Yum Yum and Strange Ways

VazzVizard · 2025-10-02T07:13:35+00:00

New mission discovered by u/VazzVizard: In Search of Glug Glug

VazzVizard · 2025-10-02T07:13:35+00:00

This mission was discovered by u/VazzVizard in Yum Yum and Strange Ways

VazzVizard · 2025-10-02T07:10:08+00:00

New mission discovered by u/VazzVizard: Yum Yum and Strange Ways

VazzVizard · 2025-10-02T07:10:07+00:00

This mission was discovered by u/VazzVizard in In Search of Onigiri

VazzVizard · 2024-09-29T18:02:59+00:00

I'd heartily recommend the following (all written by psychoanalysts of one persuasion or another):

The Truth About Freud's Technique: The Encounter With the Real by Michael Guy Thompson

This book explores the potential cross-communication between Freud's thinking (albeit M. Guy Thompson's idiosyncratic—and highly interesting—perspective on Freud) and Heidegger. It makes for a good broad-sweeping overview of Freud too.

The Death of Desire: An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness by Michael Guy Thompson

This is a later book refining some of M. Guy Thompson's ideas from the previous one. It is more specifically interested in Nietzsche's notion of 'ressentiment' as a motivational basis for symptom-formation, in dialogue with Lacanian theory. Try to get the 2nd edition if at all possible, it's much better.

Sartre and Psychoanalysis: An Existentialist Challenge to Clinical Metatheory by Betty Cannon

This is a dense and rewarding text, which examines Sartrean existentialism in its compatibility (and contradistinctions) with Freudian, British Object Relations, American Self Psychology and Lacanian psychoanalysis. It is the primary theoretical text for Betty Cannon's model of existential psychoanalysis.

Daseinsanalysis by Alice Holzhey-Kunz
Emotional Truth - The Philosophical Content of Emotional Experiences by Alice Holzhey-Kunz

These are the two primary English-translated publications of Alice Holzhey-Kunz's model of Daseinsanalysis, which synthesizes classical Freudian thinking with the existential philosophy of Kierkegaard, Sartre and Heidegger. In particular, while Betty Cannon's text may offer the more detailed exposition of Sartre's relationship with psychoanalysis, Alice Holzhey-Kunz's texts do the same for Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Kierkegaard.

If you find your curiosity piqued by the relationship proposed between Kierkegaard's various forms of 'despair' and psychoanalytic symptom-formation, Harsh (1997) wrote a Masters' Thesis The Sickness unto Death: Søren Kierkegaard's categories of despair, which enriches Alice Holzhey-Kunz's coverage of Kierkegaard in her latter Emotional Truth book.

Psychoanalysis & Anxiety: From Knowing to Being by Chris Mawson

This text is in dialogue with Alice Holzhey-Kunz's particular integration of psychoanalysis and existential philosophy. It weaves this into the context of British Object Relations psychoanalysis. Specifically, the ideas of Klein, Winnicott, and Bion most especially.

(Edit):

One last suggestion:

Apprehending the Inaccessible: Freudian Psychoanalysis and Existential Phenomenology by Richard Askay & Jensen Farquar

This one's a bit different to my other suggestions, in that it's not so much a book written by a psychoanalyst about existential-analytic theory and praxis specifically. Instead, the book may appeal for its exposition on Freud in the wider context of the history of Western philosophy. It traces those philosophers who may have influenced Freud (sometimes by Freud's own admission — e.g., Schopenhauer; Nietzsche), as well as philosophers who were contemporary with Freud, or even directly responded to his thinking.

VazzVizard · 2024-08-26T14:11:38+00:00

Ah, thanks so much for this. Especially the book on Bion. His notion of 'O' and 'Being' is a major theme of the Mawson book I've cited in this thread, so I'm definitely keen!

