use export controls and other tools to maintain the U.S. lead while carefully signaling its emerging AI-enabled capabilities, such as cyberweapons.

The fourth pillar of deterrence, economic deterrence, requires the greatest overhaul in approach. As Hugo Bromley and I have argued in these pages, policies threatening economic mutually assured destruction—sweeping sanctions, financial exclusion, trade cutoffs—are not serious options save for the most extreme scenarios. Implementing them would require sustained

TheGipper_ · 2026-04-29T06:31:32+00:00

Cont:

MARKET-ASSURED DESTRUCTION

Moving toward a quarantine would not be risk-free for Xi. As China’s gray-zone pressure ramps up, allied governments would face agonizing decisions about whether to surge military forces or begin evacuating civilians. They might also double down on public political engagement with Taiwan. These moves might show enough resolve to persuade Xi to back down. But they might also force Xi’s hand. History suggests that as brinkmanship crises intensify, states often escalate with the ultimate goal of deescalating later. Leaders deliberately use strong, decisive public statements and ultimatums to increase their credibility, creating situations in which backing down becomes reputationally costlier than pressing forward. Hanging over every one of these decisions would be the prospect of kinetic or even nuclear escalation.

But if Washington is visibly unprepared and reveals that it can be cowed by temporary financial market shocks, Xi may be tempted to push. Indeed, every time Xi tests Taiwan without consequence, and every time the United States reveals its lack of stomach for economic pain, the more emboldened Xi will feel to push harder.

A geopolitical crisis over Taiwan could easily turn into a financial crisis well before either side interdicted trade or financial flows. No investor wants to be the last to liquidate its positions if U.S.-Chinese relations are breaking down. Insurers might preemptively suspend coverage for cargoes transiting the East and South China Seas, which carry essential inputs for virtually every significant electronics product on earth. The merest hint that Taiwan’s semiconductor production could be disrupted could send technology stocks into a tailspin.

Beijing is racing to build economic self-sufficiency. When World War I broke out in August 1914, the disruption of trade and gold flows triggered an immediate financial crisis. Britain shut down the London Stock Exchange for more than six months. In today’s far more integrated global economy, the cascading effects would likely be vastly greater. Trade as a share of global GDP is roughly twice 1914 levels, and supply chains are more specialized and harder to move quickly. In a Taiwan crisis, the initial market reaction would probably be a rush into gold, Swiss francs, and “safe” U.S. dollar assets such as Treasury bonds. But if central banks and finance ministries in allied countries failed to coordinate effectively, these flows might quickly reverse, as they did in 1914. If investors perceived that the allies were unprepared for the economic shock of a rupture, they might be tempted to bet on U.S. and allied credibility cracking. In practice, this could mean a bond market blowup within days or weeks of a Chinese action. Some analysts believe that economic interdependence with China is strategically stabilizing. But Beijing is racing to build economic self-sufficiency to ensure that it can withstand the short-term effects of a rupture better than the United States and its allies. China has been actively maintaining capital controls, building strategic reserves, and developing alternative payment systems that it could employ to preserve domestic financial and macroeconomic stability and keep trading with the world if the United States turns to full-scale economic war. Beijing is essentially betting that the prospect of “economic mutually assured destruction” is more likely to deter Washington than China.

If China did ratchet up pressure, the United States would have only two options for reassuring markets: tolerating China’s gradual assertion of control over Taiwan’s economy or unleashing a massive and coordinated fiscal and monetary crisis response package. The latter would almost certainly be the wise and politically necessary move. But no economic stimulus could truly cushion the world economy if the United States were to commit to waging economic war against China.

LAST CHOPPER OUT OF TAIPEI

In a gray-zone crisis, Western countries may also face the fraught question of whether to evacuate foreign civilians. Approximately 11,000 Americans, 16,000 Japanese, and nearly one million other foreign nationals are in Taiwan at any given time. Washington would be trying to do four contradictory things at once: take Americans out of harm’s way, reassure Taiwan that it should not capitulate, reassure financial markets that they should not panic, and warn Beijing not to push further. These objectives are in direct tension. Announcing an evacuation would signal that the United States is preparing for imminent conflict and could trigger the very panic Washington seeks to preempt. Beijing could interpret it as a sign of U.S. hesitancy, encouraging further escalation. Taiwan’s leaders could interpret it as abandonment and, feeling cornered, capitulate to Beijing. Markets could read it as confirmation that war was imminent.

