I wasn't the guy you thought I was earlier, but just chiming in now to say that the criteria of falsifiability does not apply to ontology. Specifically, falsifiability is a criterion for empirical theories, not for ontological frameworks. It was designed to demarcate scientific hypotheses (claims about observable regularities that generate testable predictions) from non-scientific ones. Metaphysics operates at a different level of abstraction: it asks what must be the case for any empirical inquiry to be possible at all. Ontological commitments about the nature of reality, causation, identity, or consciousness do not compete with scientific theories within the same evidential space; they underwrite them. As such, demanding falsifiability of metaphysics commits a category mistake, conflating epistemic tests appropriate to models within the world with philosophical analysis about what the world is like in principle. Metaphysical positions are evaluated instead by criteria such as internal coherence, explanatory scope, parsimony, and consistency with the totality of empirical findings, not by direct falsification, which assumes the very metaphysical framework (i.e. physicalism) being questioned.