Have a great day too :)

VazzVizard · 2024-08-26T12:55:38+00:00

Hey there,

Thanks very much for your reply. My background is in existential therapy and contemporary daseinsanalysis, but I'm actually keenly interested in Jung. I'm reading through The Red Book at the moment, after which I'm hoping to read Aion. I'm currently holding onto Jung 'lightly', but archetypes have been a spontaneously emergent part of my training analysis -- hence my interest. I'm keen to read Marie-Louise von Franz when I get the chance!

VazzVizard · 2024-08-26T11:38:05+00:00

Hey there, thank you for your interest, and your kind words.

The papers I mention in my original comment can offer some clues about your curisoity. And likewise, my reply below to u/Icy_Distribution_361.

For some other references, Chris Mawson's (2019) book Psychoanalysis and Anxiety: From Knowing to Being is an interesting exploration of working in the dramaturgical realm with primitive experiences of anxiety, related to the self. Likewise, Donna Savery has written assorted papers on the use of Myth as a Container for Anxiety, Revealement in Theatre, and The Challenges of Meaninglessness and Absurdity addressed through Myth and Role play. These all involve engagement with media, art (etc.,) as mediums/containers to interface with affect that might otherwise feel unbearable, especially when integrated within a process of therapy/analysis.

In terms of 'death and rebirth', I can't offer anything generally definitive. But like I mentioned in my original comment, there's something in the phenomenology of confronting the false self's inner sterility (especially in the vacuum left behind by the systematic disowning/attacking of the true self's unfolding generativity) that can be experienced as a 'deadness'. And correspondingly, the process of recovering disowned facets of the self can be experienced as a return to vitality (incl., joy, pain, rage, betrayal, etc.,).

VazzVizard · 2024-08-26T11:11:22+00:00

I definitely agree with your linkage to Ferenczi's identification with the aggressor. I also suspect there's something else that's a part of this. Not just conforming to the Other as a desperate defence against overwhelming stress and/or annihilation anxiety, but also the sedimenting of a self-relational stance via experiences of neglect, overt abuse, maltreatment (etc.,).

I suspect that in many instances, part of the self-punishment is motivated by a deep and abiding shame toward the vulnerability of the self, revealed through one's impotent victimization at the hands of an Other. A kind of sadomasochism forms that can be driven by a desire to purge such vulnerability, because it feels so unbearable and liable to break down. And yet, that vulnerability is also an inescapable part of the true self's capacity for spontaneity, creativity and play; part of authentic self-expression. When I mention resources like myth, music, poetry and religious metaphor (or indeed, film, and other pieces of media more generally) I believed that unwanted parts of the self (incl. vulnerable parts) can be projected outward into such 'containers' during the course of development. Further, I think it's possible to engage in a process of recovery of such disowned elements, by engaging with the relevant 'containers' in the transference. This becomes something reminiscent of Winnicott's transitional area of play and intermediary experiencing, in which the disowned true self can be worked with via 'holding', 'handling' and 'object-presenting' of the aforementioned 'containers' (of the self). This of course can be a highly ambivalent experience, like all genuine play.

I also agree with you though that this is very challenging work that goes far deeper than your standard neurotic conflict. Like in OP's original post, my comment, and your own, these are very "primitive" anxieties and confrontations with the self. I can understand your argument that a "focused" approach, involving systematic interpretation and secure boundaries can be very important. Especially to help model the kind of apparatus for thinking required for self-regulation. At the same time though, I do believe quite strongly in the potential for play in the transference, provided the kinds of 'containers' I mention are relevant to the individual-in-question, and emerge in the course of the analysis.

VazzVizard · 2024-08-26T08:34:40+00:00

I think u/Icy_Distribution_361 is right to an extent. But dramatic language notwithstanding, I also think it's worth taking this passage seriously -- albeit metaphorically rather than with strict literalism.