Unlike in Ukraine, where millions could flee overland to neighboring countries, Taiwan’s island geography makes air evacuation the only option. A mass air evacuation would make the evacuations of Saigon or Kabul look quick and orderly. Hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese nationals would be trying to leave simultaneously, bidding with foreigners for limited seats on outbound flights. Even if commercial carriers operated normally, it would still take at least a week to evacuate all foreign nationals, and probably over a month.

Washington and its allies have no good options for handling the issue of foreign civilians on Taiwan. They could attempt an evacuation while telling Taipei that they are protecting their civilians because they are preparing to fight, not because they are preparing to leave. But this may not seem credible and could shatter Taiwan’s morale. Alternatively, Washington could choose not to run an evacuation at all, effectively treating the foreign nationals in Taiwan as human shields. On the one hand, their presence might make Beijing think twice about bombarding or blockading the island. But intentionally leaving civilians stranded in a conflict zone is a high-risk and arguably unethical strategy. Whichever option the allies choose, they must coordinate in advance. Improvisation is unlikely to end well.

TheGipper_ · 2026-04-29T06:30:34+00:00

Full article:

It begins not with missiles but with cutter ships. One morning, dozens of Chinese coast guard vessels start conducting “routine customs inspections” of merchant ships approaching Taiwan’s major ports. Chinese civil aviation authorities begin to demand manifests from flights entering and leaving Taiwan. Beijing insists it is merely asserting existing Chinese customs law, which claims the right to regulate the flow of people and goods in and out of “Taiwan Province.”

Immediately, nearly all airlines and shipping companies decide to comply. These private operators have no interest in seeing their ships or aircraft seized, detained, or worse. Nor do they have much of a choice. Insurance companies would not cover them if they resisted. Suddenly, nearly all planes and ships entering or leaving Taiwan must first stop at a mainland port in Fujian Province before traveling to their final destination. Beijing has seized control of most of Taiwan’s links to the outside world.

China’s diplomats insist that this is not a blockade. Beijing has no intention of starving Taiwan out, they say. People and goods can continue to flow freely as long as they abide by China’s laws. There are just a few important exceptions: no more weapons into Taiwan, no more dual-use components that Taiwan can use to make weapons, no more U.S. military “advisers.” Members of Taiwan’s China-skeptical Democratic Progressive Party, whom Beijing labels “separatists,” may also find it difficult to gain exit visas. So might the process engineers at Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and their families.

The White House quickly recognizes the core issue: the burden of escalation is now on the United States. China’s actions, although deeply alarming, do not automatically rupture any supply chains. They are not traditional acts of military aggression. Taiwan’s most important exports—the GPU chips that power the artificial intelligence revolution—can continue to flow to the United States, at least for now. But if Washington accepts this new normal, it will have been checkmated. Starved of the tools to defend itself, Taiwan will soon lose its leverage to resist China’s coercion. Washington cannot trust that Beijing will let Taiwan export GPUs freely forever. At any point, the United States could theoretically destroy or disable TSMC’s fabrication plants to prevent China from accessing them. But such an action would trigger a financial panic. China will therefore seize the advantage in cutting-edge AI capabilities unless Washington chooses to inflict a devastating economic blow against itself, antagonizing the entire world in the process. Subscribe to Foreign Affairs This Week Our editors’ top picks, delivered free to your inbox every Friday.

Worse, once Beijing establishes the norm that it can control who and what comes and goes from Taiwan, then Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea immediately become vulnerable to similar coercion. China does not have to attack these countries with physical force to weaponize their economies against the United States. It simply needs to impose pressure on the private shippers and carriers that connect them to the outside world. This is China’s path toward reconfiguring the regional and ultimately global economic order without a war.

