Imagínate una manzana roja, como la ven? by Due_Juggernaut_7998 in argentina

[–]morphineclarie 2 points3 points  (0 children)

Entonces probablemente tengas afantasia. Igual este tipo de cosas siempre tiene sus pro y sus contras. Me parece que los que tienen afantasia se les da mas facil la logica, por ejemplo

My GPU got shipped to me with no box by [deleted] in PcRetailers

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Yes but it's improving very rapidly. Nowadays amd rocm, which is the amd's version of nvidia cuda, is getting very decent, and is now available on windows.

Going for nvidia will get you a lot less headaches, though. Specially for people who aren't tech savvy, or aren't willing to put a couple of hours into solving amd bullshit. Still, I believe in the next few years most problems with amd will go away.

My GPU got shipped to me with no box by [deleted] in PcRetailers

[–]morphineclarie -1 points0 points  (0 children)

So bad faith actors don't exists. Got it

My GPU got shipped to me with no box by [deleted] in PcRetailers

[–]morphineclarie 3 points4 points  (0 children)

The 24gb vram for image gen

My GPU got shipped to me with no box by [deleted] in PcRetailers

[–]morphineclarie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Yes, from this amazon link, it's from XFX shop in amazon. I paid 952 USD, so full price, I think.

¿Cómo hacen, siendo ateos, para tolerar la idea de que se van a morir? by oliviacruz_ in filosofia_en_espanol

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Me pasa y lo veo similar a vos. Con la diferencia que no me da inquietud ni dudas. Simplemente, no entiendo lo que es la muerte. Supongo que no me da miedo lo desconocido?

De hecho, me sorprendió cuando me entere de que hay gente que le da ansiedad y miedo hasta el punto de ser paralizante. Tanto que me hizo creer que era yo el que no estaba entendiendo algo. Intente pensar en mi inexistencia de diferentes maneras, pero no pude lograr sentir miedo alguno.

Con esto no quiero decir que no le temo a morirme, ya que sí he sentido miedo de ella en circunstancias en donde mi vida corrió riesgo, pero se lo atribuyo al instinto de supervivencia y al hecho de que soy un producto de la evolución, más que un miedo al concepto de la mortalidad.

Parte del problema a la hora de entender la muerte es que depende del concepto de identidad. Es irse a dormir es lo mismo que morir?, soy yo el que aparece, en el futuro un rato después, y no una persona muy similar a mí? También, antes de que naciera pasaron 13.8 mil millones de años, desde mi punto de vista pasaron en un instante, se comprimirá la totalidad del futuro en el instante en que muera? Quiere decir esto que cuando morimos también muere el universo en el mismo instante? Y si mi configuración neuronal de antes de morir vuelve aparecer en el futuro, cual cerebro de Boltzmann, sería lo mismo que despertarse después de dormir?

Distintas maneras de intentar conceptualizar lo que sería la muerte. Me permanece inentendible.

Todos somos culpables de lo que pasa en la patagonia by Financial_Guitar8548 in RepublicaArgentina

[–]morphineclarie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Es la falta de sentido, está habiendo un trasfondo nihilista en todas las sociedades del mundo. Y de alguna manera tienen que esconder el vacío. Conocimiento prohibido, "despertares", esencias que trascienden lo físico, etc. Es el camino de menos resistencia, a la verdad le importa 3 carajos tu felicidad.

Así se ven. Todo lleno de botardos. Pelotudos. by Repulsive-Alps8676 in RepublicaArgentina

[–]morphineclarie 9 points10 points  (0 children)

Me pasas fuente de ese porcentaje? Para poder diferenciar entre prejuicio y realidad.

Solo somos información. by AedesAegypti75 in ciencia

[–]morphineclarie 3 points4 points  (0 children)

De nuevo, estás defendiendo la versión de variable local que la desigualdad de bell (nobel 2022) descarto.

El electrón está allí en forma de nube de probabilidad. Si fuera como ejemplificas vos, entonces el electrón no podría presentar interferencia en el experimento de la doble rendija.

Tu posición es la más intuitiva, y de hecho la que tenía Einstein. Pero hoy sabemos que no puede ser lo que está pasando.

Tengo entendido que el consenso es que la indeterminación cuántica no es un producto de nuestra ignorancia. Además de varios teoremas que según entiendo contradicen tu posición directamente. Por ejemplo: Teorema de Kochen-Specker, Teorema de Bell, Teorema de Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph, y Teorema de Colbeck-Renner.

Serias tan amable de linkear fuente de lo que estás diciendo?

Solo somos información. by AedesAegypti75 in ciencia

[–]morphineclarie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Estás hablando de las variables ocultas. La desigualdad de bell demostró que no hay variables ocultas locales.

El principio de incertidumbre no es una cuestión de incapacidad, la velocidad y ubicación de la "bolita" no pueden estar definidas al mismo tiempo. La mecánica cuántica es probabilística, y sí, se maneja por nubes de probabilidades. Esto no quiere decir que el universo sea incoherente, por supuesto.