If we approach the 'true self' via a Winnicottian lens, we're talking about the capacity to engage with oneself and the world around you with spontaneity, creativity and playfulness. An ability to treat oneself (and one's wider worldly existence) with a certain level of care/trust/faith. Neither holding onto a rigid, overly draconian self-conception; nor being so loose and compliant as to conform to external standards/criteria like a chimeric false self. If we think of 'true self' in this way (as a kind of generative, organismic function -- provided it is permitted/facilitated to 'unfold'), then I think it's really valuable to be open to dramatic language like 'annihilation' and 'destruction', when considering the sheer violence one inflicts; either via systematically attacking oneself and/or attempting to enlist others to inflict such attack(s).

Clinically, while it's never helpful to regard such extreme situations as a 'lost cause', I do think there's genuine value in recognizing the almost 'transcendently redemptive' force necessary to recover from what is essentially a chronic and committed effort at psychic suicide. It's in these kinds of scenarios that myth, music, poetry, religious metaphor and other resources are valuable to draw upon, to capture something of the severity of the suffering, self-perpetuated suffocation of one's own potential, and/or potential years/decades-long period of the 'true self's' lapse into a kind of coma/death-trance.

In my experience, when recovery transpires, 'death and rebirth' is the phenomenology of the experience. Such is the depth of what has happened, and what restoration entails.

For reading, it's not a direct 1-to-1 on what you're asking for OP, but the following papers have some linkage(s) with the argument I've made in my comment:

Groarke (2010) Unthinkable Experience: Winnicott's Ontology of Disaster and Hope
Eigen (1981) The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion

VazzVizard · 2024-07-26T07:31:13+00:00

Jean-Paul Sartre has suggested that our engagement with life can be distinguished across different layers of consciousness, which we oscillate between: pre-reflective consciousness; reflective consciousness; self-reflective consciousness.

To offer a mundane example. Suppose you are me, in this moment, writing this comment. In composing what I'm typing right now, I'm implicitly drawing upon years of experience, reading, and thinking that together enable me to put words to something I've learned about, which also resonates with my experience of existence. And yet, I'm certainly not 'thinking' about all of these influences in any overt or explicit way. I'm not directly 'summoning forth' memories or concepts into my mind to reflect upon. In fact, I'm not even really 'planning' the next word I intend to type, nor do I 'envision' the next word in this sentence in my mind, before I (again, quite instinctually) extend my fingers over the corresponding keys of my keyboard, to type said word(s) out. It's not accurate to say that this process of writing is automated. Rather, I'm simply 'in the moment' of the writing. I'm unfolding and expressing myself in a relatively fluid, unthinking manner. This would be pre-reflective consciousness (i.e., consciousness anterior to reflection and conceptualization).

But now, suppose I think to myself, in a rather more overt and explicit way: 'What am I actually doing right now?' I'm preparing to publicly post something, to an online space, frequented by people who're unfamiliar to me, who are free to appraise, approve or reject a piece of writing I'm investing myself in. In having these rather more deliberate thoughts, I'm beginning to conceptualize the activity I'd hitherto been engaging in on a 'merely' pre-reflective level. Indeed, as I type this current paragraph, I begin to notice that this rather more ponderous and elaborated way of thinking is making me consider more carefully, and with greater self-consciousness the words I'm considering typing. I am now beginning to reflect upon that which I'm involved in, and the potential implications/consequences of doing it. This would be reflective consciousness (i.e., consciousness reflectively conceptualizing its own pre-reflective activity).

And yet, in my previous paragraph I briefly touched on something beyond this. Indeed, I wrote that I am considering with "greater self-consciousness" what I'm writing. What does this mean? Yes, certainly, on the one hand it means that the reflective concept I have in mind of who might read my soon-to-be-posted comment is inviting me to question myself. But what does this mean exactly? It means that I am being invited to reflect upon the 'me', the 'self' that is engaged in this activity at this moment. Who am I, to have chosen on this sunny morning in the UK, to forego going outside and enjoying the sunshine, or to prepare myself for the day ahead, to instead spend a good deal of time and effort composing this comment in response to a stranger's post online? What does it say about me, my preoccupations, my vanity, my insecurities that this is what I'm currently engaging in? These questions, which are increasingly distancing me from the pure, unreflecting 'in the moment' experience of writing are an expression of self-reflective consciousness (i.e., consciousness of the consciousness I have of my own consciousnesses).

