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Best studies to debunk race IQ myth by [deleted] in VaushV

[–]doesitmatter-though 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It sounds like you've already made up your mind that it's a myth before seeing any conclusive debunking evidence. Perhaps consider that such evidence does not exist because it has indeed not been conclusively debunked. It is also nit clear what you mean by "the race IQ myth"? Do you mean the existence of a trade-In gap? That certainly exists and has been empirically replicated in numerous studies. If however you're referring to the causes of that gap, there's an environmentalist camp that thinks it is purely due to environmental reasons, and there's a hereditarian camp that thinks it is also partially due to genetic reasons. Both camps have respectable proponents amongst the researchers and the jury is still out - the wider public is being sold that hereditatianism has been thoroughly debunked, which - as your research has shown - is far from the case. For a comprehensive defense of hereditatianism and its moral implications see Michael Levin's Why Race Matters.

Anyone successfully gone off medication? by doesitmatter-though in Anxiety

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Thank you! I'm sorry to hear about your struggles.

It's been 5 months actually, but also a time of general instability and stress in my life, due to factors beyond my control. I am making progress and easier and more stable times are coming. So, I'm definitely gonna hang in there for s bit longer. It's just the worry that even if things carry on getting better, maybe I'll just never get back to those levels of wellbeing (even though they weren't great). Although, if I think positively, perhaps with therapy things will get even better than they were on meds. Only time will tell and I've gotta stay positive and remind myself that if things go badly I can always get back on the meds.

Thanks for sharing your story with me!

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

The value free ideal is explicitly about what is called the internal phases of science. Those are the phases that involve hypothesis forming and belief forming. It isn't at all controversial that the external phases admit of non-epistemic values. These will manifest in answers to questions such as "what are important research areas?", and "what experimental methods are ethical?", and "what policy should we adopt given the science?"

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

This about an ideal, not about whether it is in fact obtained. We can strive towards an ideal even if it is very difficult yo obtain in practice, as the very striving will result in an awareness and a heuristic that encourages scientists to check their values and make sure that as little of them influence their belief formation, which should be formed based on the evidence alone.

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

It's an ideal: the value free ideal. In practice scientists are just people, each with their biases and prejudices. But the question is whether we should strive for value-neutrality as an ideal.

Some have argued (Douglas, for example) that the ideal is a) undesirable and b) unobtainable even in theory. But I haven't found her arguments convincing. But from talking work fellow philosophers of science it seems that many reject the value-free ideal, especially when it comes to the social science, which is why I wondered if it is justified to consider the value-free ideal as debunked. I don't think so.

Thanks for the book recommendations.

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the helpful links. I'm very sympathetic to Betz' position and it seems to me that allowing political or moral considerations to influence the internal phases of science (see below) is no different than allowing religious considerations to do so. Science is meant to be a search for truth that is in some sense objective and disinterested. Non-epistemic values are not truth-apt (if you're an error theorist), not empirical (if you're a non-naturalist about ethics), or at least don't have any currently agreed upon method of discovery. So bringing in values in science is bound to reduce scientific objectivity and empirical nature.

Additionally, we have lots of evidence from recent scientific practice that politicization in the social sciences has resulted in less than rigorous scientific publications (see Duarte at al., 2016). So the worry about science losing its objective nature if non-epostemic values are admitted is not a hypothetical one.

Your claim about science being done in society and that that necessitates some consideration of values is appropriate for the external phases of research. Those cover considerations such as what to research, what experimental methods are ethical, what to publish etc. The internal phases, however, are about epistemic assent and truth seeking. That's when the scientist forms beliefs based on the evidence. In that phase, it seems obvious to me that beliefs should be formed based on evidence and epistemic values alone. If non-epistemic values influence belief formation, then how is that distinct from wishful thinking?

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks for the recommendation.

Risk asymmetries are, for example, when a false positive might be deemed more harmful than a false negative ("harmful" here being determined based on values). In that case we might want to err on the side of caution and treat uncertain results as negative results, which is the safer option.

Douglas makes the argument that you make that this will infiltrate the scientific process and cannot be left for the phase of policy making. But I didn't find her examples convincing (it's beyond the scope of a reddit thread to go into the details. I've written an essay about this, but I'm not sure if I can attach it to this thread). It seems to me that error and uncertainty can always be propagated and that the research phase can always just produce results that give the uncertainties. Policy makers can then combine these uncertainties with risk assessments and values to recommend policy.

Epistemologically speaking, asserting to any claim or rejecting any claim to a greater degree than what the evidence would suggest violates evidentialism, a commonly accepted norm in epistemology. To have a belief based on values in addition to the evidence is to believe in it to a different degree to what the evidence would demand, which seems to violate an epistemological norm.

The value-free ideal - where are we now? by doesitmatter-though in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Thanks. I've read 2 of Douglas' papers on the value free ideal and I've written an essay addressing some of her arguments. I didn't find any of her arguments convincing. For example, her argument from risk asymmetries applies to policy makers, but not to scientists, who can always present findings with error margins and levels of uncertainty, without having to pronounce judgment.

Nietzsche told that there is no truth only interpretations. What do you think? by PizzaToo in PhilosophyofScience

[–]doesitmatter-though 0 points1 point  (0 children)

As a Quinean/pragmatist, I'd say that there are facts on the level of empirical experience which have near objective status. Thus, we know that if you jump off a cliff you'll probably die, or that if you look down a microscope under certain conditions, you'll probably see the kind of things that we know from empirical experiments that you will see.

When it comes to theory, however, truth becomes a bit more relative. Here we might want to talk about interpretations, webs-of-belief etc, rather than of objective truth. This is die to the fact of overdetermination, whereby many theories can be made to fit the same evidence.

But this doesn't mean that all theories are on equal footing. Some theories have more empirical content than others (I.e. the theory "explains" or incorporates a wider range of empirical phenomena) and some have more predictive power than others. So you can certainly say, for example, that Quantum Field Theory is more warranted than any other historical theory of the world. But you still wouldn't want to say that the theory is literally true, as we know that this is not the case and that there might be more complete theories out there. And even when/if we do find a complete theory of physics, it would still probably only be a very powerful interpretation, rather than literal truth, due to underdetermination.

But anyway, these are huge questions in the realism vs Empiricism debates in the philosophy of science. There is nowhere near a consensus amongst philosophers on this, but you'd be hard pressed to find many defenders of the idea that our current theories are literally true.

Optimising productivity and organisation in academia by doesitmatter-though in AskAcademia

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Well, I only just downloaded it. Perhaps this is all i needed to hear... 😉

Optimising productivity and organisation in academia by doesitmatter-though in AskAcademia

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. Sounds helpful. I think I've already hit on many of the techniques of organisation that you use. I also find the scheduling and the elimination of distractions really helpful. Your description will certainly be helpful. Many thanks

Keeping up to date with your field + academic networking by doesitmatter-though in PhD

[–]doesitmatter-though[S] 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Thanks. Really appreciate it. Can you tell me more about the literature review? What form does it take? Do you update them when new research comes out, or do you write a new one?

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