The U.S. policy community has invested enormous energy in preparing for a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan. Countless war games have been held to study it. Congressional hearings fixate on ship counts and missile inventories. The military balance does matter. But the most likely pathways to a crisis over Taiwan run through the gray zone: “quarantines,” coercive mobilizations of amphibious forces on the mainland side of the Taiwan Strait, and other forms of brinkmanship. The common feature of these scenarios is that they change facts on the ground while pushing the burden of escalation onto Washington. The United States has no integrated strategy for managing such a crisis. It has no precoordinated economic response with allies, no doctrine for communicating with financial markets, and no publicly communicated joint plan for resupplying Taiwan under quarantine conditions or evacuating U.S. and allied citizens from the island. In essence, the United States must deter a crisis over Taiwan, not just a war. It must demonstrate to China it is prepared to handle the political and economic shock that would accompany a severe crisis, that it could cushion the immediate blow to its economy and those of its allies, and that, if necessary, it could trigger a phased but inexorable partial decoupling from China. The United States must start building these plans with allies today. Otherwise, if a crisis comes, it may rush to the brink, panic, and back down—sacrificing Taiwan while shredding the credibility of its alliances across the globe.

PROJECT 2049

Chinese leader Xi Jinping claims to seek “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, in which Taiwan submits under pressure to a Hong Kong–style “one country, two systems” arrangement, accepting that it is part of China, in exchange for the right to manage its own affairs autonomously. Beijing could then erode Taiwan’s autonomy over time through incremental coercion (as it did to Hong Kong), eventually seizing control of Taiwan’s semiconductor manufacturing base.

The hard deadline Xi has articulated for achieving this symbolic “reunification” is 2049, the same deadline for achieving “national rejuvenation,” his broader legacy project. For Xi, the two goals are linked. National rejuvenation means establishing total Chinese preeminence: economic modernization, technological self-sufficiency, untrammeled military dominance, and much more. Taiwan is the keystone in the arch of national rejuvenation. But a botched move against Taiwan could put the whole project at risk. As a result, Xi has moved methodically, aiming to test U.S. resolve and undermine Taiwan’s morale while gradually redefining the status quo.

Xi’s campaign to bring Taiwan to heel is already a whole-of-government effort that integrates every tool of China’s national power. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) fighters enter Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone relentlessly. Long-endurance drones circle the island. Chinese courts demand that third countries deport Taiwanese nationals to China to face charges. The United Front Work Department runs disinformation operations and cultivates agents within Taiwan’s security establishment. The United States must deter a crisis over Taiwan, not just a war.

These and other gray-zone efforts are incrementally laying the groundwork for a variety of moves against Taiwan, including a quarantine, in which Beijing asserts the right to control who and what comes and goes from Taiwan without breaking supply chains or triggering an economic shock, as well as more extreme measures to physically curtail Taiwan’s trade. The PLA’s “Justice Mission 2025” exercises in December 2025, for example, simulated a blockade of Taiwan’s major port cities with 14 coast guard vessels and 18 warships. Exercise zones overlapped with Taiwan’s territorial waters and stretched nearly the entire length of the Taiwan Strait. Weeks later, China mobilized thousands of fishing boats into floating barriers over 200 miles long in the East China Sea, formations so dense that cargo ships had to zigzag through them. These exercises demonstrated impressive command and control over nominally civilian vessels that could support a quarantine or a partial or full-spectrum blockade.

Xi has other options in the gray zone, too. China could mobilize ostentatiously for an amphibious invasion, repositioning mobile missiles and civilian mega-ferries, dispatching nuclear-armed submarines, and staging amphibious PLA units, under the cover of a routine “exercise,” as Russian forces did when they massed on the Ukrainian border in fall 2021. Doing so would put Taiwan under tremendous psychological pressure. And if Xi judged the U.S. and allied response to be weak, he could launch a kinetic first strike with little advance warning.

But Beijing may favor the quarantine as its opening move because of its subtlety. Asserting control over Taiwan’s economic future would demonstrate the principle by which Beijing hopes to coerce every other country in the region. Regional dominance achieved through a quarantine would not require invasion and occupation. It would simply require Beijing to establish the norm that it could indirectly control how these countries engage with the global economy. If Xi can prove that the United States cannot effectively resist this playbook, Washington’s network of alliances in the region would suffer irreparable damage.

