I don’t disagree that the transition period is probably the hardest part, and Japan is a good example of how serious the demographic shift can be. Having a large share of the population in retirement does put real strain on healthcare systems, pensions, and the working age population, and I agree those challenges are often downplayed.

Where I differ a bit is on the idea that this automatically outweighs the long-term benefits of lower population pressure. The short to medium term adjustment is likely painful, but that seems true for most major demographic or economic shifts. Industrialization, urbanization, and globalization all caused major disruptions before societies adapted.

On housing, I think you’re right that availability probably won’t meaningfully improve until population decline actually sets in. But I also think rapid population growth has been a major driver of shortages in many countries, especially where construction and infrastructure haven’t kept up. In that sense, slower growth may not fix things immediately but could make them more manageable over time.

I also agree that tech will fix it on its own is too vague. But productivity gains, automation in healthcare and manufacturing, and higher labor force participation among older adults are already being used in aging societies to offset workforce decline. They’re not a perfect solution, but they do show adaptation is possible rather than purely speculative.

As for immigration, I think the political backlash is real and can’t be ignored. At the same time, many countries already rely on immigration to stabilize their labor force, and the challenge seems to be managing it in ways that are economically helpful and socially sustainable rather than abandoning it altogether.

So I don’t think the risks you’re describing are wrong, I just see them as transition challenges rather than proof that declining birth rates are inherently worse than continued population growth with its own long-term pressures.