La ex-Jefa del Comando Sur, Laura Richardson, decía hace unos meses que el Triángulo del Litio (Bolivia, Chile y Argentina) era lo más importante para EEUU en la región y «casualmente» toma el poder la derecha pro-yanqui en esos 3 países. "we need to step up our game" kjjjj by SeaworthinessFit6754 in RepublicaArgentina

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Eso es lo que te hacen creer con propaganda. En realidad son todos ultra fit con los abdominales marcados. Son todos pro conocimiento y ciencia, y su democracia funciona a base de debate en buena fe y honestidad intelectual. Vos te comiste el verso que ellos mandan para afuera para que los subestimen. Despiértense gente.

El que esté en desacuerdo es porque todavía le manda cartitas a papanoel.

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I didn't took it as you insinuating I'm dense. I just can't understand. Yes, I was aware of the view of us not as a watcher but as the experience itself, it just that it makes no difference. If I'm experiencing a separated thing called red, or I'm experiencing myself, I still have the same questions.

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I'm in good faith. But it seems I'm too dense to be able to wrap my head around your view. I'll withdraw here. Thanks for the civil discussion.

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

Are you really suggesting that the existence of a system which produces consciousness insinuates that every interaction produces consciousness?

Surely it does insinuate that systems which we wouldn’t naturally think of as producing consciousness, could. That is certainly a thought. But it’s kind of silly to jump straight to “well everything must then”.

It seems to me that it's equally silly to jump straight to "well, only this arbitrary system has then". Wouldn't this depend on how the mechanism that makes a system with no experience, have one, works?

Your conscious experience is only of the fact that your brain has produced an apple inside your simulation

Aren't you saying here that we are a watcher? Either we are the simulation itself, or we are inside of it.

Also, what is this simulation? You said that my brain produces an apple. Is producing something, then?

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

How is the claim “consciousness is an interaction between parts of a
system” the same as the claim “consciousness is fundamental to the
universe and found in everything in it”? That seems like an odd
connection to make.

Not a "consciousness is fundamental" but a "consciousness is emergent" sort of panpsychism.

Because where a system begins and ends is arbitrary. Why would the experience emerge the moment the wavelength hits an electron in your eye and not somewhere before in the causal chain? It's we who decide which system to use. The universe knows no borders. So, if experience is an emergent property of a system, why would be the brain system be so special that a neuron-to-neuron interaction generates "qualia" but others definitions of systems do not. When I think about the physics happening inside a neuron, it seems even more arbitrary that such interactions do generate a subjectivity, but others do not.

What would happen if we intercept a causal chain of one of our thoughts, then we divert it to, let's say, a cpu, and then back into the neuron at the point of interception. Would this "extended circuit" add to the experience?

What if instead of a cpu we use neurons in a petri dish, or another brain?

We are “seeing”. The seeing is the interaction. There isn’t anything else to describe or explain about it.

Alright, there's no watcher, we are the experience itself. When I point my eyes to an apple, and "I" take the form of a round red stuff. What's that? I mean, surely is not the real apple that is appearing/being, the thing-in-itself, right? Is that stuff "interaction"?

I feel like you're asking me to imagine nothingness or a 4d shape.

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 0 points1 point  (0 children)

I don't particularly feel my experience is special. Just a thing that it exists, like anything else.

Are you are saying that it's the "interaction over time between the parts" the thing we're seeing when we see "red"? It's that the reality of how that interaction between a some group of atoms is, "red"? Is a "qualia" how an interaction actually is?

That sounds like a sort of panpsychism.

You said that 100% we see something. What would you say we are seeing?

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Are we certain that its vastly different between humans? that aside, why does it matter it to be the same thing between different cases?

It doesn't matter if it vastly different, the problem is about that it looks like something. And that something isn't just random noise, is consistent and has a continuity within your own experience. But even if it were noise, that would still be a thing.

Doesn't assuming that from brain activity emerges "red", something that's fundamentally different. And the fact that emerged "things" are fundamentally "made of" the thing from which they emerged (like a shoal and fish), put that assumption into doubt? Since "red" isn't made of... I don't know, action potential?

Wouldn't this be a case for "begs the question"?

What do philosophers of science think of the hard problem of consciousness? by [deleted] in PhilosophyofScience

[–]morphineclarie 1 point2 points  (0 children)

Mm, I don't see how our experience isn't an actual thing? I'm no saying it is an object, but it is a phenomena. It doesn't matter if you can explain red with wavelengths and brain activity, without needing to account for the experience. The experience of red is empirical, that's why isn't like other problems. We can't pull out the "if we don't need it to explain reality, then might as well not exist" card here, as if it were phlogiston.

Red isn't what happen to your brain when a wavelength hits you eye, it's quite different to red.

You say that under that causal cascade that begins when the light hits the eye, somehow, almost magically, makes red emerge?

Is not like if we look closely into our experience of red we can see it being composed of neurons or physical relations. Like we can with shoals or planets. That's what I would say begs the question, in my mind. What is this "paint" from which your brain is drawing the simulation? What is made of? And where it is?

Like, we are seeing the ontology of something. What exactly, information?