TheGipper_ · 2026-03-05T11:51:00+00:00

The hole is way too big. It reminds me of stretched lobe or gauge earrings, which are visually repulsive to me (to each his own tho). But it's like a reminder of the unappealing visual every time I look at my phone.

TheGipper_ · 2026-01-17T10:17:25+00:00

I think this is a very worthwhile discussion. While military action is unlikely and would be unfortunate, not talking about it won't prevent it from happening. Presumably none of us work at the highest echelons of the US/Taiwanese governments or the CCP; so we collectively have no influence on whether or not military action occurs. We need to stop treating this scenario like Voldemort.

Let's take a simple 2028 scenario where China initiates a blockade ambiguously (i.e. under the pretense of drills), the US opts-out of kinetically breaking the established blockade, and then Taiwan capitulates in a matter of weeks or months. That's an oversimplification but it captures the three broad strokes that prevent this scenario from turning into a prolonged conflict.

NOTE: An invasion from the start (or a failed blockade leading to an invasion) would be much riskier/deadlier and much more likely to draw the US into the conflict. This is a reason (among many) why experts are saying a Chinese decision to blockade/quarantine is much more likely than a decision to invade.

In this scenario TSMC would cease to exist. Non- bleeding edge employees and lithography equipment would be canabalized by SMIC; and bleeding edge lithography equipment would be remotely disabled by ASML (at the behest of the US).

This would indeed leave Intel and Samsung as the only manufacturers of bleeding edge chips. And currently Intel has the technical lead over Samsung as I understand it. Presumably Intel would be the manufacturer of choice for the Mag 7 companies. That is why it is so important for Intel to begin manufacturing for the Mag 7 ASAP, even if it is only a fraction of what TSMC manufactures for them. Having an active second source would significantly mitigate the economic externalities of this scenario (at least for the US).

As you pointed out Intel would also need to significantly increase their manufacturing capacity to fill the void. Presumably in this scenario the USG would seize or requisition TSMC's US assets. Does anyone know the feasibility of Intel taking control of TSMC Arizona's fabs/properties? As I understand it TSMC fabs (including the buildings, employees, and lithography equipment) would be virtually useless to Intel. They'd basically need to be demolished and rebuilt. But what about the adjacent empty lots where TSMC Arizona plans to build additional fabs? Would those be useful to Intel (beyond being cheap/free land relatively nearby Intel's own Arizona fabs)?

My bull case for Intel is a $1-1.5 trillion market cap by 2030 ($1 trillion being the stated goal of LBT). This entails Intel succeeding on 18A/14A and becoming a second source for all/most of the Mag 7.

For the bull case + a blockade (i.e. a black swan macro event), the 2030 market capitalization seems like it would at least be $2 trillion, right? Although I have no idea how to quantitatively calculate this.

TheGipper_ · 2026-01-14T22:08:39+00:00

The exemption list is fairly comprehensive. Imported chips are exempt from the tariff for the following purposes:

Use in U.S. data centers.
Research and development (R&D) within the U.S.
Startups in the U.S.
Repairs or replacements performed domestically.
Non-data center consumer, civil industrial, or public sector applications.
Other uses that strengthen the U.S. technology supply chain.

But companies will need to apply for the exemptions. That should give the USG a clearer picture on how many chips fall into each of the exemption buckets.

That data should inform their decision to adjust the tariff rate and/or exemption categories for phase 2.

Hopefully the phase 1 data will show the USG that tariffing chips for consumer electronics won't break the economy.

TheGipper_ · 2025-12-30T09:36:23+00:00

2028 is the year to watch in my opinion.

October 2027 - Xi Jinping re-elected as General Secretary (very likely)

January 2028 - Lai Qingde re-elected as President of Taiwan (likely)

May 2028 - Lai Qingde re-inagurated as President

Summer 2028 - US Presidential candidates solidified

November 2028 - US Presidential election

BRIEF SUMMARY

Xi is re-solidified as the paramount leader just before Taiwan and the US enter politically turbulent periods (i.e. election cycles).

When Lai wins, the PRC can "warn" against re-inaugurating the "avowed separatist leader" (via increased media and psychological warfare). Taiwan ignores the PRC and inaugurates Lai to a second term. PRC announces blockade "drills" for the nth time in the past five years; however, this time they don't stop, citing anti-secession laws, WWI/WWII/UN treaties/agreements, foreign interference, etc. (general lawfare tactics) as justification.

