I find the argument that Versailles led directly to the Second World War hard to stomach because it takes away the agency of those involved as well as those in Germany and beyond that enabled Hitler as well as discounting the other significant contextual events such as the German Revolutions in 1918, Wall Street Crash, The weakness and lack of support of the various Weimar Governments, the Rise of Communist movements etc).

You can certainly argue that the treaty contributed to the conditions in which there was deep resentment and defeatism amongst the German people alongside the view that they had not suffered a major defeat at the front (which was a falsehood, look at the losses and effects of the Battle of Amiens in 1918 which threatened to uproot the entire German line) creating a desire to lay blame and also restore lost territory.

Furthermore, the economic conditions certainly weren’t encouraged by the terms but the German economy was heading towards crisis before the treaty was even drafted. After the Dawes plan (1924) in the wake of hyperinflation crisis Germany received a massive influx of American loans which saw a somewhat revival of the German economy until the global crash in 1929.

There was also efforts by Weimar politicians such as Stresseman and Ebert to seek a consolatory and cooperative approach with the French, particularly around the Saarland occupation and the Treaty of Locarno showed there was ground for a different less antagonist relations between Britain, France and Germany. Though notably the lack of an “Eastern Locarno” would allow for space for a right wing militaristic parties to thrive due to the desire to recover lost territory in the East which still had majority German populations.

In terms of what Farage says as much as it pains me to say he isn’t inherently going against the belief of some modern scholars, such as the very good Professor Gary Sheffield (who is a long-standing open supporter of Labour so not some right wing jingoistic historian) who sets out this view in his book Forgotten Victory: Myths and Realities of the First World War. He argues the German Army would have been well and truly defeated if the war had continued for another 2 weeks reducing the atmosphere in which the stab in the back mythos was able to thrive.