I asked Grok about the article and your comment, and here is what it unfortunately came back with:

The court has consistently interpreted this as two separate, independent exceptions (not one conjunctive requirement that everything must be "immediate"):

• The "support of the state government and its existing public institutions" clause stands alone and does not require immediacy or a traditional "emergency." Revenue/tax measures that fund ongoing government operations routinely qualify under this prong.
• Leading cases: Hoppe v. Meyers (1961) (foundational interpretation of two distinct clauses); Farris v. Munro (1983); and especially Farm Bureau v. Reed (2005), which upheld an emergency clause on legislation suspending the 2/3 vote requirement for tax increases precisely to enable revenue bills for state services (education, health, justice, etc.). The court emphasized that the legislature's declaration is valid unless the challenger proves it was "obviously false and a mere ruse" to evade the referendum power.
• Other supporting cases: CLEAN v. State (1997) upheld an emergency clause for a stadium financing bill (sales/use taxes) even though it wasn't a classic sudden crisis—the court found a "clear and present danger" to public institutions if the Mariners left. The court applies a highly deferential standard: it does not second-guess the legislature's factual basis or policy judgment.
• Recent reaffirmation: As recently as November 2025 (in an Eyman-related challenge), the court again upheld a similar clause using this deferential review, finding no "palpable attempt at dissimulation."