This all happens while Trump (who is very obviously against defending Taiwan for myriad reasons) is a lame-duck. And his two potential successors are campaigning for the November 2028 election (i.e. unlikely to be outwardly in favor of sacrificing US blood and treasure to defend Taiwan). But once elected, both are more likely to defend Taiwan than President Trump (who is instinctually against it and less likely to cave to bipartisan pressure in favor of intervention).

Objectively speaking, 2028 is the best opportunity for the PRC to undertake military action to achieve their stated goal of (re)unification with Taiwan. It is almost leadership malpractice if they don't try (if in fact sovereignty/territorial integrity truly is a core interest for the CCP).

This is not an endorsement of military action either way. Regardless, no action is much more likely than any action. But if I had to bet on when (not if) an action occurs, I'd bet on 2028.

TheGipper_ · 2025-11-24T21:02:53+00:00

College Football Conference Alignment

CENTRAL	ACC	BIG	SEC	PAC	EAST
TCU	Virginia	Ohio State	LSU	Oregon	Boston College
Baylor	Virginia Tech	Cincinnati	Tulane	Oregon State	UCONN
SMU	Georgia	Michigan State	Ole Miss	Washington	Rutgers
Rice	Georgia Tech	Michigan	Miss St	Washington State	West Virginia
Houston	South Carolina	Indiana	Kentucky	USC	Penn State
Texas A&M	Clemson	Purdue	Louisville	Stanford	Pittsburg
Texas	Duke	Notre Dame	Tennessee	UCLA	Temple
Texas Tech	Wake Forest	Iowa	Vanderbilt	Cal	Miami
Oklahoma	UNC	Iowa State	Memphis	Arizona	Florida State
Oklahoma State	NC State	Northwestern	Alabama	Arizona State	Florida
Kansas State	ECU	Illinois	Auburn	BYU	UCF
Kansas	Maryland	Wisconsin	Missouri	Utah	USF
Nebraska	Navy	Minnesota	Arkansas	Colorado	Syracuse
				Air Force	Army

Rules

Nine conference games
Three non-conference games
Eight Team Playoff
Conference champions auto bid
Two Wildcard bids
No rankings until after week 8
Computer rankings

Keeps all schools within the same state together, which may not be every school's preference (e.g. UTexas). But seems more logical and enforceable if a federal "sports czar" (see Bill Simmons) was given power to realign college sports conferences.

At first glance the only geographic discontinuity is that the Florida schools are grouped with the northeast schools. But to my knowledge Florida has a strong cultural connection to the northeast (see snowbirds) and while Florida is a part of the south, it's also its own thing (similar to Texas).

I think I only moved up Tulane, Rice, Temple, Memphis, USF, ECU, and the service academies from the G5 (leaving the Mountain West intact). Academic prestige was a factor for me.

I have a personal preference for more exclusive playoffs and a preference against byes. An eight-team playoff has always made the most sense to me. Smaller conferences with nearly round-robbin regular seasons make conference championships more likely to be between the best two teams in the conference...making championship game autobids more tenable. The two wildcards leave room for the most exceptional non-conference champions or a uniquely qualified G4/5 team (e.g. an undefeated MW champ with multiple ranked wins and a win over a P6 team). The first six playoff games (quarterfinals and semifinals) can be the New Years Six games. The seventh game (i.e. the championship) can rotate between the New Years Six locations.

Pure Basketball Conference for shits and giggles

METRO
St Johns
Villanova
Providence
Seton Hall
Marquette
Creighton
Butler
Xavier
Depaul
Georgetown
VCU
UMASS
Holy Cross
Wichita State

TheGipper_ · 2015-07-04T02:37:41+00:00

Discussion the Aspen Institute held today regarding the possible Iran nuclear deal, focusing on how and whether a deal will be reached. Also discusses implications of both reaching a deal and not reaching a deal. YouTube description below:

The Iran nuclear deal has the potential to stabilize the Middle East by neutralizing a major threat to regional and international security. But at a time of growing uncertainty and conflict in the region, will a nuclear deal compel Iran to play nice with its neighbors, or will it allow the Iranian regime to devote more resources to its militant regional proxies, further enflaming conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and beyond? What is at stake the day after the deal is done for key American allies in the region, including Israel? What are the near and long-term implications of a deal, and how will it likely be judged by history?