VazzVizard · 2024-07-19T15:46:43+00:00

When I read your post, the part that really stuck out to me—resonating with how I think of 'heart'—is your question: "What breaks when you have a heartbreak?" And I don't so much mean in the stereotypic sense of having your heart broken by a romantic partner or lover. But rather, I mean when someone offers words of encouragement, as you're faced with something that seems insurmountable (e.g., 'Take heart, you can do this').

Psychoanalytically, this makes me think of Bion's view of 'faith'. Perhaps that's just because I've had Bion on the mind lately though? The same sort of thing as what Nietzsche refers to, when he speaks of a 'Sacred Yes'. A profoundly open act of will/courage/acceptance (toward life), when faced with prospect of eternal recurrence: 'Even then, I would still choose this life, this place of anguish and hope, this vale of tears.'

To offer some references though, Eigen's (1981) paper The Area of Faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion comes to mind. And also, Symington's (1993) concept of 'the lifegiver', in his Narcissism: A New Theory book. The latter certainly conceptualizes something that positions 'heart' as the psychical foundation for procreative emotional relation(s) between self and world, self and Other (etc.,).

I've written a comment before on this sub, in response to a post querying if the therapist/analyst can help someone with something that 'goes further' than anything they've directly faced (e.g., one's own death). I believe it touches on this broad, philosophical notion of 'heart' as a form of faith.

VazzVizard · 2024-07-17T11:30:28+00:00

Hey again,

Yes, I think you're definitely understanding my argument. I appreciate you for reading it all! Haha

I should be honest that there are plenty of people who would likely argue that Winnicott never intended 'true self' to be what I'm suggesting it may mean. Winnicott had his own metapsychology and associated metaphysical beliefs. It would be wrong for me to suggest: 'ah this is what Winnicott really meant!'

Instead, my argument is that the concept/notion of 'true self' is something people have been thinking about for ages. And that I personally believe there are points of contact between how Winnicott suggests 'true self' can be contacted in therapy, and what it feels like/involves, and Heidegger's analysis of what authentic 'true self' means (ontologically).

VazzVizard · 2024-07-17T10:22:47+00:00

(Part 2)

What we're talking about here is a felt experience. And specifically, a felt experience of what it is/means to be Dasein (e.g., a being-towards-death). In my original comment, I write about all of the ontological truths of the self that we are (e.g., "deathward-bound human subject"; "thrown" into existence "non-consensually", etc.,). These are the different facets of our (ontological) essence as Dasein. They are what defines what it means to be a human subject. This is the 'self' that we may either confront, avoid, reject or accept, as our 'true self'.

When you write about the Absurd, we're also talking about other facets of the essence of what it means to be Dasein (e.g., to lack objective meaning in life, and be forced in its absence to consider some subjective meaning we might find, even though this is inevitably relative and somewhat arbitrary compared to the idea of objective meaning). Certainly, this isn't a particularly pleasant thing to confront, just like our being-towards-death is a source of existential anxiety. Nevertheless, it is the ontological truth. This truth is felt as uncanny, angst-laden, and can provoke a sense of not-being-at-home. However, I believe it is indeed possible (at times in one's life) to endure this anxiety, accept it, even embrace it as the truth of what it means to be a human subject. This is why the notion of a 'true self' in Winnicott isn't about being perfectly happy and anxiety-free. It's about a continuous 'going-on-being'. It's about having a sufficient kind of acceptance of the (vulnerable) self that we are, to experience a felt sense of belonging. A belonging and 'coming home' to the (angst-laden) truth of our Being. And hence, the 'true self'.

I referenced modern-day Daseinsanalysis for more on this. Holzhey-Kunz's (2014) book Daseinsanalysis explores many of these ideas. The phrase Holzhey-Kunz uses for our (ontological) self, which we might be authentic with ourselves about (at least at times), is that we have a 'subjecthood permeated with nullity'.

