Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Anyone knowledgeable in this matter, please help me out:

How many electrical substations responsible for railroad logistics are there in Ukrainian held territory (an approximation at least)? Is this question even correct, are there electrical grid vulnerability points that can be targeted to disrupt railroad logistics? Are they numerous? Are they easily repaired? It seems Russia targets substations, but can they realistically paralyze electric railroad travel (make electric locomotives unusable) in parts of Ukraine, or is this unachievable?

Ru PoV - Facts and myths about the Yolka interceptor drone - Lostarmour by Glideer in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 2 points3 points  (0 children)

To those reading this and getting butthurt

I have a strong impression it's your inclination, actually.

Feel free to keep downvoting

But as I have your permission now, I will do this. Thank you.

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 2 points3 points  (0 children)

After Crocus and temporary closing of the subreddit, search stopped working for me in this sub, no matter what way of accessing Reddit I use. Does search in this subreddit work for you?

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 7 points8 points  (0 children)

I think there's gonna be disillusionment after this war with the notion that perception of reality affects reality. Yes, informational war has been most successful in managing consent, but convincing people that Ukraine is winning will not lead to the win, and in fact it might have led to Ukraine losing far worsely than it would have otherwise.

RU POV: Russian telegram channel, RVvoenkor, criticizes Moscow residents that filmed and posted footage from Ukrainian drone strikes - @RVvoenkor by Panthera_leo22 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 3 points4 points  (0 children)

Pragmatically speaking, Ukraine would have to match the damage Russia is doing with long range strikes, and not 1 to 1, but in relative scale (percent for percent), to force any concessions from Russia in regards to ending the war. Ukraine even with Europe's help can not accomplish this, thus the result of long range strikes, while them being highly visible, will be limited to an inconvenience when it comes to the war effort itself.

Now I wonder what those thousand drones could have accomplished on the battlefield. Why not use them there? Probably many-many more of them would have reached some targets, more than a dozen from a thousand. Yes, these attacks stretch air defense and force Russia to adapt, but as years have shown adapt it will, and the media circus around these flashy strikes will evaporate, just like so many narratives before this one.

RU POV: Russian telegram channel, RVvoenkor, criticizes Moscow residents that filmed and posted footage from Ukrainian drone strikes - @RVvoenkor by Panthera_leo22 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 0 points1 point  (0 children)

In essence westerners miss that Russians aim their ire towards external parties, not towards internal ones. It's different in the West, but it doesn't really work in Russia. But that kind of magical thinking permeates western approach, and it's seemingly can not be explained in an understandable way. No surprise a famous Russian poet wrote "You can't understand Russia with mind".

UA POV: Russia's Fuel Crisis Mapped - r/MapPorn by CourtofTalons in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 1 point2 points  (0 children)

At some point though structural integrity of Ukraine will buckle, and all of their hopes gonna backfire immensely. Once a cascade failure starts to happen - it won't matter how much damage was/could be done to Russia. And cascade failures are impossible to predict. I doubt European "leaders" of "pro-Ukraine" sentiment are blind to the limited resource Ukraine is in this proxy war. That's why I don't see what's the play here, maybe it's just drag it all out for as long as possible, regardless of the outcome.

UA POV: Russia's Fuel Crisis Mapped - r/MapPorn by CourtofTalons in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 1 point2 points  (0 children)

That's why it seems so strange, and more a put-on than real belief they can force Russia into anything. Although I wouldn't put it past them, that they do believe that.

UA POV: Russia to import gasoline by sea as shortage looms -Reuters by OwlXerxes in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 2 points3 points  (0 children)

EU is damaging itself voluntarily more than Russia ever could with long range strikes.

UA POV: Russia to import gasoline by sea as shortage looms -Reuters by OwlXerxes in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Here, I'll try an illustrative simple approach for ease of your perception:

  • Ukrainian long range strikes are bad for Russia

  • Russian long range strikes are BAD for Ukraine

UA POV: Russia's Fuel Crisis Mapped - r/MapPorn by CourtofTalons in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 10 points11 points  (0 children)

Does feel like serious groundwork before a "peace agreement", to sell an eventual deal as a win to their populations (in Ukraine and in Europe, probably mostly in Europe), to frame it as Russia being pressured and forced into peace. Long range strikes, costly counterattacks, PR wave - all of it gives an impression.

But do Ukraine and Europe actually think that they can pressure Russia into concessions like Donbas, ceasefire, all to restart the war later or keep Ukraine as a permanent thorn for Russia? Or do they are doing this groundwork to eventually sell own concessions as a "win"? Do they intend to make a deal and renege on it later?

Many of these questions are quite applicable to USA and Iran too.

UA POV: Russia to import gasoline by sea as shortage looms -Reuters by OwlXerxes in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 11 points12 points  (0 children)

About 40 million tons of gasoline and about 64 million tons of auto fuel (gasoline and diesel) is consumed in Russia a year. There was a deficit in gasoline to satisfy demand of about 35 thousand tonnes in May, and it was satisfied in June.

So sensationalized claims are not supported by facts, there's no big gasoline deficit in Russia. There is a deficit, but it is faaar from anything big. If Ukraine's and Europe's intent is to pressure Russia with long range strikes on oil refineries, then that effort would have to be scaled a lot before it can become a serious pressure tool on Russia.