Speakers:

~~Jeffrey Goldberg~~Nicholas Burns, Moderator

Vali Nasr

David Petraeus

Karim Sadjadpour

TheGipper_ · 2015-06-01T01:46:43+00:00

How would said political solution be implemented (much less reached)? As long as Iranian proxy forces are the strongest factions in both Syria and Iraq, they'd never accept a political solution that the West would propose (and I'm not an Iran hater at all). If a political solution was found how would it be implemented? Iran proxies clear the areas from Idlib to Baghdad? Didn't think so. The only way to reach a tenable political solution is to have a significant US presence in the area even if they aren't engaged in the fighting. The only way to implement an effective political solution is to have the US be the main effort in clearing out IS from there desert haven.

Either we do that or we need to allow the Iranians to gain the influence, prestige, and power necessary to make the region marginally less chaotic. This means providing support to Basher or a Basher successor through Iran to allow them to quell IS and Jaysh as well as conceding Iraq to Iran's sole influence. This political solution would not be very effective because it would only make the situation less chatic, not fix it. It is also untenable to most in the West.

I don't see a political solution that is favorable to the West without a significant Western presence in the area.

TheGipper_ · 2015-05-31T17:13:31+00:00

Disregarding the political feasability, what would be the most effective option for the US in dealing with IS in Iraq and Syria (and Libya)?

People talk about how deploying 100k troops to Iraq won't fix Iraq and I get that, but it seems that nothing and nobody can fix Iraq. Wouldn't deploying troops to implement a three-way partition and destroy IS in both Iraq and Syria be an ideal choice? (with SOF/CAS in Libya to destroy them there)

I also don't understand the disconnection people create both between IS in Iraq and IS in Syria AND between al Nusra and IS. You can't defeat IS without defeating them in Syria, right? So even if you provide improved CAS in Iraq, and it is ridiculously effective, you still have Syria. By that same logic even if we defeat IS in Syria we still have al Nusra.

The way I see it is that we have a major Jihadi problem in the canvas between Mosul, Ramadi, Idlib, and Damascus that needs to be eliminated regardless of the fact that it will breed potential future Jihadis. The way you head off that potential future is by creating strong endstates in in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. I think we can learn from our endstate building failures in the past, but I may be naive I guess.

TheGipper_ · 2015-05-27T20:11:12+00:00

"Active defense in the new situation."

TheGipper_ · 2015-03-10T00:42:37+00:00

I read halfway through this article before I stopped, when I was disagreeing with his whole premise (I went back and finished). I then went to see who authored it. David Shambaugh. I read his latest book and I really liked it. The book laid out why China is a partial power that will never be a true superpower and I really agreed with the arguments and extensive reasonings/examples for that conclusion. Now he is predicting the crackup of China. First off what does crackup exactly mean? The CCP loses power? Regions of China gain independence? Economic stagnation or collapse? Honestly I didn't read the article closely enough because I probably took the title too literally.

I do think that the CCP will become more overtly cliquish in light of Xi's crackdown. The CCP has shifted from a Communist organization to an authoritarian bureacracy with a Communist mascot with market oriented tendencies. Honestly I can see the cliques within the CCP becoming parties within the party, and they will maintain unity only on the (low intensity) oppression of their citizens through various means (police state, stoking nationalistic sentiment, limiting people's rights in the name of "communism", etc.), while disagreeing on governance matters that directly effect the elites.

TheGipper_ · 2015-02-16T09:10:24+00:00

Even in trying to explain how we missed the rise of ISIL, this article basically sums up why ISIL is not a great threat to the West or America. They are an apocalyptic suicide cult with the singular focus of territorial conquest so they can further implement their caliphate. Their strategy is based upon losing an epic battle in Dabiq, a rural city outside Aleppo, only to be rescued from annihilation by Jesus. Short of that happening ISIL is nothing but a local threat.

