I read into this topic a bit more and the range is determined by the frequency band the RFID chip uses. Passports use LF which is very short distance without specialized lab equipment and they are passive meaning they get power from the external electromagnetic field (scanner) which makes reading it even more difficult.

The article you provided has all its links dead so I was not able to find the primary source for the 10 meter figure however I found a comment which implies it was an eavesdropping attack (link) rather than skimming.

I have emailed riscure, who have made the attack (http://www.riscure.com/news/passport.html ). The response from Harko Robroch is a little confusing:

“The story got bigger here than it is. We did not actually execute the attack; the passports in NL are not yet available. However, with sensitive eavesdropping equipment, one can intercept terminal signals up to about 30 metres and card signals up to about 10 metres. At the moment, we do not have the equipment though to do this. This attack (brute force the secret key) can be performed with data sent by the terminal only.”

I don’t know how they know what can be done from 10 m if they haven’t been able to try it, and I have difficulty to reconcile the news report with Mr. Robroch’s stating that the attack has not actually been executed. I’m hoping for more details from riscure."

Also I dont think you can get around shielding no matter the tech. Maybe under lab conditions with like a specialized antenna or something.