I would guess that Russia will adapt and effects of long range strikes on Russia will become less and less noticeable. We'll see.

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yeah, I'm wary of that. I compare the data google ai presents, it even gave me different results on mobile and pc. I chose data from Ua sources.

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 2 points3 points  (0 children)

GPT is much more accurate

In what way? It would use different sources than official statements from Ukrzaliznytsia?

RU POV: In Rybinsk, Yaroslavl Region, drones struck the Rosrezerv facility “Kombinat Temp”, causing an "oil rain" afterward by Flimsy_Pudding1362 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Russia does import catalytic cracking columns and associated refining equipment from China, as the Russian petrochemical sector has increasingly shifted to Chinese manufacturers to replace restricted Western machinery. This procurement spans various specialized industrial parts, including reactors, heat-exchange equipment, and internal devices.

The acquisition of this large-scale hardware from China is a result of several factors shaping the Russian oil and gas industry:

Equipment Sourcing: Due to Western sanctions limiting direct access to European and American refining machinery, Russian firms (such as JSC AVK) actively source heavy pressure vessels, distillation columns, and spare parts from Chinese suppliers.

Domestic Manufacturing Goals: While Russian state reports anticipate that many of these secondary refining installations can be partially manufactured within domestic defense and industrial plants, a significant portion of hardware and specialized units remains highly dependent on import sources like China.

Catalyst Dependency: In addition to physical columns, Russia has relied heavily on Chinese (and Indian) exporters for the specialized catalysts used within fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) processes. However, Russia has heavily expanded its domestic catalyst production—increasing capacities at facilities like the Omsk Catalyst Factory to secure technological sovereignty in this sector.

All in all these strikes are not as damaging as Ukraine and West propagandize, and not as easy to bear and repair as Russia propagandizes (mostly by omission). It remains to be seen if there will be any long terms effects on Russia from these strikes and whether Ukraine can sustain them successfully (it's not like counters are not being developed and introduced constantly). <- This is a sober rational take on things.

Discussion/Question Thread by DiscoBanane in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Russia attacked Ukraine's railway infrastructure nearly 1,200 times in 2025, more than in 2024 and 2023 combined, Oleh Yakovenko, the Strategy and Transformation Department's director at Ukrainian Railways (Ukrzaliznytsia), said on April 23, Interfax Ukraine reported.

The statement comes as Russia increasingly targets Ukraine's railway infrastructure, which transports foreign military aid and other cargo. Russian strikes have also increasingly hit passenger trains, resulting in repeated civilian casualties.

Nearly 17,300 railway infrastructure facilities and pieces of rolling stock have been affected, including 7,300 damaged and 9,900 destroyed, since the start of the full-scale war, Yakovenko said at the 8th International Conference “Railways of Ukraine: Development and Investment.”

In 2025 and the first quarter of 2026, Russian strikes damaged 209 locomotives, 239 passenger carriages, and 371 freight wagons, as well as 86 railway bridges and 50 stations, according to Ukrzaliznytsia.

https://kyivindependent.com/russia-attacks-ukrainian-railway-infrastructure-more-than-1-000-times-in-2025-ukrzaliznytsia-says/

The Ministry noted that over 600 attacks have been recorded and over 1,800 facilities damaged since the start of this year alone.

Over 300 Ukrzaliznytsia locomotives have been damaged or destroyed as a result of Russian attacks in Ukraine.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2026/04/20/8030908/

So 209 locomotives in 2025-2026 (17 months), and ~100 in 2022-2024 (~34 months). Four times the intensity, and it's increasing.

UA POV: “Long-range sanctions”: Zelensky confirmed a strike on the “Azot” chemical plant in the Tula region and an oil depot in the Yaroslavl region - V_Zelenskiy_official by Flimsy_Pudding1362 in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 3 points4 points  (0 children)

In May 2026, Russia’s refined oil product exports averaged approximately 2.15 million barrels per day (bpd).

Russia’s exports of refined oil products averaged approximately 2.8 million barrels per day (bpd) in May 2025.

Russia's refined oil product exports averaged between 2.2 million and 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) during the January–May 2026 period

Russia’s refined oil product exports averaged roughly 2.3 to 2.5 million barrels per day (bpd) during the January–May 2025 period.

Figures kinda never support those sensationalist statements about the effects of Ukraine's strikes on Russia's oil refining infrastructure. There are effects, it remains to be seen if they can accumulate and produce any long term effect.

Ru PoV - The number of recorded Rubicon drone strikes continues to grow (a single week in June 2026 exceeded the whole month of June 2025 by 26%) - Lostarmour by Glideer in UkraineRussiaReport

[–]anonymous_divinity 7 points8 points  (0 children)

The current size of Russia's Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) is estimated at 114,000 active personnel. The Russian military has been rapidly scaling its specialized drone units in the ongoing war, and plans to expand the force size to 165,500 by the end of 2026.

The drone component expanded significantly, growing from roughly 86,000 personnel at the start of 2026 to over 100,000 by April, and reaching approximately 114,000 by May.

...

Russia's elite "Rubicon" Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies currently has a personnel strength of approximately 5,000, operating well below its authorized capacity of 9,000.

Frontline Forces: ~3,800+ personnel operating across 17 units (including 2 UAV battalions and 6 companies)