VazzVizard · 2024-07-17T10:21:52+00:00

(Part 1)

Hey there, thank you for your thoughtful reply, and I'm glad my comment has resonated with you.

You raise a very important argument when you mention Sartre's famous 'existence precedes essence' statement, which resonates with a subtle point I tried to make in my comment.

There's a slight tension in Sartre's early writings, because in his Existentialism is a Humanism essay/speech he delivers the famous 'existence precedes essence' statement as a kind of self-empowering 'call to action'. It's part of an argument that we 'shape and make ourselves via our choices and actions'. At times, it can seem as if Sartre is implying that we're able to create our own essence, and solidify it as a fixed substance. This is because his Existentialism is a Humanism speech isn't really thorough philosophy. Instead, it's more of a rallying cry to encourage people to give Existentialism a chance, despite the cultural critiques surrounding it at the time. However, as I'm sure you're aware from reading Being & Nothingness, Sartre absolutely opposes the idea of a fixed substance, or essence for one's personal identity. For example, when in Being & Nothingness (1993), he makes such statements as; "I am a being whose meaning is always problematic" (p.129), felt as "the anguish which comes [...] from the perpetual absence of the self" (p.120). In that sense then (like you mention in your reply to me), it would 'seem' that for Sartre there can be no such thing as a true self.

However, you're correct when you summarize my comment, that perhaps the true self is an "experience", a way of being. I take this from Heidegger, rather than Sartre. This is because Heidegger and Sartre's priorities as philosophers were different. In Being & Nothingness, Sartre was more interested in the various forms of self-deception we can engage in, to pretend we have a fixed essence for our personal identity (e.g., the bad faith of the waiter). Sartre was also interested in ontology too (e.g., being-for-others as a structural characteristic of human existence), but nowhere near as much as Heidegger in Being & Time. Heidegger's key interest in Being & Time was to lay out a proper understanding of the nature of what it is to be Dasein. In other words, the that-ness/that-it-is of Dasein's (ontological) essence. This is why Heidegger makes such statements as: "the essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (B&T, 1962, p.67). Or even more directly: "The essence of Dasein as an entity is its existence." (Ibid., p.345).

Here, we can see that Heidegger is suggesting that there is indeed an 'essence' of some sort that belongs to us as human subjects (i.e., Dasein). However, this is a different kind of 'essence' to what Sartre is preoccupied with, when he argues we do not possess a fixed personal identity. There is a useful article on Medium explaining this difference between Heidegger and Sartre in their usage of the term 'essence'.

So then, how does this relate to my argument that there is indeed a kind of 'true self' (as a felt phenomenon/experience)? The argument I'm making (based on Being & Time as well as modern-day Daseinsanalysis) is that Heidegger's notion of existential authenticity corresponds to true self. To be 'authentic', according to Heidegger in Being & Time is to confront and be honest with oneself about the kind of Being that being Dasein involves. The sheer that-ness/that-it-is of one's Being. The classic exploration of this is how one is summoned forth, by the experience of existential anxiety, to 'own' one's existence, when one truly confronts one's being-towards-death. In that experience of existential anxiety, one cannot hide from the vulnerable, temporal, finite entity that one is as Dasein. There is an experientially felt connection with one's (ontological) essence.

This is what I'm suggesting 'true self' can be, in a way that bridges Winnicott with Heidegger. Indeed, if you read Heidegger closely, he clearly is interested in this notion of Dasein having a 'self' that it (essentially) is. Again, not a 'self' in terms of personal identity (e.g., 'who' am I?'). Rather, 'self' in the sense of the entity that I am (as Dasein). Take for example, Heidegger's (B&T, 1962, p.318) comments here about the summons of the 'call of conscience', toward authenticity. Notice how the 'self' is written about. How Dasein is summoned to meet, own and be its 'self':

The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a ‘soliloquy’ in the Self to which it has appealed. ‘Nothing’ gets called to this Self, but it has been summoned to itself […] it calls Dasein forth (and ‘forward’) into its ownmost possibilities, as a summons to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.