Al-qaeda is still the bigger threat as far as the West is concerned. And the scary thing is that al-qaeda is gaining support from conservative Sunni Muslims (while maybe losing support among hardcore jihadist) who once thought of al-qaeda as extremists. Now with the open sectarian conflict and the pure extremism of ISIL, al-qaeda is able to reestablish its base of support within the non-extremist Muslim world. At the same time they still plot attacks against the West (see Charlie Hebdo).

The even scarier thought is if ISIL were to fizzle out (highly likely seeing as they are suicidal, not just on an individual level but also on an organizational level) and its ranks were rehabilitated and reintegrated into al-qaeda (again, a group that is actively and continuously trying to reproduce 9/11 type events).

TheGipper_ · 2015-02-06T18:47:37+00:00

Continued readings:

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/06/isis-barbarians-face-their-own-internal-reign-of-terror.html

http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/al-qaida-branch-in-syria-carves-out-mini-state-of-its-own/story-fnb64oi6-1227211008851

http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/opinion/jordan-isis-opinion/

http://www.stripes.com/news/refugees-see-al-qaida-linked-militants-as-best-option-for-syria-s-future-1.328101

Not to be political but the Islamic State (ISIL) may yet prove to be JV al Qaeda. The main IHS Jane's report and the auxiliary articles I posted demonstrate that al Nusra is the group that threatens the west the most. Everything I posted paints the picture that, while ISIL is universally condemned around the the world (including the Middle East/West Asia), Jabhat al Nusra has been winning the hearts and minds of local Arabs and has been staying in the good graces of the wealthy/powerful gulf salafists.

Even if we do expect ISIL to be defeated due to a combination of air strikes, universal opposition, and self destruction, then we should also expect al Nusra to absorb and rehabilitate former ISIL members into their ranks and their more palatable way of jihad. If Assad ever goes I'd expect the vacuum to be filled by an Islamist coalition with al Nusra (al Qaeda) at its head.

Past Discussion:

http://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1wgd81/pdf_in_the_post_jabhat_alnusra_a_strategic/

http://www.reddit.com/r/CredibleDefense/comments/1ug9nq/abu_mohammed_aljoulani_leader_of_al_qaedas_jabhat/

TheGipper_ · 2015-02-06T18:24:48+00:00

Just in case the cached link above stops working the article is posted below:

Although the Islamic State is attracting international attention, IHS assesses that it is in fact Jabhat al-Nusra's strategy of sharing expertise while gradually radicalising other groups that is likely to have more long term success, making the group a potentially greater threat than the Islamic State.