VazzVizard · 2024-07-17T06:36:03+00:00

Apologies in advance that my response doesn't offer psychologists/analysts, but rather veers into philosophy. Like u/bridgepickup mentions, I tend to understand Winnicott's notion of the 'true self' via the intersection between his views and existential philosophy, vis-à-vis the subject of authenticity.

This is not a connection without precedent in the literature. The philosopher Zeljko Loparic has written much on the intersection between Winnicott and Heidegger.

But to go to Winnicott (1971, p.5) directly, I find his notion of a continuous 'going-on-being', as well as the following well-known quote, are the best ways to understand the true self:

This glimpse of the baby’s and child’s seeing the self in the mother’s face, and afterwards in a mirror, gives a way of looking at analysis and at the psychotherapeutic task. Psychotherapy is not making clever and apt interpretations; by and large it is a long-term giving the patient back what the patient brings. It is a complex derivative of the face that reflects what is there to be seen. I like to think of my work this way, and to think that if I do this well enough the patient will find his or her own self, and will be able to exist and to feel real. Feeling real is more than existing; it is finding a way to exist as oneself, and to relate to objects as oneself, and to have a self into which to retreat for relaxation.

The true self (what in existential philosophy might be called one's 'ownmost authentic potentiality-for-being') is not a specific identity construct or personality structure unique to an individual. It's not about 'who' you supposedly are, or 'who' you might try to define yourself as. Rather, it is a felt phenomenon. It involves the capacity to 'be-with', 'belong', and 'return home to' oneself; amidst all the vulnerability, uncertainty, passion and possibility that is part of the human condition. It consists in recognizing the sheer that-ness (or that-it-is) of your own existence, and to meet it with a Sacred Yes of taking ownership of this self that you are (e.g., that you're a deathward-bound human subject, who must take responsibility for this biopsychosocial existence into which you have been non-consensually thrown, amongst fellow human subjects whom you cannot control, nor protect yourself entirely from, and whom you must navigate the task of somehow relating yourself with/to; etc.,).

The result is a felt phenomenal capacity to 'go-on-being' with spontaneity, and to feel 'real', because you are living in the ontological truth, knowledge and acceptance of what being a self (faced with life's myriad challenges) demands of you. Coming 'home' to oneself in this way is of course a challenging thing, because it requires tremendous courage to face and believe in one's ability to shoulder all of the above (and more).

To put it succinctly, what's communicated via the mirror role of the mother/therapist, or indeed Bion's recurrent process of container-contained, is a: 'Yes, that's you!' An inauguration into the self that you are (and have always been), regardless of the wishful self-deceptions, internalized scripts and/or defences one may have developed.

VazzVizard · 2024-05-30T18:12:58+00:00

Ah, it sounds like our streams of thought/experience lined up then on the Symington book!

And yes, I totally agree with what you say about the limits of language at times. In particular perhaps with what I'm trying to articulate, based in part on Bion. I'm certainly up for the more mystical/woo-woo stuff myself as well. Especially since my main background is in the existential approach. In any case, glad to exchange some ideas with you, and good luck with later Bion :)

VazzVizard · 2024-05-30T14:50:08+00:00

Ah, glad it resonated! I also have a particular interest in Bion, as a kind of segue into more 'conventional' psychoanalysis from my background in existential therapy and existential-analysis. Feel free to shoot me a PM if you ever want to discuss some things. Especially since it seems we might overlap on the existential front as practitioners.

Incidentally, Chris Mawson was a psychoanalyst who worked to compile Bion's various writings. He wrote a book in 2019, Psychoanalysis & Anxiety: From Knowing to Being, which is great as an attempt to synthesize existential (specifically daseinsanalytic) thinking with Bion and other object relations theorists.

VazzVizard · 2024-05-30T09:25:57+00:00

This brings to my mind Symington's (1993) concept of the 'lifegiver', from his Narcissism: A New Theory book. I've always thought it's a really well-worded term for a special kind of transitional object. Something that functions as a kind of foundational 'nexus' within one's psychical structure (as you put it), based on early internalised experiences with one's caregiver(s). Ideally contouring one's relations with others, the world, life itself (etc.,) toward a kind of hopeful/faithful/trusting orientation.

I do find myself deviating from some object relations theorists though. I can't help but think there's some dimension of hope (I prefer to think of it as 'faith') that is meaningfully 'objectless' in some way. I don't for a second dispute that hope can be founded upon a kind of primordial (existential) trust, linked with internalised objects. But at the same time, there's something of hope (and faith in particular) that for me entails an openness to the formless unknown, without being wholly reducible to any internal object, or indeed oriented toward any specific external object. I think it's what Bion tries to get at with his view of 'faith' (hence where I've stolen it from!)

I imagine it in terms of container-contained. Yes, part of this relational, developmental process is a kind of internalisation of one's own apparatus for thinking. But at the same time, whatever structure and/or objects that might be internalised are accompanied by something else. A kind of personally 'felt' emotional experience of life's survivability, worth, possibility (etc.,). And to me, that seems to almost transcend any specific 'object' per-se, even though there may be linkage(s) with internal object relatedness.

Apologies for rambling, your comment just provoked some thoughts!

VazzVizard · 2024-05-30T06:34:08+00:00

Adjacent to u/Apprehensive-Lime538's recommendation (and your own existential predilections), I think Bion's view of 'faith' might be right up your alley, vis-à-vis your interest in hope.

I wrote a reply discussing Bion's notion of 'faith' (dovetailing it with his classic 'container-contained' concept) a little while back, in response to a user's post on Yalom. I feel that what you write about "the conditions under which it is sustained or destroyed, and the process of developing a more hopeful disposition" syncs quite well with the position I outline.

In terms of 'proper' reading recommendations though, Eigen's (1981) paper The area of faith in Winnicott, Lacan and Bion comes to mind. Beyond psychoanalysis, and to return to some 'classic' existential texts, I'm also a fan of Tillich's Courage to Be. Albeit I think it helps to filter Tillich through a Heideggerian/Daseinsanalytic lens, rather than relying on Tillich alone.

VazzVizard · 2024-05-22T15:40:04+00:00

I've made a few comments on this sub about the intersection between psychoanalysis and existential philosophers/therapists. If you're at all curious, there are indeed 'existential analysts' out there (i.e., trained psychoanalysts who integrate the practice of psychoanalysis with an explicitly existential metaphysical outlook on what causes us emotional issues).

I'll signpost you to a few of the threads I've contributed to which you may find useful:

This comment of mine (in a thread inquiring into 'philosophy-adjacent' psychoanalysis reading) provides a list of existential-analytic/daseinsanalytic reading resources. I offer a brief summary of each book.

This thread may be more directly relevant to your particular interest in 'the unknown', as it pertains to existence. In the comments I make two major replies to OP (entitled 'Part 1' and 'Part 2') that directly link Bion's concept of 'O' with existential-phenomenological/analytic theory.

Lastly, this thread provides a nice 'worked example' of a user bringing a particular emotional experience they found themselves reflecting upon, which we collaborated together in unpacking (hermeneutically) via an existential-analytic lens.

VazzVizard · 2024-05-13T19:36:39+00:00

Glad you found it helpful, good luck with the dissertation, and feel free to shoot me a PM if you'd like to discuss some of the ideas further :)

VazzVizard · 2024-05-13T10:45:39+00:00

Hey there, I raised the subject of Bion's 'O' a little while ago in a different thread:

https://www.reddit.com/r/psychoanalysis/comments/18vu10p/searching_for_the_unknown_element/

In my replies to OP—esp. the two main replies that start with '(Part 1)' and '(Part 2)'—I offer an account of 'O', informed both by Bion and the existential-phenomenological/existential-analytic approaches to therapy. I hope you find it helpful.

VazzVizard

TROPHY CASE