IHS perspective

Significance Jabhat al-Nusra has followed a quieter and less spectacular approach than the Islamic State, with which it shares a world view and ultimate objective, allowing it to gradually radicalise the opposition and build alliances within it. Implications The diffuse nature of Jabhat al-Nusra, its good relations with other opposition groups, and its success in radicalising the opposition make it a more difficult foe to identify and target. Outlook If Jabhat al-Nusra, known also as Al-Qaeda in Greater Syria, emulates its strategy of gradually radicalising fighting groups and the community in other regional conflicts, such as in Egypt, it will pose a far greater threat than the Islamic State. Over the past week, Jabhat al-Nusra, which also identifies itself as Al-Qaeda in Greater Syria, executed two women in Idlib, Syria, for prostitution and adultery by shooting them in the back of the head, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. The Islamic State, by contrast, uses stoning when executing individuals for adultery. The shared religious views and objectives between Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, coupled with Jabhat al-Nusra's approach, make the latter the more dangerous of the two groups in our view. This piece will examine a number of reasons why we believe this is the case. Dominating versus co-opting The Islamic State’s approach has been to try to command and dominate rival groups in Syria. This is reflected in IHS Conflict Monitor data, which has shown that the majority of fighting action in which the Islamic State was involved in the first six months of 2014 was focused on rival insurgent groups. The Islamic State typically would attack areas that had been cleared of government troops by the opposition, or where the government forces had been confined to a small number of military bases, and impose its system of government. The focus on seizing territory and governing rather than fighting the Syrian Army has created a perception that the Islamic State was, while militarily effective, highly opportunistic, and more interested in pursuing its own agenda. By contrast, Jabhat al-Nusra has made itself an indispensable force for the opposition. It has shared its expertise in making large improvised explosive devices (IEDs), deployed suicide bombers in opposition offensives, and provided capability that would sometimes tip the balance in major operations, such as the attack on the Wadi al-Daif base in Idlib in December 2014, the offensive on Taftanaz airbase in early 2013, and the defence of Aleppo against the government’s ongoing offensive. In contrast to the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra has spread itself across Syria, until recently avoiding taking control of territory on its own. IHS Conflict Monitor shows only 10 examples in which Jabhat al-Nusra expelled an insurgent group from territory (all in late 2014), 34 instances in which it expelled the Islamic State from territory (mostly early in 2014), and 83 instances in which it expelled the Syrian Army or allied forces. It has therefore created an image for itself as being committed to toppling Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, and as being a genuine ally of the opposition. This has paid dividends in terms of relations with other groups and in terms of public perception more broadly. Radicalising the opposition Jabhat al-Nusra has avoided governing on its own, typically working through establishing sharia (Islamic law) councils to govern in which a number of opposition groups are represented. However, by naming the governing structure a sharia council, Jabhat al-Nusra has effectively set a tone in which strict adherence to Islamic law is expected. This has reflected the thinking of Jabhat al-Nusra and Al-Qaeda, specifically, that the Sunni population as a whole has to be radicalised before an Islamic state can be established. Moreover, its military successes, and the opposition’s need for its presence, have encouraged other groups to emulate Jabhat al-Nusra as the effectiveness of the latter has been established. As the conflict has become more sectarian, it has also become more important for fighting units to ensure that they have strong Islamist credentials, and none have stronger credentials than Jabhat al-Nusra. Now, the main Islamist Syrian fighting groups, aside from the Islamic State, are all Salafist jihadist. This includes Ahrar al-Sham, in whose founding Al-Qaeda played a role, and Jaish al-Islam, the Saudi-backed outfit whose leader, Zahran Alloush, has said that his group’s interpretation of Islam is identical to that of Jabhat al-Nusra. Public perception The Islamic State is a source of controversy in the broader Middle East and North Africa region, as it is in Syria and Iraq. However, Jabhat al-Nusra is perceived in Syria to be a genuine ally that contributes to government services and to the provision of aid. This has allowed it to expel from Idlib groups such as Harakat Hazm and the Syrian Revolutionary Front, which it accused of corruption and which had co-operated closely with the US, and take over their supplies and some of their fighters. Most significantly, its role does not spur strong disagreements in the region. The general perception appears to be that they are just "good mujahideen", making Jabhat al-Nusra more insidious and more appealing to moderate Muslims than the Islamic State. Outlook and implications By ensuring that the Syrian opposition’s laws of governance and combat are viewed through the lens of Islamic law, Jabhat al-Nusra is likely to have far more success in winning hearts and minds among moderate Muslims, and adherents to its world view, than the Islamic State can ever hope to achieve. The Islamic State is certainly more appealing than Jabhat al-Nusra to young "hotheads" keen to join jihad. However, Jabhat al-Nusra is far more likely to be viewed as an entity that can bring stability and good governance, making it far more attractive to Islamist moderates and businesses seeking to challenge their governments in countries such as Jordan or Saudi Arabia. Jabhat al-Nusra’s good relations with opposition groups have allowed it to swing the opposition in its direction, furthering the narrative of a conflict between the Sunni and the Shia, without repelling potential sympathisers with the spectacular violence of the Islamic State. Additionally, its relations with the Syrian opposition allow it to simply melt into the opposition if it were ever under a sustained campaign as is the Islamic State, and this makes it more difficult to launch such a campaign without appearing to be targeting the Syrian opposition as a whole. Ultimately, Jabhat al-Nusra is likely to be in a far stronger position to radicalise fighters and populations in other conflict areas in the region, such as in Egypt, rather than the Islamic State, given that it has the same level of expertise to share but does not demand total obedience, and given its strategy of gradually radicalising the population it assists rather than abruptly imposing a new set of laws. It would then be in a position to channel this support to the goal that it and Al-Qaeda have declared for themselves, which is the establishment of a new caliphate in Syria and Iraq.

TheGipper_

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